In a series of publications Edward Schiappa has argued for a fundamental reappraisal of the history of rhetoric in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Schiappa contends that the term ἐπιτομαχία itself was coined by Plato in the course of composing the Gorgias, as part of a deliberate effort to limit the scope and function of the fifth-century sophistic ‘art of λόγος’, and in particular to discredit the training offered by his educational rival Isocrates. In contrast to the discipline of ‘rhetoric’, which Plato named and defined and thereby in a real sense created, the earlier sophistic art of discourse represented, according to Schiappa, a much broader range of skills in reasoning and argumentation, which was not yet clearly differentiated from ‘philosophy’ as a separate discipline. Plato’s invention of the name and notion of ἐπιτομαχία constitutes, in Schiappa’s view, a revolutionary conceptual breakthrough in the development of rhetoric into the theoretical discipline it eventually became, by the end of the fourth century, at the hands of Aristotle and his successors. Schiappa’s main arguments for Plato as the originator of the term ἐπιτομαχία are: (1) the lack of attestation of the term in extant fifth- and fourth-century texts prior to the Gorgias; and (2) Plato’s fondness for inventing adjectives in -ικος, particularly those denoting verbal arts. A decisive stumbling
block is the phrase with which Plato introduces the word ‘rhetoric’ into the discussion in the *Gorgias* (448d), τὴν καλομέμενην ὁδηγοφικὴν – a phrase which unmistakably implies that ὁδηγοφικὴ is a term already in use. Schiappa tries to get round this implication by interpreting the participle καλομέμενην as introducing a new word, but this interpretation has been convincingly refuted by N. O'Sullivan, who also notes the weakness of Schiappa's argumentum ex silentio from the lack of attestation of ὁδηγοφικὴ in extant fifth-century texts. It stands as certain, therefore, that the term ὁδηγοφικὴ pre-existed Plato's use of it in the *Gorgias*. However, Schiappa's broader claims concerning Plato's treatment of ὁδηγοφικὴ in the *Gorgias*, the nature of the sophistic ‘art of λόγος’ and its relation to fourth-century rhetoric, and the supposed significance of the invention of the term ὁδηγοφικὴ, have not yet received the critical scrutiny they deserve. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this paper to subject them to a careful examination.

Whether Plato himself coined ὁδηγοφικὴ or merely borrowed it, Schiappa insists that his aim in the *Gorgias* was to redefine the sophistic ‘art of λόγος’ more narrowly as ὁδηγοφικὴ, and so confine its sphere of influence to public speech in the courts and assembly. In so doing, Schiappa contends, Plato implicitly attacks his educational rival Isocrates, whose training in the art of discourse he wishes thus to delimit and, consequently, to devalue. This combination of claims is on its face more than a little odd. For in comparison with the wide-ranging interests of many of the older sophists, Isocrates' educational program is self-consciously narrower in

3) Plato and ἡ καλομέμενη ὁδηγοφικὴ, Mnemosyne 46, 1993, 87–89. Schiappa's response to O'Sullivan adds nothing new, save for the implausible suggestion that Socrates' use of ὁδηγοφικὴ as though it were a current term is a simple anachronism on Plato's part (Schiappa, Response [above n. 1] 513). Despite Schiappa's continuing insistence to the contrary, Lg. 894c does not support his argument. The words καλομέμενην [sc. κίνησιν] τε [England: δὲ mss.] ὅτι τῶν ὄντων πάντων μεταβολὴν καὶ κίνησιν there do not introduce μεταβολὴ and κίνησις as new terms nor (as Schiappa suggests) distinguish a novel use of them, but identify self-moving motion as the rightly denominated source of motion and change in all things.

4) Neither Schiappa nor O'Sullivan satisfactorily explains why Plato uses the exact form of words he does in Grg. 448d. Since Plato goes on to argue that rhetoric is no true τέχνη but merely an 'empirical knack', ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή (cf. esp. 462b–466a), the phrase τὴν καλομέμενην ὁδηγοφικὴν probably reflects his rejection of rhetoric's claim to the status of a τέχνη. (On Plato's use of καλομέμενος "to draw attention to errors in the way the 'so-called' concept of 'X' is commonly used" cf. Schiappa, Did Plato [above n. 1] 468, and the passages there cited, e.g. R. 442a with the notes of Adam and Shorey ad loc.)

