SPARTA, AMYNTAS, AND THE OLYNTHIANS
IN 383 B. C.
A comparison of Xenophon and Diodorus*

After the swearing of the King’s Peace in 387 B.C. the Lacedaemonians anointed themselves its προστάται or “champions”; the modern “enforcers” surely conveys better the sinister implications of this championship. No sooner was the final text of the treaty presented for the swearing, than it became clear what explosive potential the innocuous phrase (as formulated in the King’s edict) τὰς Ἑλληνιδὰς πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας συντονόμους ἀφεῖναι¹, “all the Greek cities both small and great are to be left autonomous”, had: the Thebans, who had desired to swear the Peace on behalf of all the Boeotian cities, rightly saw that it spelt the end of the Boeotian League when they were not allowed to do this². In the hands of the Lacedaemonian leadership, which in those days strove hard to restore Lacedaemonian authority in Greece, it became a potent weapon. The diplomatic documents of the age carefully kept on the right side of the indicated clause – the treaty between Chios and Athens not only evinces the (for this period customary) deliberately parsed clauses, but actually refers to the maintenance of the King’s Peace as an overriding concern³.

¹) I thank Fritz Gschnitzer for reading an earlier draft of this paper which he improved immensely and also the anonymous referee of this journal. They hold no responsibility for its remaining deficiencies.

1) Xen. Hell. 5.1.31. The document – formally an edict of the Persian King – specifies a few exceptions.

2) Xen. Hell. 5.1.32–33. On the Thebans’ surprise at this development see now M. Zahrnt, Xenophon, Isokrates und die koinē εἰρήνη, RhM 143 (2000) 304–305.

3) Syll.3, 142. Note Ll. 19–20 which state that the Chians become allies of the Athenians ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίας καὶ αὐτονομίας, “for freedom and for autonomy”. Ll. 7–12 specifically enjoin the Chians to maintain the King’s Peace just as the Athenians do. With regard only to the ‘autonomy clause’ vid. this phrasing from the Second Athenian League’s ‘Charter’ (IG II² 43, ll. 15–21): ἐὰν τὸν τῶν συμμάχων, ἐξείναι αὐτῶι ἐλευθερίας ὡς καὶ αὐτονόμωι, πολιτείας ἣν ἢν ἑκατοντηνῖα, “if anyone wish ... to be an
Shortly after 387 the Lacedaemonians set about enforcing this provision for autonomy – always to their own advantage, of course, and in the service of their hegemonial ambitions. One of their acts concerned the Chalcidian League4, a federal state on the Chalcidice which had arisen some time after the Athenian empire’s authority in that region broke down in the 420’s. In the late 380’s, however, the Lacedaemonians undertook to destroy this league. We shall look closely at their immediate (as opposed to ultimate) motivation for acting against this league. Diodorus, copying Ephorus, and Xenophon give radically different versions, so discussion of this problem may help to determine more nearly how much influence we should allow to each of the two main sources for that period (roughly 387 to 362) where Xenophon and Ephorus (in the guise of Diodorus’ abridgement) serve as our only narrative guides.

I. Xenophon’s Version

A. The Acanthians’ and Apollonians’ Appeal at Sparta

According to Xenophon, in 383 ambassadors arrived at Sparta from the cities of Acanthus and Apollonia, who were resisting integration into the Chalcidian League. These ambassadors spoke first to the ephors who then arranged for them to address the assembly. Everything which we then hear comes in the form of the Acanthian ambassador’s speech before the Apella. Owing to the speech’s length summary will serve our purposes better than quotation5.

The ambassador, Cleigenes, begins by stating that the Lacedaemonians will know nothing of the problem which he will ask them to deal with. He therefore proceeds to summarise the history of the Olynthians’ efforts to construct a federal state. First, they made some cities use the same laws as they and have a common citizenship with them. Then they did the same with other, larger cities. Third,

4) Both Diodorus and Xenophon tend to say ‘Olynthians’ even when they probably mean the ‘Chalcidians’ League’. The Olynthians clearly were the guiding light of the Chalcidian League; and I have followed the sources in usually saying ‘Olynthians’.

5) Xen. Hell. 5.2.11–19.
the Olynthians encroached upon Macedonia, winning over the cities closest to them, then ones farther away and larger, even including Pella. In fact, their activities have almost driven Amyntas, the King of the Macedonians, from his Kingdom. Now the Olynthians have turned their attention to Acanthus and Apollonia: if these two cities do not join Olynthus, the Olynthians will attack them.

Now the ambassador makes very clear that the Acanthians and Apollonians desire nothing so much as to live under their own laws, i.e. to be αὐτόνομοι. To get the Lacedaemonians interested he states that their worst enemies, the Thebans and the Athenians, are considering allying themselves with the Olynthians. Furthermore, the Chalcidians’ only neighbours, those of the Thracians who have no King, now pay homage to the Olynthians. Several statements on the Olynthians’ power, wealth, and pride follow.

The ambassador’s peroration warns the Lacedaemonians of the danger of not acting quickly: those cities which have unwillingly joined the Olynthians would desert the federal state if an opposing force should appear; but if not, the common rights of intermarriage and ownership of property would soon meld the confederacy into an indissoluble whole.

On the basis of this appeal, the Lacedaemonians decide to intervene in the far north against the Olynthians, i.e. to break up the Chalcidian League. This is the sum extent of Xenophon’s treatment of the Lacedaemonians’ motivation for entering the war.

B. The Speech as a Literary and Historical Document

I take it as given that no-one ever delivered this speech in the form in which we find it in Xenophon. Although we have no explicit words on Xenophon’s part concerning his practice as regards speeches⁶ and although we need not necessarily assume that

⁶) A curious oddity makes interpreting Xenophon’s history difficult: it wants a preface. Herodotus (prooem.; 1.5.3–4; cf. also the consciously reflective comment at 4.30.1), Thucydides (esp. 1.20–23), and Polybius (with two ‘prefaces’ in Bks. I and III; see esp., however, the methodological matter at 2.56.10–12 and 4.2.1–3) all prefixed to their works statements explaining and justifying their purpose and method. Since Xenophon’s Hellenica consciously continue Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, they begin with the words μετὰ ταῦτα and must thus dispense with any thesis statement. On this see C. Tuplin, The Failings of Empire. A reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27, Stuttgart 1993, 36–40.
Thucydides’ words in this respect still apply\(^7\), few people will argue that Xenophon has reproduced a stenographer’s transcript of what the ambassador actually said\(^8\). That Xenophon wrote this speech to serve his own purposes will, I think, become clear enough from the following anyway.

