

## ARISTOTLE’S TESTIMONY REGARDING PLATO’S PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT

Abstract: Aristotle’s views on the development of Platonic Idealism from Socratic philosophizing, are suspected by such anti-developmentalists as Burnet and Taylor, Kahn among others. They insist that such views were mere speculation based solely upon Aristotle’s reading of Plato’s works. In this paper I will refute such scholars by considering several points. After reviewing Aristotle’s testimony in his *Metaphysics* 1 regarding Plato’s intellectual history and explaining scholars’ interpretations of this, I will consider Aristotle’s intellectual environment in Athens as to whether he had access to those who knew of Socrates’ and Plato’s philosophical activities. Setting up a working hypothesis in which Aristotle’s testimony was based merely upon his reading of Plato’s works, without direct or indirect oral information from Plato, I will point out several details which cannot be refuted by such an assumption. First, I will take up Aristotle’s testimony that Socrates never engaged in the study of nature. Regarding Socrates’ nature study there are two opposing remarks in Plato’s works. This means that Aristotle had special information by which he could judge such remarks. Second, I will deal with Aristotle’s testimony regarding young Plato’s acceptance of Heraclitean flux theory. Since we are unable to unearth such in Plato’s dialogues, we must conclude that Aristotle had other sources of information apart from his reading of Plato’s works. Third, I will examine Aristotle’s testimony regarding the theory of Forms which belongs to Plato despite the fact that it is Socrates who puts it as his own in the dialogues. Fourth, I will take up Aristotle’s remarks on Plato’s thoughts regarding the participation of the particulars in the Forms. I will argue that they suggest Plato’s oral advice to members of the Academy. In conclusion, we must assert that Aristotelian views had a basis in direct or indirect oral information from those around him at the Academy.

Keywords: Socrates, Plato, developmentalist, unitarian, Idealism

### *1. Aristotle’s testimony*

Aristotle criticizes past philosophers from the standpoint of four causes in *Metaphysics* 1.3–5 and takes up Plato’s theory of Forms in 1.6 after criticizing the Pythagoreans. Accordingly, Plato generally followed the Pythagoreans, but “he [Plato] has the original points” (1.6, 987a30–31). Aristotle details Plato’s intellectual history in his explanation of Plato’s original points.

ἐκ νέου τε γὰρ συνήθης γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλειτείσι δόξαισι, ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, τὰ πάντα μὲν καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν·

Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητούντος καὶ περὶ ὀρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκείνον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἐτέρων τούτο γιγνόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὄρον τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός, αἰεὶ γε μεταβαλλόντων. οὗτος οὖν τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε, τὰ δ' αἰσθητὰ παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι πάντα· κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ ὁμώνυμα τοῖς εἶδεσιν.

For, [Plato] having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind – for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this sort, then, he called Forms, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by participation in the Forms that have the same name as they.<sup>1</sup> (Metaphysics 1,6, 987a32–b10. Square bracket [ ] is mine.)

Thus, according to Aristotle, the reasons Plato developed the theory of Forms were as follows. (a) He accepted Heracliteanism in which things in a sensible world are always in flux and there is no knowledge regarding them. (b) He accepted Socratic philosophizing to pursue the common definitions of ethical matters. (c) He thought that the objects of definitional knowledge must remain always the same, not in flux, since there is no knowledge about the sensible things. (d) Such objects are different from the sensible things and Plato called them Forms.

Regarding Plato's intellectual history, we should also take into account Metaphysics 13, in which Aristotle states the relationship between Plato and Heracliteanism saying that "those who first maintained the existence of Forms" (οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς ἰδέας φήσαντες εἶναι, Metaph. 13.4, 1078b11–12)<sup>2</sup> accepted Heraclitean doctrines.

1) W.D. Ross' translation in: R. McKeon 1941, 700–1. The citation of the Greek text is from the edition of W.D. Ross 1924.

2) In this place the proposer of the theory of Forms is said to be "those" in plural form while the proposer is Plato at Metaphysics 1.6, 987a32–b10. By using the plural form Aristotle refers to Plato and his earlier disciples, or intends to soften his criticism of Plato, as in Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, 1096a13 at which he criticizes Plato's Form of the Good.

He then refers to Socrates by stating that he occupied himself with ethical virtue and became the first to raise the problem of a universal definition (1078b17–19). Next, Aristotle says that Socrates did not consider “the universals” (τὰ καθόλου, 1078b30) or “definitions” (τοὺς ὁρισμούς, 1078b31) existing “apart” (χωριστὰ, 1078b30), while they [those who first maintained the existence of Forms] gave them a separate existence and “called them Forms” (ιδέας προσηγόρευσαν, 1078b32). Aristotle, at *Metaphysics* 13.9, 1086b3, states that Socrates “gave the impulse” (ἐκίνησε) to Plato’s theory of Forms “by reason of his definitions” (διὰ τοὺς ὁρισμούς).

Accordingly, Aristotle proposes that Plato developed his theory of Forms from both the Heraclitean doctrines and the activities of Socrates. Though Aristotle does not refer to Plato’s dialogues, it is logical to believe that the Socrates in Plato’s Socratic dialogues, who studies ethics and seeks for the universal definitions, corresponds to the Socrates in Aristotle’s testimony while the Socrates in Plato’s middle dialogues, asserting the theory of Forms, is the Plato in Aristotle’s testimony. Of course, the Socrates in Plato’s early and middle dialogues is the dramatic persona of Plato, but the Socrates in early dialogues seems to represent the historical Socrates more than the Socrates in middle dialogues. The problem is: to what extent is Aristotle’s above testimony trustworthy? Diogenes Laertius (5.9)<sup>3</sup> cites Apollodorus’ *Chronicle*, according to which Aristotle became a disciple of Plato from seventeen until Plato’s death twenty years later. If we accept this fact, then we are naturally led to the belief that he had a more intimate knowledge regarding Plato’s intellectual history than we have. However, scholars’ discussions hinge on this point.

## 2. *Interpretations by various scholars*

According to Aristotle’s testimony, although Plato made the objects of Socratic definitions transcendental from a sensible world, Socrates did not. Contrary to Aristotle’s developmentalist interpretation, the Burnet-Taylor thesis<sup>4</sup> puts forward a type of

3) Regarding the citations from Diogenes Laertius I used the edition by M. Marcovich (1999).

