ARISTOTLE, ANTISTHENES OF RHODES, AND THE MAGIKOS*

Among the many lost works that ancient writers attributed to Aristotle is a piece entitled *Magikos*. The only substantial discussion of this work is that of Valentin Rose published a century and a half ago; since his analysis rests on some questionable assumptions that have never been closely examined, it is perhaps time for a reconsideration of the evidence. Although the evidence is scanty, we can nevertheless reach a better understanding of the work’s probable nature and, in turn, of the tradition to which it belonged.

Rose assigned five fragments to the *Magikos*.¹ F 32 comes from Diogenes Laertius: “Aristotle says that a certain *magus*, who came from Syria to Athens, made several observations about Socrates, most notably that he would have a violent end”.² F 33 is from the *Suda*, which, in its entry on Antisthenes, says that “he composed ten volumes; first is *Magikos*. It tells about Zoroaster, a certain *magus* who discovered wisdom. But certain people attribute this to Aristotle, and others to Rhodon”.³ F 34 comes from the elder Pliny’s discussion of magic: “Eudoxus, who wanted it [i. e., the magical art] to be considered the most illustrious and use-

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*) I owe thanks to the Editor, an anonymous reader, and my colleague Jeremy Trevett for their suggestions, and especially to Robert Phillips for all his advice and encouragement.

¹) I follow here the numbering of V. Rose, Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta (Leipzig 1886), in which he prints the same passages in the same order as in his Aristoteles pseudopigraphus (Leipzig 1863); I give also the numbering of O. Gigon, Aristotelis Opera III: Librorum deperditorum fragmenta (Berlin/New York 1987).

²) Diog. Laert. 2.45 = Aristotle F 32 Rose = F 663 Gigon: φησὶ δ’ Ἱ’ Ἀριστοτέλης μάγον τινά ἠλθόντα ἐκ Συρίας εἰς Ἀθηνᾶς τά τε ἄλλα καταγνώναι τοῦ Σωκράτους, καὶ δὴ καὶ βίαιον ἔσεθαι τὴν τελευτὴν αὐτῷ.

³) Suda A 2723 Adler = Aristotle F 33 Rose = F 665 Gigon: οὗτος συνέγραψε τόμους δέκα πρῶτον μαγικόν ἀφηγεῖται δὲ περὶ Ζωραοστροῦ τινὸς μάγου, εὑρόντος τὴν σοφίαν· τούτῳ δὲ τινὲς Ἀριστοτέλει, οἱ δὲ Ρώδωνι ἀνατιθέασιν.
ful of the systems of wisdom, asserted that this Zoroaster lived six thousand years before the death of Plato, and Aristotle agrees”.

The last two are again from Diogenes Laertius, this time from the discussion of ‘barbarian philosophers’ in his preface. He opens by surveying the various groups to whom the role was attributed (F 35): “among the Persians there were the magi, and among the Babylonians or Assyrians the Chaldeans, and the Gymnosophists among the Indians, and among the Celts and Galatians the ones called Druids and Semnotheoi, as Aristotle says in the *Magikos* and Sotion in book twenty-three of his *Succession*”. A little later, he has a more detailed if somewhat rambling account of the *magi* in particular: they spend their time in the worship of the gods; they make fire and earth and water the origins of the gods; they condemn the use of images; they consider cremation impious but not intercourse with their mothers or daughters, a piece of information for which he again cites Sotion’s twenty-third book. After further discussion of their customs, he says (F 36) that “they know nothing of goetic μαγεῖα, as Aristotle says in the *Magikos* and Dinon in the fifth book of the *Histories*”.

The first thing to note about these passages is that only three of them cite the *Magikos* by name; Diogenes in F 32 and Pliny in F 34 refer merely to Aristotle. The attribution of these two passages to the *Magikos* is thus prima facie quite uncertain. Rose himself more or less admitted that his assignment of F 34 was arbitrary, and Werner Jaeger argued cogently that it should be assigned instead to Aristotle’s lost dialogue *Peri philosophías*. In contrast, Rose had very specific reasons for assigning F 32 to the *Magikos*; indeed, it was central to his overall interpretation of that work.

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4) Plin. NH 30.3 = Aristotle F 34 Rose = F 664 Gigon: *Eudoxus, qui inter sapientiae sectas clarissimam utilissimamque eam [i.e., artem magicam] intelligi voluit, Zoroastrem hunc sex milibus annorum ante Platonis mortem fuisse prodidit, sic et Aristoteles*. 

5) Diog. Laert. 1.1 = Aristotle F 35 Rose = F 661 Gigon: *γεγενήθη δὲ παρὰ μὲν Πέρσαις Μάγους, παρὰ δὲ Βαβυλωνίως ἢ Ἀσσυρίως Χαλδαίοις, καὶ Γυμνοσοφίστας παρ’ Ἰνδίοις, παρὰ τε Κελτοῖς καὶ Γαλάταις τούς καλουμένους Δρυίδας καὶ Σεμνοθέους, καθὼς φησίν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Μαγικῷ καὶ Σωτίων ἐν τῷ εἰκοστῷ τρίτῳ τῆς Διαδοχῆς*. 

6) Diog. Laert. 1.8 = Aristotle F 36 Rose = F 662 Gigon: *τὴν δὲ γοητικήν μαγείαν οὐδ’ ἐγκωσάν, φησίν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Μαγικῷ καὶ Δείνων ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ τῶν Ιστοριῶν*. 

Taking his cue from the attribution of the *Magikos* to Antisthenes, Rose proposed that it was a dialogue whose scenario was set out in F 32: a *magus* visits Athens and converses with Socrates. This interpretation also determined the order in which he placed the fragments: he put F 32 first because in his view it provided the crucial evidence about the nature of the work, and he put F 33 second because the attribution of the work to Antisthenes corroborated his assumption about its nature.