Both ancient as well as modern drama uses a simple trick to fill the audience in on necessary background information unobtrusively: through contrived dialogue or soliloquies. One thinks of the two servants at the beginning of Euripides’ *Medea* who discuss their mistress’ and master’s actions not for themselves, who know it all already, but for us who do not\(^9\); or of Aphrodite’s opening monologue in the *Hippolytus*\(^10\).

The ambassador’s history lesson, while ostensibly meant for the Spartan assembly (the dramatic audience), actually seeks to inform us (Xenophon’s real audience) of the background to the situation. Thucydides would have done this in his own voice (cf. e.g. the excursus on the Pentcontaetia), but Xenophon, particularly by the second half of his *Hellenica* has grown increasingly independent of his model’s strictures: the careful notation of winters and summers gradually ceases and more and more “literary” contrivances appear\(^11\). The ambassador begins his speech with the words οἰόμεθα λανθάνειν ύμᾶς πρόγμα κατακεφάλασαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι\(^12\), “I think that you will be unaware of a great thing which is taking place in Greece”. Xenophon, who has as yet omitted reference to the Chalcidian League and the Olynthians\(^13\), now intro-

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7) Thuc. 1.22. 1.
9) Euripides, Medea 1–95.
10) Euripides, Hippolytus 1–57.
11) It was V. J. Gray’s (n. 8 above) great service to show just how often Xenophon uses “literary” devices in what, prima facie, is a dry, diachronic narrative. While quasi-Herodotean digressions from the chronological narrative are not utterly unknown in the earlier part of the *Hellenica* (e.g. the story of Mania in 3.1.10–15), they become more frequent in the later portions: e.g. 6.4.33–37 (the Thessalian tagoi from Polydorus to Tisiphonus) or 7.2.2–10 (flashback to the war between the Phliasians and the Argives).
12) Xen. Hell. 5.2.12.
13) In point of fact he had occasion to mention them: In the so-called Corinthian War in the 390’s the Chalcidian League (or at least Olynthus) had taken part in the Corinthian War in the anti-Spartan coalition according to Diodorus (i.e.
duces them to maximum effect: they have quietly been working a wonder in those days. This takes us by surprise; and we will listen as the story is told us. We see here Xenophon’s way of livening up what might otherwise degenerate into a dull history lesson by transferring the material to a first-person speech.

Other matters in the speech as well make us suspect that Xenophon is directing it at us rather than at the Lacedaemonian assembly. The ambassador’s speech (helpfully for modern scholars desirous to determine the exact nature of this League) hammers several points home: 1.) the cities within the Chalcidian League have a common citizenship, which includes free intermarriage and the right to own land anywhere within the League’s territory; 2.) all cities in the League live under the same laws; 3.) all of which means that cities such as Acanthus will lose their autonomy in that they must give up their own laws and their own unique citizenship in favour of the League’s laws and the League’s citizenship.

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15) Xen. Hell. 5.2.12 (συμπολιτεύω, “to be a fellow-citizen” – i.e. with those living within the League); 5.2.18 (τῆς πολιτείας κοινόνεο, “to have citizenship in common”).

16) Xen. Hell. 5.2.19: αἱ ἐπισημαίναι καὶ ἐγκτήσεις παρ’ ἄλληλοις, “interruption and mutual ownership (i.e. of immobilia)”. These principles have already been enacted by decree (αἰς ἐνφησιμένοι τελι); their effects, however, have yet to be felt. Thus also Tuplin (n. 6 above) 94 n. 21; otherwise Zahrnt (n. 13 above) 83.

17) Xen. Hell. 5.2.12: νόμους τοῖς συντόκοις χρώμαι, “to use the same laws”.

18) Xen. Hell. 5.2.14: βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρήσθαι καὶ συντοπολίται εἶναι, “we [i.e. the Acanthians and the Apollonians] wish to use our fathers’ laws and to be ... «Άυτοπολίτης is hapax. It may well be a coinage of Xenophon’s to express a thought exactly which he could not convey with e.g. αὐτόνομος or ἔλευθερος. Considering how συμπολιτεύω and πολιτεία function in the passages cited above, συντοπολίτης should mean something like “have one’s own citizenship to oneself”.

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Ephorus) 14.82.3, and confirmed by Isaeus 5.46. Otherwise M. Zahrnt, Olynth und die Chalkidier, Kiel 1971, 81 with n. 3; see, however, G. L. Cawkwell, The King’s Peace, CQ 31 (1981) 80 n. 35. (Efforts to emend the text in Isaeus from Ὠλόνθοι to Κορνύθοι or Ὀπούντοι have no basis in any perception of disorder in the text – they are purely ad hoc in order to bring the text into line with Xenophon’s list of troops in the anti-Spartan alliance at Hell. 4.2.16. Xenophon does not mention the Chalcidians, but as I have remarked in another place – Ephorus and Xenophon on Greece in the years 375–372 B.C., Klio 83 [2001] esp. Nn. 73 and 85 and p. 367 – the silence of Xenophon can never be decisive for rejecting something which other sources positively attest.)
The ambassador is proving – not so much for the Lacedaemonian assembly as for us – that the Olynthians’ actions run counter to the clause in the King’s Peace which guaranteed all cities their autonomy. This becomes even clearer when we consider it in the wider context of this section of the *Hellenica*. Xenophon quotes the text of the King’s edict for us at 5.1.31. Then he shows us how the Lacedaemonians, even during the process of swearing the Peace, used the autonomy clause to great effect against Thebes and Argos, forcing the former to concede full autonomy to the Boeotian cities and the latter to remove its garrison from Corinth and thus effectively to dissolve its federal union with that city. Xenophon then explicitly speaks of the Lacedaemonians as the Peace’s προστάται and barely seems able to contain his amazement at the remarkable turnaround in their fortunes:

Whereas the Lacedaemonians had during the [Corinthian] War barely held their own against their opponents, they found themselves in a much more advantageous position thanks to the so-called Peace of Antalcidas (i.e. the King’s Peace). For in that they became the ‘champions’ of the Peace, which the King (i.e. Artaxerxes II) had sent down, and effected the cities’ autonomy, they obtained an ally in Corinth, while they made the Boeotian cities autonomous of the Thebans, which they [the Lacedaemonians] for a long time had been desiring. They [the Lacedaemonians] also caused the Argives to cease treating Corinth as their [the Argives’] own in that they [the Lacedaemonians] called up the levy against them [the Argives] in case they [the Argives] would not leave Corinth.

Xenophon then goes on to recount three further undertakings of the Spartans in the years immediately following: the “dioecism” of Mantinea, the (forced) recall of exiles by Phlius with a consequent attack on Phlius in favour of the exiles’ rights, and the dissolution of the Chalcidians’ League. Xenophon does not explicitly connect these actions to the King’s Peace, though one may easily, as we will see,


20) Xen. Hell. 5.1.36.
assume an implicit connection. (In my view, which I hope to have occasion to develop fully elsewhere, Xenophon – as indeed Thucydides – does often argue implicitly through a planned arrangement of material so that the reader collects a specific impression.)