5) Schiappa, Did Plato (above n. 1) 465–68, Protagoras (above n. 1) 45–47, Name (above n. 1) 2, 11.
scope, and eschews what he regards as the philosophical pretensions and irrelevancies of his fifth-century predecessors. It did not take Plato to restrict the focus of Isocrates' training in comparison with the fifth-century sophistic ‘art of λόγος.’ Schiappa, however, offers two arguments in support of his contentions. (1) The word ὑποτοςεῖα, which appears first in In soph. 21, may, he suggests, have been “a novel term associated with the training offered by Isocrates”, so that Gorgias’ declaration (Grg. 449a) that he is knowledgeable in ὑποτοική “would have been a clear signal to fourth-century readers that the target of the passage was Isocrates.” (2) Since Isocrates was (on the usual view) a pupil of Gorgias, Plato’s attack on the latter would, Schiappa argues, have been seen as an attack on the former as well; and he points out that the dialogue begins with an exchange between Polus and Chairephon, the respective pupils of Gorgias and Socrates. However, a brief glance at In soph. 21 (καὶ τοὺς βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ταύτης προστατομένους πολὺ ἐν θάττων πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ πρὸς ὑποτοςεῖαν ὑφελήσειν) reveals that ὑποτεια there signifies ‘skill in oratory’ and designates one outcome (though not the main one) of the training advocated by Isocrates. In this very passage as elsewhere, Isocrates identifies the training he offers as φιλοσοφία ποτὶ ὑποτοςεῖα. It is most unlikely, then, that Plato’s use of ὑποτοική is intended to recall Isocrates’ ὑποτοςεῖα. Certainly Plato’s critique of rhetoric applies to Isocrates, as well as to other teachers of rhetoric and to their pupils, the Athenian ὑποτειεῖα. But the evidence for a specific attack on Isocrates in the Gorgias is very slender. It consists in the main of the resemblances between

7) Schiappa, Did Plato (above n. 1) 465, cf. Protagoras (above n. 1) 45.
9) Rather than ‘oratory’, as both Schiappa and LSJ s.v. interpret. G. Norlin, Isocrates II (Loeb edition), London and New York 1929, 177 more accurately translates “facility in oratory.”
(1) Grg. 463a (ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας) and In soph. 17 (ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς); and (2) Grg. 519b–d and In soph. 5–6. The former can be explained as a parody of Isocrates by Plato, or (less likely) by the assumption of a common model, or else as a mere coincidence. The latter is best explained simply as an ‘old joke’ against the sophists repeated independently by Plato and Isocrates.

Schiappa’s broader and more important claim, to the effect that Plato endeavored to redefine and restrict the sophistic ‘art of λόγος’ in order to differentiate it from his own brand of philosophy, rests on a selective and tendentious use of the relevant evidence. In the first place, in the Gorgias itself Plato’s concern is not with sophistic education or the sophistic ‘art of λόγος’ as a whole, but rather with one particular facet of it which (in his view) exercised a deleterious influence on Athenian social and political life: the (apparently) morally neutral training in rhetoric offered by sophists like Gorgias and Polus, which put the tools of mass persuasion into the hands of unscrupulous aspirants to political power like Callicles. Although the historical Gorgias may well have disavowed the intention of teaching ἀφήνει (cf. Men. 95c), in the Gorgias the sophist is forced to admit that the art he professes to teach – the art of persuasion – is after all concerned with the subjects of justice and injustice, right and wrong (cf. Grg. 454b). Yet, according to Plato, neither the teachers nor the practitioners of this art possess true knowledge about these subjects; rather, they operate on the basis of mere opinion (cf. Grg. 454d–455d). This fundamental contradiction, in Plato’s view, vitiates the kind of training offered by Gorgias; and in the Gorgias he sets out to expose the disastrous political and social consequences that flow from such a flawed system of education. This focus explains why

Eucken (above n. 10) 36–41, with references to earlier literature. Wilamowitz, Platon II, Berlin 1920 (= 1962), 108 and Jaeger (above n. 10) III 58 with n. 44 suppose that the Gorgias preceded In sophistas, which would preclude an attack on Isocrates in that dialogue; but the majority of critics support the reverse chronology (on the date of the Gorgias cf. e.g. Dodds, 24–27).


