THE LAW OF SOPHOCLES AND THE BEGINNINGS OF PERMANENT PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS IN ATHENS

The final years of the fourth century B.C. were vital ones for the emergence of Athens as the centre of Hellenistic philosophy: by the close of that century, all four of the great philosophical schools upon which the prestige of the city would later heavily rest – the Academy, the Peripatos, the Garden of Epicurus and the Stoic school of Zeno – were present in the city. But Athens almost did not become the educational centre of the Greek world. In 307/6, anti-intellectualism was rife in the city, which had just been liberated from the ten-year long tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum. Demetrius, who had ruled 317–307 under the aegis of the Macedonian overlord, Cassander, was a prominent pupil of Aristotle’s Peripatos, and a major scholar in his own right. Public dissatisfaction with his rule found expression in the immediate aftermath of his overthrow. A law was introduced by an Athenian, Sophocles of Sunium, forbidding the establishment of a philosophical school without the express permission of the Athenian assembly and boule; failure to gain that prior permission was to be punishable by death.¹ To be

sure, the law was not technically an outright prohibition against such schools, although within the exaggerated realm of contemporary comedy it could be misrepresented as such,2 and its impact on Athenian philosophical society was marked: many philosophers fled the city.3 Fortunately for Athens, the law remained valid for only a year. Sophocles was prosecuted by one Philon (said to have been a pupil of Theophrastus) for introducing an illegal measure; despite the best efforts of Demosthenes’ nephew, Demochares, who spoke in defence, Sophocles was convicted by an overwhelming majority, fined and his law repealed.4 The vote which secured the abolition of the law avowed the Athenians’ belief in intellectual freedoms, and was the catalyst for the foundation in that city of the last two great philosophical schools: not long after the law’s repeal (in 306), Epicurus returned to his native Athens to establish his famous garden there,5 and soon after that (c. 300) Zeno of Citium, founder of the Stoic movement, came to the city and began to teach in the Stoa Poikile.

The general thrust of Sophocles’ law is well understood. It was an essentially political gesture, prompted by the perceived collaboration of the Peripatos with the hated Macedonian overlords.6 Demetrius of Phalerum’s connection with Cassander had been but one instance of that relationship. Aristotle’s links to Alexander the Great, and to Cassander’s father, Antipater, are well

2) See Alexis F 99 Kassel and Austin = Arnott (above, n. 1) F 99. In this fragment of Alexis’ *Hippeus*, a play performed at the Great Dionysia of 307/6, one character – thought by Meineke to have been an old man whose son had been corrupted by the philosophers – speaks in hyperbolic terms of the law as sending to perdition (*ἐξ κόρακας ἔφεσιν... ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς*) all the philosophers. The abbreviated version of the law given by Pollux 9.42 also presents it as an outright prohibition against philosophical institutions in Athens.

3) Diog. Laert. 5.38.

4) Athen. 610e. The basis of Philon’s case is nowhere preserved. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Antigonus von Karystos, Berlin 1881, 270 ff. argued Sophocles’ law amounted to impiety, a view based on the belief that the schools were legally constituted as *θησαυροί*. J. P. Lynch, Aristotle’s School, Berkeley 1972, chapter 4, esp. 117–18 effectively demolishes this hypothesis. More probable is that the law impinged upon the right of free association, on which see Gaius, Dig. 47.22.4.

5) Diog. Laert. 10.2.15 = Apollodorus FGrHist 244 F 42.

6) Other schools, notably the Academy, were drawn into a general debate prompted by the law, as is clear from the listing of Platonic tyrants in the speech of Demochares (Athen. 508f–509b).
known: he had been Alexander’s tutor, and owned estates in Macedonia, while Antipater is named as the executor of his will. Aristotle’s successor, Theophrastus, was also held in high regard by Cassander. These personal associations with high-ranking Macedonians, culminating in Cassander’s installation in power of Demetrius of Phalerum in 317, underscored the supposed link between philosophical training and anti-Athenian, undemocratic political behaviour – a link already implicitly present in the trial and condemnation of Socrates in 399 B.C. It is clear from the fragments of the speech which Demochares delivered in defence of Sophocles (Athen. 508f–509b) that the tyrannical tendencies of philosophers were indeed highlighted in 307. Sophocles’ law sought to bring these suspect philosophical schools with their perceived anti-democratic leanings under the jurisdiction of the state.