Nonetheless, in point of fact Xenophon does explicitly link the actions regarding Thebes, Corinth, and Argos with those regarding Mantinea, Phlius, and the Chalcidice to form a thematic unity. This section of the *Hellenica* concerns the turnaround in the Spartans’ fortunes. To the concluding words on the successful Olynthian campaign (5.3.26) Xenophon appends these words, tying the actions against Olynthus in with all the rest (5.3.27):

Προκεχωρηκότων δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίως ὡστε Θηβαίους μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Βοιωτοὺς παντάπασιν ἐπὶ εἴκειοίν εἶναι, Κορινθίους δὲ πιστοτέρους γεγενέσθαι, Ἀργείους δὲ τεταπεινόσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔτι ὥσπερ εὐτυχώς τῶν μνήμων τὴν ὑποφορὰν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ ἡμιμοσθαί, τὸν δὲ αὐτοὺς συμμάχους κεκολασμένον αὐτὸς διήρφην εἰγὸν αὐτοῖς, παντάπασιν ἡδὴ καλὸς καὶ ἁσφαλῶς ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς κατεσκευάσθαι.

So things had turned out for the Lacedaemonians in such a way that the Thebans and the other Boeotians were absolutely at their mercy, the Corinthians had become most loyal, the Argives had been humbled because they could no longer use the movable calendar, the Athenians were bereft (i.e. of allies); and with those of (their own) allies (i.e. Mantinea and Phlius) who had acted disloyally towards them having been punished, they thought that (their) rule was excellently and securely established in all respects.

Now this does not prove that we are meant to connect the King’s Peace – which Xenophon explicitly connects only to the actions undertaken to the detriment of Thebes, Corinth, and Argos – with the actions at Mantinea and Phlius and on the Chalcidice also, where Xenophon, so to speak, does not connect the dots for us\(^\text{21}\).
Yet at least in two cases Xenophon does go out of his way to suggest the connection to us. We have already seen that Xenophon has been precise in his analysis of the constitutional nature of the Olynthians’ League, proving (adventently or not) that it would have violated Acanthus’ and Apollonia’s autonomy. In other words he gives us the specific information we need to ‘connect the dots’. I do not choose to believe that this is coincidence. Let us now look at another of the three questionable undertakings, the “dioecism” of Mantinea.

After the Spartans took Mantinea, they forced it to “dioecise”, to split up into four villages\(^{22}\). The action was obviously calculated to break Mantinea’s power into fragments. Xenophon clearly states that the Mantineans had once lived in four villages – which had obviously once had their own laws and their own distinct citizenship, i.e. had been autonomous. On the probable assumption that one of these villages was Helisson, for which we have the treaty with Mantinea which regulated the synoecism, then we can confirm that at least two (i.e. Mantinea itself and Helisson) of these villages had once been sovereign states just a few years earlier\(^ {23}\). In fact, this treaty shows that Mantinea in 385 might legitimately have been viewed as a ‘sympolity’ of recent standing. Finally, Xenophon does not leave us in any doubt that these four new/old villages received that ‘autonomy’ back after the dioecism since he explicitly states that the Spartans sent a ζεναγός – an official sent into an allied city for the purposes of raising troops – to each one of the

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\(^{22}\) Xen. Hell. 5.2.1–7. Diod. 15.5.4, gives “five”, following Ephorus (FGrHist 70 F 79 = Harpocratio, s. v. Μαντινέων Διοικησιμός). Strabo, 8.3.2, p. 337, also says “five”, presumably because he is following (ultimately) Ephorus. For discussion and references see P.J. Stylianou, A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus, Book 15, Oxford 1998, 175. Determining who is right here is difficult, though one may perhaps more easily explain how Xenophon might have made four of five: if, as Sparta, Mantinea had consisted of one main conurbation and one outlying (but close) settlement (as Amyclae), then Xenophon could with justice have spoken of a quartering of Mantinea for the physical process of the dioecism would have involved only the division of the main conurbation into four parts. Stylianou (loc. cit.) has advanced another explanation. Nisi fallamus, most general treatments of this event have assumed without explanation that Mantinea was divided into five villages.

\(^{23}\) G.-J. and M.-J. te Riele, Hélisson entre en sympolitie avec Mantinée: une nouvelle inscription d’Arcadie, BCH 111 (1987) 167–190; the authors date the inscription to the early fourth century, just before the dioecism.
newly created villages (i.e. instead of just one to ‘Mantineia’)\textsuperscript{24}. Xenophon then does not allow us to entertain any illusion that the ‘city’ of Mantinea has simply been turned into four ‘villages’ (as e.g. Sparta itself was) that still formed a political unity. Implicit in the entire account is the reëstablishing of the four villages’ ‘autonomy’ – for which Xenophon himself provides the decisive information. As in the case of the Olynthians’ League, the ‘autonomy clause’ of the King’s Peace provides a strong connective thread with the actions the Spartans undertook against Thebes, Corinth, and Argos\textsuperscript{25}.

One issue, however, we must concede: Sparta’s actions regarding Phlius – the forced recall of exiles – cannot turn on the ‘autonomy clause’, nor even on any clause in the King’s edict as Xenophon cites it for us. Nevertheless, George Cawkwell showed that Xenophon did not quote the text of the peace treaty actually sworn, but rather merely the King’s edict, when he in 1973 established the existence of an additional codicil specifically stipulating that Athens could not instal gates on the entrance to the Peiraeus\textsuperscript{26}. Now Cawkwell also produced cogent arguments for the possible presence of an ‘Exiles’ Clause’ in the King’s Peace, to whose discussion we must here refer the reader\textsuperscript{27}. If such a clause had been present, it could have provided the technical justification for Sparta’s actions. Granted, Xenophon has not informed us of any ‘Exiles’ Clause’. All the same, he does mention, as an almost natural consequence of the dissolution of the Argive-Corinthian

\textsuperscript{24} Xen. Hell. 5.2.7.

\textsuperscript{25} For further discussion of the ‘autonomy clause’ and the dioecism of Mantinea see M. Jehne, Koine Eirene. Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 1994, 48–50; note also the apt formulation in n. 9: “Dehnbarkeit der Autonomieformel”.

\textsuperscript{26} G. L. Cawkwell, The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, CQ 23 (1973) 52–54; cf. eundem (n. 13 above) 74–75 (against the criticism of R. K. Sinclair, The King’s Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval Forces 387–378, Chiron 8 [1978] 31–34). N. b. the assurance of Badian (n. 19 above) 47, on this codicil, deduced by Cawkwell: “beyond possibility of refutation”. (Jehne [n. 25 above] 39–40, while rejecting other arguments for additional clauses, never specifically deals with Cawkwell’s case concerning the gates of the Peiraeus.)