14) Schiappa, Did Plato (above n. 1) 465–68, Protagoras (above n. 1) 45–47, Name (above n. 1) 11.

15) Cf. Dodds (above n. 11) 10.

16) On the connection between rhetoric and the dialogue’s wider social and
other aspects of the sophists’ enterprise are ignored in the *Gorgias*; to infer, as Schiappa does, that Plato was trying (covertly) to redefine that enterprise is to ignore the dialogue’s subject and purpose. Facets of sophistic teaching neglected in the *Gorgias* receive their due attention in a number of other dialogues which Schiappa hardly mentions. These include the *Euthydemus* (on the sophistic art of argumentation), the *Protagoras* (on the sophists’ claim to teach *politeia* ἄρετη, and on their treatment of poetry [cf. 338e–347e]), and the *Theaetetus* (on the epistemological issues involved in Protagoras’ man-measure sentence). That Plato fully recognized and acknowledged (although he could not accept) the broad scope claimed by the sophistic ‘art of λόγος’ is shown by such passages as Phdr. 261aff., where Socrates argues that rhetoric extends beyond the courts and other public assemblies to include persuasion exercised καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις; and Sph. 232b–e, where the sophistic art of ἀντιλογική is said to embrace natural science, law and the whole of politics, and each and every art. Schiappa’s neglect of the evidence of dialogues other than the *Gorgias* results in a one-sided and distorted picture of Plato’s engagement with his sophistic predecessors.

Further doubt is thrown on Schiappa’s contentions regarding Plato and the ‘invention’ of ὑποτιμεῖ by the sophist Alcidamas’ use of the term. ὑποτιμεῖ appears twice in the opening paragraph of his *De Sophistis*: καὶ πολλοστόν μέρος τῆς ὑποτιμικῆς κεκτημένου δυνάμεως ὁλης τῆς τέχνης ἀμφισβητοῦσι (1.1, 8.4–5 Avezzù); and καὶ τοὺς ἐπ’ αὐτό τούτο τὸν ἄνθρωπον αἰτομαλλόκυκτος ἀπολειφθείσθαι πολὺ καὶ ὑποτιμηκῆς καὶ φιλοσοφίας ὑπειληφθὼς (1.2, 8.9–10 Avezzù).

This work is conventionally dated to the period 390–380 B.C., on the basis of supposed connections with Isocrates’ *In sophistas* and *Panegyricus*. But Schiappa argues for a much later date, some-political concerns cf. Dodds (above n. 11) 1–4, 10 and P. Friedländer, *Plato II: The Dialogues*, tr. H. Meyerhoff, New York 1964, 244–45. Cf. also Olympiodorus’ characterization of the συντός of the *Gorgias*: περὶ τῶν ἄρχων τῶν ηθικῶν διαλεγόμενοι τῶν φιλοσοφῶν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν εὐθυμίαν (In Grg. p. 3, 18–20 Westerink).


18) In the first passage, δύναμίς is practically synonymous with τέχνη (as is shown by ὡς τῆς τέχνης). For the virtual equivalence of δύναμις and τέχνη cf. e.g. Aristotle, EN 1094a10 with J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, London 1900, xxiii with n. 3, 8, and LSJ s.v. δύναμις II.3.

time between the *Panegyricus* (c. 380 B.C.) and the *Antidosis* (c. 354 B.C.)\(^{20}\). Whatever the date of Alcidamas' work, it either preceded or followed the *Gorgias*. If the former, then it would provide the earliest attestations of ὄροική, and the suggestion that Plato coined the term would be disproved. If the latter, the result is equally unwelcome for Schiappa's thesis. For Alcidamas, who was himself a sophist and a pupil of Gorgias, shows no awareness of employing a term that Plato coined or redefined in an attack on the sophistic 'art of λόγος'. On the contrary, his use of ὄροική in a programmatic section of his pamphlet clearly implies that it was a term in common employment, without the derogatory overtones that Schiappa suggests Plato invested it with.

