DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT NOUNS
A Terminological Innovation in Herodian?*

Abstract: This article lays out the terminological system used to distinguish between concrete and abstract nouns in Pseudo-Arcadius’ Epitome of Herodian’s Περὶ καθολικῆς προσῳδίας (‘On prosody in general’), and shows that this system is fundamentally different from those found in other Greek grammatical texts.

Keywords: Pseudo-Arcadius, Herodian, concrete nouns, abstract nouns, οὐσία

(i) Introduction

Today we divide nouns, for some purposes, into two large groups: concrete nouns and abstract nouns. This categorization of nouns was already made by ancient Greek grammarians, but different terms for concrete and abstract nouns are used in different texts.

This article will first lay out the terminological system used to distinguish between concrete and abstract nouns in Pseudo-Arcadius’ Epitome of Herodian’s Περὶ καθολικῆς προσῳδίας (‘On prosody in general’), and then show that this system is fundamentally different from those found in other Greek grammatical texts. At first sight, Pseudo-Arcadius’ system shares the use of the term οὐσία with some other texts in which concrete and abstract nouns are distinguished, but the term turns out to occupy a quite different place in the system. Finally, we will consider the origins of Pseu-

*) This article was written while I held a Humboldt Postdoctoral Research Fellowship at the University of Cologne. I am greatly indebted to Philomen Probert and Stephanos Matthaios for their feedback on my article.

1) Pseudo-Arcadius’ Epitome is one of the two fully-preserved epitomes of Herodian’s Περὶ καθολικῆς προσῳδίας. The other one is by John Philoponus of Alexandria. See Dickey 2007, 76.

2) As well as reading relevant texts and secondary literature likely to be relevant, for the initial collection of evidence I also made a TLG search for the term οὐσία in grammatical and lexicographical texts up to the 13th century AD.
do-Arcadius’ system: does it go back to Herodian, and how did it come about in the first place?

(ii) The usage of the term οὐσία in Pseudo-Arcadius’ Epitome

There are five passages in which – as we shall see – Pseudo-Arcadius’ epitome of Herodian’s lost Περὶ καθολικῆς προσῳδίας draws a distinction between abstract and concrete nouns:

(1) 121.4–9 Τὰ εἰς ΔΗ λήγοντα ἔχοντα τὴν πρὸ τέλους συλλαβήν βραχείαν μὴ εἰς σύμφωνον καταλήγουσαν, εἰ μὲν κύρια ὦσιν ἢ οὐσίαν σημαίνοι, βαρύνεται· πέδη, κνίδη, σίδη, Νέδη· εἰ δὲ κατὰ πράγματος τάσσοιτο, ὀξύνεται· κομιδή (ἡ ἐπιμέλεια), ἁδή (ἡ ἡδονή), φραδή (ἡ βουλή), χλιδή (ὁ κόσμος).

(2) 34.14–17 Τὰ εἰς ΝΙΣ διβράχεα προσηγορικὰ ὀξύνεται, κατ’ οὐσίας κείμενα Α ἢ Ο παραλήγοντα· ῥανίς, χλανίς, σανίς, ὀνίς, κονίς (τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς), κόνις δὲ τὸ χῶμα. σπάνις καὶ φρόνις οὐκ ἐπὶ οὐσίας.

(3) 112.7–10 Τὰ εἰς Α μακρὸν μονογενῆ τῇ ΕΙ ἢ τῷ Ι μακρῷ παραληγόμενα ἐπὶ οὐσίας τιθέμενα ὀξύνεται· χειά, ζειά (εἶδος κριθῆς), φλιά, θριά. τὸ δὲ μνεία, χρεία βαρύνεται, οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ οὐσίας λαμβάνεται ...

(4) 68.7–12 Τὰ εἰς ΩΜΟΣ δισύλλαβα προσηγορικὰ ἀρχόμενα ἀπὸ συμφώνου μὴ τοῦ Μ, εἰ ἐπὶ οὐσίας τάττοιτο, ὀξύνεται· βωμός, ψωμός, ζωμός, θωμός (ὁ σωρός). τὸ μεντοί κόμος (ἡ ὀδὴ) βαρύνεται καὶ τὸ μῶμος ἀπὸ τοῦ Μ ἄρχεται, καὶ τὸ Ῥῶμος καὶ Κρῶμος (κύριον) βαρύνεται, ὡσπερ τὸ ὄμος.