Rose’s interpretation is ingenious and apparently coherent, and has won the assent of other scholars. Yet it depends on problematic assumptions. First, he assumes that the attribution of the work to Antisthenes is evidence that it took the form of a Socratic dialogue. Since Antisthenes apparently also wrote in other formats, however, the attribution in itself is hardly cogent evidence. Moreover, the work was also attributed to Aristotle, who so far as we know did not write Socratic dialogues at all, and there is no reason why the attribution to Antisthenes should carry more weight. Secondly, Rose assumes that F 32 describes the scenario of a dialogue, although there is nothing in the passage itself to suggest this; on the contrary, it reads just like all the other anecdotes that Diogenes Laertius records. In short, Rose’s hypothesis that the *Magikos* was a dialogue has no basis in the evidence. But without it, there is no compelling reason to assign F 32 to the *Magikos* at all. The mere fact

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8) E.g., F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, Supplementband II: Sotion (Basel 1978) 66–7.

9) Rose, Pseudepigraphus (above n. 1) 50 asserts that “scilicet ex Suida (s. \'Αντισθενης) discimus eundem librum ab accuratoribus Antistheni adscriptum fuisse” (emphasis added), but I can find nothing in the *Suda* entry itself to support this characterization.

10) As further support, Rose cited other examples from the fourth century BCE of dialogues between Greek philosophers and representatives of ‘alien wisdom’: Heraclides Ponticus’ dialogue *Zoroaster* (Plut. Adv. Colot. 14, 1115a = Heraclides F 68 Wehrli) and Clearchus’ dialogue *On Sleep*, in which Aristotle, as one of the chief interlocutors, describes his encounter with a Jew (Jos. Ap. 1.175–82 = Clearchus F 6 Wehrli). But the former is far too poorly known to provide a meaningful parallel (H. B. Gottschalk, Heraclides of Pontus [Oxford 1980] 111–12), and in the latter it is by no means clear that Clearchus included an actual dialogue between Aristotle and the Jew. Rose also noted the possible influence of Aristoxenus’ story of a conversation between Socrates and an Indian (Eus. Praep. Evang. 11.3 = Aristoxenus F 53 Wehrli), but did not point out that this parallel, which is the most exact of those he cited, weighs more in favor of F 32 being simply an anecdote rather than the scenario of a dialogue.
that it mentions a *magus* is hardly decisive, since as I shall discuss below Aristotle referred to *magi* in other contexts. Moreover, a wide range of spurious works circulated under his name; we need merely consider the paradoxography of *On Marvelous Things Heard* to get some sense of what sorts of information might be attributed to him.\(^{11}\) Given our limited knowledge about both the genuine lost works of Aristotle and these pseudepigrapha, we can only guess about Diogenes’ source for his anecdote; although the *Magikos* is a not unreasonable guess, it is no more than that. F 32 is thus a very uncertain foundation for an interpretation, and we would do better to build instead on the definite references to this work, i. e., F 33, 35, and 36.

The best place to begin is with its title: indeed, the title is the only thing to indicate that these three passages all refer to the same work.\(^{12}\) The titles given to prose works generally followed certain conventions, so that a title of a particular sort is usually a good indication that the work to which it was given belonged to a particular genre. Consequently, the title *Magikos* provides a clue to the nature of the work itself. This is true even if the author himself was not responsible for the title. It is in fact very unclear whether the authors of prose works gave them specific titles at all, at least before the Hellenistic period; what we regard as titles may in practice have been no more than conventional ways of referring to particular types of works.\(^{13}\) If so, titles ought to have even more predictive value, since they would have depended not on the whims of individual authors but on conventions widespread among the sorts of people who referred to or quoted from publicly available texts.

\(^{11}\) Some form of this text was attributed to Aristotle at least by the time of Athenaeus (12.541a); see further A. Giannini, Studi sulla paradossografia greca, II, Da Callimaco all’età imperiale: la letteratura paradossografica, Acme 17 (1964) 99–140 at 133–5. I owe this reference to Robert Phillips.

\(^{12}\) It is even possible that the reference in the *Suda* (F 33) and those in Diogenes Laertius (F 35 and 36) do not concern the same work, although the *Suda’s* mention of possible Aristotelian authorship and the similarity in the allusions to its contents make this a very strong probability.

\(^{13}\) On titles in general, see E. Nachmanson, *Der griechische Buchtitel: einige Beobachtungen* (Göteborg 1941) and J.-C. Fredouille, M. O. Goulet-Cazé, P. Hoffmann, and P. Petitmengin (eds.), *Titres et articulations du texte dans les œuvres antiques: Actes du Colloque International de Chantilly 13–15 décembre 1994* (Paris 1997); I owe thanks to my colleague Jeremy Trevett for his guidance on this issue.
The title *Magikos* is presumably short for ὁ μαγικὸς λόγος. The method of referring to a prose work by means of a masculine adjective in agreement with λόγος dates back to the first half of the fourth century BCE. Thus Plato describes Socrates’ speech in *Phaedrus* as an ἐρωτικός λόγος (Phdr. 227c) and his speech in *Menexenus* as an ἐπιτάφιος λόγος (Men. 236b). Although in these cases the terms function more as names for types of speeches than as titles for specific speeches, by the latter part of the fourth century BCE they seem to be well on the way to becoming actual titles. So for example Isocrates, in his *Philippus* of 346 BCE, can refer to his πανηγυρικός (Isocr. 5.9 etc.): he clearly expects that his readers will know that this is not just any πανηγυρικός λόγος, but the famous *Panegyrikos* of 380 BCE. This development is even clearer in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, in which he can casually cite “Isocrates in the *Panegyrikos*” or “Socrates in the *Epitaphios*”.

Aristotle also provides the earliest evidence for naming speeches after a particular place, such as the *Messeniaikos* of Alcidamas (Rhet. 1.13,1373b18) or the *Olympikos logos* of Gorgias (Rhet. 3.14,1414b31). By the Hellenistic period this convention was clearly well established, so that even now it is customary to refer to the *Areopagitikos* and the *Panathenaikos* of Isocrates, or the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* of Demosthenes.