But while the broad impetus of the legislation is widely accepted, little attention has been directed to its actual framing. The problem is of some interest because the law marks a departure from the usual mode of anti-philosophical expression. Anti-intellectualism in the ancient world is largely a tradition of individual prosecutions, rather than of systematic suppression of philosophical activity; Sophocles’ law is one of the very few documented attempts to regulate learning on a state-wide scale. It is the purpose of this paper to trace the basis of Sophocles’ attack, by looking at developments in the Phalerean period which may have made possible this shift from single prosecutions.

7) Plut. Alex. 7.2–8. 3. The evidence for Aristotle’s relations with Philip and Alexander is collated by I. Düring, Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition, Göteborg 1957, 284–99.
8) Diog. Laert. 5.11.
9) Diog. Laert. 5.37.
11) In an Athenian context, two earlier measures may be isolated. Xen. Mem. 1.2.31 mentions a prohibition on the teaching of rhetoric enacted by the tyrant, Critias. Then there is the law of Diopeithes (Plut. Per. 32.1, aimed at physical philosophers) – but its historicity is much disputed. Outside Athens, Lysimachus is said to have expelled the philosophers from Thrace (Athen. 610e), a move which – again if historical – must have been roughly contemporary with the law of Sophocles (see H. S. Lund, Lysimachus: a study in early Hellenistic kingship, London 1992, 101). For the more usual mode of anti-intellectualism, namely the prosecution of individuals, in the years just before Sophocles’ law, see below, p. 255.
Demetrius of Phalerum himself may be the key figure here, for he altered the foundations of the Peripatos in a way which might have facilitated Sophocles’ law. During his period in control of Athens, he gave to Theophrastus a special dispensation which allowed the latter to acquire land in Attica. (As a metic, Theophrastus would ordinarily have been barred from owning such property.) The sole source for this grant is Diogenes Laertius, who includes this information in his biography of Theophrastus (5.39):

λέγεται δ’ αὖτὸν καὶ ίδιον κήπον σχείν μετὰ τῇν Ἀριστοτέλους
tελευτήν Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαλερέως, ὃς ἦν καὶ γνώριμος αὐτῷ, τούτο
συμπράξαντος.

He [Theophrastus] is said to have become the owner of a garden after Aristotle’s death, through the intervention of Demetrius of Phalerum who was his friend.

This land, gained through Demetrius of Phalerum’s patronage, was the garden (κήπος) around which the Peripatetic school became centred. The acquisition of a garden changed significantly the shape of the Peripatetic school. Under its founder, Aristotle, the school had no fixed abode of its own, for Aristotle’s metic status had similarly prevented him from holding land in Attica;12 his school thus existed only as an informal association of individuals who gathered in a public facility, the Lyceum, and as such it was a rather ill-defined entity.13 This is not to suggest that the acquisition of land created a legal corporate identity for the school, or that it is meaningless to think of ‘Aristotle’s school’ simply because it resided only in the public space of the Lyceum.14 What may be posited, however, is that through the acquisition under Demetrius of a specific, private property devoted to the study of philosophy, the Peripatos may have become a more easily recognisable unit, distinguished by those who frequented that private property.15

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12) Indeed, it is on this very point – Aristotle’s ineligibility to own Athenian property – that Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 223) argues against the proposition that Aristotle could have established an institution to rival that of Plato.
14) Compare Lynch (above, n. 4) 106–34.
15) And, incidentally, it may have become a more politically suspect unit. While philosophers gathered in public arenas, their teachings could at least be monitored by the gymnasiarch (as is documented by Aesch. 1.12 and [Plato], Eryxias 399a–b).
This emergence of the school as a more readily identifiable unit described by its association at the κῆπος may, in itself, have encouraged opponents to aim at the school in toto, rather than at individual philosophers. The timing of the law is consistent with this. Prior to Theophrastus’ acquisition of his garden under Demetrius, indeed before Demetrius’ elevation in 317, Aristotle and his associates had been subject to individual prosecution.\textsuperscript{16} This pattern of individual accusation is replaced by Sophocles’ law in 307, after Demetrius’ grant of property to his philosophical colleagues.