According to Schiappa the 'art of λόγος' practiced and taught by the fifth-century sophists differed fundamentally from the theoretical discipline of rhetoric as it developed in the fourth century. Specifically, he contends that before Plato's conceptualization of ὄροική the verbal arts were "less differentiated and more holistic in scope;" that 'rhetoric' was not yet distinguished from philosophy as a distinct discipline, and that between the goals of successful persuasion on the one hand and seeking truth on the other no necessary conflict was felt\(^{21}\). Part of the difficulty with Schiappa's position is terminological. Following George Kennedy, he distinguishes two senses of the word 'rhetoric': (1) persuasive speaking or oratory; and (2) rhetorical theory or "conceptual or meta-rhetoric that attempts to theorize about oratory\(^{22}\)." The first Schiappa allows to the sophists, the second he would deny. These definitions do not quite correspond to Greek usage, however, for ὄροική refers (to be precise) not to oratory per se but to the art or craft (τέχνη) of persuasive speech\(^{23}\). On the other hand, 'rhetorical theory' or 'meta-rhetoric' as Schiappa defines it gives the wrong emphasis as a designation for what the Greeks called ὄροική, a τέχνη which (like others) had as its goal not so much the theoretical understanding as the skillful practice or 'produc-
tion’ of persuasive speech. This emerges clearly from Plato’s definition of rhetoric as a “craftsman of persuasion,” πειθοῦς δημιουργ-γός.24

In support of his contentions concerning the fifth-century sophistic ‘art of λόγος’ Schiappa discusses three texts that he regards as valuable evidence for the nature of sophistic teaching: Aristophanes’ Clouds, Gorgias’ Helen, and the anonymous Dialexeis. Of the portrait of Socrates and his school in the Clouds Schiappa emphasizes three features: (1) the close relationship posited “between thinking and speaking and between acquiring wisdom and the ability to persuade;” (2) the breadth of the training offered by Socrates, which embraces both persuasive speaking and subjects such as astronomy, surveying, geometry, and meteorology; and (3) the absence of a “disciplinary jargon” of rhetoric.25 From these features he concludes that at the time the play was written, ‘rhetoric’ was not yet a distinct subject but “still a largely undifferentiated part of skill in logos.” Now Aristophanes’ portrait of Socrates was most likely intended as a caricature of the type ‘intellectual’, and so includes some features pertaining to ‘philosophers’ like the Presocratics and others pertaining to ‘sophists’ in the narrower sense.27 Of course, some of the latter included scientific and/or technical subjects in their teaching, and in this respect resemble the Aristophanic Socrates.28 Dover characterizes such a combination of rhetoric and science as “a legacy from the past,” and ascribes the belief in the relevance of scientific knowledge to rhetorical training to the absence of the notion of intellectual specialization, as well as to the inadequacy of traditional education.29 Other sophists eschewed scientific and technical subjects. The Platonic Protagoras, for example, disavows instruction in arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music (cf. Prt. 318d–e), while the ἀνθρώπων he professes to teach (cf. Prt. 318e–319e) in-