But this form of title was used chiefly for speeches; for other genres, other conventions became established. Dialogues, for example, were typically either named after one of their major characters or given a descriptive title in which a noun denoting the topic was the object of the preposition περί; by the first century BCE it was apparently conventional to assign dialogues a double title that included each type.

Prose treatises, for their part, were usually assigned titles either in the περί form or in the form of

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13) Aristotle, Antisthenes of Rhodes, and the Magikos
14) Rhet. 3.7, 1408b15 (cf. 3.17, 1418a31): Ἡσιοκράτης ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ; Rhet. 3.14, 1415b30: Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιτάφιῳ.
15) According to Diogenes Laertius (3.57), Thrasyllus used double titles for all of Plato’s dialogues, e.g., Εὐθυπρότον ἦ περί ὀσίου, Φαίδων ἦ περὶ γυνῆς, Θεαίτητος ἦ περὶ ἐπιστήμης; J. Mansfeld, Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text (Leiden 1994) 71–3, convincingly argues that Thrasyllus only generalized an existing tendency. That the practice of giving dialogues a double title was already conventional is suggested by the titles of Varro’s *logistorici*, e.g., *Marius de fortuna* (Macr. Sat. 3.18.5) and *Messalla de valetudini* (Prob. Buc. 6.31), and by Cicero’s *Cato maior de senectute* (Cic. Amic. 4; cf. Div. 2.3 and Att. 14.21.3).
neuter plural adjectives, such as we find in the extant works of Aristotle, e.g., Περὶ ποιητικῆς or Πολιτικά. It was relatively rare, however, for philosophical works of any sort to be given titles in the logos-form that was used for speeches. There were various exceptions to this general trend, of which by far the most important was the title Protreptikos.16 This title was assigned to works by a range of philosophers, the best known and most important being the Protreptikos of Aristotle. In this case, there is an obvious explanation for the title, since the work was written in the form of a prose address, i.e., a written speech.17 These conventions in titles were by the first century BCE so well established that when Cicero, following the lead of Aristotle, wrote a protreptic work of his own but cast it in dialogue form he gave it a title of the appropriate type, Hortensius.18 Given these conventions, we would expect a dialogue between Socrates and a magus, such as Rose proposed, to have been given the title Magos rather than Magikos.

It is of course true that some philosophical dialogues were assigned titles in the form of a singular masculine adjective. The most obvious example is Plato’s Politikos, which might at first glance seem an obvious parallel to Magikos. But the parallel is deceptive, since in the Platonic title πολιτικός is undoubtedly meant to be in agreement with ἀνήρ, not λόγος, as the symmetry with its companion piece Σωφριτής reveals. It is extremely unlikely that the same was true of μαγικός, since the existence of the noun μάγος made the periphrasis μαγικός ἀνήρ unnecessary. In other cases, however, it is not so easy to decide whether a title implies ἀνήρ or

16) Two of Xenophon’s prose treatises have titles in this form, Kynegetikos and Hipparchikos. We may also note that Diogenes Laertius credits various philosophers with works entitled Ἐρωτικός, e.g., Eucleides of Megara (2.108), Aristotle (5.43), Theophrastus (5.43), Demetrius of Phalerum (5.81), and Heraclides Ponticus (5.87); the title perhaps looks back to Socrates’ ἐρωτικός λόγος in the Phaedrus.

17) Diogenes Laertius assigns protreptikoi to Aristippus (2.85), Plato (3.60, as an alternative title for Clitophon), Aristotle (5.22), Theophrastus (5.49), Demetrius of Phalerum (5.81), and Epicurus (10.28). The earliest definite reference to Aristotle’s work under this title is in Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Top. 110a23 = F 51 Rose = F 55.1 Gigon), although W. Jaeger, Aristotle (Oxford 1948) 58–60, argued that the reference to “those who write protreptikoi λόγοι to their friends” in Ad Demonicum ([Isocr.] 1.3) was in fact a specific reference to Aristotle by one of Isocrates’ pupils. Whether or not one accepts his argument, the passage does point to the origins of this title as a descriptive term for a particular type of speech.

18) I follow the observation of Jaeger (above n. 17) 55; for the title, see Cic. Div. 2. 1.
λόγος. The two most striking occur among the works of Xenophon: *Oikonomikos* and *Tyrannikos* (an alternative title for *Hiero*). It is certainly possible that whoever assigned these titles to these dialogues intended the reader to understand λόγος, and many readers may have done so even if it was not intended. But although we cannot exclude the possibility that a dialogue could have a title in this form, the weight of the evidence remains strongly against it. It thus seems best to conclude that, on the evidence of its title, the *Magikos* is much more likely to have been an address or prose treatise than a dialogue.

We may now consider its contents, by examining in more detail the three definite references to the work. Although brief and general, they do provide some indication of its overall subject and general approach. In F 35, Diogenes Laertius says that the work presented the magi as a caste of foreign wise men comparable to the Chaldeans, the Gymnosophists, or the Druids, and implies that it presented these wise men as the originators of philosophy. This idea eventually became commonplace, and was often elaborated by stories that this or that Greek philosopher acquired his wisdom by studying with this or that group of foreign wise men. Its origins, however, seem to lie with the early peripatetics, and to some extent with Aristotle himself. In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle treats the magi as sages who combine philosophical and mythical language in their descriptions of the cosmos; the fact that he associates them with Pherecydes of Syrus suggests that he placed them in the earliest stages of philosophical development. In his lost dialogue Περί ϕιλοσοφίας he apparently developed this view at greater length.

19) For the title *Tyrannikos*, see Athen. 3.121d and 4.171e, and Diog. Laert. 2.57. S. Pomeroy, Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*: A Social and Historical Commentary (Oxford 1994) 213, prefers to understand λόγος with these titles, although she does not give any specific arguments in its favor. There is a similar ambiguity with the *Physikos* of Antisthenes, known by that title to Philodemus (Antisthenes F 39A Deceiving Caizzi = F 179 Giannantoni) and Cicero (ND 1.32), although in this case our information is too meager to indicate whether this was a prose treatise or a dialogue.