3) I quote the text of Pseudo-Arcadius’ Epitome from my forthcoming edition, but the page and line numbers are those of Schmidt 1860.
4) Translations of passages of Greek are mine, unless otherwise noted.
Disyllabic common nouns ending in ΩΜΟΣ and beginning with a consonant other than Μ, if they are used of an οὐσία, are oxytone: βωμός, ψωμός, ζωμός, θωμός (‘heap’). But κώμος (‘singing’) is recessive, and μώμος begins with Μ, and Ῥώμος and Κρώμος (a proper name) are recessive, just like οίμος.

(5) 113.20–114.2 Τὰ εἰς Α μακρὸν τρισύλλαβα παραληγόμενα τῷ Ι ἐπὶ οὐσίας λαμβανόμενα βαρύνεται, χωρὶς τινων· καρδία, σχεδία, ζημία, σηπία, οἰκία.

Trisyllabic (words) ending in long Α which have I in their penultimate syllable, understood in relation to an οὐσία, are recessive, apart from a few: καρδία, σχεδία, ζημία, σηπία, οἰκία.

Passages (1)–(5) thus divide the entities denoted by nouns into two groups: οὐσία on the one hand, and πράγματα or non-οὐσία on the other. The table below contains a list of words denoting an οὐσία and a list of words denoting the sort of entity that is contrasted with οὐσία. It is clear from the meanings of the words in the two lists that the distinction between ἐπὶ οὐσίας / κατ’ οὐσίας (vel sim.) and οὐκ ἐπὶ οὐσίας / κατὰ πράγματος is a distinction between concrete and abstract nouns:

<table>
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</table>
| Passage (1) | οὐσίαις σημαίνει πέδη (‘fetter’) κνίδη (‘nettle’) σίδη (‘pomegranate’) | κατὰ πράγματος τάσσεται κομιδή (‘care’) ἁδή (‘pleasure’) φραδή (‘counsel’)
| | | χλιδή (‘luxury’) |
| Passage (2) | κατ’ οὐσίας κείμενα σπάνις ῥανίς (‘drop’) φρόνις (‘prudence, wisdom’) | οὐκ ἐπὶ οὐσίας σάνις (‘board’) ὀνίς (‘ass’s dung’) κονίς (‘louse egg’) |
Pseudo-Arcadius has a single internally coherent system for distinguishing between concrete and abstract nouns. The term οὐσία is consistently used for the sort of entity that concrete nouns denote, while the sort of entity that abstract nouns denote can be called a πρᾶγμα or ‘not an οὐσία’. In passage (1) the term οὐσία is juxtaposed with the term πρᾶγμα. In passages (2) and (3) κατ’ οὐσίας κείμενα and ἐπὶ οὐσίας τιθέμενα are juxtaposed with οὐκ ἐπὶ οὐσίας and οὐ (γὰρ) ἐπὶ οὐσίας λαμβάνεται respectively. In the latter passages it is more relevant for Pseudo-Arcadius to point out that the words in question do not fall under the category κατ’ οὐσίας κείμενα / ἐπὶ οὐσίας τιθέμενα than to give a positive designation for the contrasted category. Differently from passage (1), where words denoting an οὐσία are said to be recessive while those denoting a πρᾶγμα are oxytone, passages (2) and (3) only tell us how to accent words that denote an οὐσία and fulfil various other conditions.

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6) This is LSJ’s gloss rather than a translation of the gloss εἶδος κριθῆς given in the text.

7) The gloss ‘fine’ in its sense ‘sum of money imposed as penalty’ denotes something tangible. However, ζημία can also denote something less tangible (e.g. ‘penalty’ or ‘damage’), but in the context of the other words in this list it is clear that ζημία is included as a word capable of denoting something relatively tangible.
Pseudo-Arcadius notes that certain words do not fall under these rules because they do not denote an οὐσία: what is relevant here is not what kind of entity they do denote but simply that they do not fulfil the condition κατ’ οὐσίας κείμενα or ἐπὶ οὐσίας τιθέμενο.