Demetrius’ grant of land to Theophrastus may have had a yet more fundamental impact on the formulation of Sophocles’ law, in that it may have been this very type of grant which was being challenged. It is necessary to examine here the status of Theophrastus’ tenure of his κῆπος as Demetrius’ grant may have been a legal innovation. It is often assumed that Theophrastus’ acquisition of land was achieved through the well-established process of ἐγκτησίς, a process by which metics could be granted the special right to own Attic property (although this is not explicitly stated to have been the process at Diog. Laert. 5.39). But there are anomalies in Theophrastus’ management of his garden which make problematic this notion of simple ἐγκτησίς. Grants of ἐγκτησίς were not normally hereditary: land owned thus could not be willed to an honorand’s descendants.\textsuperscript{17} Theophrastus, by contrast, was able to dispose of his κῆπος. In his will of 286 B.C., he stipulated that the garden and associated buildings were to belong to those wishing to study philosophy and that no individual was to use these holdings as private property:

\textsuperscript{16} The sources for these trials are collated and discussed by E. Derenne, Les procès d’impiété, Liège 1930. The political implications are treated by R. A. Bauman, Political trials in ancient Greece, London 1990, and subsequently by L. O’Sullivan, Athenian impiety trials in the late fourth century B.C., CQ 47, 1997, 136–152.

\textsuperscript{17} On ἐγκτησίς, A. R. W. Harrison, The laws of Athens, Oxford 1968, 237–38. A. S. Henry, Honours and privileges in Athenian decrees, Hildesheim 1983, 208–210 discusses the problem of inheritance of granted property, and observes that while some grants were transferable, “in the vast majority of cases . . . enktesis is granted to the principal beneficiary alone”. Of those grants which could be transferred, the future recipients are always the descendants of the original honorand, and ‘Theophrastus’ transmission of his garden to the school cannot be explained in these terms.
The garden and the walk and all the houses by the garden I give to such of my friends named here as wish to study and to philosophise together, since it is not possible for all men to be always in residence, on condition that no-one alienates the property or devotes it to private use.

The fact of the transfer of the property is unusual, and there is another curious feature in the stipulation that the property was to be used after Theophrastus’ death by his remaining philosophical associates. This kind of transfer, in which land is stipulated for the use of a nominated group for a specified purpose, is, to the best of my knowledge, unprecedented, although it is paralleled very soon after Theophrastus’ death in the handling of another contemporary philosophical school – Epicurus left his garden (his personal property) to those of his companions who wished to pursue their studies. We may be still some way from the existence of philosophical schools as actual corporate entities, for it is clear that, from a legal viewpoint, the ownership of the school land was not held collectively by the school. While Theophrastus stipulated that the garden was in practice to be used collectively, in strict legal terms it may have been retained in individual ownership, since the wills of later heads of the Peripatos reveal that the head remained responsible for the transmission of the property. Yet this retention by an individual in technical terms is, in

18) Diog. Laert. 5.52–53.
19) For Epicurus, see Diog. Laert. 10.16–17.
20) Compare Diog. Laert. 5.62, 70. On the Peripatetics’ wills in general, see H. B. Gottschalk, Notes on the wills of the Peripatetic scholarchs, Hermes 100, 1972, 314–342. Again, in the case of Epicurus’ garden, there was no collective ownership in legal terms. Despite his stipulation that the garden was to be retained for his group of philosophical associates, he rejected the idea of common property as an organisational model for his school (Diog. Laert. 10.11). The existence of corporate identity in Greek legal thought has been denied (for relevant bibliography, see Lynch [above, n. 4] 123–24), but rehabilitated by Harrison (above, n. 17) 242 n. 1. An inscription of the Lycurgan period (IG ii2 337 = Tod, GHI no. 189, dated from 333/32) which grants land to merchants from Citium for a temple to Aphrodite shows a similar grant of ἔκτησις to a group, rather than to an individual metic; this case falls short of establishing a precedent for the subsequent transmission of Theophrastus’ garden, however, as a temple need not be willed from individual to individual as the philosopher’s garden did.
itself, complicated by the fact that the heads of the Peripatos after Theophrastus were not Athenians but metics, who ordinarily would have required their own dispensation to hold land. Theophrastus’ transmission of the garden hints, therefore, that Demetrious of Phalerum did not make a straightforward grant through ἐγκτησίας and that, while Theophrastus may have been the individual owner of the grounds in legal terms, Demetrios’ provision of land was in practice very much for the purposes of the school.21

