

ARISTOTLE AND ARIUS DIDYMUS ON HOUSEHOLD AND ΠΟΛΙΣ

Newman noted long ago that although Aristotle was witness to the rise of Macedonia “[f]or all that appears to the contrary in its pages, the Politics may have been written while Thebes was still the leading power. Not a particle of Aristotle’s attention is diverted from the πόλις to the ἔθνος.”¹ The πόλις remained central to his thought. As a result, Aristotle bequeathed to his followers in the world after Alexander, and especially in the centuries which saw the rise of Rome, a number of difficult philosophical and practical problems. While remaining central in many ways to the cultural and social life of Greeks (and of other peoples) it became increasingly difficult to make a convincing case for the political and social centrality of the πόλις as maintained in Aristotle’s philosophy of the state. Apart from challenges from the world of politics and international affairs, there were also philosophical and purely social challenges that needed to be met. Stoicism, in particular, with its doctrine of social οἰκείωσις, the theory explaining the relationship of individuals to family, kin, fellow citizens and the rest of humankind, offered an attractive alternative to Aristotle’s restricted emphasis on the πόλις. Already in the works of Theophrastus and in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* we can see a shift in doctrine.

Our sources for Aristotelian political theory in the period after Alexander are extremely limited, and it is not before the age of Augustus that we have anything like an overview. From this time there is the *Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics and Politics* found in the florilegist Stobaeus, authored by Augustus’ court philosopher and confidant, Arius Didymus.²

1) W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford 1887) 1.477–478.

2) First given evidentiary support, following earlier leads, by A. Meineke, *Zu Stobaeus*, *Zeitschrift für Gymnasialwesen* 13 (1859) 363–365; accepted by H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879) 69 f., and reaffirmed by D. E. Hahm, *The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus*, in *ANRW II.36.4* (1990) 2935–3055. More recently

The brief summary of the *Politics* found in the *Epitome* reveals a number of significant modifications in Aristotelian doctrine. These are to be found primarily in the description of the relationship of household to πόλις, and of the relationships within the household itself where in place of the strict hierarchy of Aristotle there is a new emphasis on mutuality between the spouses and a softening of the master/slave relationship. It is remarkable that of the five pages that the *Epitome* devotes to the *Politics*, two of them deal with these topics.

Although the *Epitome* is generally considered to be the work of Arius Didymus himself, it is not clear how many of the deviations from Aristotle that we find there are due to Arius himself, and how many might have been introduced by others working in the peripatetic tradition and which Arius found already elaborated in the handbooks which are thought to have been his sources.³ While this issue cannot be satisfactorily decided because of the lack of evidence, it does not affect the value of the *Epitome* which lies in its testimony to the modifications of Aristotle's theory of the state which were circulating in the first century B. C. and the first century A. D. Essentially what the *Epitome* tells us is that Arius (or his predecessors) thought that it was necessary to make changes in some of the most fundamental aspects of Aristotle's political theory in order to bring it into conformity with contemporary political and social realities. This paper is aimed primarily at examining the nature of these changes and not whether Arius is ultimately responsible for them. The use of the term 'Arius' is not meant to imply that in all cases where the term occurs we are actually dealing with the opinions of Arius rather than those of his predecessors.

T. Göransson, *Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus* (Göteborg 1995), has challenged the identification, but the traditional position has been reaffirmed by B. Inwood in his review of Göransson, *BMCRCR* 95.12.8 (1995) (electronic) = 7 (1996) 25–30, and by A. J. Pomeroy (ed.) *Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics* (Atlanta 1999) 2. On Arius see E. Rawson, *Roman rulers and the Philosophic Adviser*, in M. Griffin and J. Barnes, *Philosophia Togata* 1 (Oxford 1989) 234–237; 243–245; 253.

3) For the Aristotelian tradition see P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias* (Berlin 1973); H. B. Gottschalk, *Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century A. D.*, *ANRW* II.36.2 (1987) 1079–1174. Arius' sources were a number of late Peripatetic compendia; Moraux, *ibid.* 438–443; Hahm (above note 2) 2981; contra C. Lord who thinks Arius had direct access to Andronicus' edition of the *Politics* in: *The Early History of the Aristotelian Corpus*, *TAPA* 107 (1986) 141 n. 9.

I. *The household according to Arius*

The section of Arius' Peripatetic *Epitome* dealing with household management and politics (Stobaeus 2.147.26–152.25), has usually been thought to be closer to Aristotle than the longer ethical part (116.19–147.25).⁴ The differences, however, are significant. Arius' style is often characterized, as it is here, by staccato juxtaposing of more or less interrelated theses.⁵ Those proposed by Arius on household management and politics are compressed and complex, and their arrangement often involves a considerable degree of subtlety. Information is presented incrementally, with a minimum of argument. Sometimes what looks like a forthright statement of doctrine is subsequently modified – or virtually negated – by what follows.

The division on the household breaks down into two theses regarding households:

- A. Household I:
 - (a) First definition of the household (148.5–7)
 - (b) The household as source of the πόλις (148.7–13)
 - (c) The household as model for constitutions (148.13–19)
- B. Household II:
 - (a) Second definition of the household (148.19–149.11)
 - (b) Wealth-getting (149.11–23)

After a general introduction asserting that man is by nature a political animal, Arius presents the first two subtheses of Section A (148.5–13) as follows:

4) Citations in Moraux (above note 3) 1.419. Cf. M. Pohlenz, Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie (Göttingen 1940) 38 and n. 2. The most detailed discussion of the household and political sections is provided by Moraux, but see also Gottschalk (above note 3) 1125; 1127–1129; more briefly, M. Giusta, I dossografi di etica (Turin 1967) 2.522–523; 530–531. All page references to Arius are from Wachsmuth's 1884 edition of Stobaeus.

5) The theses are at times linked systematically in elaborate divisions, cf. the comments in this regard of D. E. Hahm, A. A. Long, R. W. Sharples in W. W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus* (New Brunswick/London 1983). There are exceptions to this as the well known, extended discussion of οἰκείωσις in the *Peripatetic Epitome* demonstrates; Moraux (above note 3) 437–438.

(a) The first association is the union according to custom of husband and wife for the purpose of raising children and sharing life in common. And this union is called a household; (b) it is the source of the πόλις. Regarding this last point the following needs to be said. The household is, in fact, like a kind of small city if, at least as one would wish, the marriage increases and leads to children, and they, coupling with one another, another household is brought into existence; then a third and a fourth. From these comes a village and, [finally], a state, for when a number of villages come into existence a πόλις is produced.⁶

To take the differences between Arius and Aristotle in order we have the following:

1) When Aristotle first introduces the subject of the household he emphasizes that it consists of two distinct subcommunities or relationships, that of husband and wife, and that of master and slave. From the combination of these two communities the first household (οἰκία πρώτη, 1252b10) results. Later he repeats and elaborates this into a principle: In its perfected form the household is made up of free and unfree parts (οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων συνέστηκεν, 1253b4). The πόλις for Aristotle is a σύνθετον or a σύνθεσις, an example of a class of natural entities that are composites, wholes made up of uncompounded elements, ἀσύνθετα.⁷ By themselves the parts – the household and the village – lack complete autarky. Full self-sufficiency is achieved only

6) Πολιτεία δὲ πρώτη σύνοδος ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς κατὰ νόμον ἐπὶ τέκνων γεννήσει καὶ βίου κοινωνία. Τοῦτο δὲ προσονομάζεται μὲν οἶκος, ἀρχὴ δὲ πόλεως ἔστι· περὶ οὗ δὴ καὶ λεκτέον. Μικρὰ γάρ τις ἔοικεν εἶναι πόλις ὁ οἶκος, εἴ γε κατ' εὐχὴν ἀυξομένου τοῦ γάμου καὶ τῶν παίδων ἐπιδιδόντων καὶ συνδυαζομένων ἀλλήλοις ἕτερος οἶκος ὑφίσταται καὶ τρίτος οὕτω καὶ τέταρτος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων κώμη καὶ πόλις. Πλειόνων γὰρ γενομένων κωμῶν πόλις ἀπετελέσθη.