In passage (4) we are not given a specific term for the notion that contrasts with οὐσία. After a list of examples that illustrate the rule ‘Disyllabic common nouns ending in ΩΜΟΣ and beginning with a consonant other than Μ, if they are used of an οὐσία, are oxytone’, we are told that κώμος (‘singing’) is recessive. One could argue that this word is intended as a straightforward exception to the rule: a disyllabic common noun ending in ΩΜΟΣ and beginning with a consonant other than Μ, used of an οὐσία, but not accented in accordance with the rule. But the other examples mentioned in the same sentence are excluded from the rule because they do not fulfil all the conditions mentioned (‘Disyllabic common nouns ending in ΩΜΟΣ and beginning with a consonant other than Μ, if they are used of an οὐσία’): the word μῶμος (‘blame, reproach’) does not obey the condition ‘beginning with a consonant other than Μ’, while Ρῶμος and Κρῶμος, both proper names, are excluded because the rule applies to προσηγορικά ‘common nouns’, and finally ὦμος must have been cited as an example of a word that fails to meet the condition ‘beginning with a consonant other than Μ’. This suggests that κώμος too fails to fulfil one of the conditions, and the only condition of this rule that κώμος could fail to fulfil is ‘if they are used of an οὐσία’.

(iii) The terms used by other Greek grammarians to distinguish between concrete and abstract nouns

(iiiia) The Τέχνη γραμματική attributed to Dionysius Thrax and the scholia to the Τέχνη

We find a distinction between abstract and concrete nouns in the Τέχνη γραμματική attributed to Dionysius Thrax (passage [6]) and in two scholia to Dionysius Thrax (passages [7] and [8]):

8) It is not the purpose of the present study to answer the fiercely debated question of the authenticity or lack of authenticity of this Τέχνη γραμματική. On this issue one can consult the essays in Law / Sluiter 1995, Di Benedetto 2000, 394–400, De Jonge 2008, 91–95, Matthaios 2009, 386–400, and Pagani 2010, 390–409.
όνομα is a part of speech with cases, signifying a σώμα or a πράγμα (a σώμα like λίθος ['stone'] and a πράγμα like παιδεία ['education']), and employed generally or individually (generally as in ἄνθρωπος ['man'], ἵππος ['horse'], or individually as in Σωκράτης). The ὀνόμα has five accidents: genders, derivational statuses (i.e. primitive or derived), compositional statuses (i.e. simple or compound), numbers and cases.

The distinguishing characteristic of the ὀνόμα is that it signifies an οὐσία; and an οὐσία is something that exists in itself, that does not need another (thing) in order to exist; and some of the οὐσίαι are perceived through the senses, while others are perceived through the mind.

In passage (6), the terms σώμα and πράγμα convey the kinds of entities denoted by concrete and abstract nouns respectively. The examples λίθος and παιδεία help to give an idea of what is meant by these terms: a σώμα is a tangible entity, while a πράγμα is an intangible entity.11

Passages (7) and (8) distinguish between the kinds of entities denoted by concrete and abstract nouns with the terms αἰσθητὴ οὐσία (‘an οὐσία perceived through the senses’) and νοητὴ οὐσία (‘an οὐσία perceived through thought’). The αἰσθητὴ οὐσία correspond to the σώμα that we find in the Τέχνη γραμματική...
buted to Dionysius Thrax, while the νοηταὶ οὐσίαι correspond to the πράγμα. Thus, in passages (7) and (8) the term οὐσία does not independently convey the kind of entity denoted by a concrete noun but needs an additional qualification.