4) Concerning the Burnet-Taylor thesis see Taylor 1911; Burnet 1914; Burnet 1911. Ross criticizes their thesis in Ross 1924, xxxiii–lii.

Unitarianism (I call it Socratic Unitarianism) stating that the theory of Forms spoken by the historical Socrates in Plato's writings is that of immanent forms.<sup>5</sup> They state that Socrates' thoughts and activities depicted in Plato's works are historical<sup>6</sup> and he adopted Pythagorean mathematical theory of forms and applied it systematically to morals and aesthetics. Then, the Forms in Plato's middle dialogues are, according to them, immanent forms, not transcendental Forms. But, Aristotle's remark in *Metaphysics* 13.4 seems to contradict their view. As many scholars naturally assume, "those who first maintained the existence of Forms" in *Metaphysics* 13.4 (1078b11–12) refer to Plato who gave them a "separate existence" (ἐχώρισαν, 1078b31). But, Burnet and Taylor assert that "those who first maintained the existence of Forms" indicate neither Socrates nor Plato, but "the friends of *eidōs*" (τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους)<sup>7</sup> in Plato's *Sophist* (248a4). In this way, they attempt to interpret Plato's texts by using the Unitarianism of Socratic immanent forms while rejecting Aristotle's explanation and disputing the development of Plato's theory of transcendental Forms from Socratic pursuit of common definitions.

Ross<sup>8</sup> maintains that Aristotle's testimony is contrary to Taylor's (and Burnet's) view,<sup>9</sup> disputing their assertion that Aristotle's remarks on Socrates can be traced back to Plato's works<sup>10</sup> and that Aristotle did not do a critical treatment of what he had read in the works of Plato and the *Socratikoi Logoi* of others. According to Ross Aristotle had, besides Plato's dialogues, "the unwritten

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5) "The *eidōs* is immanent" (Burnet 1911, xlvi n. 2).

6) Cf. Taylor 1911, 55–7, 89. If the Burnet-Taylor thesis is correct, the thought, which Aristotle explains as "which in most respects followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities that distinguishes it from the philosophy of Italians" (*Metaph.* 1.6, 987a30–1), should belong to the historical Socrates. But, Aristotle speaks of it as Plato's philosophy.

7) They refer to "a school of mathematicians, half-Pythagoreans and half-Eleatic" (Taylor 1911, 87). Also, see Burnet 1911, xlvi n. 2; Taylor 1911, 81. But, in *Metaphysics* 1.6 Plato is nominated (987b7–8) as the person who, being influenced by Heraclitean thought and Socratic teaching, called the things which are the object of common definition and which are other than sensible things "Forms."

8) Ross 1924, xxxiv–xlv.

9) Ross 1924, xliii.

10) Burnet 1914: "every theory Aristotle tells us about Sokrates comes from the Platonic dialogues, and especially from the *Phaedo* itself" (127–8). See also Taylor 1911, 40–1, 54, 67.

teachings” (ἄγραφα δόγματα, Phys. 209b15)<sup>11</sup> of Plato, as well as “the whole verbal tradition”<sup>12</sup> in the Academy. Though we cannot confirm the existence of Plato’s unwritten teachings, it seems to be accurate that he had “the whole verbal tradition” during the twenty years at the Academy. According to Ross, though Aristotle criticized Plato’s theory of Forms, it is unlikely that he could not distinguish between Plato’s and Socrates’ philosophical views.<sup>13</sup>

Kahn<sup>14</sup> also rejects Plato’s development from Socrates. Compared to the Burnet-Taylor thesis, we may refer to his view as Platonic Unitarianism since Kahn asserts that Plato consistently held the belief in the transcendental Forms from the start of his writing. According to Kahn’s “ingressive interpretation” (Kahn 1996, 59–70) the so-called Socratic dialogues were written to prepare readers for his theory of Forms expressed in the middle dialogues. Kahn believes that Plato’s doctrines, which solve the *aporia* in the Socratic dialogues,<sup>15</sup> were disclosed gradually in the middle dialogues. Regarding Aristotle’s testimony in *Metaphysics* 1 cited above, Kahn says “many historians of philosophy have followed this account of the origin of Plato’s theory of Forms”<sup>16</sup> and he puts forward several arguments<sup>17</sup> to reject it, among which is the insistence that Aristotle’s report is “his own speculation, based upon his reading of the dialogues.”<sup>18</sup>

11) Ross 1924, xxxv.

12) Ross 1924, xxxv.

13) Ross 1924, xlv.

14) See Kahn 1996. McPherran, Brickhouse, and Brickhouse / Smith put forward different views. See McPherran 1996, 16–7; Brickhouse 1990, 95–9; Brickhouse / Smith 2003, 112–131, esp. 123–4.

15) See also Erler 1987, who thinks that the *aporia*, which is a product of innerworldly thinking of Socrates’ interlocutors, can be overcome through Idea-oriented thinking. Taking the same line Manuwald 2000 regards the final *aporia* in the *Laches* to be settled by the tripartite theory of soul, which presupposes the theory of Forms, in the *Republic*.

16) Kahn 1996, 81.

17) Kahn 1996, 81–2. According to him, (1) the only sure thing in Aristotle’s report is that “the theory of Forms belongs to Plato, not Socrates,” (2) there is no basis for Ross’ assertion that Aristotle’s report came from an oral tradition in the Academy or Plato himself, since (3) we don’t know the relationship between Plato and Aristotle, and (4) Plato does not suggest any readiness to speak openly about his intellectual development.

18) Kahn 1996, 83. Kahn thinks that “It is sometimes supposed that Aristotle is relying here on an oral tradition in the Academy, or even that he had discussed these matters with Plato himself. Such an assumption seems entirely gratuitous” (81–2).

