
Saarbrücken

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BARCID ‘PROCONSULS’ AND PUNIC POLITICS, 237–218 B.C.

The Carthaginian republic in the years after 237 B.C. was effectively dominated by a single political faction or group, centred on the so-called Barcids – the family of Hamilcar Barca, hero of the last years of the First Punic War and the republic’s first generalissimo in Spain. Hamilcar was killed there in battle in 229 or 228, to be followed in command by his son-in-law Hasdrubal until 221, then by his momentously famous eldest son Hannibal. Their soldierly feats are well known. By contrast and surprisingly, what rôle they played in the politics and government of their state in the years between the First and Second Punic Wars is much disputed.
Hamilcar Barca and his successors in command campaigned and governed in the Iberian peninsula from 237 on, building there a wealthy and militarily powerful Carthaginian province. The spark that fired the Second Punic War was, in turn, Spanish: the east-coast town of Saguntum. Hannibal took the Carthaginian state with him into the war in 218 – enjoying, both Polybius and Livy declare, the overwhelming support of the authorities at Carthage.

Not so the earliest Roman writer on these matters, Q. Fabius Pictor, soon after the end of the war. Hannibal, he affirmed, had launched it "on his own initiative against the judgement of the Carthaginians. None of the notables at Carthage approved his actions over the city of Saguntum." Polybius finds this quite incredible1).

Fabius wrote too that both Hasdrubal and, following his example, Hannibal ruled in Spain without reference to the senate of Carthage. Likewise then, some scholars infer, Hamilcar Barca. If total independence from North Africa seems too drastic, then at any rate there was (others suggest) a fair degree of autonomy. As a contrast, some see the Barcid "proconsuls" as agents of their home state, their powers more or less limited even if, in personal popularity and political influence, they outdid perhaps most or all other leading figures2).

1) Support for Hannibal in 218: Pol. 3.20.9–10, 33.1–4; Livy 21.18.14. Fabius' claim, Pol. 3.8.6–7 (κατά τὴν αὐτοῦ προαιρέσειν ... παρὰ τὴν Καρθηνούν γνώμην, 6); Polybius' disbelief, 3.8.9–11, cf. 9.1–5.

That they were popular is beyond serious cavil. Hamilcar was elected to his successive commands in North Africa and Spain; Hasdrubal, and then Hannibal, likewise. Polybius, Hamilcar’s biographer Nepos, and Appian note the wealth they sent back to North Africa, proceeds of plunder and other exploitation. Diodorus in a surviving excerpt of his history stresses Hamilcar’s popularity in 237 with ordinary Carthaginians, Appian that of his son-in-law. Even forty years later, in 196, Hannibal was elected to high civil office to confront the resurgent oligarchy with a series of popular reforms.

It has often been an irresistible temptation, then, to link this family sequence of generalships to another phenomenon reported by Polybius: a change in the political balance at Carthage by 218.

Government among the Carthaginians had been the preserve, in practice, of their wealthy aristocracy for a very long time. The small quantity both of sources and of Punic names used by the aristocracy prevents detailed reconstruction of how politics worked before about 240 (modern reconstructions are mostly inspired guesswork). But Aristotle’s later-fourth-century sketch assesses the Punic system as a well-balanced oligarchic organism, if with some defects. Notably, openly accepted bribery and the influence of wealth pure and simple; also a deviation or two towards democracy.

Polybius complains about bribery too — something, he avers, you never saw at Rome. But things were even worse by 218. Earlier in that century, at the period when the First Punic War broke out, the old system was still flourishing; or, as he puts it, the Carthaginians were still uncorrupted. By 218, “among the Carthaginians the people had acquired the most power in deliberations.”

The political system, for Polybius, had deteriorated.


3) Wealth from Spain: Pol. 3.17.7; Nepos, Hamil. 3.1; Appian, Iber. 5.18, 6.22; Hann. 2.4. Cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist. 33.96–97 (Hannibal’s rich proceeds from Spanish silver mines). Popularity: Diod. 25.8; App. Iber. 4.16; Livy 33.45.6–48.11 (Hannibal as sufete, 196–195).