Whether this type of organisation of philosophical associations, in which a school owned land, was an entirely new development, or rather a new state of affairs just for the Peripatos, is very difficult to establish. The obvious place to look for comparison is to Plato’s Academy, but the legalities of that school’s connection with any property are a very vexed issue. The Academic school made use of two sites. There was the public gymnasium in the sanctuary of the Attic hero, Academus, a sanctuary in which Plato himself had dedicated a τέμενος to the Muses (the Museum); it was of course from this site that the Academy derived its name. Anecdotal evidence in Diogenes Laertius (4.63) suggests that the use of the public property continued at least down to the scholarchy of Carneades (c. 213–129 B.C.): the gymasiarch (the public official designated to oversee the gymnasium) is reported to have asked Carneades, who was delivering a lecture, to lower his voice. To some extent at least, then, Plato’s school was like Aristotle’s, since both gathered in public spaces (the Academy and the Lyceum respectively). Unlike the early Peripatos, however, Plato’s school also made use of a private property which he acquired near the Academy: so Apuleius (de Plat. 1.4), who writes of a hortulus ‘qui Academiae iunctus fuit’.22 It was in this garden that Plato had his living quarters, rather than on the inherited, paternal estate which he also owned.

21) Similar observations about the property holding of the school are made by D. Whitehead, Xenocrates the metic, RhM 124, 1981, 223–244, especially 227–29. He concludes that “the school as a whole [not merely Theophrastus] received this concession [the right to hold land]”.

22) An anecdote on the acquisition of the garden is given by Diog. Laert. 3.20; see further Olymp. in Alc. 2.123–24, in Grg. 41. 8. Further, the division of the school’s activities over two properties, one at the Academy and one a private garden, is at the basis of an anecdote in Aelian, V. H. 3.19.
It is often maintained that the little garden by the Academy is to be associated in some legalistic sense with Plato’s philosophical association.\textsuperscript{23} For example, the elevation of Plato’s nephew, Speusippus, to the scholarchy upon Plato’s death in 347 B.C., against the rival candidatures of the more intellectually prominent Aristotle and Xenocrates, has been linked by some to the fact that Speusippus, unlike the two metic rivals, could inherit land in Attica. On that basis, Speusippus was preferred in 347 supposedly because land occupied by the Academics could be legally retained by an Athenian scholarch.\textsuperscript{24} This does require that the set-up of the Academy changed by 339/38, upon Speusippus’ demise: at that date, the metic Xenocrates became scholarch. Another suggestion, again based on the notion that the school was linked to some of Plato’s private property, is that the school existed from Plato’s death as something of a corporate body, and that the property of the school was left not to any individual scholarch but to the group of philosophers as a whole, in a manner somewhat akin to Theophrastus’ designation of his garden as a bequest for those who wished to continue their studies.\textsuperscript{25}

There may, however, be a fundamental flaw in the underlying assumption that the Academic philosophers in the fourth century actually owned the garden, either collegially or through their scholarch, as distinct from simply using the garden.\textsuperscript{26} After all, in the version of Plato’s will preserved by Diogenes Laertius (3.41–

\textsuperscript{23} In fact, the private garden and the public gymnasium are sometimes conflated, so that discussions include the ownership of the actual sanctuary called the Academy. The belief that successive scholarchs owned Plato’s garden can be traced at least as far back as E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Hildesheim 1888, 985 n. 2.

\textsuperscript{24} So A.-H. Chroust, Speusippus succeeds Plato in the scholarchate of the Academy, REG 84, 1971, 338–341. The division between the scholarchy and the ownership of Plato’s garden argued for below, however, gives incidental support to those who, like Whitehead (above, n. 21), have argued that Speusippus defeated both Xenocrates and Aristotle for the scholarchy on his personal merits, and not simply because of any legal convenience stemming from his ability to own Athenian property.