7) 1252a19–20; 1253a20; 1254a25–30; 1262b10–20; 1276b6; 1328a21 f. “The State is ... a Whole composed of parts ... not a μίξις or a κρᾶσις in which the mingled elements vanish, replaced by a new entity, the result of the mixture; still less is it a σύμφυσις ...: it is, on the contrary, a σύνθεσις ... , an union in a compound form of uncompounded elements (ἀσύνθετα), which continue to subsist as elements or parts within the compound Whole.” Newman (above note 1) 1.43; 64–66; cf. R. Brandt, Untersuchungen zur politischen Philosophie des Aristoteles, Hermes 102 (1974) 191–192; R. G. Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory (Oxford 1977) 28 f.; E. Schütrumpf, Die Analyse der Polis durch Aristoteles (Amsterdam 1980) 28 f.; 165–168; W. J. Booth, Politics and the Household. A Commentary on Aristotle's Politics Book One, History of Political Thought 2 (1981) 215–216; 224–225; A. Kamp, Die politische Philosophie des Aristoteles und ihre metaphysischen Grundlagen (Münich 1985) 95 f.; 110 f.; G. Seel, Die Rechtfertigung von Herrschaft in der ‘Politik’ des Aristoteles, Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’, in: Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum, ed. G. Patzig (Göttingen 1990) 34–38, with references.

when the parts come together in their natural end, the state (1252b28–30).⁸

Arius, on the other hand, provides no analysis of this type. On the contrary, the household is the association of husband and wife alone; there is no mention of the master and slave association. The syntax seems to underline this when, after defining marriage as the union of man and woman, Arius goes on to add: “And this [union] of man and wife is called a household, the origin of the state.” Analysis of the role of the unfree and of mutual benefit is postponed to thesis B where it is presented in a different context and with no direct reference to the genesis of the πόλις. Thus, in Arius’ definition of the household there are no parts, no natural hierarchy, no autarky, no teleology.⁹

2) Nothing is said, at least in the *Politics*, about a shared life as one of the aims of marriage (Arius’ βίου κοινωνία).¹⁰ For Arius, marriage is a σύνοδος κατὰ νόμον, a formula Moraux regards as un-Aristotelian.¹¹ For the Aristotle of *Politics* 1.1, marriage comes about out of necessity (1252a26–30).

3) Arius asserts that the household is the source (ἀρχή) of the πόλις. In subthesis (c) under A (above), Arius claims that just as households provide the seed for the generation of cities, so they perform a similar function for constitutions. Thus source in this con-

8) Cf. also 1280b33–35: “A state is a partnership (κοινωνία) of families and of clans in living well, and its object is a full and independent life (ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκειας)”; and 1280b40–1281a1: “A state (πόλις) is the partnership of clans and villages in a full and independent life which in our view constitutes a happy and noble life (τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς)”. All translations of Aristotle are from H. Rackham (Loeb series) unless otherwise noted. Discussion of autarky in connection with the πόλις in Arius is postponed to the discussion of politics, 150.1–10.

9) It might be argued that Arius is compressing his material so greatly he has no time to elaborate on these Aristotelian refinements. I do not believe this is the case. Rather, as I hope will become clear, the choice of terms and their formulation by Arius is deliberate and precise.

10) The shared life is, of course, the subject of Aristotle’s discussion in NE 1162a16–27, but under a different heading, φιλία, not under the rubric of what constitutes a πόλις. Cf. Xen. Oec. 1–10 and commentary by S. B. Pomeroy, *Xenophon: Oeconomicus* (Oxford 1994). Φιλία is discussed in the Stoic section of Stobaeus (attributed to Arius) at 74.3–4 where it is defined as βίου κοινωνία. By the first century marriage as a shared life was commonplace, see D. L. Balch, *Let Wives be Submissive* (Atlanta 1981) and idem, *Neopythagorean Moralists and the New Testament Household Codes*, ANRW II.26.1 (1992) 380–411.

11) Moraux (above note 3) 419 n. 321.

text is equated to seed. One seed, i. e. one family, produces another which generates another until first a village is formed, and then a πόλις. In this scenario the πόλις would be an historical, biological aggregation of families – simply a large family – held together by family ties of blood and φιλία. Aristotle in the *Eudemian Ethics* also uses ἀρχή in connection with the household, stating that in the household are first found the origins (ἀρχαί) and springs (πηγαί) of friendship, of political organization, and justice (1242a40). This, however, does not make the household the source of the state the way it is in the *Politics*.

4) This last point, viz. Arius' view that the πόλις was just an extended family, is made explicit in the next subthesis (b), the comparison of household to πόλις. This analogy contradicts a fundamental point of *Politics* 1 where Aristotle argues that the πόλις is not just the family projected on a larger scale.¹² Aristotle did not think (and given his teleology would not think) that any of the component parts of the household could offer adequate models for his analysis of the πόλις.¹³ On the other hand, this

12) 1252a9–10. Aristotle argues against Plato that the rulership in the state is different in kind from rulership in the family or in an estate. It is not a matter of size or numbers “as if there were no difference between a large household and a small city.” A fortiori, the small, nuclear family described by Arius, would not be like a state. Nor is the state a ‘mature’ household “as though Aristotle envisions a process of development in which a household turns into a village and then finally a polis,” J. Roberts, *Political Animals in the Nicomachean Ethics*, *Phronesis* 34 (1989) 194. In Book 7, 1325a27–30 Aristotle repeats this criticism with a reference back to Book 1. M. Schofield suggests that the reason Aristotle emphasized this thesis was the popularity in the world of international politics of the view that despotism and political rule amounted to the same thing: “Plato’s view of all rule as essentially a single form of knowledge does not necessarily entail immoralist consequences. But its obliteration of crucial distinctions is dangerous, for it is just such *apaideusia* that *Realpolitik* will exploit with a vengeance,” M. Schofield, *Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery*, in: Patzig (above note 7) 20; cf. J. M. Cooper, *Political Animals and Civic Friendship*, *ibid.* 233 and n. 15. An excellent treatment of this whole subject is to be found in A. W. Saxonhouse, *Fear of Diversity* (Chicago 1992), in particular Part 3 Aristotle: Diversity and the Birth of Political Science, 185–232.

13) Thus W. Weissleder: “Much of the first two books of the *Politics* is dedicated to the task of demonstrating that the individual subsystems of which the *oikia* is composed, and of which the role of *oikonomikos* is the syndromic summation, offer no role model that could be successfully raised to a higher political power. In Aristotle’s system, none of the components of the *oikia* structure can serve, either alone or in conjunction with others, to generate a political community that would be anything but a larger and more populous *oikia*,” in: R. Cohen and E. R. Service

doctrine is close to the position of Philo and the Neopythagoreans.¹⁴

5) Arius' lineal derivation of the state from the household (defined in terms of kin only), through the consanguineal village, is Aristotelian only in part. The claim of Aristotle that the πόλις is 'natural' does not depend on the existence of a biological connection among its citizens.¹⁵ It is true that a selective reading of Aristotle can be construed to suggest that he believed in some kind of exclusively biological basis for the state, but only by omitting key elements in his argument.¹⁶

Arius' next proposition (subthesis [c] of A, 148.13–18) runs as follows:

(c) Wherefore, just as the household provides the πόλις with the seeds of its genesis, so it also provides the seeds of its constitution. For the household offers outlines or models of kingship, aristocracy and dem-

(eds.), *Origins of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues 1978) 198. Cf. G. Bien, *Die Grundlegung der politischen Philosophie bei Aristoteles* (Freiburg/Munich 31985) 303 f.