4) Fourth-century oligarchy: Aristotle, Politics 2.11.1272b–1273b, 5.12.1316a, 6.5.1320b; Pol. 6.51.1–2, 6–7. Wealth and bribery: Arist. ibid. 1273a; Pol. 6.56.1–4 (contrasted with Roman mores, though cf. 18.35.1–2, 31.25.3–7 for less flattering later opinions of these). Punic political change by 218: Pol. 6.51.3–4 (χείρον ἴν τὸ Καρχηδονίων [sc. πολίτευμα], 3; διὸ καὶ τὴν πλείοστην δύναμιν ἐν
These claims and items of evidence have been put together in various interpretations. Thus a political, economic and social revolution at Carthage in the early 230s, produced by military and economic crises, and promoted by and profitable to the Barcids – thus brought to power at the expense and enmity of the oligarchy – is the most dramatic. Or, instead, political frustration and resulting self-exile to imperial ventures in Spain. Or Hamilcar and his faction simply as the democratic side in Punic politics, intent on expansion abroad and consistently opposed by the party of oligarchy and African aggrandisement under the well-known Hanno “the Great” – with one side and then the other winning political ascendancy down the decades. For some scholars, such explanations may even overlap.

All the same, none may be the right story.

II. The elective generalship

First the Barcid generalship itself. This was elective, as Carthaginian generalships had always been. Polybius is particularly detailed on Hannibal’s appointment. In 221 “on the death of Hasdrubal, … [the Carthaginians] at first waited for a pronouncement on the part of the troops, and when news reached them from their armies that the soldiers had unanimously [ὁμοθυμαδόν] chosen Hannibal as their commander [στρατηγόν], they hastened to summon a general assembly of the commons, which unanimously [μὲν γνώμη] ratified the choice of the soldiers” (thus W. R. Paton’s Loeb translation). Cornelius Nepos and Livy concur in ratification at Carthage.

Going back to 229/228 and Hasdrubal, we find the same procedure reported, more briefly, by Polybius (on Hamilcar’s death “the Carthaginians entrusted the generalship [στρατηγίαν] to

Hasdrubal") and Diodorus (he was "acclaimed as general [στρατηγός] by both the army [τοῦ λαοῦ] and the Carthaginians")\(^6\).

And the same, it appears, with Hamilcar in more chequered circumstances. Amid the fearful mercenary and Libyan revolt in North Africa which followed the First Punic War, unsatisfactory performance by Hanno, the general in command, caused "the Carthaginians" to "put Hamilcar surnamed Barca in charge" as general: presumably senior in status, since Hanno remained a general too. When Punic counsels were obstructed by rivalry between the two, "the Carthaginians" authorised their army to choose between the two, and it chose Hamilcar - though once that happened, "the citizens" sent out one Hannibal (the Punic élite, as just remarked, used a limited range of names) as a replacement for Hanno. As it seems they afterwards did with Hanno himself again.

In these activities Hamilcar seems to have had superior authority - or to have been entitled to it, although Hanno was disinclined to conform. Not only was Hamilcar originally "put in charge" after his rival made a mess of things, but later Polybius writes of him "summoning Hanno to himself" and, after this unsatisfactory person's removal, treating his replacement Hannibal more or less as a second in command. That at this time there was a "comprehensive" generalship, over and above a territorial "generalship of Libya", has been inferred. But in the absence of any specific evidence, it is better to suppose that the supremacy of one strategos over the other (or others) was simply laid down in his terms of appointment by the people - rather as the Roman People specified a consul's provincia without making it part of his official title\(^7\).

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\(^6\) Generalship elective: most recently Huss (n. 2) 463; also Gsell, HAAN 2. 229. Hannibal in 221: Pol. 3.13.3–4; Nepos, Hann. 3.1, reading rather as though summarised from Polybius (exercitus summam imperii ad eum detulit. Id Carthaginem delatum publice comprobatum est); Livy 21.3.1; App. Iber. 8.29 (confirmation by the senate at Carthage), Hann. 3.8 (by vote of the people). Hasdrubal in 229/228: Pol. 2.1.9; Diod. 25.12 (on λαὸς see Huss, Gesch. der Karth. 274 n. 47); cf. App. Iber. 6.22 (the Carthaginians "sent another army to Spain" and appointed him - already there - the new general); Justin 44.5.5 (mittitur).