McPherran and Brickhouse criticize Kahn. McPherran<sup>19</sup> asserts that there is much in Aristotle's testimony that seems unlikely to be from a naïve victim of Plato's legerdemain and that Aristotle was well acquainted with other *Sokratikoi Logoi* and was in contact with those who had known Socrates. According to Brickhouse's criticism<sup>20</sup> of Kahn, many scholars prefer a developmental rather than a unitarian approach.<sup>21</sup> For, a philosophical view of the historical Socrates is, according to Aristotle, different from that of Plato and what Aristotle regards as the views of the historical Socrates agrees with those in Plato's early dialogues. This argument of developmentalism supposes that Aristotle stood at a privileged position in which he was able to distinguish between the views of the historical Socrates and of Plato. But, according to Kahn, Aristotle had no knowledge other than Plato's dialogues and nothing else by which to confirm his understanding of whose views were in the early dialogues. But, Brickhouse asserts that (1) it is difficult to believe that Aristotle had no clear understanding, during his twenty years at the Academy, as to what the historical Socrates believed. (2) It would be difficult to believe that Aristotle could not discern that Plato's Socratic dialogues were written according to Kahn's ingressive program, during his twenty years at the Academy, and he had never asked Plato the role of such Socratic dialogues.<sup>22</sup> McPherran's and Brickhouse's assertions seem to be correct. But, their assertions seem to presuppose that Aristotle received direct or indirect oral information from Plato. I believe that such a point should be scrutinized more fully.

Let us briefly consider the skeptical argument of Ilting<sup>23</sup> regarding Aristotle. Ilting says that if Plato, in his youth, had accepted Heraclitean doctrines and kept them until later in life, it would be curious that there is no mention of them in his early works. He thinks that such a story, which he calls "Cratylus-legend" ("Die Kratylos-Legende," 384), is "a pure invention" ("reine Konstruktion," 385) by Aristotle and "explicitly false" ("nachweislich

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19) McPherran 1996, 17. Vlastos asserts the same (Vlastos 1991, 97 n. 69).

20) Brickhouse 1990, 95–9.

21) Brickhouse 1990, 97.

22) According to Kahn 1996, 83, Aristotle didn't have any oral information, direct or indirect, from Plato. In this paper I concentrate on this point.

23) Ilting 1965, 377–92.

falsch,” 381). Again, Aristotle says Plato accepted Socrates’ philosophizing in pursuit of common definitions. But, Ilting says what Aristotle thinks to be Socrates’ activities is in reality Plato’s philosophizing, since Socrates had not gone further beyond his grasp of “knowledge of ignorance” (“ein Wissen des Nichtwissens,” 386) in the *Apology*. This is due to Aristotle’s misunderstanding from the reading of Plato’s works. Ilting asserts that Aristotle, as well as other members of the Academy, could not distinguish between Socrates’ thoughts and those of his disciples (386) nor have a detailed knowledge of their master’s philosophical development (384).

If we speculate only from Plato’s works, we can think of other instances. Beversluis<sup>24</sup> suggests that “Plato held two antithetical philosophies at different stages of his career” (295), rather than development from Socrates’ philosophy. Again, we can also assert that the historical Socrates held antithetical philosophies of immanent and transcendental Forms at different stages of his career and Plato faithfully portrays them in his works. Considering the arguments of the scholars mentioned above, they indicate a common methodology. All of them, from a reading of Plato’s works, speculate the *realia* of Plato’s theory of Forms and denounce Aristotle’s testimony.<sup>25</sup> They seem to presuppose that the only source for

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24) Beversluis 1993, 293–313.

25) According to Gerson 2014, all the dialogues of Plato were written in the Academy (409), after he came under the Pythagorean influence in southern Italy near the end of his wandering period (409). Throughout his life Plato held “two-world metaphysics” (403) which was influence of the Pythagoreans. Gerson calls this “Pythagorean-inspired Platonism” (414). Thus he denounces Aristotle’s testimony by negating Plato’s “Socratic period” (403). His assertion seems to contain several weaknesses.

(1) Gerson’s evidence for the Pythagorean influence on Plato is Aristotle’s remark that: “After the philosophies named came the system of Plato, which followed these philosophies in many respects but also had its own peculiarities distinguishing it from the philosophy of the Italians” (Metaph. 1.6, 987a29–31. Gerson’s translation, 406). Gerson understands the word “followed” (ἀκολουθούσα, 987a30) as “was influenced by” (407). However, this only means that Plato’s doctrines have a lot of similarities with Pythagorean doctrines (and the philosophies before them).

(2) In his explanation of the “peculiarities” Aristotle says that Plato “from youth” (ἐκ νέου, 987a32) accepted the Heracliteanism and the philosophical activities of Socrates. The phrase “from youth” is used in the explanation of the peculiar points of the philosophy of Plato against the Pythagoreans and therefore refers to only the Heracliteanism and the philosophical activities of Socrates while Gerson includes also Pythagoreans (“Plato at least was influenced by Pythagoreans [the

Aristotle's testimony is Plato's works and he couldn't have had access, directly or indirectly, of Plato's oral information.

In this paper I will focus on the common view of those who doubt Aristotle's testimony. They assert that (a) his statements can be traced back to Plato's dialogues and that (b) his statements do not reflect oral information from Plato nor people of the Academy.<sup>26</sup> Thus, our focal point will be whether Aristotle's information was obtained only from his reading of Plato's dialogues. If we are able to uncover any of Aristotelian comment(s) derived from sources other than Plato's works, it will be enough to refute these scholars noted above.<sup>27</sup> I will first glance at Aristotle's human relationships at the Academy to determine the possibility of his obtaining oral information.

### 3. *Aristotle's intellectual and human environment in Athens*

We should briefly affirm Aristotle's intellectual and human environment in Athens. Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) came to Athens from Stagira in 367 B.C. at the age of seventeen. He lived and studied with Plato at the Academy for almost twenty years up until Plato's death (348/7 B.C.). He also taught while helping his master. We assume that such facts indicate a friendly relationship between them. Plato's remarks to Aristotle and Xenocrates in Diogenes Laertius (4.6) also suggests a friendly relationship among the members of the Academy. Plato continually said to a grumpy Xenocrates to take on grace and that he needed a spur, while Aristotle a bridle.<sup>28</sup>

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'Italians']," 407). Thus, Gerson thinks that young Plato was influenced by Pythagoreans. But this is contrary to Aristotle's text.

(3) Moreover, on the one hand Gerson says Plato was influenced by the Pythagoreans "from youth" (406), i. e., "early to mid-twenties" (407), i. e., before Socrates' death. On the other hand he says "It was presumably in southern Italy that Plato came under Pythagorean influence" (409). But his journey to southern Italy was near the end of his period of wandering after Socrates' death. Regarding the period of Pythagorean influence on Plato, Gerson's explanation is not clear.