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24) Cf. Grg. 453a with the note of Dodds (above n. 11).
25) Schiappa, Name (above n. 1) 5–6.
26) Schiappa, Name (above n. 1) 6.
27) Cf. K. J. Dover, Aristophanes: Clouds, Oxford 1968, xxxv–xxxviii, who points out that the distinction between sophists and philosophers was foreign to the language of Aristophanes’ time. Schiappa himself (Name [above n. 1] 6) recognizes that Clouds offers “an attack on the newfangled ‘higher education’ in general.”
28) Hippias, for example, taught astronomy and mathematics (cf. Plato, Prt. 315c, 318e, H. Ma. 285c); and Antiphon the sophist discussed a variety of scientific and medical topics in the second book of his Πειράτικα (cf. DK 87 B 22–39).
29) Dover, Clouds (above n. 27) xxxvii–xxxviii.
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cludes a substantial rhetorical component (cf. Prt. 319a: ὁπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατότατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν). And Thrasymachus of Chalcedon seems to have concerned himself almost exclusively with rhetoric. Schiappa is undoubtedly right to conclude that “Aristophanes clearly did not reduce all sophistic teaching to training in public speaking.” But his further conclusion, that rhetoric did not yet exist as a distinct subject, ignores Aristophanes’ dramatic purposes and is quite unjustified. Furthermore, Schiappa’s argument about the absence of a “disciplinary jargon” of rhetoric, correct as it is for Clouds, overlooks the same author’s Eq. 1375–1380 and fr. 205 (Kassel-Austin), as well as Plato, Phdr. 266d–267d, all of which attest to the development in the later fifth century of precisely the sort of jargon he misses in Clouds.

As for Gorgias, Schiappa recalls how in Hel. 13 the sophist emphasizes the wide-ranging power of λόγος, which exercises its persuasive force alike in the realms of scientific, forensic, and philosophical discourse:

Schiappa concludes that for Gorgias, “the skills of logos were much broader in scope than that of the discipline rhétorikê as explicated by Plato and Aristotle.” It is true that Gorgias exalted the power of persuasive speech, and seems to have considered the art of rhetoric superior to all other arts. But this falls far short of proving that (as Schiappa maintains) his ‘art of λόγος’ was “holistic

30) Despite W. Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur I 3.1, München 1940, 186, Cicero’s inclusion of Thrasymachus in a list of those who discussed and wrote “de natura rerum” (De orat. 3.32.128 = DK 85 A 9) deserves no credence.

31) Schiappa, Name (above n. 1) 6.

32) On the Aristophanic texts cf. Dover, Frogs (above n. 2) 30 with n. 55, with references to further literature.

33) Schiappa, Name (above n. 1) 6.


2 Phain. Mix 6 Philet. 144 b
and largely undifferentiated." Rather, Gorgias' emphasis on persuasion is the direct result of his pessimistic or sceptical attitude toward the possibility of attaining truth, and consequent preoccupation with belief or opinion, which is easily manipulated by λόγος. It is unnecessary to enlist here the controversial evidence of the second part of the Περὶ τοῦ μῆ δύντος, which defends a thesis in which Gorgias may or may not have seriously believed. His position appears plainly enough in the Helen, where it is affirmed that since knowledge is difficult (though not impossible) to acquire, the majority of people must make do on most issues with opinion, slippery and uncertain though it is:

eί μὲν γὰρ πάντες περὶ πάντων εἶχον τῶν παροιχομένων μνήμην τῶν τε παρόντων (ἐννοιαν) τῶν τε μελλόντων πρόοιαν, οὐκ ἂν όμοίως ἐξελλοιῶσθαί ἤν δὴ λόγος. ἂλλα νῦν γε οὕτε μνημήναι τὸ παροιχομένον οὕτε σκέψασθαι τὸ παρόν οὕτε μαντεύσασθαι τὸ μέλλον εὐτρόφος ἔξει, ὅπερ περὶ τῶν πλείστων οἱ πλείστοι τὴν δόξαν σύμμοιρον τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχονται. ἢ δὲ δόξα σφαλερά καὶ ἀβεβαιός οὕσα σφαλεράς καὶ ἀβεβαιοῖς εὐτυχίαις περιβάλλει τούτων αὐτῆς χρομένους.

Viewed from this perspective, Gorgias' emphasis on the scope and power of the art of persuasion looks much more like a reduction of other disciplines to the level of rhetoric than an enlargement in the concept of rhetoric itself.