\textsuperscript{25} For this and similar possibilities, see Whitehead (above, n. 21) 225 ff.

\textsuperscript{26} The continued use of the garden by scholarchs after Plato’s death is evidenced by Plut. de Exilio 603b (Plutarch does not specify that he means the κήπος, not the gymnasium, but by stating that the land he is writing of was bought for three thousand drachmas, it is clear that the κήπος is meant – its price is given at Diog. Laert. 3.20).
only two properties are mentioned: one is Plato’s paternal estate, the other an estate acquired by Plato which is stated to have been bordered on its western side by the Cephisus. The former is willed to Plato’s relative, Adeimantus, and the latter seems to have been also. Nowhere does Plato indicate in his will the bequest of any land for his philosophical associates, or make reference to a third property next to the Academy, and Speusippus, the subsequent scholarch, is mentioned only among a number of executors, not as a beneficiary. This itself is suspicious, and scholars often assume that the land for the Academy was a separate issue dealt with in another, now lost, legal document. But it may be rather that the garden near the Academy was indeed the acquired land recorded in Plato’s will as being bequeathed to Adeimantus. The situation of that property as delineated in Plato’s will cannot be fixed exactly, but the specification that it lay close by the Cephisus does take us close to the site of the public gymnasium called the Academy and to Colonus where, as Diogenes Laertius says (3.5), the garden owned by Plato near the Academy was sited.

If, in the aftermath of Plato's death, Adeimantus owned the garden near the Academy while Speusippus was scholarch, it emerges that there was a division between the actual, legal tenure of the land, and the structure of the Academic school itself. The scholarch of the school could be a metic, like Xenocrates, or a native Athenian, as was Polemo (the scholarch after Xenocrates), if the scholarchy were essentially a position of intellectual guidance of the association. The author of the Index Academicorum Herculanensis describes Plato's own rôle in the school in terms suggestive of an intellectual, not legalistic, leadership, when he writes of Plato as being 'supervisor' and 'setter of problems' for his colleagues (ἀρχιτεκτονοῦντος καὶ προβλήματα διδόντος τοῦ Πλάτωνος) and we may wonder whether this, and not ownership of the garden, is essentially what it meant to be one of the early scholarchs of the Academy. Under such a division of duties, the scholarch himself might indeed be a metic since the land used

27) For Adeimantus’ inheritance of both listed properties see Whitehead (above, n. 21) 230 n. 24, likewise Lynch (above, n. 4) 126; Lynch further suspects, as I argue below, that one of the two properties inherited by Adeimantus was the κήπος near the Academy.

by the Academic school remained technically under the private ownership of an Athenian.

If this is the case, then the situation of the Academics in the fourth century was different from that in which the Peripatos found itself after Demetrius’ grant to Theophrastus. It may have been the very novelty of the Peripatos’ property holding, signalling a fundamental shift in the structure of philosophical institutions in Athens, which offered Sophocles an avenue of attack, and allowed Sophocles to frame his law in a way which would strike specifically at the one school most compromised by its dealings with the Macedonians. This conclusion comes with a ‘caveat’: the evidence for anomalies in Demetrius’ grant comes only from Theophrastus’ will, and is thus much later than the grant itself. If, however, Demetrius’ grant was indeed formulated in terms that made it not merely a grant to Theophrastus for the duration of his life, but a grant to be exercised by subsequent Peripatetics after his death, then it is possible that Sophocles’ law was directed very specifically at that grant. The school, comprising a number of metics, could not retain its land without some special dispensation. That dispensation had been granted initially by the fiat of Demetrius himself;29 perhaps Sophocles sought to make such dispensations the prerogative of the assembly and council alone.