26) Nehamas also thinks that the information of Aristotle concerning Socrates came from Plato's dialogues (Nehamas 1992, 168–171).

27) I would not go further into the controversy between Unitarians and Developmentalists in this paper, although I prefer the latter position.

28) Regarding the relationship between Plato and his disciples in the Academy, such as Aristotle, Speusippus, and Xenocrates, Cherniss (1945) asserts that they

There are also other members of the Academy from whom Aristotle could obtain information. I will mention only the well-known. Theaetetus (c. 417–369 B.C.), when young, became acquainted with the elder Socrates (Pl. *Theaet.* 142c). He became a member of the Academy and died not long before Aristotle joined (367 B.C.). He could relate to the other members of the Academy regarding the thoughts of Socrates, which Aristotle could know through them. Speusippus (c. 407–339 B.C.), who was Plato's nephew, was twenty-four years older than Aristotle. When Aristotle joined the Academy, Speusippus met him during Plato's second visit to Sicily (367 B.C.). During Aristotle's stay at the Academy (367–347 B.C.) Speusippus was always at the Academy except for a visit to Sicily with Plato (361 B.C.). It is natural that Speusippus took care of young Aristotle and taught him various things concerning the historical Socrates which he had probably heard from his uncle Plato. Xenocrates (396/5–314/3 B.C.), who became a close friend of Aristotle, was a disciple of Aeschines whose teacher was Socrates, and later became Plato's disciple. When Aristotle joined the Academy Xenocrates was absent since Plato had taken him to Sicily. Theaetetus was Xenocrates' senior disciple at the Academy. Thus Xenocrates could learn many things regarding Socrates and Plato from Aeschines, Theaetetus, and Speusippus. When Plato died, Aristotle went to Atarneus in Asia Minor with Xenocrates after being invited by Hermias, a former member of the Academy. Later (339 B.C.) Xenocrates became the third president of the Academy after Speusippus. The plausibility is very high that Aristotle must have also heard information from Xenocrates.

There were also Athenians from whom Aristotle could get information about Socrates and Plato. Aeschines of Sphettus (c. 425–

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(not only Plato and his disciples but also disciples mutually) had deep respect for each other (65) and thus Plato did not offer authoritative answers to disciples' questions regarding his doctrines but entrusted answers from their own ability and initiative (78). However, Cherniss' assertion seems to lack any basis whatsoever. Young Aristotle joined the Academy when he was seventeen and Plato was sixty. It seems unlikely that they formed such a relationship which Cherniss asserts. Again, Speusippus was the son of Plato's sister Potone. When he was born, Plato was twenty years old. It is natural that Plato talked to his sister's son. As a result, Speusippus became Plato's disciple. It is difficult to conceive of such a relationship among them as Cherniss imagines. Regarding the criticism of Cherniss' view see Ross (1951, 143) and Barnes (1995, 178).

350 B.C.), who was Socrates' disciple and of Plato's age, depicted Socrates' activities in his works. For example, Socrates in his *Alcibiades* is very similar to the Socrates in Plato's Socratic dialogues in which he made his interlocutors realize their miserable condition and encouraged them to pursue virtue.<sup>29</sup> But, Aeschines' Socrates never refers to the theory of transcendental Forms. Aeschines, who died two years before Plato, must have been familiar with Plato's activities in his prime as well as in his old age. Aristotle could gain information about Socrates from him. Isocrates (436–338 B.C.),<sup>30</sup> although he was not Socrates' disciple, was influenced by Socrates' thoughts as is clear from his work *Antidosis*. Of course, he could distinguish between the thoughts of the historical Socrates and Plato. All of them, including Plato himself, knew the facts of the matter. It is likely that Aristotle, who was keenly interested in the philosophy of his predecessors, wrote the testimony while getting information from them. But, in the next four sections let us take a working hypothesis that Aristotle wrote the testimony only from a reading of Plato's dialogues and without access to firsthand information.

#### 4. Socrates' engagement in nature study

I shall explore items in Aristotle's testimony which cannot be accounted for from Plato's works, but rather from direct or indirect oral information. In *Metaphysics* 1 Aristotle refers to Heracliteanism and Socrates' philosophizing as to what led Plato to the theory of Forms. Regarding Socrates' activities he says at *Metaphysics* 1.6, 987b1–4 that Socrates was (a) busying himself about ethical matters and (b) neglecting the world of nature as a whole but (c) seeking "the universal" (τὸ καθόλου) in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions. Note that Socrates here clearly points to an historical Socrates distinguished from Plato, since Aristotle says such philosophical activities by Socrates led Plato to the theory of Forms.

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29) See Yonezawa 2012, 490–500.

30) We can see Socrates' influence in Isocrates' *Antidosis*. Concerning this, see Brickhouse / Smith 1989, 7–9.

We need to compare the above to Socrates' activities Aristotle depicts at *Metaphysics* 13.4, 1078b17–19. He says that (a) Socrates engaged in ethics and (c) pursued, for the first time, the universal definitions. Note that the phrase (b) “neglecting the world of nature as a whole” in *Metaphysics* 1 is absent in *Metaphysics* 13. Considering Aristotle's assertion that Plato's theory of Forms was derived from Socrates' quest for universal definitions, his statement in *Metaphysics* 1 that Socrates never engaged in nature study is irrelevant to his main point. This seems to be the reason why the phrase is missing in *Metaphysics* 13.

This fact, however, is important to us. Socrates says autobiographically in Plato's *Phaedo* (96a), which Aristotle was well familiar with,<sup>31</sup> that “I was very ardent” (θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα, 96a7) in the study of nature “when young” (νέος ὢν, 96a7). It is clear, according to this autobiography, that he engaged in the study over a fairly long period since he says “I was often changing my mind in the investigation” (καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον, 96a10–b1). Thus, Burnet and Taylor assume that Socrates' nature study is an historical fact.<sup>32</sup> But, Aristotle, as we saw, says that Socrates was busying himself about ethical matters and “neglecting the world of nature as a whole” (περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, *Met.* 1.6, 987b2). This means that Aristotle decrees that Plato's *Phaedo* is not a reliable source regarding the historical Socrates' philosophical activities. If Burnet and Taylor as well as Kahn were correct, and Aristotle's single source of information is Plato's works, then Aristotle should have stated that young Socrates ardently studied natural science.