\textsuperscript{27} Cawkwell (n. 13 above) 80–83. For speculation on additional clauses possibly contained in the treaty see Badian (n. 19 above) 42–47. Contra, Jehne (n. 25 above) 39–40; cf. Zahrnt (n. 2 above) n. 16.
union, the return of Corinthian exiles to Corinth. Does Xenophon simply assume (and expect his readers to assume) that a return of exiles naturally followed upon the swearing of the Peace—and might be enforced were it not to follow in a specific case? So even in the case of Sparta’s actions at Phlius we may suspect some connexion to the King’s Peace, if not specifically to the ‘autonomy clause’. However that may be, I do think we can clearly see the ‘autonomy clause’ operating in the cases of Mantinea and the Chalcidians; and I believe that Xenophon means us to see this for it is he who has taken good care to provide us with precisely the information we need to see it.

In Xenophon’s presentation the ‘sympolity’ of Mantinea implicitly is the same as the ‘sympolity’ which the Olynthians were forging on the Chalcidice; as that which had existed in Boeotia under Theban leadership or between Argos and Corinth before the King’s Peace. In other words: it was a cornerstone of Lacedaemonian foreign policy in those days to oppose any statal structure which transcended that of individual cities (no matter how small) which of right were and ought to be autonomous.

To return then, after this detour, to the Olynthians. Once the ambassador has proved that the Olynthians are in violation of the ‘autonomy clause’, the Lacedaemonians must, on Xenophon’s implicit presentation of their foreign policy in this section of the Hellenica, act to enforce the clause. The Acanthian ambassador’s argument is all too obviously tailored to fit exactly into Xenophon’s presentation of Lacedaemonian foreign policy. What we cannot judge is how well Xenophon understood what the Lacedaemonian leadership really thought (just as one may question how well Polybius truly understood the Roman aristocracy); but we probably can accept that the rôle as ‘Champions of the Peace’ and the demand for strict observance of the ‘autonomy clause’ functioned

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28) Xen. Hell. 5.1.34. See Cawkwell (n. 13 above) 83, for speculation on the possible existence of exiles from Mantinea in this context.

29) Cf. Sinclair (n. 26 above) 37 who characterises the Lacedaemonians’ undertaking against Olynthus as follows: “[the Lacedaemonians were] presumably acting in the name of autonomy”.

30) Cf. Tuplin (n. 6 above) 94: “It would … be illogical for Sparta not to be concerned [viz. on hearing of the Olynthians’ sympolity], since the Olynthian Bundesstaat represents a union more serious than Boeotia, about which Sparta did take action via the King’s Peace”.

as integral components of Lacedaemonian diplomatic propaganda and official posturing in those days. Whether the participants in the Lacedaemonian assembly were all that interested in whether or not Olynthus was violating a clause of the King’s Peace is a different matter altogether.

At any rate, what we have in the speech as Xenophon presents it to us are arguments which fit Xenophon’s theme and Xenophon’s interpretation of events.

C. Historical Interpretation of the Information in the Speech

We have seen that the speech as recorded is Xenophon’s and no-one else’s. It is historical argumentation which Xenophon presents to us; and we must judge it according to the standard methods. First of all, one aspect of the speech we can substantiate independently: the Olynthians’ encroachment into Macedonia. Ephorus spoke of the same thing, but I should like to postpone discussion of this until the second part of this essay.

Second, the ambassador must make a case for swift action: else the League may succeed in solidifying itself. The ambassador in fact presents the Olynthians’ League as one to which it is profitable to belong, and suggests that more and more the once independent cities will come to realise this. Furthermore, intermarriage and mutual rights of property ownership will soon be taking hold.\(^{31}\) Taken by themselves, these things suggest that the League was not all that unpopular among at least some of the Chalcidian towns.

Now this does not rule out that some cities objected vehemently to losing their autonomy. We must allow that Acanthus and Apollonia might have felt themselves bullied by the Olynthians and were endeavouring to stay clear of the League in order to retain their own self-government. They may have appealed to Sparta for help; for the Lacedaemonians to intervene on the Chalcidice so as to free them from the turbulent Olynthians.

Our age, on the other hand, has surely seen enough appeals for intervention in a foreign region (e.g. the Hungarian appeal to the Soviet Union in 1956 or the Kuwaiti appeal to Iraq in 1990) to be suspicious of such appeals. That is not to say that legitimate appeals

\(^{31}\) Xen. Hell. 5.2.18–19.
do not occur; but that unscrupulous governments often arrange such appeals as a cheap justification for aggression. Nor were such appeals as justification unknown to fourth century Greece: appeals from certain factions to Sparta and the corresponding appeals from the opposed ones to Athens did from time to time serve to legitimize the two cities’ aggressive foreign policy.

Xenophon of course states that the ambassadors from Acanthus and Apollonia led official embassies; not delegates sent by this or that faction. Let us, however, here recall Beloch’s famous dictum: “Der Philologe glaubt, was in den Quellen steht, bis ihm bewiesen wird, daß es falsch ist. Der Historiker glaubt es nur, wenn ihm bewiesen wird, daß es wahr ist.” Can we independently corroborate the Acanthians’ and the Apollonians’ mission to Sparta to request intervention on the Chalcidice?

Unfortunately, no. In the case of Acanthus the treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidians at least shows that Acanthus was not a member of the League ca. 390; and explicitly states that neither the Chalcidians nor Amyntas could make a separate alliance with the Acanthians. Apollonia does not receive mention in this treaty which hardly proves its membership in the League: either, owing to insignificance, it merited no special mention in the treaty’s text (both Amyntas and the Chalcidians were allowed to make an alliance with it) or it may have stood under Macedonian (rather than Chalcidian) control at the time. We know almost nothing else of these cities at the requisite time.

Let us now add one more consideration: The Lacedaemonians do not seem to have had particular scruples about their military interventions in this period, as e.g. the Mantineans learnt to their cost. With regard to the federal union of Corinth and Argos Xenophon may betray himself when he writes of the Argive gar-

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32) E.g. Xen. Hell. 5.2.26–28 presents a scenario whereby the Lacedaemonian garrison on the Cadmea was requested by one of the leading magistrates of Thebes, Leontiades. The truth of the story does not concern us here, only how Xenophon’s account tends to excuse or at least to mitigate the Lacedaemonians’ violation of the King’s Peace.

33) J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte 1.2, Straßburg 1913, 15.