(iiib) P. Yale 1.25

Another distinction between concrete and abstract nouns is found in P. Yale 1.25 (= Wouters [1979] 47–60; 1st century AD):

(9) [...] ὀνόμα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν λέξις [...] [σίμαν ἰδίαν σώματος ἢ πράγματος] [πημαίνουσα, χιορίς χρόνου πτώσε-] [ον ἐπιδεκτι]κή, οἴον Ὄμηρος, Πάρις

... an ὀνόμα is thus a word which indicates the individual οὐσία of a σώμα or πράγμα, without tense and displaying cases, like Ὄμηρος, Πάρις

In passage (9), the term οὐσία is supplemented by σώματος ἢ πράγματος (column 1, lines 6–9).13 The phrase (ἰδία) οὐσία πράγματος

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12) See also the discussion in Schoemann 1862, 80. The division of οὐσίαι into αἰσθηταί and νοηταί, apart from these two scholia to Dionysius Thrax, is also found in the commentators on Aristotle. Ammonius, in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories, has the phrase τῶν οὐσιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι νοηταὶ αἱ δὲ αἰσθηταί (CAG 4.4, 45.17), which is almost verbatim the same phrase as in passage (8). Similar phrases containing this distinction are also found in other commentators on Aristotle, as for example Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Metaph. CAG 1, 175.18–19, 191.15–16) and Philoponus (in APo. 13.3, 338.5–6, 338.30–31).

13) The background to the use of the term οὐσία in the definition of ὀνόμα is the Aristotelian tradition. See further Schoemann 1862, 81, Steinhall 1891, 237–43, and more recently Matthaios 1999, 211–12. Although no definition of ὀνόμα has come down to us from Aristotle, in his Categories (2a11–19) he distinguishes between the πρῶται οὐσίαι (primary substances) and the δεύτεραι οὐσίαι (secondary substances). Simplicius, one of Aristotle’s commentators, explains that the πρῶται οὐσίαι are individuals, in other words the entities denoted by proper names, as for example Σωκράτης, and the δεύτεραι οὐσίαι are the species within which the πρῶται οὐσίαι are included, in other words entities denoted by common nouns, as for example ἄνθρωπος (in Cat. CAG 8, 80.28–29 πρῶτος μὲν τὰς ἀτόμους οὐσίας ἐδέστο, δευτέρας δὲ τὰς κοινὰς καὶ ἀπλὰς [‘he assigned as first the individual substances, while as second the common and general ones’]). The term οὐσία appears also in the two definitions of ὀνόμα attested in Plato’s Cratylus, at 388b13–388c1 ὀνόμα ἃρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικόν τῆς οὐσίας ὀρίστερες κερκίς ψαφάματος [‘therefore a name is an instrument for teaching and for separating being, as a pin-beater is for a web’, translated by Ademollo 2011, 110] and at 436e2–4 ὡς τοῦ παντός ἱόντος τε καὶ φερομένου καὶ ῥέοντος φαιμεν σημαίνεϊν ἡμῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ
presents a problem. At first sight, one could think that \( (ἰδίω) \) οὐσία σώματος signifies an entity denoted by a concrete noun and \( (ἰδίω) \) οὐσία πράγματος one denoted by an abstract noun. However, in lines 3–4 and 10 ἀρσηγορία appears as another part of speech, not subsumed under ονόμα.\(^{14}\) Given this, it is unlikely that ονόμα here covers anything more than proper names. In fact, after Chrysippus’ distinction between ονόμα and ἀρσηγορία the term ονόμα can be used to signify proper names exclusively.\(^{15}\) The first editor of this papyrus, Hubbell, suggested as a solution to this problem that \( ἥ \) πράγματος should be bracketed.\(^{16}\) In defence of maintaining \( ἥ \) πράγματος Wouters argued that “to the earliest Stoics the ονόμα (κύριον) is a ‘more genuine’ name than the ἀρσηγορία”, thus considering that the terms ονόμα κύριον and ἀρσηγορία do not correspond to ‘proper name’ and ‘class-name’ respectively.\(^{17}\) This point loses ground because of Chrysippus’ distinction between ονόμα and ἀρσηγορία. Wouters also suggested that “the addition of σώματος ἥ πράγματος to οὐσίαν ἰδίαν by the grammarian of P. Yale 1.25 was presumably inspired by Dionysius Thrax’s definition”.\(^{18}\) This, of course, would presuppose that the definition of ονόμα we find in P. Yale 1.25 was later than the one found in the Τέχνη γραμματική – which is possible regardless of the date of the Τέχνη γραμματική itself. The problem in P. Yale 1.25 has no easy solution, but what matters for our purposes is that οὐσία in passage (9) once again requires an additional qualification (σώματος) in order to convey an entity denoted by a concrete noun. The term also needs an additional qualification (πράγματος) in order to convey an entity denoted by an abstract noun, if this point was indeed intended in the text.