We should at this point take into account Socrates' remarks about his nature study in the other works of Plato. Socrates says in the *Apology*, totally denying his engagement in nature study, that “I know nothing at all” (ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίω, 19c4–5) and “I have no part in it” (ἐμοὶ τούτων . . . οὐδὲν μέτεστιν, 19c8). Saying that the old accusers against him accused him of “nothing true” (οὐδὲν ἀληθές, 18b2), he engages the very jurors at his trial as witnesses as to this assertion. Since none of the jurors had ever witnessed his engagement in nature study, he uses it as one

31) Aristotle cites directly from the *Phaedo* in *Metaphysics* (1.9, 991b3; 13.5, 1080a2), or, in *De Gen. et Corr.* (2.9, 335b10–16).

32) Taylor 1911, 56–7.

of his attestations. Moreover, Socrates in the *Laches*, who is nearly fifty, says that “starting from my youth I have longed” (ἐπιθυμῶ ... ἐκ νέου ἀρξάμενος, 186c2) to know how to form one's soul so as to be as good as possible. Thus, Socrates seems to have engaged in ethics from the period of his youth. It is clear that his remarks in the *Apology* (and in the *Laches*) are not consistent with those in the *Phaedo*, in which he says he became amazingly enthusiastic about nature study while young,<sup>33</sup> although there have been failed attempts to reconcile both remarks.<sup>34</sup> By saying that Socrates nev-

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33) When young, Socrates might have read the books of natural scientists. For example, Socrates himself says in the *Apology* that the books by them are sold at a moderate price in the *agora* (26e) and he shows his knowledge of Anaxagoras' teachings that the sun is stone and the moon is earth (26d). Even Meletus shows some of the doctrines of Anaxagoras when trying to saddle Socrates with the doctrines (26d). But, we cannot call Meletus and the Athenians who read their books natural scientists. Such ordinary peoples' interest is very different from the enthusiasm depicted in the *Phaedo*.

34) According to Ross (1987, 226) Socrates, when young, engaged in nature study but the Delphic oracle made him shift his concern from science to morality. If Ross were correct and Socrates had to have engaged in nature study before the oracle, Socrates should have gone to natural scientists to find a person wiser than himself, not to the politicians, poets, and artisans. And his topic should have been about nature study, not about virtue. It is more probable that he was searching for ethics before and after the Delphic oracle. Moreover, if Ross were correct, Socrates should have told in court that he had done nature study before the oracle but never after that. But he flatly denies it without designation of a period of time. In that case he turned out to tell a lie in court to avoid a death sentence. However, he didn't need to tell a lie since he didn't fear death.

Dover (1971, 68) tries to reconcile the *Apology* with the *Phaedo* by reducing Socrates' flat denial of his involvement in nature study to a plea that he never taught others nor discussed such things publicly. However, this is a distortion, since Socrates' disclaimer of engaging in nature study places emphasis on the fact that he never engaged nor had interest in it. That he never taught or discussed it publicly is a mere result of that.

Guthrie's (1969, 422) “impressive evidence” for the historical Socrates' nature study is the “congruence” of the *Phaedo* with the information from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (4.7.3–5) and Aristophanes' *Clouds*. But, Xenophon's *Memorabilia* intends to justify and glorify Socrates, since he wants to declare Socrates' criticism of higher geometry and astronomy as coming from his own experience, not his ignorance. The aim of Aristophanes' *Clouds* is to slander Socrates by saddling him with atheism. In the last argument for the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo*, Plato utilizes the old rumor about Socrates' engagement in nature study to heighten the dramatic effect of the work, and to add persuasiveness to the argument for the immortality of the soul from a new and safe causation which is superior to that of natural scientists. See Yonezawa 1991.

er engaged in the study of nature, Aristotle is tantamount to declaring that Socrates in the *Phaedo* is not the real one while the one in the *Apology* (and in the *Laches*) is authentic. The difficulty is why would Aristotle determine that Socrates' remarks in the *Apology* are genuine while his remarks in the *Phaedo* are not, even though both were by the same author. Of course, he seems to be well acquainted with Plato's *Apology* judging from his *Rhetoric* (3.18, 1419a8–12), in which he repeats Socrates's refutation against Meletus in the *Apology* (27b–c). If Aristotle had judged from these works alone, the information should have been equivalent. This means that he was not a passive reader of the works, but that he was an active one who could determine the reliability among them concerning the historical Socrates. We cannot help but believe in the existence of Aristotle's sources other than Plato's dialogues. Denying such a possibility, Kahn says that “we know nothing of the personal relations between Plato and Aristotle.”<sup>35</sup> However, we know certain facts regarding his relationship to Plato, other members of the Academy and the Athenians, as we saw in the previous section.

In view of the above considerations it is likely that Aristotle could deny Socrates' engagement in nature study because he had heard about it from either Plato himself or from other members of the Academy or those Athenians who personally knew Socrates. We can also take into consideration the jurors at Socrates' trial. Socrates made them “witnesses” (μάρτυρες, *Ap.* 19d1) to his assertion that he did not engage in nature study.<sup>36</sup> If Aristotle had suspected what Plato wrote in the *Phaedo* regarding Socrates' nature study, he could easily have got a contrary confirmation from them. Aristotle, when he said that Socrates did not engage in nature study, well knew behind the scenes, i. e., that the Socrates in the *Apology* was the historical Socrates while the one in the *Phaedo* was a figure of Plato's philosophical drama.

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35) Kahn 1996, 82.

36) Of course, there is a problem whether Socrates really asked the jurors such thing in court. But, I presume it in this paper.

### 5. *Plato's commitment to Heracliteanism*

According to Aristotle's testimony (Metaph. 1.6, 987a32–b1) (1) Plato, when young, learned the flux theory of the Heraclitean school from Cratylus and (2) held it until late in life. We can confirm Aristotle's latter assertion from the *Theaetetus*. At the outset of the work it is reported that Theaetetus was taken to Athens "barely alive" (ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις, 142b1) having been wounded in the battle at Corinth (369 B.C.). It is very probable that the work was written to mourn his death (369 B.C.)<sup>37</sup> and two years later (367 B.C.) Aristotle joined the Academy when Plato was sixty. Thus, the *Theaetetus* was probably written at the time or later when Aristotle arrived at the Academy.