34) Syll. 135 = Tod 111 = Staatsverträge des Altertums 2, Nr. 231. On this inscription see Zahrnt (n. 13 above) 122–124, who discusses various possibilities for interpreting the clause. See also R. M. Errington, History of Macedonia, Berkeley 1990, 31.
rison in Corinth, that the Corinthians did not wish to let it go\textsuperscript{35}. As soon as the Argive garrison had withdrawn, a different ‘faction’ gained control of Corinth with the usual expulsion of political opponents and the usual reorientation of alliances\textsuperscript{36}. The dissolution of the Boeotian League need not have delighted all the cities in Boeotia. Certainly Thebes’ old enemy Orchomenus and also Plataea were happy\textsuperscript{37}; but Thespiae apparently had to be garrisoned by the Lacedaemonians in the following years\textsuperscript{38}. Sparta often showed an extraordinary willingness to intervene here and there on behalf of a pro-Lacedaemonian ‘faction’. Given the speciousness of the Lacedaemonians’ official reasoning during these years (on any interpretation of events), we simply must reckon with the possibility that the justification for the Lacedaemonians’ intervention was a highly contrived affair. While we probably should shrink back from assuming that the embassies of the Acanthians and the Apollonians are entirely fictitious\textsuperscript{39} – after all, both cities really did fight on the Spartans’ side in the ensuing war against the Olynthians\textsuperscript{40} –, we simply must admit that we do not...
know if everything in Xenophon concerning these embassies and their mission is entirely on the up-and-up.

II. Diodorus’ Version

A. Amyntas’ Appeal

We now turn to look at Ephorus’ version, as seen through the possibly distorting lens of Diodorus’ abridgment in his entry for the year 383/2. We read there a much briefer, somewhat simpler version. First we hear how the Lacedaemonians starting at about this time began to strive for control over all Greece in contravention of the King’s Peace. Then Diodorus tells us that in Macedonia King Amyntas had suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of the Illyrians and that he had renounced his rule. Shortly before he gave up power, he granted to the Olynthians a large tract of land in the marches towards the Chalcidice “on account of his renouncing his power”. Later, when Amyntas regained his Kingdom contrary to expectation, he asked the Olynthians for his land back. They refused, so Amyntas levied an army and asked the Lacedaemonians for help. They responded by sending an army 41.

Very clearly, we have here a completely different version from Xenophon’s; one in which the Acanthians and the Apollonians play no rôle at all42. For that matter, however, Amyntas’ appeal plays no rôle in Xenophon’s version.

41) Diod. 15.19.1–3.

42) Unless Diodorus edited them out, we have every right to expect to find them in Ephorus had he judged them relevant. Although Ephorus did cover the history of geographical units discretely (see e.g. the detailed analysis of W. Kolbe, Diodors Wert für die Geschichte der Pentekontaetie, Hermes 72 [1937] 241–269, with regard to Ephorus’ arrangement of material for the Pentekontaetia), in his expansive universal history all details germane to any situation were included on principle – even at the cost of considerable repetition. To take one example (of many): In FGrHist 70 F 115 = Strabo 8.3.33, p. 358, Ephorus, covering the history of Elis, recounts the story of Pheidon’s famous march on Olympia and provides the reader with much background information on Pheidon which, strictly speaking, had little relevance to Elis. In FGrHist 70 F 176 = Strabo 8.6.16, p. 376, in another context – presumably the history of Aegina, but possibly the history of Argos – Ephorus repeats some of the information about Pheidon. If Fr. 176 is taken from a section dealing with Aeginetan history, then Ephorus should have dealt with
B. Historical Evaluation

1. The Diodoran doublet: 14.92.3 & 15.19.2

We now need to subject Ephorus’ version to the same sort of investigation as above. – First, we must dissect a Diodoran ‘doublet’. Diodorus, in an earlier passage (14.92.3–4 – for the year 393/2), repeats some of this information, to wit that Amyntas gave land to the Olynthians just before he was forced by an Illyrian invasion to give up his Kingdom; that the Thessalians helped him regain power a short time later (μετὰ ὀλίγον χρόνον); and that according to some accounts a pretender, Argaeus, ruled for two years in his stead. While at first glance the passage seems an obvious doublet, several details do not match. Less important is the mention of the pretender Argaeus since he might have fallen victim to Diodorus’ abridging in the later passage. More important, however, is Amyntas’ ally: the Thessalians. Diodorus in the later passage names Amyntas’ ally as well, namely the Lacedaemonians.

43) The phrase μετὰ ὀλίγον χρόνον cannot expand to cover a ten-year period as L. de Salva, Diodoro XIV 92,3 e XV 19,2, Athenaeum 50 (1972) 114–116 has suggested in an attempt to reconcile the two Diodoran passages by assuming that ten years elapsed before the Thessalians restored Amyntas. Quite the contrary, the precise chronological indication in the supplementary version that a pretender actually ruled for two years (Diod. 14.92.4 – following no doubt an alternative story recounted by Ephorus) implies that the imprecise ὀλίγος χρόνος refers, if anything, to an even briefer space of time than the two years.

44) The anonymous referee of this journal has suggested that one might resolve this conflict by assuming that the Thessalians first restored Amyntas and that then the Lacedaemonians helped him regain land from the Olynthians. I see two difficulties with this approach. First, the view could imply that Diodorus placed the passage at 14.92.3–4 ten years out of chronological sequence. While Diodorus is notoriously unreliable in chronological matters, in the portions of his work which run parallel with Xenophon he is all the same never more than a year or two off Xenophon’s chronology; and, often enough, the matter even then remains open to debate. Second, while one might counter this last line of reasoning by dating the restoration to 393/2, but the reacquisition of land from the Olynthians with Lacedaemonian help to 383/2 (thus Errington [n. 34 above] 31–32), this approach in its turn collides with the stress Xenophon lays on the speed with which the Olynthians, after initial successes in the Chalcidice, were coming into possession of
These differences in detail together tend to point towards two distinct losses of Amyntas’ kingdom. On the other hand, while two invasions of Macedonia by Illyrians will not necessarily raise eyebrows, two cessions of land to the Olynthians probably should. These things point towards a doublet.

In principle Diodorus brings two kinds of doublets, of which the first is relatively simple to deal with: Where Ephorus, mostly owing to his method of arranging material, had repeated himself, Diodorus sometimes copied down both passages and treated them as referring to separate events45. Diodorus, however, also occasionally manufactured his own ‘doublets’ by mistakenly attributing details regarding one event to another, similar one. The two events, somewhat similar to begin with, then seem identical (or nearly so) and we suspect a doublet. Properly, we should distinguish between ‘genuine’ and ‘spurious’ doublets. The pair of 15.19.2 and 14.90.3 obviously belong to this latter category. Amyntas probably did lose his Kingdom (or large portions thereof) twice; and Diodorus was misled into applying details of the one loss to his account of the other.