14) SVF 3.323 (Philo): "A household is a city on a small and compact scale, and the management of a household is a contracted kind of constitution; so that a city may be called a large household, and the government of a city a general household economy. And from these considerations we may see that the manager of a household and the ruler of a state are the same, though the multitude and magnitude of their responsibilities may be different." Citing this text and SVF 2.937 S. G. Pembroke comments: "It was . . . possible [for the Stoics] to express the community of the whole world in terms of a household no less well than in those of the politeia," in: A. A. Long, *Problems in Stoicism* (London 1971) 131. Neopythagorean texts reflecting Peripatetic and Stoic thought may also be cited. Callicratidas says that a family and a city "are an imitation according to analogy of the government of the world" (Thesleff 105.23–24); Iamblichus in the *Life of Pythagoras* states that "cities are constituted from households" (Deubner 95.22). Citations are from Balch (above note 10) 393–394.

15) On the subject of Aristotle's naturalism see F. D. Miller Jr., *Aristotle's Political Naturalism*, *Apeiron* 22.4 (1989) 195–218.

16) "A village according to the most natural account seems to be a colony from a household formed of those whom some people speak of as 'fellow nurslings', sons and sons' sons . . . The partnership finally composed of several villages is the city-state" (1252b16–18; 27–28). But this is not all that Aristotle has to say about the state and its relationship to its constituent parts. Cf. Newman (above note 1) 1.43. This is not to say that Aristotle is wholly clear on how we are to judge the 'naturalness' of the πόλις, Newman, *ibid.* 28–30; 64–65; and Miller (above note 15) *passim*; Roberts (above note 12) 191–194; cf. Mulgan (above note 7) 18 f.; M. Schofield, in: Patzig (above note 7) 16 f.; D. J. Depew, *Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle's History of Animals*, *Phronesis* 40.2 (1995) 156–181.

ocracy. Thus the relationship of parents to children is monarchic in form; that of husbands to wives is aristocratic; that of children to one another is democratic.¹⁷

1) Again there is apparent concordance with Aristotle.¹⁸ However, the main difference is what is not mentioned: the absence of the despotic relationship of master/slave. The explanation for this appears to be that having chosen to eliminate (at least at this point) the master/slave component of the household, Arius is forced, in the interests of consistency, to omit also the despotic/tyrannic relationship.¹⁹ This omission seems to confirm that this is not a haphazardly assembled thesis. Thesis A is, at least, internally cohesive.

2) Moraux suggests that Arius' claim that households are to be regarded as the sources and seeds of the city reflects Panaetius' formula found in Cicero, *de officiis* 1.54:²⁰

[T]he first fellowship exists within marriage itself, and the next with one's children. Then there is the one house in which everything is shared. Indeed that is the principle of a city and the seed-bed, as it were, of a political community.²¹

17) Διὸ καὶ τὰ σπέρματα καθάπερ τῆς γενέσεως τῇ πόλει παρέσχεν ὁ οἶκος, οὕτω καὶ τῆς πολιτείας. Καὶ γὰρ βασιλείας ὑπογραφήν εἶναι περὶ τὸν οἶκον καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. Γονέων μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τέκνα κοινωνίας τὸ σχῆμα βασιλικόν· ἀνδρῶν δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκας ἀριστοκρατικόν· παίδων δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους δημοκρατικόν.

18) In several places in *Politics* 1 Aristotle speaks of the relationship between the parts of the household. The smallest parts are the dyads: master/slave; husband/wife; father/children. These three dyads are characterized as possessing despotic, marriage, and generative relationships respectively (1253b8–10; cf. 1259a37–39). On the other hand, the kind of constitution that prevails in the household (and the village community) as a whole is monarchy (πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, 1252b20–22; μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος, 1255b19). Arius, according to Moraux, is closer to the version found in NE 1161a24 f., deviating only in so far as the relationship of children for Arius is democratic, whereas Aristotle makes it timocratic (political in *EE*), (above note 3) 421.

19) Aristotle's rule of husband over wife is changed from political to aristocratic, but the relationship of father to son (or children), more significantly, is converted into a relationship of p a r e n t s to children, as is the description of the relationship of the children among themselves as democratic. In *NE* democracy occurs only in households without masters or where the ruler of the house is weak and everyone can do as they please (1161a6–9).

20) Moraux (above note 3) 420 and n. 324. Cicero's passage "shares with [the later Peripatetics] the metaphor of the household as the seedbed of the state," A. R. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis* (Ann Arbor 1996) 173.

21) [*P*]rima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium [= ἀρχή] urbis et quasi seminarium rei

Arius himself uses the terms ἀρχαί and σπέρματα at the beginning of the ethical section of the Peripatetic *Epitome* (116.22):

Character, he says, has its name from habit, for [those characteristics] of which we have the beginnings and seeds from nature, attain perfection by habit and right upbringing, and therefore the study of character is a study of habit and concerns only the animals, and above all man.²²

In this instance the usage seems closer to Cicero's discussion of what constitutes a republic (*de rep.* 1.41), than to the discussion in the household management section in Arius. After defining *res publica* in terms of natural sociability and utility the text resumes after a break: . . . *Idam quasi semina, neque reliquarum virtutum nec ipsius rei publicae reperiaturs ulla institutio*. The restoration and meaning of this passage is much debated. I follow the emendation of L. Perelli: *(Nullam hominum gentem reperire possumus, in qua non sint iustitiae quaedam quasi semina neque reliquarum virtutum, nec ipsius rei publicae reperiaturs ulla institutio)*.²³ The seeds in this case are not households but dispositions or naturally implanted impulses that ultimately lead to the growth of virtues (principally justice), and so to the πόλις.²⁴ This is what Arius seems

publicae [= τὰ σπέρματα καθάπερ τῆς γενέσεως τῆ πόλει]. Tr. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins, *Cicero: On Duties* (Cambridge 1991) 23.

22) Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἦθος τοῦνομα λαβεῖν φησιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ὧν γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως ἀρχὰς ἔχομεν καὶ σπέρματα, τούτων τὰς τελειότητας περιποιεῖσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ ταῖς ὀρθαῖς ἀγωγαῖς· δι' ὃ καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἐθικὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ μόνᾳ τὰ ζῷα γίνεσθαι καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἄνθρωπον. Tr. Goergemanns, in: Fortenbaugh (above note 5) 168.

23) L. Perelli, *La definizione e l'origine dello stato nel pensiero di Cicerone*, in: *Atti della Accademia della Scienze de Torino* 106 (1972) 296 and *Il de republica e il pensiero politico di Cicerone* (Turin 1977) 20; accepted by J. E. G. Zetzl, *Cicero: De re publica* (Cambridge 1995) 130.

24) The order of evolution for Cicero is as follows: first an assemblage of people gathers, *iuris consensus*, in a definite place in order to provide themselves with dwellings. They fortify the location and provide it with shrines and gathering places. This is the city. Cicero is not here dealing, as he says explicitly, with the original elements of the πόλις, from marriage onwards. Recent discussion is to be found in H. P. Kohns, *Res publica – res populi* (zu Cic. 1.39), *Gymnasium* 77 (1970) 392–404; *Consensus iuris – communio utilitatis* (zu Cic. 1.39), *Gymnasium* 81 (1974) 485–498; *Prima causa coeundi* (zu Cic. rep. 1.39), *Gymnasium* 83 (1976) 209–214; R. Werner, *Über Herkunft und Bedeutung von Ciceros Staatsdefinition*, *Chiron* 3 (1973) 163–178; W. Suerbaum, *Vom Antiken zum Frühmittelalterlichen Staatsbegriff* (Munich 1977) 27–28; 36 n. 97; 40f.; D. Frede, *Constitution and Citizenship: Peripatetic Influence on Cicero's Political Conceptions in the De re publica*, in:

to mean in his use of similar language, namely that men have simple natural instincts towards sociability.