\( \)ονόματα (‘we say that names signify being for us on the assumption that everything moves and is carried about and flows’, translated by Ademollo 2011, 438). In Aristotle, Simplicius, and Plato, however, the term οὐσία does not appear in the context of distinguishing between concrete and abstract nouns.

\(^{14}\) To be more precise, Hubbell 1933, 190 and Wouters 1979, 49 read ἀρσηγορία in line 3 and reconstruct -γορία at the beginning of line 4. ἀρσηγορία in line 10 is a reconstruction on the basis of the preserved sections of the definition and the example given.

\(^{15}\) See Wouters 1979, 53 and Matthaios 1996, 55, 71.

\(^{16}\) Hubbell 1933, 191. See also the discussion in Matthaios 1996, 70–71. As an alternative solution along similar lines, an anonymous reviewer tentatively suggested adding μάλλων before ἥ πράγματος.

\(^{17}\) Wouters 1979, 53.

\(^{18}\) Wouters 1979, 53. See also the discussion in Matthaios 1996, 70–71.
Thus, in passages (7), (8), and (9), by contrast with (1)–(5), the term οὐσία does not independently signify the kind of entity denoted by a concrete noun. By itself the term signifies the entity denoted by any noun, and to signify the entity denoted by a concrete noun it needs an additional qualification.

The table below summarises the terminology used by Greek grammarians other than Pseudo-Arcadius to distinguish between concrete and abstract nouns:

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passage (6)</td>
<td>σῶμα σημαίνει</td>
<td>πράγμα σημαίνει</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>λίθος ('stone')</td>
<td>παιδεία ('education')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage (7)</td>
<td>αἰσθητὴ οὐσία</td>
<td>νοητὴ οὐσία</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage (8)</td>
<td>αἰσθηταὶ οὐσίαι</td>
<td>νοηταὶ οὐσίαι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage (9)</td>
<td>οὐσίαν ἰδίαν</td>
<td>Ὅμηρος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>σώματος σημαίνει</td>
<td>Πάρις</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iv) The terms used in philosophical texts to distinguish between concrete and abstract nouns

Given the Aristotelian background of the term οὐσία, one would like to know if any philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition employed the term οὐσία exclusively with regard to concrete nouns.19

Ammonius in his commentary on Porphyrius’ Introduction considers that both the σῶμα (‘corporeal being’) and the ἀσώματον (‘incorporeal being’) are types of οὐσία (passage [10]):20

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19) See also footnote 13 above.

20) The distinction between σῶμα and ἀσώματον is found in Aristotle at Cael. 305a17–18 πάν γὰρ τὸ γίνομεν ὃν τινι γίγνεται καὶ ἢτοι ἀσώματον ἔσται ἐν ὃ ἡ γένεσις, ἢ ἐξεῖ σῶμα (‘for everything that comes into being, comes into being in something, and that in which the generation takes place will either be incorporeal or will possess body’).
Porphyrius, in his commentary on Ptolemaeus’ Ἀρμονικά, combines the Aristotelian distinction between σῶμα and ἀσώματον with the distinction between αἰσθητά and νοητά. Thus, in passage (11) αἰσθητά and νοητά differ in terms of their species of οὐσία:

(11) Λέγεται τοίνυν νοητὸν ἰδίως, ὃ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν διενήνοχε τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὡς ἔστι μόνα τὰ ἀσώματα νοητὰ καὶ καθάπαξ ὅσα μὴ σώματα.
(Porph. In Harm. 17.13–4)

What is specifically called ‘perceived through thought’ is that which differs in terms of οὐσία itself from the things perceived through the senses, because only incorporeal beings are perceived through thought, and to put it briefly everything that is not a σώμα.

For both Ammonius and Porphyrius, the term οὐσία thus covers both tangible and intangible entities. There is no evidence that any philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition use the term οὐσία exclusively for tangible entities such as could be denoted by concrete nouns.