\(^7\) Hamilcar's appointment: Pol. 1.75.1–2 ([Καρχιστόνων] ... στρατηγοῦν), 82.5 and 12 (the army to choose), Hannibal the replacement and seeming lieutenant: 82.12. Whether this was normal seems impossible to tell. In some earlier crises the Carthaginians had likewise put two generals in charge: in 310 during Agathocles' invasion (Diod. 20.10.1 - curiously enough, again two inimici) and in 255 when faced with Regulus' (Pol. 1.30.1); though in 255 they recalled their general in Sicily as well and seemingly put him in overall command (ibid. 1–2). On multiple generals cf. Gsell, 2. 420–25. Com-
Admittedly, after Hannibal’s untimely death Hamilcar and Hanno (who once more turns up holding an active command) were finally persuaded to co-operate – virtually as equals. But that looks as though due to personal rivalry constrained by exigencies of state. The revolt over, Hamilcar won the personal struggle. He was elected general again, or (it may be) simply confirmed as supreme general: according to Diodorus, “he induced the people to entrust to him the generalship of the whole of Libya”, meaning North Africa. And Hanno disappears from official posts.

To be sure, Appian reports the pair now, after the mercenaries’ war, being elected colleagues in command to fight the Numidians. He goes on to have Hamilcar remain sole general only when that is over. If true, this dual command would form a strangely exact parallel with what had happened in the recent war (in which some Numidians fought with the rebels). Polybius by contrast records Hamilcar leaving for Spain with his troops immediately the revolt was over: a move which fits other chronological indications of his ensuing career. Appian’s report is not to be taken at face value – rather, as a distorted and displaced version of the earlier events.

Overall, election was the citizens’ prerogative. But, strikingly, the army at a critical point during the African revolt was given a say. A novelty? At all events no such measure is reported earlier in Punic history, even in similarly grave situations. But it was repeated with the succession of Hasdrubal and then Hannibal in

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Spain. Significantly, the army involved was institutionally the one which had chosen Hamilcar and which he had then taken to Spain. The troops who did the choosing can only have been the Carthaginian element (largely officers); many of them were very likely the same men in all three elections. It is to be noticed how, in Hannibal’s treaty of 215 with King Philip V of Macedon, the oath is sworn not only by Hannibal and his councillors but also by “all the Carthaginians compaigning with him” – his citizen soldiers, or rather officers, evidently 9).

Morally and politically, then, the approval of the Barcid army (as it can reasonably be termed) had become vital in the choice of general. Legally it cannot have had formal validity, or the ratification by the citizens at home would have been superfluous. But the people’s vote seconded that of the troops. In this, at any rate, the elective strategia under Hamilcar and his successors may have differed in its relation to the other institutions of state from generalships of previous times.

III. Barcid powers

This strategia was probably indefinite both in space and time. Diodorus writes of Hamilcar being elected general “of all Africa for an indefinite period” (provided that his text be thus corrected from the manuscript’s “for a very short period”, a patent mistake). Walton’s emendation of Λιβύνς in the phrase preceding to Ἰηῆ-γίας, i.e. Spain, is not persuasive for, with none of Spain as yet under Punic military control, the position could hardly be named after it. Besides which, another excerpt from Diodorus soon after terms Hamilcar as “exercising the command over [or with regard to] Carthage”. Not only that, we find Hamilcar some time later sending his son-in-law from Spain back to Africa to deal with another Numidian outbreak. On the other hand Hamilcar so promptly shifted to Spain, once the revolt and the Sardinia crisis with the Romans were over, as virtually to prove that this expedition had been planned from earlier. To name it merely in terms of Africa would be pointless 10).

9) Pol. 7.9.1 καὶ πάντες Καρχηδόνιοι οἱ στρατευόμενοι μετ ’ αὐτοῦ, cf. 7.9.7 ὑπὸ Καρχηδόνων τῶν συστρατευομένων.