The break with Aristotle is more subtle than at first appears. Aristotle had postulated that either the complete household (the οἰκία τέλειος, the household with slaves) or the incomplete household (the household without slaves but with a substitute labor unit, the ox), were the smallest parts from which the πόλις was constituted.²⁵ What Arius seems to have done in his reworking of the tradition is to have taken Aristotle's definition of the incompletely autarkic household and transformed it into a simple, nuclear family of parents and children, without any reference to the complementary and necessary property and labor components. In this first definition of the household he offers something approximating modern definitions of what social anthropologists call the conjugal family unit, i. e. the limited reproductive unit of parents and children.²⁶ At the same time Arius, breaking with Aristotle, claims that this particular type of household, i. e. the nuclear household, is the constituent unit of the πόλις. Autarky at the family level is thus not an essential aspect of the πόλις. Arius' simple conjugal family is the source of the πόλις.

This modification fundamentally undermines Aristotle's architecture of the πόλις which is dependent on autarkic units which in turn find their completion in the larger political community. In Aristotle's view it was the ability of the constituent households to be self-sustaining that made them key to the functioning of the πόλις. The ownership of property, the independence it provided its members and the owner's role in administering and defending his possessions and that of his fellow householders constituted the foundation of the πόλις. It was the economic and political independence of such households ranged together in the state that Aristotle thought distinguished the πόλις household from the barbarian household. In the latter there was no differentiation of function, no hierarchy, and both husband and wife are alike slaves of the ruler. Such households could not form the basis of a proper

W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos* (New Brunswick/London 1989) 77–100.

25) Pol. 1.2.1252a26–1252b12; 3.1253b4–5: “the household in its perfect form (οἰκία τέλειος) consists of slaves and freemen.”

26) Cf. R. McNetting, R. R. Wilk and E. J. Arnould, *Households: Comparative and Historical Studies of the Domestic Group* (Berkeley 1984) *passim*.

πόλις. The consequences of Arius' reformulation of Aristotle's theory of the household will become apparent when we reach Arius' discussion of the πόλις.

Arius' next division (B, [a]: 148.19–149.11) contains the second definition of the household:

Indeed male is joined to female in the desire for children and the permanence of the race; but each of them desires children. When a couple takes in partnership a helper, whether a slave by nature (one who has a strong body suitable for service but who is dull and unable to live by himself, for whom it is beneficial to be ruled), or a slave by convention, from the union for the same purpose, and the consideration of all for what is mutually beneficial, a household is constituted.²⁷

Following this piece of analysis Arius continues: The rule of the household belongs by nature to the husband because the power of deliberation (τὸ βουλευτικόν) in wives is inferior, does not yet exist in children, and is absent in slaves. On the other hand prudent household management (which includes the rule of the house and those things pertaining to the household) is the husband's appropriate realm of action. Household rule is characterized by four relationships and activities: paternal (πατρικόν); conjugal (γαμικόν); mastership (δεσποτικόν); and the art of acquiring wealth (χρηματιστικόν). The remainder of the discussion (thesis [b]) is devoted to a brief account of the acquisition of goods.

Although extremely compressed, this description of the household is, on the whole, closer to the Aristotle of the *Politics* than Arius' first definition. All the divisions or parts of the household discussed at 1253b5–13 – master/slave, husband/wife, father/children, wealth-getting – are present. Nevertheless, there are some significant modifications.

1) Aristotle's position that the first union of male and female arises from necessity, not choice, has been already noted.²⁸ The language of Aristotle in this connection is biological. He stresses the

27) Συνέρχεσθαι γὰρ τῷ θήλει τὸ ἄρρεν κατὰ πόθον τεκνώσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ γένους διαμονῆς· ἐφίεσθαι γὰρ ἑκάτερον γεννήσεως. Συνελθόντων δὲ καὶ συνεργόν τῆς κοινωνίας προσλαβομένων, εἴτε φύσει δοῦλον, (ἰσχυρὸν μὲν τῷ σώματι πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν, νοθὴ δὲ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀδύνατον διαζῆν, ᾧ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι συμφέρειν,) εἴτε καὶ νόμῳ (δοῦλον,) ἐκ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνόδου καὶ τῆς πάντων πρὸς ἕν συμφέρον προμηθείας, οἶκον συνίστασθαι.

28) οὐκ ἐκ προαίρεσεως (1252a28–30). For discussion of Aristotle's line of argument see Miller (above note 14) 210; Schofield, in: Patzig (above note 7) 21.

identity of the reproductive drive shared with animals and plants; the relationship of husband and wife is elemental, unregulated by already existing custom or law. It precedes organized, civilized life. Arius, on the other hand, seems to move away from this primitive form of marriage to a more socialized form of coupling: male seeks to be united with female out of desire (κατὰ πόθον) for children, and further, each partner desires children. This formulation of marriage is more akin to that of the first definition where marriage is defined as a union, κατὰ νόμον, of husband and wife for the procreation of children, and a shared life. Here as elsewhere, Arius has modified and softened Aristotle's stark account.

2) Following Aristotle's general principle of natural hierarchy (1254a21) Arius justifies the enslavement of the natural slave as ὅτι τὸ ἄρχεσθαι συμφέρειν.²⁹ He offers no explanation, however, of how slaves by convention benefit from being taken into a household. The household is self-consciously, contractually, established. Yet for Aristotle the complementary communities of husband and wife, and natural ruler and naturally ruled are by nature. While teleology seems present in the argument for natural slaves (τὸ ἄρχεσθαι συμφέρειν), Arius dilutes the principle of natural hierarchy as a major explanatory element as he did in the first definition.³⁰

3) The second definition does not relate the household to the genesis of the state as does the first definition.

To sum up: Aristotle in Politics 1.2 postulated that the πόλις is made up of autarkic households of two kinds. Arius recognizes both types of household but even as he does so he modifies Aristotle's position. First he weakens the role of household in its role as an essential constituent element of the πόλις. He emphasizes marriage as a personal relationship while diminishing Aristotle's stress on the economic aspect of the household as the smallest, stand-alone socio-economic entity out of which the πόλις is made

29) For Aristotle the household is inevitably a hierarchy because all composite things are hierarchies: "In every composite thing, where a plurality of parts, whether continuous or discrete, is combined to make a single common whole, there is always found a ruling and a subject factor, and this characteristic of living things is present in them as an outcome of the whole of nature" 1254a28–32. Cf. E. Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford 1947) 109–110; M. Riedel, *Metaphysik und Metapolitik* (Frankfurt 1975) 73–80; G. Seel, in: Patzig (above note 7) 35.

30) Teleology is also missing in the next section where Arius states the thesis of superiority of the householder.

up. Arius' household could exist in any kind of state. Aristotle's household on the other hand is complementary to the πόλις: the πόλις could not exist without this specific type of household and the household would be incomplete politically without the πόλις. For Aristotle the household is transformed by its function as a constituent part of the state. Conversely, from the viewpoint of the πόλις, virtue is possible only in such a household. Deliberation and the exercise of φρόνησις depends on the existence of a political community of which the household is the basis. It is the household that is the platform for political participation and the kind of human fulfillment Aristotle thinks is the proper end of human beings. Arius fails to bring out this fundamental aspect of Aristotle's doctrine and insinuates instead a more apolitical social role for the family and its members.