(v) The ways in which other Greek grammarians use the term οὐσία

We have seen in section (iii) that some grammatical texts (passages [7], [8], and [9]) employ the term οὐσία together with an additional qualification to indicate concrete and abstract nouns. We will now investigate cases where the term οὐσία is employed in other contexts.

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21) CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca.
22) Cf. passages In Porph. CAG 4.3, 70.14 and 77.16–17. Similar passages are found in Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Metaph. CAG 1, 267.29–30) and in Philoponus (in APr. CAG 13.2, 15.14).
23) Compare the distinction between αἰσθητά and νοητά οὐσίαι in passages (7) and (8), but in passage (11) the terms αἰσθητά and νοητά do not qualify οὐσία. Instead, it is implied that things perceived through thought (νοητά) and things perceived through the senses (αἰσθητά) all have an οὐσία of one kind or the other.
In the Τέχνη γραμματική attributed to Dionysius Thrax, the
term οὐσία is used in the definition of κύρια and προσηγορικά:

(12) κύριον μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ τὴν ἰδίαν οὐσίαν σημαίνον, οἰον Ὅμηρος, Σωκράτης. προσηγορικὸν δὲ ἐστι τὸ τὴν κοινὴν οὐσίαν σημαίνον, οἰον ἄνδρωπος, ἵππος.
(D.T. GG i.i 33.6–34.2)

A proper name is one signifying an individual οὐσία, like Ὅμηρος, Σω-
κράτης. And a common noun is the one signifying a shared οὐσία, like ἄνδρωπος, ἵππος.

The terms ἰδία οὐσία and κοινὴ οὐσία here convey the entities de-
noted by proper names (κύρια ὀνόματα) and common nouns (προ-
σηγορικά) respectively.24 The distinction between concrete and ab-
stract nouns is not raised in this passage, but the use of the term
οὐσία is consistent with its use in the scholia to Dionysius Thrax
(passages [7] and [8]). The entity denoted by any noun is termed an
οὐσία, and this term is further qualified in order to distinguish the
entities denoted by different sorts of nouns – abstract and concrete
nouns in passages (7) and (8), or proper and common nouns in pas-
sage (12).

In Apollonius Dyscolus, in the context of a distinction be-
tween ἀντωνυμίαι (‘pronouns’) and ὀνόματα (‘nominals’),25 pro-
nouns are said to signify an οὐσία, while ὀνόματα signify an οὐσία
μετὰ ποιότητος (‘οὐσία with a quality’):26

(13) οὐσίαν σημαίνουσιν αἱ ἀντωνυμίαι, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐσίαν μετὰ
ποιότητος
(A.D. Pron. GG ii.i 27.9–10)27

the pronouns signify an οὐσία, while the nouns (signify) an οὐσία with
a quality

24) See also Lallot 1998, 150.
25) I use the word ‘nominal’ as a cover term for nouns and adjectives.
26) See also the discussion in Schmidt 1859, 232 and Steinthal 1891, 239–41.
27) Apollonius’ οὐσία μετὰ ποιότητος finds a successor about seven centuries
later, when Choeroboscus (in Theod. GG iv.i 106.3–10) mentions the definition of
In suggesting that ὀνόματα refer to a being (οὐσία) and convey a quality (ποιότης), the phrase οὐσίαν μετὰ ποιότητος appears to combine the Aristotelian and the Stoic traditions. Pronouns, as opposed to nouns, refer to someone or something without telling us anything about this entity: in other words they do not indicate a quality (ποιότης) (cf. A.D. Pron. GG ii.i 4.1–2). Apollonius makes no distinction here between abstract and concrete nouns, but his distinction between nouns and pronouns suggests once again that the entity denoted by any noun (and indeed any pronoun) is considered an οὐσία.