20) The bibliography on this topic is extensive. For two important ancient discussions, see Diog. Laert. 1.1–11 and Clem. Alex. Strom. 1.15, 66–72; for a comprehensive survey of the evidence concerning Plato, with much further bibliography, see H. Dörrie, Der Platonismus in der Antike, Bd. 2: Der hellenistische Rahmen des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus (Stuttgart 1990) 166–218 and 425–505.

According to Diogenes Laertius, “Aristotle in the first book of Περὶ φιλοσοφίας says that the magi are older than the Egyptians, and that according to them there are two principles, a good daimon and an evil daimon, the one called Zeus and Oromasdes and the other called Hades and Areimanios”. Since we know from another citation that Aristotle also talked about the Orphic poems in this work, it seems likely that he began with a discussion of the same sort of semi-mythical philosophical works that he mentions in Metaphysics.

The statement in the Suda (F 33) that the Magikos dealt with Zoroaster, whom it depicted as a “discoverer of wisdom”, fits very well with the evidence from Diogenes Laertius that it treated the magi as barbarian philosophers. The Greek belief that Zoroaster was the founder of magian tradition apparently dates back to Xanthus the Lydian, who according to Diogenes Laertius assigned Zoroaster a date of 6000 years before Xerxes’ invasion of Greece and made him the founder of the succession of magi. From Pliny, it appears that Eudoxus and Aristotle modified Xanthus’ date by substituting the death of Plato for the invasion of Xerxes, but agreed with him in making Zoroaster the originator of the magian ars, which Eudoxus allegedly regarded as “the most illustrious and useful of the systems of wisdom”. Aristotle’s discussion of

22) Diog. Laert. 1.8 (continuing from the passage quoted above in n. 6) = F 6 Rose = F 6 Untersteiner: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ προσβυτέρως εἶναι τῶν Ἀιγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχαῖς, ἀγαθὸν δαιμόνιον καὶ κακὸν δαιμόνιον· καὶ τῷ μὲν ὅνομα εἶναι Ζεὺς καὶ Ἰρωμάσδης, τῷ δὲ Αἰδής καὶ Ἀρειμάντας. Similar views are attributed to Eudoxus (Diog. Laert. 1.8 = F 341 Lasserre), Eudemus (Dam. Princ. I 319 Ruelle = F 150 Wehrli), and Clearchus (Diog. Laert. 1.9 = F 13 Wehrli), as well as Theopompus (Diog. Laert. 1.8–9 and Plut. Is. et Os. 47, 370b–c = FGrHist 115 F 64a and 65).

23) Orphic poems: Philoponus, In De anima 186.24–6 and Cic. ND 1.107 = F 7 Rose = F 7 Untersteiner; for the opening of the Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, see Jaeger (above n. 17) 128–36.

24) Diog. Laert. 1.2 = FGrHist 765 F 32: Ζάνθος δὲ ὁ Λυδὸς εἰς τὴν Ζέρζου διάβασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ζωροσάτρου ἐξακοσιακτία φησί, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πολλοὺς τινας μάγους κατὰ διαδοχὴν; for discussion, see J. Bidez and F. Cumont, Les Mages hellénisés (Paris 1938) I 5–8 and II 7–9.

25) Plin. NH 30.3 = Eudoxus F 342 Lasserre, quoted above in n. 4; according to Diogenes Laertius (1.8 = F 341 Lasserre), Eudoxus also agreed with Aristotle on the two principles of magian tradition. For the suggestion that Eudoxus may have played a key role in bringing Zoroaster and magian tradition to the attention of fourth century BCE philosophical circles, see Jaeger (above n. 17) 131–2 and Bidez and Cumont (above n. 24) I 11–12; A. Momigliano, Alien Wisdom (Cambridge 1975) 144, expresses doubts.
Zoroaster’s date was probably part of the survey of quasi-mythical proto-philosophy with which he opened his dialogue Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, since as we have seen he there discussed the antiquity of magian tradition in general. Other writers and thinkers in Aristotle’s circle also apparently treated Zoroaster as an archaic philosopher. Heraclides Ponticus, for example, wrote a work that was known to Plutarch by the title Zoroaster and that perhaps concerned questions of physical philosophy. This view of Zoroaster as a philosopher later became a commonplace.

Lastly, according to Diogenes Laertius (F 36), the Magikos rejected the idea that the magi knew anything about ‘goetic mageia’, that is, magic in the sense of ‘sorcery’ or ‘Zauberei’. This polemical assertion was undoubtedly a response to the colloquial use of the word μάγος as a synonym for γόης, a usage that dates back to the fifth century BCE. Several writers of the fifth and fourth centuries use the word μάγος and its cognates to describe wandering religious specialists; some associate it with φάρμακα, wonder-working, and interactions with the dead, and two explicitly treat it as equivalent to γόης. Given these tendencies, anyone who wanted to discuss the Persian magi as philosophers or religious specialists might be tempted to make an explicit distinction between their
teaching and the γοητεία with which some people associated the term μάγος. Diogenes Laertius claims that the fourth-century BCE historian Dinon was of the same opinion as the author of the *Magikos*. Dinon discussed the *magi* in his *Persika*, and since he evidently presented them as religious authorities and wise men, it would not be surprising if he sought to distance them from the colloquial associations of the word μάγος.29 One of the most elaborate examples of this distinction occurs in Philo. Philo describes “the true magic” as “the scientific vision by which the facts of nature are presented in a clearer light”, and says that it is held in such reverence that no one may become Great King of the Persians unless he has mastered this lore. “But”, he continues, “there is a counterfeit of this, most properly called a perversion of art, pursued by charlatan mendicants and parasites and the basest of the women and slave population, who make it their profession to deal in purifications and disenchantments and promise with some sort of charms and incantations to turn men’s love into deadly enmity and their hatred into profound affection”.30