II. Arius and the nature of the state

Arius now moves on to the division dealing with the nature of the city (150.1–10):

The main points regarding politics are as follows. πόλεις are constituted because men are by nature disposed to community and because it is useful for them. Next, the πόλις is the most perfect form of association; being a citizen involves sharing in political rule in the state. Indeed, a πόλις is a group of such people sufficient in numbers for an autarkic life. The limitation of numbers is such that the πόλις is not [as large as to be] unable to mutually interact with itself, or [as small as] to be despised, but adequate to provide the needs of life and to deter aggression.³¹

The summary seems orthodox enough at first glance. At one point Arius even cites the actual words of Aristotle (one of only two instances in the sections of the *Epitome* under review here).³² Never-

31) Περὶ δὲ (πολιτικῆς) ταυτ' ἂν εἴη κεφάλαια: πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι συνέστησαν αἱ πόλεις τῇ μὲν διὰ τὸ φύσει κοινωνικὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῇ δὲ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον. Εἶτα ὅτι ἡ τελειοτάτη κοινωνία πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι πολίτης ἐστὶν ὃ μέτεστι πολιτικῆς ἀρχῆς. Πόλις δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἰκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς. Τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ὄρον εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὥστε μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἀσυμπαθῆ μήτ' εὐκαταφρόνητον ὑπάρχειν, παρεσκευάσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ἀνευδραῖς καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἕξωθεν ἐπιόντας ἰκανῶς.

32) 3,1275b20–21: πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἰκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς . . .

theless, on closer inspection we can see that some important modifications have been introduced. Before going into these, however, we should recall that it is unlikely that the original readers of the *Epitome* would not have come to this division equipped with an orthodox understanding of Aristotle's doctrine regarding household and πόλις, as though they had just read the relevant passages of the *Politics*.³³ Rather, they would have had in mind Arius' rewriting of the subject of household management in the previous section. From this reading they would have been left with the belief that the πόλις was just a large social conglomeration of families and villages, not a special kind of association where human beings could achieve their ultimate fulfillment through political action. Thus this division dealing with politics might seem at a cursory reading to be at odds with the doctrine already discussed. But this is not the case because Arius once again manages to preserve consistency by making additional modifications in Aristotle's doctrine of the nature of the πόλις. He achieves consistency as follows.

By the first century the origins of states were accounted for anthropologically or philosophically in terms of various versions of the social contract, utility or natural impulse theories.³⁴ Arius identifies both utility and natural impulse as Aristotelian and modifies Aristotle on both doctrines.

33) There was a possibility that the readers were familiar with the esoteric works of Aristotle, Moraux (above note 3) 436–437. Hahm believes that the lemmata of the *Epitomes* were probably part of Stobaeus' original anthology and were not the work of Stobaeus (above note 2) 2976–2978. The use of the third person plural, as Fortenbaugh suggests, gives the impression that Arius is giving the views of the Peripatetics in general (above note 5) 217 n.1. Our epitomator was not interested in reconstructing the authentic, historical doctrine of Aristotle in scholarly fashion, so much as putting forward his own view of the current state of Peripatetic philosophy, a kind of contemporary catechism of the school whose purpose was practical: to provide relevant, contemporary doctrinal guidance. Hahm puts it well in his summation of the purpose of Arius' doxographies: "[Arius'] purpose now was not to produce another historical survey. It was rather to provide a guidebook or map of the array of moral choices he and others were facing in their personal lives," in: Fortenbaugh (above note 5) 31.

34) F. Steinmetz, Staatengründung – aus Schwäche oder natürlichem Geselligkeitsdrang? Zur Geschichte einer Theorie, in: P. Steinmetz (ed.), *Politeia und Res Publica* (Wiesbaden 1969) 181–199; S. Blundell, *The Origins of Civilization in Greek and Roman Thought* (London 1986); T. Cole, *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology* (Atlanta 1990); cf. also Perelli (above note 23) and Kohns (above note 24); Dyck (above note 20) 350.

Aristotle makes utility secondary to natural impulse.³⁵ At 1278b20 f. he argues that “even when men have no need of assistance from each other they nonetheless desire to live together (συζῆν).” The common good draws them together but only “in so far as each achieves a share in the good life (τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς).” Aristotle grants that mere life also has a role to play in that there is “some element of value contained in even the mere state of being alive” (1278b17–30). Commenting on this passage Simpson remarks that these statements show that Aristotle rejected “all theories, ancient and modern, that understand the point of political community to be the securing of private and material goods (as property and bodily survival). Such theories, he implies, are contrary both to the observable facts and to the political or communal nature of humanity.”³⁶

In explaining natural impulse Arius does not claim that humans are by nature political animals; instead he opts for the more general phrase referring only to the social inclination of human beings (τὸ φύσει κοινωνικὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον). Although the assertion that humans are by nature socially inclined is not evidence of Stoicism per se,³⁷ its use in this context, as well as in the light of what follows, is suggestive, a signal on Arius’ part that he has shifted focus from the political to the social realms. Thus this presentation of πόλις origins does not contradict what Arius has already said regarding the state in the household management section.

35) Perelli (above note 23) 285; Steinmetz (above note 34) 183–187; 195–196.

36) P. L. P. Simpson, *A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle* (Chapel Hill/London 1998) 149; Perelli commenting on the same passage notes that for Aristotle “il vantaggio comune è uno dei fini della costituzione della società civile, ma nella misura in cui questa utilità contribuisce al ‘vivere bene,’ cioè al bene morale di ciascuno . . . nella Politica Aristotele subordina [communio utilitatis] allo zēn kalōs, alla vita virtuosa di ciascun cittadino, che è il fine ultimo della comunità statale per Aristotele come per Platone,” (above note 23) 285. Utility is the end, not the cause of the state (ibid. and 290); cf. R. Stark, *Ciceros Staatsdefinition*, in: R. Klein (ed.), *Das Staatsdenken der Römer* (Darmstadt 1966) 339–340.

37) Thus at EE 1242a25 Aristotle says that humans are “animals disposed to community”, and Moraux is technically right to reject Dreizehnter’s belief that the definition is Stoic (above note 3) 424 n. 343. But this is not really the point. What is surprising is its use. When given an opportunity in the appropriate context to state the most representative definition of orthodox doctrine regarding the political nature of man, Arius pointedly fails to do so. It is not that he is unfamiliar with Aristotle’s famous dictum since it occurs in the transition from the ethical part of the *Epitome* to the political (ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶν ἄνθρωπος, 148.3–4).

What follows next summarizes Aristotle accurately as far as it goes: The πόλις is the most perfect of associations; a citizen is one who shares in rule; the πόλις is a mass of such people. But at this point the summary stops with the words: “sufficient for life;” it pointedly does not go on to say: “for the good life,” thus giving a different sense to the whole subthesis. There is no suggestion that sharing in rule is necessary for the good life.

The most perfect community turns out to be perfect only in the sense that its citizens’ material wants are provided for, and that the πόλις is capable of self-defense, not that the πόλις is the place, indeed the only place, where the good life can be attained.³⁸ Economic autarky alone does not define a πόλις. Talking about the appropriate size of the city Aristotle says: “[a πόλις] consisting of too many, though self-sufficing in the mere necessities, will be so in the way in which a nation (ἔθνος) is, and not as a state (πόλις).”³⁹ There is a limit to how large a πόλις can be, and that limitation is political in nature.⁴⁰ The key is the number “that is self-sufficient for the purpose of living the good life after the manner of a political community” (αὐτάρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, 1326b8–9). It would be interesting to know whether Arius was familiar with Aristotle’s musings about polit-

38) See especially T. Irwin, *The Good of Political Activity*, in: Patzig (above note 7) 73–98; cf. V. Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (London 1960) 88 f.; A. Kamp (above note 7) 98 f.; J. M. Cooper, *Contemplation and Happiness: A Reconsideration*, *Synthese* 72 (1987) 187–216; Booth (above note 7) 42 f. and passim.