Further evidence for Apollonius’ use of the term οὐσία comes from his Syntax, where we find the phrase γενικὴ οὐσία. The idea here is that by referring to a particular individual, a proper name implicitly conveys also the category it belongs to, so that a common noun can be understood (e.g. Trypho implies also ‘man’). The supplement γενικήν was introduced by Franciscus Portus on the basis of Priscian (GLK29 III 122.5–6 generalem substantiam):30

(14) ὑπάρξιν τινος ὑποκειμένου ἐπιζητοῦντές φαμεν τίς κινεῖται; τίς περιπατεῖ; τίς λαλεῖ; προδήλου μὲν οὔσης τῆς κινήσεως, τῆς περιπατήσεως, τῆς λαλίας, τοῦ δὲ ἐνεργοῦντος προσώπου καθεστῶτος. ἐνθὲ καὶ αἱ ἀνθυπαγωγαὶ ὀνοματικαὶ γίνονται, προσηγορικαὶ ἢ κύρια.

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28) This mixing of the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions can be also seen in Priscian, who follows Apollonius Dyscolus closely at Institutiones Grammaticae 2.18: proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare (‘it is characteristic of a nomen to signify a substance and a quality’). See also the discussion in Schmidt 1859, 233 and Jeep 1893, 124–25.

29) GLK = Grammatici Latini edited by Keil.

30) See Lallot 1997, II 27 n. 95. In his critical apparatus Uhlig 1910, 29 reports that Egenolff in his copy of Bekker’s edition noted his preference for the word κοινή instead of γενικήν.
When we seek the identity of someone given, we say 'who is moving?', 'who is walking?', 'who is talking?', when the motion, the walking, and the talking are manifest, while the person acting is unclear. The replies are nominal, either common nouns or proper names, with proper names also revealing a general οὐσία. For we say 'the man is walking' or 'the horse (is walking)', or 'Trypho (is walking)', with 'the man' again implied.

Once again no distinction between abstract and concrete nouns is made, and the term οὐσία conveys the entity denoted by any noun.

In Choeroboscus’ commentary on Theodosius the term οὐσία is used in connection with the pronoun τίς, and is employed in the context of distinguishing between an individual entity and its properties. The pronoun τίς, by contrast with the other interrogative pronouns which are said to be ζητητικά περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν (‘asking after the properties of the οὐσία’), is said to be αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας ζητητικόν (‘asking after the οὐσία itself’):

(15) πάλιν ἀποροῦσί τινες λέγοντες, τί δήποτε τῶν πευστικῶν ἁπάντων ἀπὸ τοῦ Π ἀρχομένων, οἷον ποῖος πόσος πηλίκος πόστος ποδαπός, μόνον τὸ τίς ἀπὸ τοῦ Τ ἀρχεται; καὶ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὸ τίς αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ ζητητικόν, οἷον τίς ἐστι Σωκράτης; (τίς ἐστι) Πλάτων; Πλάτων: τὰ ἀλλὰ πευστικὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰσὶ ζητητικὰ, οἷον τὸ ποῖος πολύτητος, τὸ πόσος ποσότητος, τὸ πηλίκος πηλικότητος, τὸ ποδαπός ἔθνους, τὸ πόστος τάξεως ἐπειδή ὄν τὸ τίς αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ ζητητικόν, τῶν ἀλλων πευστικῶν ζητητικῶν ὄντων τῶν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἰκότως ὡς διαλλάξαν περὶ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρὸς τὰ ἀλλὰ πευστικὰ διήλλαξε καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ οὐκ ἀρχεται ἀπὸ τοῦ Π. τῶν ἄλλων ἀπὸ τοῦ Π ἀρχομένων.

(Choerob. in Theod. GG iv.i 193.15–25)

Again some raise the question, “Why among all the interrogatives beginning with π, like ποίος πόσος πηλίκος πόστος ποδαπός, does only τίς begin with a Τ?”. And it is possible to give this reason: that τίς asks after the οὐσία itself, as in τίς ἐστι Σωκράτης; (τίς ἐστι) Πλάτων: The other interrogatives ask after the properties of the οὐσία, as in ποίος after quality, πόσος after quantity, πηλίκος after size, ποδαπός after nationality, πόστος after position in a series. So since τίς asks after the οὐσία itself, while all the other interrogatives ask after the properties of the οὐσία, just as τίς differs in meaning in comparison with the other interrogatives, so it reasonably differs also with regard to its beginning, and it does not begin with a π while the others begin with π.