10) εἰς χρόνον ἀδρίστον and not εἰς χ. ἀδρίστον (Diod. 25.8); ἀλλὰ τῆς Ἰηῆγίας rather than ὅ. τ. Λιβύνς, so Walton (Loeb edn.) 11. 152 n. 1. “Exercising the command over Carthage” (στρατηγής κατὰ Καρχηδόνα) and sending Hasdrubal back to Africa: Diod. 25.10.1 and 3. That there was no pre-237 Carthaginian
Whatever its scope, the holder’s title seems to have been simply “general”. Thus Hannibal in the Greek text of his treaty with Philip V, even though Greek had the term στρατηγός αυτοκράτωρ for “general with supreme powers” (and Diodorus writes that the Spaniards gave it to Hasdrubal). As noted above, no territorial description is likely either – “general in Africa and Spain”, for instance (and during the Second Punic War this would have been an inadequate description of Hannibal’s position). None such is met with in any other source.

On one view, the Barcids did have and at some stage lost the African strategia, thus had to be content with the Iberian. This depends on interpreting Fabius Pictor’s story about Hasdrubal to mean that, on taking over command in Spain, he went to Africa to try to recover the strategia there – only to fail. Then (it must follow) Hannibal on succeeding him managed to reunite the two commands, since he is found exercising authority in both areas by 218. This chequered course of events is not backed by reliable evidence: even Fabius’ has to be reinterpreted for the purpose. No more persuasive the hypothesis linked to it – that Hasdrubal’s accession, at army behest, amounted to a limited and legal “revolt” against the home government and produced a sovereign strategos in Spain.

Rather similarly, K.-H. Schwarte holds to an independent Barcid Spain which the home state “reclaimed” only in 219 – neatly negating, he thinks, the validity of Hasdrubal’s Ebro accord with the Romans (but apparently not any other compacts struck by that leader, an improbable selectiveness). Again, the evidence cited above fails to fit.


The powers of the Barcids’ *strategia* were plainly very wide. In Spain they made alliances and agreements and founded cities (Hasdrubal’s “New Carthage” simply the most notable). According to Diodorus, Hasdrubal caused himself to be acclaimed supreme general (στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ) by the Spanish peoples. The Romans approached him successfully for an agreement concerning the river Ébro. When war with them loomed – thus most likely in early spring 218 – Hannibal made sizeable military preparations to ensure the security not only of Punic Spain but of North Africa too, including the city of Carthage. He appointed his brother Hasdrubal to take over command in Spain in his absence (no mention of any election). In other words he was exercising full military authority over all Punic territory. This he continued to do during the war. Polybius stresses how the Punic side of it lay in his hands and his alone12).

Particularly revealing again is his treaty with Philip of Macedon. The oath to this treaty was sworn not only by “Hannibal the general” but also by three other named Carthaginians “and by all the γεουσασταί [senators] of the Carthaginians with him and all the Carthaginians campaigning with him”. Nor did the alliance between the two powers embrace just these various Carthaginians. It should also cover those at home. For Philip, as the first proviso on his side, engages to protect “the lord Carthaginians” as well as “Hannibal the general and those with him, and the subjects of the Carthaginians who enjoy their own laws, and the Uticans, and those cities and tribes ruled by the Carthaginians”. If it did not cover the Carthaginians at home, as is sometimes held, these would have been curiously isolated. Besides, implementing the detailed terms of the treaty would need the co-operation of the home authorities. For example it specifies clauses (including the

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12) Alliances and agreements in Spain: e.g. Pol. 2.1.7; Diod. 25.10.2; Livy 21.2.5; App. Iber. 7.24. Hasdrubal acclaimed στρατ. αὐτ. ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν Ἰβηρῶν: Diod. 25.12. Roman claims about the Ébro treaty: Pol. 3.29.1–3. Hannibal’s military arrangements for Spain and Africa before the outbreak of war: Pol. 3.33.5–18, drawn from Hannibal’s own record in the temple of Hera at Cape Lacinium in southern Italy (appointment of his brother: 33.6); cf. Bengtson (n. 7) 159–60. Hannibal alone directed Punic war-efforts: Pol. 9.22.1–6. Treaty with Philip V: Pol. 7.9; cf. Livy 23.33.9; H. H. Schmitt, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums 3 (München 1969) 245–50, no. 528.
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future making of war and peace) that shall form part of any peace
treaty between Carthaginians and Romans.