In the *Theaetetus* we observe two types of flux theory and Plato's differing treatment of them. Those who hold a radical flux theory are called "disciples of Heraclitus" (οἱ . . . τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἐταῖροι, 179d7–8), and are portrayed as those who lack the ability to conduct dialogues (179e–180a), who shoot out enigmatic phrases while being asked questions (180a), with whom no one can reach any conclusion since they do not allow for anything concrete (180c). Thus, it is unbelievable that Plato accepted such a flux theory. But Socrates mentions, in the same work, a different type of flux theory (156a–157c), which explains the sensible world and sense-perception. According to this theory, "all is motion" (τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, 156a5) and there are two kinds of motion, active and passive. But, the roles of these, active and passive, are not fixed, but interchangeable. From the interaction of these two kinds of motion, two kinds of offspring emerge, "what is perceived" (αἰσθητόν, 156a9) and "the perception" (αἰσθησις, 156a9) of them. Thus, it is clear that this story concerns the sensible world. The theory says: "nothing is one thing just by itself, but is always in the process of becoming for someone, and being is to be ruled out altogether" (157a8–b1).<sup>38</sup> Thus, if we follow this theory, the common definition, which uses "to be," cannot have as its object the sensible world, which is always in the process of becoming something. If a definition is possible, the object must be the things other than the sensible world. But, this is exactly what Aristotle says in his testi-

37) See Guthrie 1978, 61.

38) Translation of Cornford 1935, 47–8.

mony regarding the formation of Plato's theory of Forms from Socrates' pursuit of definition and Heracliteanism.

This kind of flux theory<sup>39</sup> belongs to, according to Socrates in the *Theaetetus*, "very refined people" (πολὺ κομψότεροι, 156a3) and the interlocutor Theaetetus accepts it as an "extraordinarily reasonable view" (θαυμασιῶς ... ὡς ἔχειν λόγον, 157d10). Hence, we surmise that the older Plato held the latter kind of flux theory, which is distinguished from the radical flux theory of the disciples of Heraclitus. Thus, the latter half of Aristotle's testimony that Plato, in his later years, maintained Heraclitean doctrines can be traced back to the *Theaetetus*. Of course, it is possible that he heard it directly from Plato himself.

The problem is: how could Aristotle know of young Plato's acceptance of Heraclitean views and his early association with Cratylus, as Ross says that "What we should not have known from the dialogues is Plato's early acquaintance with Cratylus."<sup>40</sup> First of all, what does "from his (Plato's) youth" (ἐκ νέου, *Metaph.* 1.6, 987a32) exactly mean? Aristotle first mentions young Plato's familiarity with Heraclitean views and then his acceptance of Socrates' teachings (*Metaph.* 1.6, 987b4). Thus Plato had come to know Heraclitean doctrines before<sup>41</sup> he accepted Socrates' teachings. When did he become Socrates' disciple? Of course, at least before Socrates was executed, i. e., before Plato was twenty-seven. Moreover, according to Plato's *Epistle 7*, when he was twenty-two or -three, "I was appalled and drew back from those injustices at the time" (ἔδυσχέρανά τε καὶ ἑμαυτὸν ἐπανήγαγον ἀπὸ τῶν τότε κακῶν, 325a4–5) seeing that the old revered Socrates was implicated in the incident of the arrest of Leon by the Thirty Tyrants (404 B. C.). It is clear then that Plato was already a devoted disciple of Socrates at that time. This is in accord with the story of Diogenes

39) According to Guthrie (1978, 78) this theory "seems to borrow features from both Heraclitean flux and the atomism of Democritus." Cornford (1935, 49), Jackson (1885, 256), Burnet (1914, 196), Ritter (1923, 97 n. 2), McDowell (1973, 130) believe that this theory belongs to Plato, though Guthrie himself does not believe so (Guthrie 1978, 78 n. 3). I agree with the former scholars considering Socrates' phrase "the more refined people" or Theaetetus' remark "extraordinary reasonable view."

40) Ross 1924, xlvi.

41) Cherniss (1955, 184–6) criticizes Allan (1954, 271–87), who, denying the general interpretation, asserts that Plato's acquaintance with Cratylus did not antedate his acceptance of Socrates' philosophy.

Laertius (3.6) that Plato became Socrates' disciple when he was twenty. From the above it is most probable that Plato came to know Heraclitean thought before he was twenty. This is consistent with Aristotle's remark that Plato became familiar with the flux theory from his youth.

The next problem is whether Aristotle could know of young Plato's acceptance of Heraclitean doctrines only through a reading of Plato's works. One might point out the *Cratylus*, in which Socrates, jokingly using a strained etymology, is referring to the flux theory at 401d–402c. But this does not demonstrate young Plato's acceptance of the flux theory. He was not young when he wrote the *Cratylus*, which was written after the Socratic dialogues. Again, he gives a warning in the work saying "not accept easily" (μὴ ῥαδίως ἀποδέχεσθαι, 440d4–5) the radical Heraclitean thought, since it deprives "the beautiful itself" (ἀπὸ τὸ καλὸν, 439d5) of its existence and "knowledge" (γνῶσις, 440a6) of its existence since all things are passing on.<sup>42</sup>

Let us here consider Schadewaldt's view.<sup>43</sup> According to him the *Cratylus* is not one of early dialogues but it was written before the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* and after the *Republic* (631). But, the argument of etymology in the *Cratylus* comes from his association with Cratylus before his becoming Socrates' disciple ("Versuche, aus dem richtig gedeuteten Namen auf das Wesen der Sache zu schliessen," 629). The central part of the etymology, which is an attempt to search for the essence of things from the correctly indicated names (629), presupposes Heraclitean flux theory. Thus young Plato pursued something secure in the realm of flux (629). This argument, however, is, as he himself admits, "a hypothesis" ("die Hypothese," 629). He does not demonstrate that the argument regarding etymology in the *Cratylus* comes from Plato's early association with Cratylus and Heracliteanism.

We cannot infer from remarks in the *Cratylus* alone that young Plato accepted the flux theory, although Aristotle reports as such. We should choose one of two alternatives. (1) As Ilting asserts in his "Die Kratylos-Legende" (1965, 384), Aristotle fabricat-

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42) But this may demonstrate that Plato, when he wrote the *Cratylus*, thought that the sensible world is in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about it, as Aristotle's testimony notes.