(16) πάλιν ἀποροῦσι τινες λέγοντες, τί δήποτε πάντων τῶν πευστικῶν μή ὄντων ζητητικῶν αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας ἄλλα τῶν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, οἶον
Again some raise the question, “Why among all the interrogatives which do not ask after the οὐσία itself but after the properties of the οὐσία – like ποίος after quality, πόσος after quantity, πηλίκος after size, πόστος after position in a series, and ποδαπός after nationality –, does only τίς ask after the οὐσία itself?” For on being asked ‘τίς ἐστι;’ we say Σωκράτης (or) Πλάτων.

No distinction between abstract and concrete nouns is drawn here, but the use of οὐσία is consistent with the use we have seen consistently except in Pseudo-Arcadius: the referent of any noun or pronoun, regardless of tangibility or intangibility, is termed an οὐσία.

(vi) Should the use of the term οὐσία be attributed to Pseudo-Arcadius or Herodian?

At this point, one might ask if the use of the term οὐσία in Pseudo-Arcadius should be attributed to Herodian, or rather to the epitomator or some intermediate source. Pseudo-Arcadius tells us in his preface that his work is an abridgement of Herodian’s Περὶ καθολικῆς προσῳδίας, and that he has divided complex rules of Herodian’s into larger numbers of simpler rules. There is no evidence to suggest that he altered Herodian’s terminology, but on the other hand this cannot be ruled out. If we wish to decide whether the term οὐσία should be attributed to Herodian or Pseudo-Arcadius, we would ideally be able to find evidence on Herodian’s use of the term from his other works. Of these, however, only the Περὶ μονήρους λέξεως survives in its entirety, while other works are preserved in epitomes or fragments. In his collected edition of Herodian’s works, Lentz made a compilation of various Herodianic sources, but his reconstruction of Herodian is notoriously speculative. Lentz’s reconstruction of Herodian’s Περὶ ὀνομάτων contains two passages where the term οὐσία is used (GG iii.ii 622.6–16, GG iii.ii 622.37–42). These passages come from Choero-

31) For a list of Herodian’s works see Dickey 2014, 325–45.
boscus’ commentary on Theodosius: they are our passages (15) and (16). As we have seen, the term οὐσία is used here in the sense that we consistently find in authors other than Pseudo-Arcadius: οὐσία simply signifies the referent of any expression that has a referent. However, these passages do not contain any evidence allowing the term οὐσία to be attributed to Herodian. Thus, it cannot be decided with certainty whether the unique use of the term οὐσία we find in Pseudo-Arcadius should be attributed to Herodian, to Pseudo-Arcadius, or to some intermediate source.

(vii) Conclusion

In conclusion, our examination of the term οὐσία has shown that the use of this term in Pseudo-Arcadius’ Epitome differs from (i) the terms used by other ancient Greek scholars to distinguish between concrete and abstract nouns, and (ii) the ways in which other Greek scholars use the term οὐσία. Pseudo-Arcadius contrasts with all our other ancient Greek scholars in the place that the term οὐσία occupies in the system for distinguishing between concrete and abstract nouns. For Pseudo-Arcadius nouns denote an οὐσία if they are concrete or a πρᾶγμα (or ‘not an οὐσία’) if they are abstract. For other ancient scholars who use the term οὐσία in connection with nouns, all nouns denote an οὐσία: concrete nouns denote one type of οὐσία whereas abstract nouns denote another. Given that no predecessor for this use of the term οὐσία has been discovered so far, even in texts of a similar genre and philosophical background, Pseudo-Arcadius’ use should probably be considered an innovation on the part of Herodian, the epitomator, or an intermediate source, although an antecedent might come to light in the future.

At this point we might ask how this innovation came about in the first place. The word οὐσία is derived from the verb εἶναι ‘to be’, and ought to mean ‘existence’ or ‘something that exists’.34 For all the other ancient scholars we have considered, an οὐσία is something that exists in a tangible or intangible sense. Herodian or Pseudo-Arcadius (or even an intermediate source) has interpreted exis-

34) On the interpretation of the term οὐσία in Plato as a nominalization of the existential εἶναι see Ademollo 2011, 110.
tence in a more concrete and perhaps more intuitive sense: only the entities denoted by concrete nouns really exist, as it were, or can be called οὐσίαι.

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