39) 1326b4–5. Cf. Newman ad loc.: “A πόλις consisting of too large a number of citizens is not a πόλις because a πόλις is a κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας (3.3.1276b1), and a constitution cannot easily exist in a very large πόλις, for magistracies cannot easily exist in it, and a constitution implies the existence of magistracies It seems to be implied that the constitution is the source of ‘completeness in respect of good life.’ Aristotle’s argument here throws some light on his reference to Babylon in 3.1276a27 f., where it is implied that Babylon covered too large a space to be one city . . . The ἔθνος appears to be a κοινωνία . . . but it is too large to have a constitution . . .” (above note 1) 3.346–347. Cf. Mulgan (above note 6) 22; 90–91; Schütrumpf (above note 7) 10 f.

40) The πόλις exists as a mean between states that are too large and those that are too small: “There is a due measure of size for a state also, as well as for everything” (1326a25, tr. W. L. Newman [above note 1] 3.345, with references). Newman’s comment (ad loc.) is worth noting: “Not only will too large a State fail of being well-ordered and beautiful, but it will fail also to be able to discharge the function of a State and to realize self-completeness in respect of the good life, and the same thing may be said of too small a State likewise.”

ical communities larger than the πόλις; if he was, he chose to ignore them.⁴¹

In the next subthesis where Arius deals explicitly with the appropriate size of the πόλις we find further modifications tending in the same direction. The limitations of the state are phrased negatively: a πόλις should not be so large that it becomes ἀσυμπαθής, or so small that it is despised. The main point here is the choice of the term ἀσυμπαθής. Clearly this is a term suggesting the well-known Stoic belief that the universe is a unified body where parts cohere and interact ('sympathize') with each other.⁴² This is not a term we would expect here with its implications of a society much larger than the πόλις of Aristotle. Hardly chosen by accident, it cleverly insinuates a non-Aristotelian meaning within an Aristotelian context.

In the division dealing with how the state should be ruled (150.17–23) Arius repeats Aristotle's summaries of the possibilities in Book 3 of the *Politics*. The correct constitutions are the rule of the one, kingship; of the few, aristocracy; of the many, democracy (meaning πολιτεία). Tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy are the deviant forms. Arius emphasizes that what justifies each of the orthodox forms of the constitution is that it is rule on behalf of the common good. The best constitution is one ruled κατ' ἀρετήν (151.4).

Thus, in this section we have a discussion of politics that a) leaves out a critical component of Aristotelian doctrine regarding

41) For Aristotle's thoughts on political associations beyond the framework of the πόλις, cf. R. Weil, *Aristote et l'histoire: Essai sur la 'Politique'* (Paris 1960) 367 f.; J. Bordes, *Politica dans la pensée grecque jusqu'à Aristote* (Paris 1982) 437 f.

42) SVF 2.546: "If the whole world did not coalesce the kosmos would not be naturally organized and ordered, nor could there be interaction (συμπαθεία) of its parts among themselves." Cf. SVF 2.534; 1013. In discussing ἀσυμπάθεια Strache cites Phintys (Stob. 4.592.9) and Dio Chrys. (Or. 48.7). Dio speaks of the πόλις that is ὁμογνώμονα, φίλη αὐτῆ, and συμπαθής; Phintys similarly speaks of one that is ὁμοίονομος and συμπαθής. Strache goes on to comment: "[Q]uam ego e Stoicorum intima sententia ita explicandam esse putaverim, ut civium συμπάθεια comparetur cum συμπαθεία illa, quam ad omnes mundi partes pertinere Stoici docebant . . ." He identifies the sentiment with Antiochus, H. Strache, *De Arii Didymi in morali Philosophia Auctoribus* (Diss. Berlin 1909) 68. On συμπάθεια cf. A. Bonhoeffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart 1894) 265 (index); Epictet und die Stoa (Stuttgart 1890) 77–78; 250–251; 258; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (Göttingen 1959) 217; 230; C. J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Texts* (Leiden 1964) 912; 935; R. B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics* (Leiden 1976) 188; I. G. Kidd, *Posidonius: The Commentary* (Cambridge 1988) 2.1, F104, F106.

the πόλις, viz. the primacy of its political character and the connection of citizen participation to politics and the good life; b) it suggests that we might think (under circumstances not specified) of the πόλις in terms of a more expansive entity than that envisaged by Aristotle. This, however, does not make Arius' definition of the πόλις equivalent to the Stoics' πλήθος ἀνθρώπων, but it does seem to suggest movement in that direction.⁴³ Arius' πόλις is still, verbally, the orthodox πλήθος πολιτῶν, although it is clear that his definition can allow for citizens who are citizens only in an attenuated sense. He has walked a narrow line avoiding, on the one hand, tossing out the Aristotelian doctrine in favor of a Stoic position, and on the other, merely repeating the traditional doctrines. Why he made this choice needs now to be investigated.

III. Peripatetics and Stoics: Arius' harmonization

Analysis begins with the section on household management. It appears that Arius has provided us with two theses regarding the household, the one, A, quite distant from the doctrines of the *Politics*, and the other, B (a), somewhat closer. Each thesis states a particular point; perhaps we are intended to see them, in the familiar method of Arius' style of presentation, as separate, though connected bits of information. These theses, while not incompatible with each other are separately, and in combination, incompatible with Aristotle's position on household and πόλις. This in itself may point to the nature of the problem: Arius knew of criticism of Aristotle's doctrine of the household and the πόλις, or appreciated some problems associated with it, and responded to it (Thesis A). Then, after modifying Aristotle's central position (actually eviscerating it), in Thesis A, he artfully added, in Thesis B, the remainder of Aristotle's theory, with suitable alterations to make it fit with A. Again, this method of procedure has been encountered elsewhere in the two *Epitomes*. Although it may have served Arius' epitomizing aim, it does not constitute an explanation for us. The argument is simply pushed back a step. Why did he feel he needed to

43) SVF 3.329. In the *Stoic Epitome* Arius also talks about the πόλις. There he refers to it as a σύστημα τῶν ἀνθρώπων (103.19). Cf. M. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge 1991) Appendix F.

make changes? To note the Stoicizing aspects of these changes which, as has been suggested, are significant, does not answer the question either.

We might begin by searching for clues in other parts of the Peripatetic *Epitome*, and then weighing up the relationship of the sections under review to the document as a whole. This procedure, of course, presupposes that the household management and politics divisions are parts of the *Epitome* as a whole, and that the *Epitome* itself is a coherent document, not a haphazard collection of disconnected propositions.

The first of these presuppositions is supported by two internal references within the household management and politics divisions which suggest that their author composed them with an eye on the remainder of the survey. The first reference is a prefatory statement to the effect that having sufficiently dealt with the virtues and the topic of ethics, the author will now go on to household management and politics (147.26–148.3). The second is found in the first paragraph of the section on politics, and refers back to previous discussion in the household management part (150.12 referring to 149.8–10).⁴⁴

Support for the second proposition, viz. that the *Epitome* is a coherent whole, derives from the consistency of the doctrine expounded in both parts.⁴⁵ In the ethical section where Arius touches on the subject of families and citizenship (in the thesis on social οἰκείωσις), he there argues (120.8–12) that just as children can be loved for their own sake, so can parents, wives, relatives, and fellow citizens. He then adds:

44) These divisions are not likely to be insertions by Stobaeus or some other hand. Little credit, in fact, is given by most modern critics to the handiwork of Stobaeus. Gottschalk, for instance, rejects the claim of A. Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Oxford 1978) 21–22, that the introductory section to the Stoic and Peripatetic section was written by Stobaeus himself, as special pleading (above note 3) 1101 n. 112 (with references); Hahm, in the most important up-to-date survey of the whole *Epitome* comments: “The fact that each of the three doxographies displays a tight logical structure is virtual proof that Stobaeus did not himself compile any of them, but derived each from some earlier source” (above note 2) 2946.