43) Schadewaldt 1970.

ed young Plato's acceptance of Heracliteanism through a reading of Plato's *Cratylus*. (2) Aristotle heard, indirectly or directly, from Plato that he had accepted Heracliteanism when he was young. But, when Ilting prefers (1) to (2), he seems to presuppose that Aristotle as well as others in the Academy could not know the fact of the philosophical development of Plato.<sup>44</sup> But, from the observation regarding Aristotle's environment at the Academy the possibility is very high that Aristotle heard of young Plato's acceptance of Heracliteanism from Plato himself or people at the Academy.<sup>45</sup>

### 6. Aristotle's attribution of the theory of Forms to Plato

After saying at *Metaphysics* 1.6, 987b1–4 that Socrates searched for the universal in ethics and fixed thoughts on definitions, Aristotle states that Plato "accepted him [Socrates]" (ἐκείνον ἀποδεξάμενος, 1.6, 987b4) and thought that the objects of the universal definitions, which "he [Plato] named Forms" (ιδέας προσηγόρευσε, 1.6, 987b8), were not sensible things which were always changing, but the things "other than" (ἑτέρον, 1.6, 987b5) them. Again, in *Metaphysics* 13.4 Aristotle contrasts Plato (and his early disciples) to Socrates saying that Socrates did not make the universal and definitions exist apart from sensible things while "they gave them separate existence" (οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, 13.4, 1078b31) and called them Forms (13.4, 1078b32). When Aristotle criticizes the Form of the Good in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he states that the theory of Forms was introduced from his friends (1.6, 1096a12–13). The friends refer to Plato (and his earlier disciples). Hence it is certain that Aristotle reasons that the theory of Forms belonged to Plato.

If we suppose that Aristotle depends only on Plato's dialogues, the question arises: from where did he decide that the the-

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44) Ilting 1965, 384: "Die Kratylus-Legende ist das Ergebnis dieser Umdeutung, die beweist, daß vermutlich weder Aristoteles noch sonst jemand im Kreise Platons ein halbes Jahrhundert nach dem Tode des Sokrates eine wirklich genaue Vorstellung von der tatsächlichen philosophischen Entwicklung ihres Lehrers mehr haben konnte."

45) I agree with Ross (1924, xlvii) that this is an information from Plato himself, not Aristotle's inference from reading the *Theaetetus* or the *Cratylus*, since there is nothing which suggests young Plato's acquaintance with *Cratylus* in the *Theaetetus* nor in the *Cratylus*, as we have seen.

ory of transcendental Forms belonged to Plato and not to Socrates? It is regarded as a matter of fact that the theory of Forms belongs to Plato. But this is not as easy as it seems. The middle dialogues (the *Symposium*, the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Republic*) contain thoughts regarding the transcendental Forms, but they are spoken as Socrates' own in the dialogues, not Plato's. If Aristotle's source of information were only Plato's dialogues, then he could not help to have felt that the thought of transcendental Forms belonged to Socrates. Why would Aristotle declare that the thoughts expressed in such works are really Plato's rather than those of the historical Socrates'?

Regarding Aristotle's testimony Kahn says<sup>46</sup> that "the only solid piece of historical information here is that the theory of Forms belongs to Plato, not to Socrates." Kahn thinks that this is "a fact well known to everyone in the Academy." Thus he admits that Aristotle's information came from the oral tradition at the Academy. I believe that these remarks of Kahn are not consistent with his belief that Aristotle's source of information regarding his testimony is Plato's writings. It is not clear why Kahn could attribute this "fact" to the oral information at the Academy while holding that Aristotle's other testimony came from his reading of Plato's dialogues. It is not Plato but Socrates who asserts that the theory of Forms is his own, in the dialogues. Kahn cannot explain Aristotle's testimony that the theory of Forms belongs to Plato by attributing it to his reading of Plato's works.

But I believe I can give some explanation for this. In his First Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle begins to criticize the Form of the Good while saying that such an inquiry is "an uphill one" (προσάντους, 1.6, 1096a12). Aristotle's reason for this is that the Forms have been introduced by his "friends" (φίλους ἀνδρας, 1096a13). Nevertheless, Aristotle says that the lovers of wisdom should "honor truth" (προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, 1096a16–17) above friends. As Ross<sup>47</sup> has pointed out, it is natural to think that he means Plato (and his earlier disciples) as those who introduced the theory of Forms. Note the fact that he calls them "friends."

As we saw in section three, Diogenes Laertius suggests a friendly relationship between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle himself

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46) Kahn 1996, 82.

47) Ross 1924, xxxvi.

admits such a relationship when he calls Plato his “friend.” It would then be curious if he did not know his friend’s most important philosophical thoughts (the theory of Forms). I believe that he could not use the word “friend,” if he had merely read Plato’s dialogues. Aristotle did after all live and study with Plato for some twenty years up to Plato’s death. Thus, it is natural to presume that Aristotle knew directly from his friends, Plato and the members of the Academy, that the theory of Forms belonged to Plato, not Socrates, during a twenty year stay at the Academy.<sup>48</sup>

### 7. Concerning the participation in the Forms

Following the testimony (Metaph. 1.6, 987b7–9) I mentioned above, Aristotle explains Plato’s<sup>49</sup> thoughts regarding the relationship between the Forms and the particulars: that “the particulars, which have the same name (ὁμώνυμα) as the Forms, exist by participation (κατὰ μέθεξις) in them” (Metaph. 1.6, 987b9–10). That is, the sensible particulars gain their names as well as their existence from a participation in the Forms. Aristotle refers to what is stated in Plato’s *Phaedo*. In the section of “the second voyage for the search for cause” (99c9–d1), Socrates explains his new and safe causation, which is contrasted to the causes of nature scientists. According to him; “if there is anything beautiful” (εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν, 100c4) besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that “it participates in that Beautiful” (διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ, 100c5–6). He says he clung to it “simply, naively, and foolishly” (100d3–4).