We must now analyse Diodorus’ manufacture of this spurious doublet. The common detail which arouses the most suspicion a priori concerns the twofold cession of land to the Olynthians. For the later loss of territory to the Olynthians we do have Xenophon’s

Macedonian land in 383 or 382 (5.2.13): ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσῆκουσαν αἱ [αἱ πόλεις] ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόρρω καὶ μεῖζον ἐπορεύοντο, καὶ κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἑξοντας ὀδη ἄλλας τε πόλλας καὶ Πέλλαν; “when the (cities) closest to them came over, they quickly proceeded also to ones farther away and larger. Indeed, when we left [for Sparta], they were already holding many others and in particular Pella”. Resolving the differences between Xenophon’s and Diodorus’ accounts is precisely the issue here, but however one resolves them, this fact remains: Xenophon bears witness to Olynthian seizure of Macedonian land (at first that ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, “closest to them”) beginning shortly before and assuming frightening momentum in 383 or 382, for which time (if not year) Diodorus, hardly by coincidence, also attests the Olynthians coming into possession of Macedonian land (ὁμορος χώρα, “land bordering [theirs]”). Only Diodorus attests the same thing for 393/2 also.

45) Ephorus dealt with the siege of Aegina during the Pentecontaetia on two occasions, so Diodorus produced two sieges – one in 464 (11.70.2) and the other in 459 (11.78.3). In 11.81–82 Diodorus, misled by a proleptic discussion of Ephorus’ on the battle of Oenophyta, constructed a second battle (in addition to the real battle in 11.83). For the dates involved see V. Parker, The Chronology of the Pentecontaetia from 465 to 456 B. C., Athenaeum 81 (1993) 129–147.
parallel account – yet Xenophon speaks of the Olynthians’ seizure of Macedonian land (including Pella) and their practically driving Amyntas from Macedonia\(^{46}\). Both historians attest to the presence of large tracts of Macedonian land in Olynthian hands, so surely we can accept this much a priori\(^{47}\). On the assumption that Xenophon’s description of how the Olynthians came to hold this land reflect the truth better, then Amyntas’ cession of land would have occurred just before his first loss of the Kingdom; i.e. Diodorus would have taken the detail of the cession from the earlier incident and applied it to the later also (when the Olynthians captured the land as Xenophon says). Let us treat this, for now, as a working hypothesis.

Next, did Amyntas twice lose his Kingdom owing to an invasion of Illyrians? Enough wars between Illyrians and Macedonians are attested that we can find nothing inherently improbable about this prospect. Yet the evidence is not entirely clear. Demosthenes records that at some time the Thessalians expelled Amyntas\(^{48}\). Again there is nothing inherently improbable about the Thessalians expelling a Macedonian King. After all, if both the Thebans and the Athenians could from time to time force Macedonian kings to acknowledge their hegemony, the Thessalians might have driven one from his kingdom. According to Diodorus, however, it was Thessalians who restored Amyntas after his first expulsion\(^{49}\). Now

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46) Xen. Hell. 5.2.12–13.
47) The land to which Xenophon refers includes that “closest” to the Olynthians. This is surely roughly identical to that “bordering” the Olynthians to which Diodorus refers. According to Xenophon, however, the Olynthians go on to capture much more land.
48) Demosth. 23.111; cf. Schol. Aeschines 2.26. (The scholiast comments on Aeschines’ vague reference to Athenian aid to Amyntas: ἐκβληθέντα γὰρ ποτὲ τὸν Ἀμύνταν ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας ὑπὸ Θετταλῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατηγοροῦν πάλιν ἑπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν. “For the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, after the Thessalians had expelled Amyntas from his kingdom, restored him to his kingdom”. The scholiast has conjured up otherwise unattested Athenian participation in Amyntas’ restoration on the basis of Aeschines’ vague reference; with regard to the Thessalians’ deposition of Amyntas the scholiast seems to follow Demosthenes, who, however, does not explicitly state that the Thessalians expelled Amyntas from Macedonia (see immediately below in the text). The Lacedaemonian aid to Amyntas probably derives from the general tradition attested both in Ephorus as well as in Isocrates, Panegyricus 125–126.)
49) Diod. 14.92.3.
there is a way to accept Demosthenes’ assertion without rejecting Diodorus’, if one allows for some rhetorical stretching of a point in a Demosthenic speech: Amyntas could have been encroaching on the lands of the Perrhaebi50, one of the so-called perioci peoples generally under Thessalian domination. If e. g. Jason of Pherae drove him out of that region ca. 370, Demosthenes’ rhetorical reference to the Thessalians’ “driving Amyntas out” finds an easy explanation. For Demosthenes’ purposes in this speech – to show that Philip was hardly likely to seek allies amongst the Thessalians, “who had once expelled his father” – an expulsion from the Perrhaebia may have sufficed51.

On balance, therefore, I feel that Diodorus’ version can stand and that the Thessalians helped restore Amyntas to his throne when he was first expelled. The reasons will become clear in a moment.

Let us proceed. Isocrates mentions that Amyntas lost his Kingdom to “Barbarians”52 – by which presumably the Illyrians are meant; but we do not immediately know to which loss of the Kingdom Isocrates refers. In his epitome of Trogus Justin makes reference to Amyntas’ hard-fought wars against “the Illyrians and the Olynthians”53. Obviously, the passage’s compression pre-

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50) An inscription from the time of Trajan, published in ABSA 17 (1910–11) 193–194, attests to Amyntas’ arbitration in a boundary dispute between the Perrhaebi and the Elimeians. N. G. L. Hammond, History of Macedonia 2, Oxford 1979, 178 (cf. Errington [n. 34 above] 34) rightly points out that this inscription, a priori, proves no more than that Amyntas was a mutually acceptable arbitrator – not necessarily, as Rosenberg, Hermes 51, 1916, 503 and 505 (non uidi), argued (and B. Lenk, s. v. Perrhaebi, RE 19,1 [1937] 908 accepted), that he intervened as ‘Oberherr’ of both areas. However, Amyntas’ involvement certainly evinces some Macedonian influence in the Perrhaebia (at the expense of Thessalian influence). At any rate, Amyntas’ successor (and Philip’s brother), Alexander II, did penetrate far into Thessaly (Diod. 15.61.4–5) before Pelopidas expelled him (Diod. 15.67.2–4). So Amyntas also could have encroached on the Perrhaebia.

51) I owe this suggestion to the referee of this journal.