We may thus conclude that the *Magikos* was a prose treatise or address dealing with the Persian *magi*, whom it presented as disciples of Zoroaster and the bearers of a quasi-mythical physical philosophy that had no connection to popular ideas about γοητεία. Although it is obviously impossible to know what else the work may have contained, we may reasonably suppose that it was not wildly inconsistent. One result of this re-examination of the evidence is that Diogenes Laertius’ ascription of the *Magikos* to Aristotle no longer seems prima facie absurd. Although virtually every scholar has dismissed it out of hand, it is by no means intrinsically impossible or even implausible.31 On the contrary, there is nothing

29) Dinon agreed with the Platonist Hermodorus that ‘Zoroaster’ literally meant ‘star-worshipper’, and claimed that the *magi* considered fire and water to be the only images of the gods: see, respectively, Diog. Laert. 1.8 and Clem. Alex. Protr. 5.65.1 = FGrHist 690 F 5 and F 28. He also followed Herodotus and others in presenting the *magi* as experts in dream-interpretation: Cic. Div. 1.46 = FGrHist 690 F 10.

30) Phil. Spec. Leg. 3.100–1, in the Loeb translation of F.H. Colson. Note also Suda M 13: Μαγική· τεύτην ἐφεύρον Μήδοι καὶ Πέρσαι, ἐ διαφέρουσα τῆς γοητείας καὶ αὐτῆς φαρμακείας.

31) It is regarded as spurious by, e.g., Rose, Pseudepigraphus (above n. 1) 50–2; E. Heitz, Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles (Leipzig 1865) 294; Jaeger (above n. 17) 135 and n. 1; Bidez and Cumont (above n. 24) II 8 n. 2; P. Moraux, Les Listes anciennes des ouvrages d’Aristote (Louvain 1951) 266–7, and Momigliano
in the scanty references to the *Magikos* that could not be contemporary with Aristotle or that does not fit with his known opinions about the *magi* and the first stages of philosophy. The reasons for rejecting the attribution are instead external, and concern who did and more importantly who did not attribute the work to Aristotle. There are three chief points to consider.

To begin with, there is some reason to think that Sotion, who wrote a *Succession of Philosophers* sometime in the period 200–170 BCE, knew the *Magikos* as a work of Aristotle. Diogenes Laertius, in both the passages where he cites the *Magikos*, refers also to book twenty-three of Sotion’s work. Since Diogenes nowhere else mentions the *Magikos*, but often cites Sotion, this coincidence suggests that it was Sotion who was originally responsible for the references to the *Magikos*. Further considerations, however, render this conclusion rather uncertain. First, Diogenes otherwise mentions no book of Sotion’s work later than the eleventh, and most scholars have accepted the arguments advanced by Roeper over a century and a half ago that the reference to the “twenty-third” book in these passages is an error for “thirteenth”. Yet the fact

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32) This was accepted, e.g., by Rose, Pseudoepigraphus (above n. 1) 50, followed by Wehrli (above n. 8), who prints the two passages of Diogenes Laertius as fragments 35 and 36 in his edition of Sotion. F 35 is straightforward enough, since Diogenes cites the *Magikos* and Sotion together. F 36 is more complex, since in that passage he associates the *Magikos* not with Sotion but with Dinon; but because he does cite Sotion shortly before, and the very same book of his work as in his previous citation, it seems likely enough that he took both references from him. Certainly Diogenes seems to have known Dinon only at second hand, since his only other reference to his work takes quite a different form (9.50 = FGrHist 690 F 6). On Diogenes’ use of Sotion, see J. Mejer, Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background (Wiesbaden 1978) 40–2, who argues that he probably sometimes consulted his work directly, and F. Aronadio, Due fonti laerzione: Sozione e Demetrio di Magnesia, Elenchos 11 (1990) 203–55 at 203–35, who is more inclined to see most of the references as second-hand.

33) That is, κγ instead of γ; see G. Roepke, Conjecturen zu Diogenes Laertius, Philologus 3 (1848) 22–65 at 22–5, and Zu Laertios Diogenes I, Philologus 30 (1870) 557–77 at 557–60; Roepke’s conclusion that Sotion’s work comprised thirteen books was followed, e.g., by H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin 1879) 147 and Wehrli (above n. 8), and is commonly found in handbooks. Editors of Diogenes Laertius have been more conservative, generally retaining “twenty-third” in the text: e.g., H.S. Long in the Oxford text of 1964 and M. Marcovich in the Teubner of 1999.
that the same mistake occurs in both the passages that cite the *Magikos* creates some suspicion that in this case Diogenes was citing Sotion at second-hand, and that the error existed in his source.\(^{34}\) Secondly, F 35 includes in its list of ‘barbarian philosophers’ the Druids and Semnotheoi of the Celts and Galatians. Apart from this passage, however, the earliest references to Druids date only to the first century BCE, and it was probably a scholar of that time who first included the Druids in the roll of ‘barbarian philosophers’\(^{35}\). We must consequently assume that Diogenes either added this reference himself or was using an intermediate source that expanded on Sotion. Thirdly, it is worth noting that the adjective μάγικος, -ή, -όν is not securely attested until the first century BCE, and that earlier writers seem instead to have used either μάγος, -ον or μαγευτικός, -ή, -όν.\(^{36}\) Given the scanty remains of Hellenistic literature, we can hardly attach much weight to this observation; nevertheless, it makes it slightly less likely that a text was circulating in the third century BCE under the title *Magikos*. For all these reasons, it seems very probable that Diogenes was citing Sotion through a later source, one that added the Druids to the list of barbarian philosophers and so dated to the first century BCE.

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\(^{34}\) As suggested by Wehrli (above n. 8) 66 and Aronadio (above n. 32) 234.