The terminology of Sophocles’ law may support this interpretation. Pollux, who mentions the law at 9.42 and is thought to retain some of its original wording,30 states the measure thus: μὴ ἔξειναι μηδενὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν διατριβήν κατασκευάσασθαι. This is probably the first use of the term διατριβή to denote a philosophical school, and it seems to refer to the physical presence of the

29) It has been suggested to me by the editor that the description of the grant in Diog. Laert. 5.39, and in particular the phrasing of Demetrius’ rôle – Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαλερᾶς, ὃς ἦν καὶ γνώριμος αὐτῷ, τούτῳ συμπράξαντος – may indicate that Demetrius organised the grant in conjunction with the usual instruments, the council and assembly. Such might be the force of συμπράξαντος, but an easier reading of the passage in context (quoted in full above, p. 254) would suggest that Demetrius’ collaboration was with the subject of the statement, namely Theophrastus, who must have been an active participant in the establishment of the Peripatetic garden. Moreover, if the assembly and council had indeed given their imprimatur to the Peripatos under Demetrius, the insistence on such ratification under the terms of Sophocles’ law, and Theophrastus’ flight from Athens in 307/6, are difficult to rationalise.

30) On Pollux’ retention of the original text, Wilamowitz (above, n. 4) 270 n. 6.
philosopher’s property, rather than to the abstract association among those studying philosophy. Pollux indeed quotes Sophocles’ law because it illustrates the use of \( \delta \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \beta \nu \) to denote a building. The term is, moreover, that used in philosophers’ wills to denote the physical schools to be retained by those interested in philosophy. Strato, Theophrastus’ successor as head of the Peripatos, may have intended the garden and its amenities when he wrote \( \kappa \tau \alpha \lambda \epsilon \iota \pi \omega \tau \varepsilon \iota \nu \delta \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \beta \nu \Lambda \omicron \kappa \omicron \omega \nu \) (he goes on to bequeath to Lyco his books, and all the furniture in the dining hall – which must be an allusion to the school property). The appearance of \( \delta \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \beta \nu \) in this new sense in Sophocles’ law may have been prompted by the new establishment of the Peripatetic garden after Demetrius’ benefaction. On this understanding, Sophocles’ measure may be interpreted as a move to make dependent on public authorisation the continued tenure of such \( \delta \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \beta \nu \) by groups of individuals studying philosophy – those philosophers with suspect political leanings could be denied the right to hold the gardens in which their schools were based.

By granting Theophrastus a \( \kappa \eta \pi \omicron \varsigma \) for the Peripatos, I would argue, Demetrius fundamentally changed the shape of that philosophical establishment; ironically, by the very same measure, he afforded Sophocles grounds to challenge the entire school. That Demetrius is an important figure in Athenian intellectual history has long been recognised, but to his more general impact of rous-

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31) Mention must be made of Theopompus, who wrote a \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \varepsilon \tau \pi \omicron \nu \delta \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \beta \nu \). Assuming that the title was Theopompus’ own, and not some later appellation, this use of \( \delta \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \beta \nu \) predates Sophocles’ law. But, as M. A. Flower, Theopompus of Chios, Oxford 1994, 37 n. 48 suggests, \( \delta \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \beta \nu \) here does not mean ‘school’. Although Flower’s reason (namely, that the term is not used of a school until the second century) is perhaps untenable, his conclusion may be valid: the fragments of Theopompus’ work indicate that the title is better read as ‘Against the teachings of Plato’, since the surviving material suggests an attack on Platonic doctrine.

32) Following the precedent established by the Peripatos, and after the rejection of Sophocles’ law, the Academy may have moved to a set-up more like that of the Peripatos, with land being held by successive scholarchs specifically for the purposes of the school, and, as noted above (n. 19), the Epicureans had exclusive use of a private property. Not all later schools adopted the model of the Peripatos, however: Ariston of Chios broke from the Stoics and began an independent school by lecturing in the Cynosarges gymnasium (Diog. Laert. 7.161), and an unnamed philosopher later set up a school in the Ptolemaic gymnasium (Apollodorus FGrHist 244 F 59).
ing suspicions against philosophers through his tyranny we may add this more specific influence. By his creation of circumstances which facilitated Sophocles’ law, and as a result of the ensuing debate and subsequent repeal of that law, Demetrius had a major—although unforeseen—effect on the development of Athenian philosophical culture. With the promulgation of Sophocles’ law, the fate of intellectual activity—and the reputation of Athens as a magnet for philosophers and thinkers—hung in the balance; the Athenians’ ultimate rejection of the kind of state control advocated by Sophocles secured her place as the school of Hellas and her renown as the seat of learning.