52) Isocrates, Archidamus 46; cf. Aelian, Historia varia 4.8. In my opinion Isocrates, loc. cit., does not attest Lacedaemonian help to Amyntas (pace Stylianou [n. 22 above] 212–213): [Ἀμύντας] χωρίων μικρὸν καταλαβὼν καὶ φίλους ἐνθέντες μεταπεμψάμενός means, as it has usually been translated, “Amyntas seized a small redoubt and from this redoubt sent for aid”, and not, “Amyntas seized a small redoubt and asked for aid from here (i.e. Sparta, where Archidamus is presented as speaking)”.

cludes any exact interpretation: wars against both simultaneously as well as wars against first the Illyrians and then the Olynthians must remain possible interpretations. Of course, if Trogus had written first of a terrible war against the Illyrians and then of a second, chronologically distinct conflict with the Olynthians, we could end our discussion rather quickly with the following proposal:

1.) ca. 393 Amyntas loses his Kingdom after the Illyrians invade, but before fleeing cedes some land to the Olynthians; shortly thereafter the Thessalians restore him to his throne;

2.) ca. 383 Amyntas falls out with the Olynthians who again drive him from much of his land; but again he returns, this time with Lacedaemonian help.

In this case Diodorus’ mention of the Illyrians in regard to the second expulsion would be an erroneous transfer of a detail from the first to the second expulsion – just as the cession of land to the Olynthians.

Here, at the end of this discussion of the rise of this spurious doublet, I would like to adduce some final considerations in support of our reconstruction. Xenophon indirectly indicates that Amyntas still possessed much of the Emathia in his conflict with the Olynthians, for the Olynthians’ depredations had affected the land stretching from the Chalcidice westwards to the Axios as well as some land west of the Axios up to Pella (i.e. within the Emathia). If Amyntas was on the verge of losing his Kingdom, he was losing the eastern portions first. Illyrian seizures of Macedonian territory, on the other hand, for obvious reasons tended to take place in the high country to the North and Northwest of “lower” Macedonia. Xenophon, however, implies that the mountainous areas surrounding the Emathia were not under Illyrian control in 381. He refers to the rulers of the surrounding lands whom

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54) Xen. Hell. 5.2.13: The Olynthians take the Macedonian cities that are closest to them and then proceed to ones farther away, of which only Pella is mentioned. The geographical indications are confined to the territory east and immediately west of the Axios. The rest of the Emathia remained in Amyntas’ hands.

55) E.g. on the occasion of Philip’s accession to the throne (or regency) in 359: Diod. 16.2.4–6 and 4.3–7.

56) Xen. Hell. 5.2.38 (cited below to n. 65).
Amyntas is to gain as allies. These lands then (e.g. Elimeia, Eordaia, Paeonia) seem to be independent (i.e. not subject to Amyntas), yet still amenable to being called upon by him as allies (i.e. not under the control of Illyrian invaders either). If this be correct, then the Illyrian invasion clearly cannot belong to the second (near) loss of the Kingdom, but must belong to the first. Then, Isocrates refers to Amyntas’ loss of the Kingdom to Barbarians – with the exception of one fortified place. This too must then refer to the first loss. On this occasion, then, Amyntas does seem to have lost almost all his Kingdom: first, the Illyrians seized much of Upper Macedonia; second, Amyntas (presumably so as not to let his enemies have everything) had ceded lands in the East of his Kingdom to the Olynthians; and, third, a pretender had taken control of whatever was left to the Macedonian throne. On the occasion of the second (near) loss Amyntas still retained, as we have seen, most of the Emathia.

Let us summarise the above: Diodorus’ treatment of Amyntas’ two losses of his Kingdom (or large portions thereof) is characterised by his imbuing the second loss with details pertinent only to the first; to wit, that the Kingdom was lost owing to an invasion of Illyrians and that Amyntas, shortly before fleeing, ceded land to the Olynthians. Once we remove this overlay we see that Ephorus had definitely spoken of:

1.) Macedonian land in Olynthian hands.
2.) Lacedaemonian intervention in the Macedonians’ favour.
3.) some sort of conflict between the Macedonians and the Olynthians.

This reconstruction is compatible with all the evidence, with the possible exception of Demosthenes (who speaks of the Thessalians’ once expelling Amyntas). We have, however, suggested a way of interpreting this so as to avoid any conflict with the rest of the evidence.

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57) Thus e.g. A. Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit 2, Leipzig 1886, 7.
58) Zahrnt (n. 13 above) 154, suggests the lands around the Anthemus River.
59) Above n. 50 (and in text). – It is unclear how the treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidians, Syll. 3 135 = Tod 111 = Staatsverträge des Altertums 2, Nr. 231, should be fitted into this. The treaty’s date is uncertain enough that we could actually place it before Amyntas’ cession of land to the Olynthians ca. 393.
2. Evaluation of the Historicity of the Lacedaemonians’ Intervention on behalf of the Macedonians

Having worked our way through the Diodoran ‘doublet’ we can now turn our attention to what Ephorus (as delineated immediately above) presumably said about the conflict between the Lacedaemonians and the Olynthians. This we must now independently confirm.

First, Xenophon and Ephorus both attest Olynthian possession of Macedonian land; we may presume some sort of a conflict on this basis. Amyntas did fight against the Olynthians later on to get his land back from the Olynthians, and so we have a motive for Amyntas’ detestation of the Olynthians and a reason for him to seek an ally against them. On Xenophon’s own presentation of events, the Olynthians, before the Lacedaemonians came, had, in fact, the upper hand against Amyntas.

Second, did the Lacedaemonians make an alliance with Amyntas? Ephorus was not the only one who claimed they did. Isocrates in an important passage in the Panegyricus argues that the Lacedaemonians at the time of the speech’s publication have completely reneged on their former policies of expelling tyrants and aiding the people: instead they now attack the Greek states and give aid to monarchs. Thus, on the one hand they are now laying siege to Olynthus, but on the other are aiding Amyntas of Macedonia.60 The context makes clear that Sparta’s actions are moreover viewed as violations of the King’s Peace. The Panegyricus was circulated ca. 38061, so it stands extremely close in time to the events themselves; and it propounds the same interpretation of the Lacedaemonian intervention against the Olynthians as Ephorus/Diodorus, uidelicet that the Lacedaemonians attacked Olynthus in aid of Amyntas of Macedon, who, as we have seen, had cause to ask for their help against the Chalcidian League which was in possession of land which had once belonged to him. While Isocrates is obviously proving a point62, his speech is no retrospective revisionism,

On the other hand, it might belong between 393 and the start of the later hostilities between Amyntas and Olynthus.

60) Isocrates, Panegyricus 125–126.

61) The passage just cited (Panegyricus 125–126) also establishes the date: the sieges of Olynthus and Phlius are described as still in process.

62) Since it is obviously possible in this context that Isocrates may have purposefully omitted something which failed to fit his theme – e.g. Lacedaemonian aid
but rather contemporary with the events he describes. It is therefore unlikely that he could have gotten away with a complete mis-representation of what was happening on the Chalcidice.