\(^{35}\) The earliest extant references to the Druids are in Caesar (BG 6.13–18) and Diodorus Siculus (4.31.3–4), but it is widely agreed that Posidonius discussed them in his histories: see J. Malitz, *Die Historien des Poseidonios* (Munich 1983) 191 and I. G. Kidd, *Posidonius*, vol. II: The Commentary (Cambridge 1988) 317. O. Gigon, *Das Prooemium des Diogenes Laertios: Struktur und Probleme*, in: G. Luck (ed.), *Horizonte der Humanitas: Eine Freundesgabe für Prof. Dr. Walter Wili zu seinem 60. Geburtstag* (Bern 1960) 37–64 at 42, points out that since Posidonius is also the first extant writer to mention the Phoenician Mochus (F 285–6 Edelstein-Kidd = Strab. 16.2.24 and Sext. Emp. Math. 9.359–64; see further Kidd, ibid. 972–4), he was probably responsible for the list of the three ancient wise men that Diogenes appends to his list of ‘barbarian philosophers’. It thus seems very likely that Posidonius also originated the latter list, a possibility that Gigon, ibid. 44–6, notes with considerable reservations.

\(^{36}\) *Μαγικός*: Ps.-Phoc. 149, LXX Sap. 17:7, Phil. Spec. 3.100; μάγος: Sosiphanes TrGF I 2 261–3, the anonymous fragment at TrGF II 288–9, Philodemus Anth. Pal. 5.121 = 17 Sider; μαγευτικός: Pl. Pht. 280e. Clement of Alexandria quotes Xanthus the Lydian ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγραφομένοις Μαγικοῖς (Strom. 3.2, 11.1 = FGrHist 765 F 31), but since this title is nowhere else credited to Xanthus, the text in question may well have been a section of the *Lydiaka* that later received a separate heading; in any case, this is not solid evidence for the use of the adjective μαγικός in the fifth century BCE.
BCE or even later.\textsuperscript{37} We cannot be certain, therefore, that it was Sotion himself and not this later source that referred to the \textit{Magikos} of Aristotle.

Secondly, there are the lists of Aristotle’s works attached to the life of Diogenes Laertius and the \textit{Vita Menagiana}. These lists present enough similarities that they are generally agreed to derive from a common source; although the identification of this source has been much debated, most scholars favor a date in the third century BCE.\textsuperscript{38} Neither list includes the \textit{Magikos}, which may therefore indicate that this work was at that time either not yet in circulation or not yet attributed to Aristotle. Yet we know neither what these lists represented nor how their designations of Aristotle’s works correspond to those in use today. If they were not meant to be comprehensive, if for example they originated as inventories of a particular collection, the absence of the \textit{Magikos} might signify nothing more than the absence of the work from that collection. If on the other hand ‘\textit{Magikos}’ were a special designation for one part of a longer work, it may well have not been

\textsuperscript{37} One plausible candidate for this hypothetical source would be Alexander Polyhistor’s \textit{Succession of Philosophers}, which Diogenes perhaps used directly for information on Pythagoras (8.24–36 = FGrHist 273 F 93). We know that in his work \textit{Περὶ Πυθαγορικῶν σωμβόλων} Alexander apparently expanded on the long-standing tradition that Pythagoras was a student of Zaratas (i.e., Zoroaster: see Aristoxenus ap. Hipp. Ref. 1.2.12 = F 13 Wehrli) to make him a student of “the Galatians and Brahmins” as well (Clem. Alex. Strom. 1.15, 70.1 = FGrHist 273 F 94). It would thus not be surprising if in his \textit{Succession} he expanded Sotion’s list of ‘barbarian philosophers’ by adding the Druids and other new discoveries; in any case, we would certainly expect that addition to come from someone working in a western context like Rome.

\textsuperscript{38} Diog. Laert. 5.22–7; the \textit{Vita Menagiana} in I. Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition (Göteborg 1957) 80–93. Moraux (above n. 31) 211–47 discusses in detail the source of the list and argues that it derives from Ariston of Ceos; Düring, ibid. 67–9 and Ariston or Hermippus, Classica et Mediaevalia 17 (1956) 11–21, rejects this suggestion and suggests that the list was an inventory of Aristotle’s works in the Alexandrian library that was later incorporated by Hermippus into his biography; C. Lord, On the Early History of the Aristotelian Corpus, AJPh 107 (1986) 137–61, suggests that it goes back to an inventory compiled by Neleus of Scepsis when he inherited Theophrastus’ library; for a clear discussion of the issues, see further J. Bollansée, Hermippos of Smyrna and his Biographical Writings: A Reappraisal (Leuven 1999) 233–43. Scholars seem now to agree that the list goes back to the early Hellenistic period, although as Bollansée rightly points out, our lack of evidence makes it difficult to go beyond this.
given a separate entry in the list. Consequently, this argument from silence adds very little to our knowledge.

Lastly, and most importantly, there is the fact that, apart from Diogenes Laertius, only two sources even mention the Magikos at all, and both of them cast doubt on Aristotelian authorship. We have already noted one of these, the Suda entry on Antisthenes, which suggests that there was a debate over the authorship of the treatise. The other source is the list of Aristotelian pseudepigrapha appended to the catalogue in the Vita Menagiana, which includes the Magikos amidst several otherwise completely unknown works. This indicates that at least one ancient scholar who was presumably familiar with the work explicitly rejected its attribution to Aristotle. But because the origin of this list is completely obscure, we cannot deduce from it anything more definite. It is likely enough that Andronicus of Rhodes dealt with questions of authenticity in his Pinakes, but we cannot determine whether or not he was responsible for the list in the Vita Menagiana nor, even if we could, would his authority necessarily carry great weight.