Regarding the participation itself, Socrates says ambiguously in the *Phaedo* that: “whether by its presence (παρουσία) or communion (κοινωνία) or in whatever way and manner (ὅπῃ . . . καὶ ὅπως) may be” (100d5–6). And then he says “I [Socrates] will not further insist on this issue” (οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, 100d6–7) regarding the precise nature of the relationship between particulars and the Forms.

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48) Ross (1924, xxxvii) says that “It is natural to suppose that it was well understood in the Academy that Plato had in the dialogues sometimes used Socrates as the mouthpiece of Platonic and non-Socratic views, and Plato may very well have made this clear in his oral teaching.”

Aristotle's remarks at *Metaphysics* 1.6, 987b13–14, which follows the quotation (987b9–10) above after a short comment regarding Plato's *methexis* and Pythagorean *mimesis*, seems to correspond to this point in the *Phaedo*. Aristotle says as to the relationship between the Forms and particulars that “what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left for investigating on common ground” (τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξις ἢ τὴν μίμησιν ἣτις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν, 987b13–14). Thus, Aristotle says that Plato did not articulate clearly regarding the nature of the relationship between the Forms and particulars and left it open for investigation. The phrases “in whatever way and manner may be” in *Phaedo* 100d5–6 and “what (the participation or the imitation of the Forms) could be” in *Metaphysics* 1.6, 987b13 both indicate Plato's ambiguity regarding the relationship between the Forms and particulars. While Plato says in the *Phaedo* that “I will not further insist on this issue” (100d6–7),<sup>50</sup> Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics* that “they left [this issue] for investigating on the common ground” (987b14). I feel some gap between the remark that “I [Plato] will not further insist on this issue” in the *Phaedo* and the remark in the *Metaphysics* that “they [= Plato] left the problem for the investigation on the common ground” regarding the issue of the exact nature of the *methexis*. Plato says merely that he does not further investigate this issue. But, Aristotle says Plato left the problem to be investigated on the common ground. But Plato could not expect people, who he did not know, to investigate this problem on the common ground. Rather, I believe he expected his acquaintances, that is, his disciples, to investigate this problem “on the common ground,” i. e., jointly in the Academy. Again, the word “left” (ἀφεῖσαν) seems to mean “confided to” or “entrusted to.”

Here we should consider Plato's method of educating his disciples. Plato's contemporary comic poet Epicrates, through the mouth of one of his characters who saw Plato's activities in the Academy, reports in his comedy that Plato “very mildly encouraged” (μάλᾳ πρόως . . . ἐπέταξ)<sup>51</sup> the deadlocked younger disciples

49) Cf. οὗτος, *Metaph.* 1.6, 987b7.

50) This problem is treated in detail in *Parmenides* 130e ff. but, as Ross (1924, 165) says, “no positive solution is left in possession and the question may fairly be said to be left open.”

51) *Epikrates*, frg. 10(11),33–34 K.-A.

to define again the pumpkin from the start. Though this remark is part of Epicrates' comedy, it contains no mockery nor sarcasm but is a report from an eyewitness. But Cherniss does not regard this scene as evidence for Plato's activity in the Academy. He says that the scene is "a patent imitation"<sup>52</sup> of a similar scene in Socrates' school (*Phrontisterion*) in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (188–191) and no one believes that Socrates' activity depicted in Aristophanes' comedy is an historical fact. But the scene of Socrates' school contains bawdy and bizarre remarks of the characters while the scene of Epicrates' comedy does not contain such. Rather, Plato's warm and calm character as an educator is evident. Again, we can know from the report of Simplicius that Plato's usual way of teaching was "giving a problem" (ἀποδιδούς πρόβλημα)<sup>53</sup> to the senior disciples. Hence, it is sure that Plato's way of educating students in the Academy is to encourage and assign them to solving problems.

In light of the above, Aristotle seems to suggest in his testimony: "[Plato] left the problem for the investigation on the common ground" that Plato orally gave him and other disciples advice or encouragement to investigate together the nature of participation, although Plato merely says in the *Phaedo* that he himself will not scrutinize the issue. We can thus infer that Aristotle had direct or indirect oral contact with Plato.

### 8. Conclusion

Aristotle's testimony regarding Plato's theory of Forms as a development from Heracliteanism and Socratic philosophizing is opposed by various scholars today. They assert that Aristotle's testimony came from merely a reading of Plato's dialogues and cannot be regarded as independent evidence. After explaining Aristotle's testimony and the interpretations of various present day scholars, I examined Aristotle's intellectual and personal environment in the Academy, where he was surrounded by various others who knew the truth. I pointed out that there is enough of a possibility that he could have known the intellectual history of his master from such people, if he so wished. I set up a working hypothesis in

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52) Cherniss 1980, 63.

53) Simplicius, in Cael. 493, 1–2. See Heiberg 1783.

which Aristotle could not have experienced oral information regarding the thoughts of Socrates and Plato in the Academy and wrote the testimony from only a reading of Plato's dialogues. Yet there definitely appear items which cannot be traced back to Plato's works. Plato states contradictory things as to Socrates' engagement in nature study in the *Phaedo* and in the *Apology*. Though Aristotle knows of both descriptions, he denies Socrates' engagement in nature study in the former work. Such a conclusion cannot be merely from a reading of Plato's works alone, which give contradictory views. It is more probable that he had information from Plato, the members of the Academy, or other acquaintances. Again, we cannot infer from Plato's works what Aristotle states concerning young Plato's acceptance of Heraclitean views. We are obliged to believe that Aristotle had oral information other than through the works alone. Moreover, we cannot unequivocally say, only from the dialogues, that the theory of transcendental Forms, which is spoken through the mouth of Socrates, belongs to Plato himself. From Plato's works we can only presume that Socrates, who sought for common definitions in ethics, came to arrive at the theory of transcendental Forms since he is the protagonist of such works. Aristotle seems to have achieved such information about the authorship of the theory from his close relationship to Plato. Though Plato does not make the nature of *methexis* clear in the *Phaedo*, Aristotle suggests that he advised his students to investigate the issue in the Academy. This can be understood from Plato's usual way of teaching at the Academy and indicates the possibility of Aristotle's gaining oral information from Plato.

The relationship guessed at by modern scholars, in which the members of the Academy only read their master's works without receiving direct or indirect oral information, is not evident at all. If such were the case, I believe Aristotle need not have stayed at the Academy for twenty years and he could not have called his master a "friend."

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