Less important than Isocrates’ evidence is that of several scholars who, for various reasons, cannot depend on him, at least not completely. N.b. the phrasing of a scholium to Aelius Aristides\(^{63}\): Φοιβίδας, ὁ Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγὸς, ... παρὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐπὶ τῷ βοηθήσαι Ἀμύντα, τῷ Μακεδόνων βασιλεῖ, “Phoeidas, the Lacedaemonians’ commander, ... was passing by Boeotia, [going] to the aid of Amyntas, the King of the Macedonians”. Comparison with Diodorus 15.19.3 and Xen. Hellenica 5.2.24–32 suggests that this scholion derives from a combination of material found in Ephorus and Xenophon. Finally, a (somewhat garbed) scholium to Aeschines also mentions Lacedaemonian aid to Amyntas\(^{64}\).

Because Ephorus’ presentation had more detail than Isocrates’, Ephorus cannot have depended on him alone. Taken together, however, Ephorus and the contemporary Isocrates (with the scholia) form a reasonably heavy body of evidence that should be allowed to outweigh Xenophon’s portrayal of a Lacedaemonian expedition purely for the sake of the Acanthians and the Apollonians. While it is not easy to see why Isocrates and Ephorus should have fabricated a Lacedaemonian expedition in aid of Amyntas, it is quite easy to see why Xenophon should have wanted to transform it into an expedition in aid of Greek cities: Isocrates’ polemic in the \textit{Panegyricus} makes clear how much odium might attach itself to anyone seen aiding a barbarian despot (e.g. Amyntas of Macedonia or the King of Persia) against Greeks, particularly when that despot was trying to rule over Greeks. Isocrates shows us how (at least some) contemporary Greeks viewed Sparta’s intervention in the North – Xenophon gives us Lacedaemonian apologia\(^{65}\): first,

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\(^{63}\) Schol. to Aelius Aristides, Panathenaicus 266 (= p.274 in Dindorf’s edition and 167 in the numeration in Dindorf’s margin, by which latter number, specifically 167.7, the passage is indicated in Dindorf’s edition of the scholia).

\(^{64}\) Schol. to Aeschines 2.26. Above n.37.

\(^{65}\) Notwithstanding that Tuplin (n.6 above) passim has shown that Xenophon’s depiction of Sparta as a whole as well as of individual Lacedaemonians was considerably more nuanced than is often assumed and that Xenophon had deep misgivings about some of the Lacedaemonians’ actions (including those discussed
the intervention took place not for Amyntas’ sake, but on behalf of Greek cities; second, not, as Isocrates had claimed, to enslave Greeks, but to liberate Greeks (i.e. from the Olynthians); third, Amyntas had nothing to do with motivating the expedition.

This last point is deceptively simple. For Xenophon does exclude Amyntas from the ‘Vorgeschichte’ of the expedition. Only after an advance force has already arrived in the Chalcidice and when the main force under Teleutias arrives, does Xenophon make any mention of Amyntas. But when Amyntas does appear, we see Teleutias practically giving him orders:

\[\text{[Τελευτίας] προέπεμπε δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἀμύνταν. καὶ ἡξίου αὐτὸν καὶ ξένους μισθούσθαι καὶ τοῖς πλησίον βασιλεύσι χρήματα διδόναι, ὄς συμμάχους εἶναι, ἐξερ \betaοῦλοιτο τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.}^{66}\]

Teleutias sent ahead to Amyntas also and saw fit that Amyntas should hire mercenaries and give money to neighbouring kings, that they [i.e. the neighbouring kings] might become allies, if he wished to regain his Kingdom.

Could Teleutias have written in this tone to Amyntas without any prior arrangement between the King and the Lacedaemonians? No, Teleutias is too well-informed of Amyntas’ position and obviously knows that Amyntas is willing to help the Lacedaemonians in any way he can – which is why Teleutias can ask him to hire mercenaries, etc. Xenophon has simply omitted mention of Amyntas (in order not to undercut his revisionistic exposition of how the Lacedaemonians intervened on behalf of Greek cities) until now. Amyntas’ introduction for obvious reasons takes place swiftly, unobtrusively, and at the latest point possible.

### III. Conclusion

We have compared two versions of the Lacedaemonians’ immediate motivation for intervening against the Chalcidian League. (That their ultimate motivation was the reattainment of their hegemonial position in Greece should go without saying.) According to the one version (Ephorus’) the Lacedaemonians took up

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^{66} Xen. Hell. 5.2.38.
cudgels against the League in alliance with and at the request of the King of the Macedonians, Amyntas. In the other (Xenophon’s) the intervention was purely the result of an embassy sent by two Chalcidian cities desirous to stay out of the League, but under pressure to join. The first version can in most details be confirmed by recourse to independent sources; and in the case of Isocrates’ Panegyricus, near contemporary. We may accept, I feel, that Amyntas did ask the Lacedaemonians for help against the Chalcidian League, as Ephorus related and as Diodorus copied down – but Xenophon pointedly omitted.

The second version does not find confirmation in independent sources – no source other than Xenophon mentions an embassy of the Acanthians and Apollonians in this context, least of all as a deciding factor for beginning the war. Xenophon’s presentation of his version contains overly juristic arguments contrived and designed to fit a revisionistic, apologetic theme of his own. Does any of this prove conclusively that Xenophon’s version is impossible? No. But the onus probandi falls on the positive; and I do feel that we have shown that Ephorus’ version admits of positive proof in a way in which Xenophon’s does not. And that is the important point.

Now few people will deny that both versions can be combined easily enough: both Amyntas and the Acanthians with the Apollonians may have sent embassies to Sparta67. This, however, raises one final point. Contemporary Greek opinion (as seen in Isocrates and whatever source-material Ephorus based himself on) viewed Amyntas as the major factor; the embassy of the Acanthians and the Apollonians merited no mention outside of Xenophon (unless Ephorus did include it, and it simply fell victim to Diodorus’ shortening). Xenophon in his counter-exposition suppressed what others viewed as the major issue and lifted out of obscurity a minor matter. We need to exercise extreme caution about Xenophon’s silence (when compared to Ephorus’ positive exposition) as well as caution about Xenophon’s positive comments which can be geared towards Xenophon’s own thesis.

That said, this comparison of Xenophon with Ephorus has, I hope, shown many of the problems we face in piecing together the history of this period. Even though Xenophon (through the medi-

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67) Thus e.g. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte 3.1², Berlin 1922, 102–103.
um of the Acanthian ambassador’s speech) displays singular political and constitutional acumen in his detailed analysis of the Olynthians’ League; even though Ephorus’ presentation has been badly garbled by Diodorus’ abridgement and confusion; in the final analysis Ephorus’ version on the Lacedaemonians’ motivation for entering into a war against the Olynthians probably comes closer to the truth, whereas Xenophon’s turns out to be revisionism intended to prove that what the Lacedaemonians were really doing was not what they were seen to be doing.

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