As regards the possibility of Aristotelian authorship, then, we may reach the following conclusions. First, there is nothing in our admittedly very limited evidence for the contents of the work that would exclude Aristotelian authorship. Secondly, the work was definitely circulating under Aristotle’s name by the time of Diogenes Laertius, and presumably by that of his immediate source, which as I have suggested dates probably to the first century BCE or later; the attribution to Aristotle may even have been current already in the time of Sotion, although for the reasons I have given this is very uncertain. Thirdly, the attribution to Aristotle seems to have done little for the work’s popularity: it was evidently fair-
ly obscure, and little known or at least little valued even by those people who would presumably have been interested in its contents. Lastly, at least one ancient authority explicitly rejected Aristotelian authorship, and others disputed it by attributing the work to other writers. We may now consider whether these alternative attributions can cast any further light on the text’s origin and history.

The Suda, as we have seen, indicates that at least one scholar identified the author of the work as Antisthenes. There is no other evidence for this attribution, which seems in fact a bit odd. Although we depend for our knowledge of Antisthenes on the brief and no doubt tendentious remarks of later writers, there is nothing in these to suggest that his interests embraced the sorts of topics that were evidently the focus of the Magikos. Olof Gigon suggested that Antisthenes’ dialogue Cyrus might have caused later scholars to regard him as a possible author, but the few references to this work and the treatments of Cyrus by Antisthenes’ younger contemporaries Xenophon and Plato suggest that it was primarily concerned with moral and educational issues; although Antisthenes may well have mentioned the role of the magi as Cyrus’ teachers, he is unlikely to have done much more than that. In short, the attribution of the Magikos to Antisthenes, in sharp contrast with its attribution to Aristotle, is surprising and even puzzling.

An attractive explanation for the attribution to Antisthenes is that it was a secondary development. As we have seen, the Suda presents as a third possible author a certain Rhodon, an otherwise completely unattested writer. Many scholars have accordingly accepted the proposal to emend Πόθωνι to τῷ Ροθίῳ, and to translate the sentence thus: “but certain people attribute this to Aristotle, and others to the Rhodian [Antisthenes].” Two writers men-

41) Gigon (above n. 35) 44. For references to Antisthenes’ Cyrus, see F 19–21B Decleva Caizzi and F 84–91 Giannantoni, and the detailed discussion of G. Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae (Naples 1990) IV 295–308; as possible parallels, see Xen. Cyr. and Pl. Leg. 3.694a–695e, and cf. Plato’s discussion of the magi as teachers at Pl. Alc. 121c–122a. We may note that most scholars reject the attribution to Antisthenes, e. g., F. Decleva Caizzi, Antisthenis Fragmenta (Milan 1966) 87, and Giannantoni, ibid. IV 255–6.

42) The only Rhodon in the TLG canon is an anti-heretical Christian writer of the second century CE (Eus. HE 5.13), an unlikely candidate.

43) This emendation was proposed by Bernhardy in T. Gaisford and G. Bernhardy, Suidae Lexicon Graece et Latine (Halle 1853) I 487 and independently by Heitz (above n. 31) 294.
tion an Antisthenes of Rhodes: Diogenes Laertius, who in his list of other men with the name Antisthenes mentions “a certain Rhodian historian”, and Polybius, who criticizes an Antisthenes of Rhodes for errors in his account of the Battle of Lade in 201 BCE; according to Polybius, he was contemporary with the events he described.\textsuperscript{44} This Antisthenes of Rhodes may be identical with one or both of two other authors with the same name: a succession writer cited thirteen times by Diogenes Laertius and a peripatetic philosopher cited by Phlegon of Tralles.\textsuperscript{45} Since succession writers and peripatetic philosophers are exactly the sorts of people likely to have been interested in the subject matter of the \textit{Magikos}, many scholars have suggested that Antisthenes of Rhodes was in fact its author.\textsuperscript{46} Indeed, we know that Antisthenes the succession writer had a particular interest in the common idea that Greek philosophers learned from eastern wisdom, since according to Diogenes Laertius he described how Democritus traveled to Egypt, the Chaldeans, Persia, and the Red Sea.\textsuperscript{47} If Antisthenes of Rhodes were the actual author of the \textit{Magikos}, we could easily explain the attribution to the Socratic Antisthenes as a confusion of names, with the obscure Rhodian mistaken for his more famous Athenian predecessor.

This hypothesis is naturally open to objections. Although many scholars accept the identification of Antisthenes of Rhodes with the succession writer and the peripatetic, J. Janda has brought forceful arguments against it.\textsuperscript{48} They do not, however, seem to me

\textsuperscript{44} Diog. Laert. 6.19: Ἀντισθένης τις ἱστορίκης; Polyb. 16.14.2–3: Ζήνων καὶ Ἀντισθένης οἱ Ἀντισθένες ... κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς γεγόνασι καὶ προσέτε πεπολέμηται ...


\textsuperscript{46} So for example E. Schwartz, Antisthenes (9), RE I (1894) 2537–8; M. Wellmann, Die Φιλοσοφία des Bolos Demokritos und der Magier Anaxilaos aus Larissa (Berlin 1928: Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ph.-hist. Klasse, no. 7) 57 n.3; Bidez and Cumont (above n. 24) II 17 n.3 and 69 n.3; Momigliano (above n. 25) 143; Giannantoni (above n. 41) IV 256, with further references; none of these writers, however, actually argue the case.

\textsuperscript{47} Diog. Laert. 9.35, 38 = Antisthenes FGrHist 508 F 12–13.