Schiappa considers lastly three chapters of the anonymous Dialexeis. He notes the absence of any reference to political- or public-speaking contexts either in the discussion of memorization in the ninth chapter (Dialex. 9.1-6) or in the mention of καυσος in the second (Dialex. 2.20). In light of the centrality of both the concept of καυσος and the art of memory in later rhetorical theory, Schiappa concludes that the non-rhetorical treatment of these subjects in the Dialexeis shows that no "disciplinary matrix" yet connected them with oratory. From this, as well as from the absence of the terms διαλεκτική, ὀητορική, and φιλοσοφία from the discus-

35) For the philosophical background of Gorgias’ views on rhetoric cf. e.g. Guthrie, Sophists (above n. 19) 272–73 and H. Cherniss, Selected Papers, Leiden 1977, 24, 88.


37) Schiappa, Name (above n.1) 7, who refers for the concept of “disciplinary matrix” to T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1970, 182.
sion in the eighth chapter of an all-embracing τέχνη that encompasses the abilities to converse in brief, make public speeches, and know and teach about the nature of all things, Schiappa infers that for the author of the Dialexēs rhetoric did not yet exist as a discipline distinct from, and in competition with, philosophy38. In the first place, however, the notion of καιρός is employed by the anonymous author in the course of a proof that καλά and αἰσχρά are the same, that is, in the context of an ethical discussion in which oratory or rhetoric simply has no place39. Secondly, although oratory is not mentioned explicitly in the discussion of memory in the ninth chapter, the techniques for memorization mentioned there have an obvious relevance to it, and it is by no means certain that the author is unaware of this relevance. (Moreover the chapter as transmitted is incomplete.) Again, the ‘omnicompetence’ (as Schiappa follows T. M. Robinson 40 in calling it) described in the eighth chapter of the Dialexēs is a good example of the sort of omniscience some sophists laid claim to41. The fact that particular τέχναι such as ‘rhetoric’ or ‘dialectic’ are not mentioned in the discussion of this omnicompetent art hardly proves, however, that rhetoric did not yet exist as a discipline. Finally, when Schiappa maintains42, on the evidence of this same chapter of the Dialexēs, that a sharp distinction between the goals of successful persuasion on the one hand and telling the truth on the other is foreign to fifth-century sophistic and does not antedate Plato, he forgets that this distinction is implied in a passage of Gorgias’ Helen that he himself quotes at length: εἰς λόγος πολὺν ὄχλον ἔτρεψε καὶ ἐπείσε τέχνη γραφεῖς, ὅν όληθεία λεχθεῖς43.

38) Schiappa, Name (above n. 1) 8–9.
39) Cf. Dialex. 2.20: ὡς δὲ τὸ σῶνολον εἶπαι, πάντα καιρόι μὲν καλά ἐντι, ἐν ἀκαριαία δ’ αἰσχρά: τί ὅν διεξαραξάμην; ἔφαν ἀπεδείξειν ταῦτα αἰσχρά καὶ καλά ἑστα, καὶ ἀπέδειξα ἐν τούτοις πάσι.
42) Schiappa, Name (above n. 1) 3, 8, 11.
43) Hel. 13. The interpretation of the emphasized words offered by Immisch (above n. 34) 32 cannot be right (“ea verba ostendunt logographorum commenta artificiose adornata, que memoriter cum recitat quasi ipse composuerit, mentitur
Between the fifth-century sophist ‘art of λόγος’ and the fully developed ‘rhetoric’ of the late fourth century Schiappa identifies a transitional stage, represented by the writings of Plato and Isocrates and by the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, in which the art of discourse was designated by the expression λόγων τέχνη. He supposes this expression to have had a wide range of reference, embracing “any kind of conceptual or philosophical teaching.” As Schiappa himself notes, however, both Plato and Aristotle treat it as equivalent to ὑπομονή. And none of the passages in which he claims to detect a broader meaning stands up to scrutiny. In Anonymus Iamblichii 2.7 (καὶ τέχνην μὲν ἄν τις τὴν κατὰ λόγους πυθόμενος καὶ μαθὼν οὐ χείρων τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἄν γένοιτο ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ καλὰ.), the phrase τέχνην τὴν κατὰ λόγους clearly refers to the “art of discourse.” The λόγων τέχνη that, on Xenophon’s report, Critias forbade Socrates to teach (cf. Mem. 1.2.31) is not at all coextensive with philosophical argumentation or equivalent to Socratic dialectic, as Schiappa suggests. Rather, since Xenophon reports (Mem. 1.2.15) that Alcibiades and Critias associated with Socrates in the belief that they would become ικανον πάντων λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν, that is, at politics (τὰ πολιτικά, Mem. 1.2.16), it is reasonable to suppose that λόγων τέχνη refers in this context to the training in oratory that was so important for success in Athenian public life. In Dialexeis 8.1–5 the expression λόγων τέχναι appears three times in the treatment of the ‘omnicompetent’ art discussed above. Schiappa follows Robinson in interpreting it here as “argument-skills.” This seems right, but hardly justifies Schiappa’s claims concerning the expression λόγων τέχνη. Cole claims an even broader and more inclusive sense for the expression; only he applies it to the earliest, ‘protorhetorical’ stage in the development of the rhetoric. Among the works he considers examples of genre ‘λόγων τέχνη’ are the writings of sophists such as Gorgias, Protagoras, Prodicus, Antiphon, and the anonymous author of the Dialexeis; the paradoxes of Zeno of Elea; the pseudo-Xenophontic Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, and the corpus of speeches in Thucydides. It is