45) What follows supports, I believe, Hahm’s generalization regarding the coherence of the *Peripatetic Epitome*: “If we read through the Peripatetic doxography without the expectation of finding the standard doxographic topics, we notice that there is a coherent progression governing the order of topics,” (above note 2) 2990. Cf. the same author’s similar evaluation of Arius’ method of procedure in Fortenbaugh (above note 5) 20–26; 30–31.

If among these friendly relations some happen to be remote, and some close, this doesn't make any difference for our argument, for in each case they are choiceworthy for their own sake and not for their usefulness. Now if a friendly relation to fellow citizens is choiceworthy for its own sake it follows necessarily that the same is the case about friendly relations towards persons of the same ethnic group and of the same race, and so also about human beings in general.⁴⁶

The Stoic, or para-Stoic coloring of this passage is widely acknowledged.⁴⁷ However, as Inwood suggests, there are parallels in Aristotle that are also close to social οἰκειώσεις.⁴⁸ This, however, is true only up to a point, a point not observed in this instance by Arius. On the contrary, Arius aggressively extends the concept of friendship far beyond Aristotle's strictures on its elasticity.

In the introduction to Nicomachean Ethics, Book 8, Aristotle reviews common opinion on friendship, noting that φιλία begins in the smallest circle of the family, in the natural affection of parent for child, and child for parent. This kind of relationship exists not just in man but among most animals. But φιλία is especially strong among men, "which is why we praise those who love their fellow men" (1155a20–21). Nevertheless friendship has its limits and its degrees. In Politics 2.1, in a lengthy refutation of Plato's communism, Aristotle discusses friendship in context: while it is

46) Εἰ δὲ τῶν φιλιῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι πόρρω συμβέβηκε, τὰς δὲ προσεχεις ἡμῖν, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔπος· πᾶσαν γὰρ δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ μόνον διὰ τὰς χρεΐας. Εἰ δ' ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας φιλία δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πρὸς ὁμοειθεῖς καὶ ὁμοφύλους, ὥστε καὶ τὴν πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους (120.15–20). Tr. Goergemanns, in: Fortenbaugh (above note 5) 170. C. O. Brink believes Theophrastus can be detected in this quote but it is hard to see how this can be true (Phronesis 1 [1956] 136). The basis of οἰκειότης for Theophrastus was either common descent or common upbringing and subjection to the same laws, not φιλία (Porphyry 3.25.1–4 = W. W. Fortenbaugh et al. (eds.), Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence [Leiden 1992] 2, nr. 531).

47) The Stoic emphasis has been noted since J. N. Madvig's commentary on Cicero's *de finibus* (3rd. ed. 1876) Excursus VII 837–848. The term 'para Stoic' was coined by B. Inwood, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984) 167 f. Pohlenz's view, probably the most generally accepted, is that in his survey Arius followed an anonymous late Peripatetic source that used Stoic ideas and terminology, while preserving what its author thought were essential doctrines of the school, (above note 4) 40; cf. Moraux (above note 3) 436–439; 443.

48) In: Fortenbaugh (above note 5) 198; Gauthier and Jolif in their commentary consider Arius' account of οἰκειώσεις to be "un bon développement de ce passage" (i. e. of NE 1155a16–21), *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain and Paris 1959) 3.664.

the greatest of goods for the πόλις, and the best safeguard against στόσις, it is a mistake to confuse personal friendship with citizenship; friendship is too watery (ὕδαρῆ) to serve this role (1262b15). The πόλις is not a large family, and the kinds of ties that hold a family together cannot be generalized to the πόλις.⁴⁹ On the contrary, the πόλις is characterized by its diversity, not its homogeneity.⁵⁰ In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 8 Aristotle distinguishes degrees of friendship, making friendship among the good (i.e. friendship for the other's sake), the highest form, and also the most limited. One makes friends with others for the sake of utility or pleasure, but with the good for their own sake (δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι, 1157b1–5; cf. 1156a11–15; 1156b10). Discussing the question of whether the number of friends should be limited he comments: “While it is true that we may be friendly with many as citizens (πολιτικῶς) ... it is not possible to have many friends whom we love for their excellence and for themselves (δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς, 1171a17–20).” Political relationships, while they may be ‘friendly’ to a degree, exist at a different level of intensity from friendship δι' αὐτοῦς. A fortiori, one presumes, friendship outside the πόλις is even weaker.⁵¹ Yet Arius sees no problem in predicating the same kind of relationship univocally of family, citizen, and all of humanity.

49) As already argued above note 12.

50) 1261a24: οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων; cf. Seel (above note 7) 39; Saxonhouse (above note 12).

51) On the flexibility of friendship see the discussion between J. M. Cooper and J. Annas in: Patzig (above note 7) 220–241; 244–245; cf. also J. Roberts (above note 12) 190; 203–204; T. Irwin in: Patzig (above note 7) 84 f. Brink, commenting on Aristotle's review of opinions regarding the potential universality of φιλία at 1155a20, observes that Aristotle does not commit himself: “Here one could have expected a further (Theophrastean) extension, first to Greeks and Greeks, or barbarians and barbarians, next to ‘all men’, and ultimately to man and brute, yet we are but offered the observation that especially on journeys one sees how near and dear human beings are to one another.” The reason for this, Brink believes, is that while Aristotle “assumed that certain principles were generally valid throughout nature, ... he had been anxious to avoid fitting together too closely the several parts of his natural system; for this would have weakened the specific qualities of ethics and politics ...” (above note 46) 133–134. The gap was not entirely filled by Theophrastus, but his circles of relationship spreading out from the smallest group was exploited by the Stoics (Brink, *ibid.* 137).

IV. Conclusions

The fact of the matter is that Arius has not done a particularly good job of forging a convincing philosophical connection between households, *πόλεις* and larger political entities. He has, however, managed to preserve consistency between the various parts of the *Epitome* in this regard, no mean feat given the difficulties involved. There is thus no conflict between the doctrine proposed in the ethical section of the *Epitome*, and the doctrine in the section on household and *πόλις*. Everything begins with the family and proceeds outwards from there in expanding circles: the same kind of relationship unites family members, fellow-citizens, ethnic groups, races, and finally all of humanity. Political relationships as such are not seen as especially significant, or more importantly from an Aristotelian viewpoint, limiting. They do not seem to be different from the kinds of friendly relationships that are, supposedly, capable of uniting all people. Clearly, this is not a doctrine Aristotle would have accepted. For him, justice is based on some form of equality, and true justice, like true friendship, can exist only among friends who are friends on a basis of equality.⁵² Therefore, those outside the *πόλις*, not to mention those in the *πόλις* who are not full citizens, can at best have only a very weak relationship of justice among themselves.

Aristotle did not offer an easy escape for his successors from this dilemma. For Aristotle the *πόλις* was the natural and only environment within which human beings could achieve the end for which they were destined by nature.⁵³ The *πόλις* was the perfect society, the end of its constituent sub-communities. It was the Whole; it was self-sufficient.⁵⁴ Only in the *πόλις* could the good

52) 1161b1f. Discussing Theophrastus' expanding circles in Porphyry, *De Abstinencia* 3.25, Brink remarks that "Aristotle would have denied the appropriateness of Theophrastus' scheme not only in regard to the horse and the ox and other lower animals but in regard to members of the human race outside the pale," (above note 46) 134. By pale Brink means the *πόλις*, the realm of political relationship.

53) Miller (above note 15) 196; Brandt (above note 7) 195; Roberts (above note 12) 194–195; 200; Kamp (above note 7) 116.