\textsuperscript{48} J. Janda, D’Antisthéné, auteur des successions des philosophes, Listy Filologické 89 (1966) 341–64, especially 348–56; note also the doubts expressed by F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Vol. 2 (Oxford 1967) 518. Schwartz (above n. 46) argued for the identity of the historian with the succession-writer and possibly also with the philosopher; Jacoby (FGrHist 508) assumed the
Aristotle, Antisthenes of Rhodes, and the *Magikos*  

decisive. First, he quite correctly points out that the writer criticized by Polybius was clearly a serious rational historian, whereas the peripatetic cited by Phlegon was a writer of *θαυμάσια*. Although this is a good indication that the two references concern different works, we cannot necessarily conclude that they must have been the works of different writers. There is no prima facie reason why a serious historian of the Hellenistic period might not also engage in paradoxography; after all, the genre seems to have begun with no less weighty an authority than Callimachus. Secondly, Janda insists that Diogenes Laertius would not have referred to this Antisthenes solely as “a certain Rhodian historian” if he knew that he was identical with the succession writer that he frequently cited: his apparent ignorance is therefore a strong argument against the identification of the two. As J. Mejer has argued, however, Diogenes almost certainly worked from extracts made at different times from different sources that were undoubtedly, according to our standards, very imperfectly collated and indexed; in such circumstances, it does not seem to me at all unlikely that, as many scholars have suggested, Diogenes simply failed to make the connection between the Rhodian historian and the succession writer.

There is also the question of how the work, if written by an author whose identity continued to be known, came to be attributed to Aristotle. But this situation is hardly unparalleled. To take only one example, works of Bolus of Mendes circulated under the name of Democritus, even though Bolus’ authorship was known at least to some writers. Antisthenes may even have not intended to

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identity of all three, an opinion also maintained by Giannattasio Andria (above n. 45) 29–36 in the most recent full discussion of the problem. D. Runia, Antisthenes (2), DNP I (1996) 794–5, says that most scholars now accept the identification of the historian with the succession writer, and that the identification with Phlegon’s peripatetic is also possible.

49) Janda (above n. 48) 349–56; more specifically, he argues that Diogenes took his reference to the Rhodian historian from Demetrius of Magnesia’s work on men of the same name, and that the phrase *τις ιστορικός* indicates that Demetrius described the man only as a historian; this seems to me far from certain. Moreover, Mejer (above n. 32) 38–9 has shown that we should not automatically assume that Diogenes took all his lists of homonyms from Demetrius, which further lessens the force of Janda’s argument.

50) Compare the elder Pliny’s insistence that Democritus was the author of *Chirocmeta* (NH 24.160) with Columella’s assertion that this was a work of Bolus (Rust. 7.5.17); see further Wellmann (above n. 46) and the more recent discussions
produce a forgery; if he somehow invoked the authority of Aristotle in the text, for example by presenting him as the speaker of this μαγικὸς λόγος, we could easily understand why some later writers came to attribute the work to Aristotle and, simultaneously, why others rejected it.51

It seems to me that the two most likely possibilities of the text’s origin are that it either emanated from the peripatetic circles of the mid to late fourth century BCE or was written in the second century BCE by Antisthenes of Rhodes. In favor of the first possibility are the close similarities that the text evidently bore to other works of that time, including works of Aristotle himself; as I have suggested, there is even some chance that it was a genuine work of Aristotle, although ancient doubts about its authorship and even more its very obscurity weigh strongly against it. The second hypothesis, in turn, neatly accounts for its otherwise puzzling attribution to the Socratic Antisthenes, and is by no means out of keeping with its affinities to the scholarly and peripatetic tradition. On either hypothesis, we must assume that Diogenes Laertius took his reference to Sotion and the Magikos from an unnamed intermediate source that added the Druids to the list of barbarian philosophers and presumably introduced the error of citing book twenty–three of Sotion’s work. Although it is no longer fashionable to postulate unnamed intermediate sources lurking behind extant texts, it remains very probable that in many cases they did exist. In this particular case, an assumption of this sort seems to me preferable to the assumption that Greek writers were already treating the Druids as barbarian philosophers in the fourth or even the second century BCE.52

51 On the possibilities of such errors, see Speyer (above n. 50) 41–4.

52 As point rightly stressed by W. Spoerri, Späthellenistische Berichte über Welt, Kultur und Götter (Basel 1959) 57; for the possible identity of this source, see n. 37 above. Given the Celtic invasions of the third century BCE, it is not impossible
Alternatively, it is also possible that the *Magikos* was a work of the first century BCE or later, and so could have mentioned the Druids itself. The earliest definite reference we have to the work is after all in Diogenes Laertius; although it is probably safe to assume that he took his citations from an earlier source, that source could easily have been as late as the second century CE (compare, e.g., his extensive use of Favorinus). As I have suggested, the use of the adjective μαγικός seems to belong more to the later than to the earlier Hellenistic period, and the polemic about the distinction between the teachings of the *magi* and goetic magic seems to recall the passage of Philo. On the other hand, although the hypothesis of a date for the *Magikos* in the first century BCE or later does not contradict the available evidence, it also does relatively little to explain any of it.

But if we are unable to fix with assurance the author and date of the *Magikos*, we can nevertheless draw some useful conclusions about its nature. The title suggests that it was not a dialogue, as Rose postulated, but instead a prose treatise or address that treated the *magi* as ‘barbarian philosophers’. In its account of the *magi*, in so far as we can discern it from the scanty evidence available to us, it seems to have fit perfectly well with the typical Greek scholarly views about Zoroaster and the *magi* that dated back to the fourth century BCE. This does not of course mean that it would have provided a historically accurate account of the Persian *magi*, since as several recent scholars have stressed, Greek writings about the *magi* tended to reflect Greek assumptions more than Persian reality. Yet the Greek assumptions we see reflected in the evidence for the *Magikos* are the same as those attributed to respectable philosophers and scholars. The work thus seems to have been much closer in both form and spirit to a treatise like Herm-

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53) We should note, however, that it is far from certain what form this distinction took in the original text: although the *Magikos*, and Dinon as well, may have made points that supported this position, Diogenes may have derived this particular formulation of it from his intermediate source.

Hermippus’ *Περὶ μέγων* than most scholars have thought, and it is in that tradition that we can most reasonably locate it.\(^{55}\) In this regard, the fact that it could plausibly have been written either by someone in the circle of Aristotle or by a historian like Antisthenes of Rhodes is more significant than our inability to identify its author with certainty.

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\(^{55}\) On Hermippus’ work, see now F 56–8 in Bollansée (above n. 26), with detailed commentary.