44) Schiappa, Name (above n. 1) 4–5, Beginnings (above n. 1) 11–12, 26.
45) Cf. the passages cited by Schiappa, Name (above n. 1) 4 n. 25.
48) Cole (above n. 1) 95–112.
doubtful, however, whether Cole is justified in classifying such a
diverse group of works under the heading λόγων τέχνη.

The preceding discussion has sought to show that Schiappa’s
claims concerning the nature of the fifth-century sophistic ‘art of
λόγος’ rest on unjustified inferences from the limited range of
evidence he considers. Equally important to the evaluation of these
claims is the substantial body of evidence contradicting them
which Schiappa fails to come to terms with. For instance, Plato,
Aristotle, and (in a relatively early work) Isocrates all attest to
the existence of rhetorical handbooks, τέχναι, individual examples of
which are ascribed to a number of late fifth- and early fourth-
century rhetoricians and sophists49. Schiappa curtly dismisses
these as being “without authority;” he concedes at the most that
so-called τέχναι were merely exemplary or specimen speeches50.
Cole too minimizes the element of precept in early rhetorical τέχναι,
contending that they were exclusively or primarily “practice
and demonstration” texts composed of model speeches or parts of
speeches51. Such exaggerated scepticism is without foundation.
The form of early rhetorical handbooks is admittedly a difficult
problem52, and many of them probably did consist mainly of
speeches or collections of commonplaces. Yet the evi-
dence indicates that Thrasymachus’ τέχνη, at least, combined pre-
ccept with example; and there is no reason to think that it was
unique in this respect53. But whatever the proportion of precept to