54) "Hence every city-state exists by nature inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist; for the city-state is an end, since that which each thing is when its growth is completed we speak of as being the nature of each thing ... Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good; and self-sufficiency is an

life be secured. In terms of gradations of autarky we begin with the individual who by himself is incapable of living self-sufficiently, and move on to the true household which has a measure of autarky for daily needs (i. e. the household consisting of free and dependent members, not just the nuclear family of husband and wife). Then comes the village which has sufficient autarky “for the satisfaction of not mere daily needs” (1252b16). Finally we arrive at the πόλις which alone has the highest level of autarky, in which all of the constituent parts find their completion, first for the sake of life, and then for the good life (1252b29–30).

A corollary of this doctrine had to be: Beyond the πόλις there could be no other human organization sufficient in itself in so far as human autarky and happiness are concerned. Other forms of socio-political life were either subordinate or inferior to the πόλις. Aristotle had surveyed all forms of human association and had made his conclusion.⁵⁵ His followers were left to cope with the consequences.⁵⁶

end, and a chief good” (1252b3–1253a2). Cf. A. Kamp (above note 7) 100–106; G. Bien (above note 13) 145 f.; 305 f.

55) Aristotle was quite familiar with the world beyond the πόλις and had given it some, if mostly inconclusive, thought, cf. R. Weil (above note 41) 367 f.; J. Bordes, *ibid.* 437 f.; A. Kamp (above note 7) 65 f.; R. Mueller, *Polis und Res Publica* (Weimar 1987) 226 f. Surely, therefore, he was fully aware of what he was asserting in his theory of the πόλις. His followers can hardly be blamed for not making much progress beyond the circles of φιλία which Aristotle’s own work suggested. A more difficult question is whether Arius was aware of Aristotle’s potentially significant reflections on ἐθνῆ and κοινὰ πολιτεία in *Politics* 4, 5, 6. Pohlenz is unjust when he claims that a “more original thinker” than Arius would have been able to make use of the concept of οἰκείωσις to expand on the πόλις (above note 4) 38. Cf. Schofield’s discussion of false consciousness in Aristotle’s theory of slavery (with C. H. Kahn’s rejoinder) in: Patzig (above note 7) 1–31. Erskine sees the influence of Aristotle on Panaetius’ justification of empire, A. Erskine, *The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action* (Ithaca 1990) 196–197.

56) Another example of Arius’ failure to bridge a philosophical gap of equally large proportions is suggested by Inwood in regard to the difficult transition in Arius’ discussion of personal and social οἰκείωσις (119.20–21). The problem, Inwood argues, was Chrysippus himself who had failed “to forge a firm and plausible link” between the two doctrines, Fortenbaugh (above note 5) 196. The tinkering with Aristotle’s theory of the πόλις began possibly as early as Theophrastus whose circles of relationships are claimed by Brink to be detectable in Cicero and Arius (above note 46) 138. The account of the state in *Ps. Aristotle, Oeconomica* 1 (1343a10f.), emphasizes, like Arius, economic self-sufficiency: a state is a number of households with land and possessions sufficient for the good (in a material sense) life. The household has undergone a similar transformation.

One can sympathize with the problem faced by his successors, and ultimately by the epitomator of the tradition, Arius. In attempting to bring Aristotle's theory of the πόλις into conformity with the realities of both the real and philosophical world the best Arius could do was offer this para-Stoic account of human society, and settle for the banal assertion that all social and political development began with the family and urging the traditional principle that the only legitimate form of rule was rule on behalf of the ruled, not the rulers.⁵⁷ Hence, once Arius had made the decision to include the doctrine of social οἰκείωσις in the ethical part of the *Epitome* he had a problem of consistency when he got to the household management and political parts. He had to make significant changes.

Consistency, however, was achieved at a price. At best Arius was able to maintain only the doctrine of the natural sociability of humankind while watering down its complementary (from an Aristotelian viewpoint), political nature. It might be argued that Arius' revision of Aristotle preserved the πόλις without restricting development to it and also expanded its moral dimensions and potentialities to all people. This is true enough. The Hellenistic kingdoms and Rome did not destroy the πόλις as the basis of civilized society (civilized, that is, in Greco-Roman terms). But in this world there was no room for political autarky of the old πόλις type. Politics, such as it was, now belonged in the palaces of kings, or at Rome, in the palace of the Princeps, where, coincidentally, Arius and his family (at least Arius and his sons), were comfortably

57) The weakness of the expanding circles argument of Arius, and Cicero, de finibus 5.65 is discussed by Pembroke (above note 14) 123–125; cf. 130: “The effortlessness suggested by this high speed summary is hardly reassuring . . . the absence of any specific resistances to be met with and overcome in the course of this process, for example on crossing the borderline from personal acquaintance, however slight, to anonymous encounters, is not offset by any formal demonstration that the total affection of which any one person is capable can increase so as to meet the universal demands to be made on it.” Baldry suggests that Cicero's real feelings on the matter are to be found in de amicitia 19–20 where he emphasizes the strength of friendship for the few as opposed to the many, H. C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge 1965) 200. Hierocles tries to cope with this weakness in the theory by urging ‘serious men’ to try to overcome the obvious gap in what they feel for their kinsmen in the inner circles, as contrasted with what they feel for the rest of humanity in the outermost (Stob. 2.672.2–6; 16–18 Hense); cf. B. Inwood, *Hierocles: Theory and Argument, Second Century AD*, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984) 181–182.

installed. Just as Aristotle embraced the finality of the πόλις, Arius and the version of the Peripatetic tradition he represents, embraced the non-πόλις dominated world after Alexander. This world-view includes the πόλις, but realistically reduces its importance by extending its scope. Generous in its expansiveness, it is a view of human society in which πόλις-style politics counts for little. The underpinnings of such politics had been eliminated.

Intellectually there was no longer any validity to the claim that the πόλις had a special kind of political and social primacy. The connection between the household and the πόλις that was of such unique importance for the πόλις of the classical age and for Aristotle's theory of the *Politics*, and what distinguished the πόλις household from the barbarian (see above, pp. 207 and 209–210), no longer held true. The πόλις household differed from the barbarian household precisely because it was the basic, indivisible constituent unit of the πόλις. When the nature of the πόλις changed, so did the nature of the household.

Deliberation and the exercise of such essential civic virtues as φρόνησις presupposed the existence of a free political environment for their exercise. After Alexander this presupposition was, for the most part, no longer valid. Correspondingly, the kind of moral prominence that a free πόλις conferred on its households, evaporated. The householder could no longer claim the kind of authority within his household that his public role in the politeuma of his πόλις had previously accorded him. As a result we see in the *Epitome* a flattening of the Aristotelian family hierarchy and an emphasis instead on the mutuality of the relationship between husband and wife. To the diminution of the independence of the πόλις, its privatization so to speak, corresponded a similar kind of privatization, in the etymological sense of deprivation, of the household.

That Arius' (or his predecessors') solutions as manifested in their adaptations of Aristotle's political theory in the *Epitome* were ultimately unsatisfactory is understandable. The desideratum of exercising meaningful citizenship in manageable political entities in a world dominated by large and powerful states where citizenship meant little or nothing, was an elusive goal for the πόλις-dwellers of the Hellenistic kingdoms and for the citizens of imperial Rome. It remains an elusive goal to the present. In the new political philosophy urged by Zeno's *Politeia* the focus was no longer to be the

role of citizenship in the πόλις, but instead, as Schofield puts it, “the moral potentialities of man considered as man, not as citizen.”⁵⁸ Whether ethics and politics benefited from this separation and privatization is another question.⁵⁹

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58) Schofield (above note 40) 102–103.

59) I wish to thank David J. Depew, Andy Dyck and Ron Hock for reading this paper and making helpful suggestions.