49) Cf. Isocrates, In soph. 19 (οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν γενόμενοι καὶ τὰς καλομέμενας
τέχναις γράψατε τοιμήσαστες), Plato, Phdr. 266d (τὰ γ’ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ
λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις), 271c (οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὃν σὺ ἀκήρους, τέχνας
λόγων), Aristotle, Rh. 1354а12. At Phdr. 266d–267d Plato gives an overview of the
contents of these works. For a collection of the evidence cf. L. Radermacher, Ar-
50) Schiappa, Did Plato (above n. 1) 459 n. 7, Beginnings (above n. 1) 22–23, 32.
51) Cole (above n. 1) 80–94. His terminological argument (90–92) from the
expression τέχνην γράφειν proves nothing, however, as it simply ignores the con-
crete sense of τέχνη (‘handbook’) at issue.
52) Cf. F. Solmsen in his review of Radermacher (above n. 49), Gnomon 26,
1954, 214–15, with the literature there cited.
590, W. Kroll, RE Suppl. VII (1940) 1046, Solmsen (above n. 52) 215. G. Kennedy,
The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton 1963, 52–54, and idem, The earliest
rhetorical handbooks, AJP 80, 1959, 169–78 draws a sharper distinction than the
evidence warrants between handbooks and collections of specimen speeches and/or
commonplaces. The term τέχναι seems to have covered both; cf. F. Solmsen, RE V
A 2 (1934) 1843, K. Barwick, Das Problem der Isokrateischen Techne, Philologus
107, 1963, 46–48, Cole (above n. 1) 81–82.
example in early handbooks, it seems perverse to deny them the title of 'rhetoric', which Cole himself defines, in "the narrowest and most conventional sense of the term", as "a speaker's or writer's self-conscious manipulation of his medium with a view to ensuring his message as favorable a reception as possible on the part of the particular audience being addressed." Surely the early τέχναι both exemplified and inculcated techniques for just such self-conscious manipulation of the medium of speech. Furthermore, not only Plato and Aristotle, but also Isocrates, testify that early τέχναι were concerned primarily with dicanic or forensic oratory. Their testimony is opposed on unconvincing grounds by Wilcox and more recently by Cole, whose argument for a broader scope for early τέχναι depends on a very wide definition of the genre, which does not correspond to what Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle seem to mean by τέχναι. Schiappa ignores the evidence for the restricted scope of the handbooks, and for an obvious reason: it is fatal to his thesis that Plato was responsible for limiting the sophistic 'art of λόγος' to the political sphere of courts and assembly.

In light of the evidence and arguments presented above, the significance that Schiappa attributes to Plato's supposed invention of the name and notion of rhetoric appears illusory, despite the formidable array of modern theorizing he summons in support of his contentions. The term ὑποτομή itself certainly antedated its appearance in the Gorgias, and there is no reason to think that Plato either invented or redefined it in the way, and with the motives, Schiappa suggests. Both Schiappa and Cole represent the transition from the fifth-century sophistic 'art of λόγος' to fourth-century ὑποτομή as a revolutionary development. Such a picture is flatly contradicted by the testimony of Aristotle, who in the important passage SE 183b26–184b3 contrasts the evolutionary development of rhetoric with his own invention ex nihilo (as he alleges) of syllogistic. In rejecting the evolutionary account sanc-

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54) Cole (above n. 1) ix.
55) Cf. Isocrates, In soph. 19–20, Plato, Phdr. 261b, Aristotle, Rh. 1354b22–29, Kroll (above n. 53) 1041, etc.
57) Schiappa, Name (above n. 1) 8–11, Beginnings (above n. 1) 7–11.
58) Schiappa, Beginnings (above n. 1) 17–18 and Cole (above n. 1) 23 are aware of this passage, but neither deals adequately with the challenge it presents to the thesis of revolutionary development.
tioned by Aristotle and adopted in all previous modern scholarship, Schiappa and Cole appeal to the analogy of Aristotle’s treatment of his philosophical predecessors69. They point out that (as Cherniss and others have demonstrated) Aristotle often misrepresents his predecessors’ thought as being more like his own than it really was, and fails to recognize the distinctive assumptions, problems, and concerns that guided their thinking. So also in case of rhetoric, they suggest, Aristotle, and Plato as well, fundamentally misrepresent the fifth-century sophistic ‘art of λόγος’ by treating it as identical with the ὑπογραφή that they themselves created, and that alone deserves the title of ‘rhetoric.’ The weakness of this line of argument is obvious, however. No one denies Presocratic thought the title of ‘philosophy’ simply because it differs (and is recognized as differing) from the kind of philosophy created by Plato and Aristotle. All our evidence indicates that even before Plato’s attack on ὑπογραφή there existed an evolving discipline concerned with the techniques of persuasive speech. In denying this discipline the title of ‘rhetoric’ merely because it differs from the rhetorical theory developed later by Aristotle and his successors, Schiappa and Cole unfairly privilege Aristotle’s brand of metarhetorical analysis60.

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59) Schiappa, Beginnings (above n. 1) 9–10, 16–17, 32–33, Cole (above n. 1) xi, 26–27.
60) I would like to thank Prof. C. W. Müller for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.