Hannibal struck alliances with towns and peoples within Italy
too, and their clauses were not purely military. To Capua, for
instance, likewise in 215, he guaranteed her laws, magistrates and
rights. So too with Locri, and later Tarentum. If this was done by a
general with limited powers and no authority to commit his home
government, what terms (one must wonder) would reveal a real
plenipotentiary?13).

But wide-ranging legal competence as general may not have
been novel. Punic generals abroad had always enjoyed a fairly free
hand. Isocrates in the fourth century described the Carthaginians
as “ruled by an oligarchy at home, by a king in the field”. In Sicily
in 314, as Diodorus reports, one of them negotiated peace between
Agathocles of Syracuse and the other Sicilian Greeks – to the
annoyance of the authorities at home. In 264 another Hannibal
intervened, after the devastating Syracusan victory over the
Mamertines of Messana at the river Longanus, to negotiate with
the victors and save the defeated from ruin: the need for speed was
surely too great to permit consulting Carthage first (he had
stationed himself at the isle of Lipara just to the north). Later in
264 his successor Hanno struck alliances with Agrigentum and
then with Syracuse.14)

Conceivably, of course, none of these agreements bound the
Punic state until formally ratified at Carthage by whatever con-
stitutional body had this power. But nothing suggests that things
were any different for the treaties struck by the Barcid ‘procon-
suls’. It is equally conceivable that generals did have, or could be

13) Livy 23.7.1–2 (Capua), 24.1.3 (Locri); Pol. 8.25.1–2, Livy 25.8.6 (Tarentum); Schmitt 244–45, 254–55. The κατικοὶ Καρθηνίας of 7.9.5 might be
principes viri with Hannibal (the Mago, Myrcan and Barmocar of 9.1) – thus
Eucken (n. 2) 67 – but the phrase τοὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ follows his name in that list
and should cover any such. The “lord Carthaginians” are quite likely the Punic
people as a whole: thus A.-H. Chroust, International treaties in antiquity, Classica et
Medievalia 15 (1954) 68 n. 44, 79; Walbank, Comm. 2 (1967) 53; Nicolet (n. 2) 613;
Huss, Gesch. d. Karth. 151 n. 5, 467. Mago et al. may be best explained as
plenipotentiaries from Carthage associated with Hannibal in the negotiations
(Chroust 76–77; Walbank 2, 44–45; Huss 342 n. 62) – less likely as his three chief
councillors (Bickerman [n. 2] 7). Only Hannibal and his army bound by the oath:
Bickerman 17–19; Chroust 83; Eucken 65–72; while Walbank 2.43, 45, and
Schmitt, Staatsvertr. 3. 250, are uncertain.

14) Isocr. Nicocles 24; Diod. 19.65.5, 71.6–7, 72.2, and Justin 22.3.2–7; Diod. 22.13.7–8 for Hannibal in 264 (on the date: B. D. Hoyos, Antichthon 19
granted, the power to make binding treaties in the name of the Punic state. Hamilcar in 241 was given plenipotentiary powers to negotiate peace with the Romans. The one international agreement known from Barcid Spain – Hasdrubal’s accord with the Romans about the river Ebro – definitely was not ratified at Carthage: but the Romans assumed that it bound the Carthaginians just the same15).

Punic generals were exercising administrative powers, too, before Hamilcar in Spain. During the war with the Romans it had been generals who enforced the Carthaginians’ harsh taxation of their African subjects. The plural might imply that more than one operated at any given time; or else merely that more than one general in succession (if so, with subordinates) administered in Africa over the length of the war. By the outbreak of the mercenaries’ revolt, the already-mentioned Hanno was (in Polybius’ phrasing) “the general in Libya” – presumably the sole such, or else the chief such. Hanno it was who had carried out military operations in the interior around 247, notably the capture of the important town of Hecatompylus (the later Theveste). Warfare and government, in Carthage’s own hinterland, seem clearly combined in the one office.

Perhaps, as Herman Bengtson suggests, the generalship developed these wider competences under Hellenistic influence. Rather more likely, they had always been part of its functions, depending on circumstances. That could account for Isocrates’ mid-fourth-century dictum. If so, what had changed for the later third century is that fuller sources and broader activities allow us to hear more about the generals’ powers. And that from 237 the holder of the chief generalship was effectively the director of the state16).

15) Hamilcar’s powers in 241: Pol. 1.62.3. Carthaginians denied Hasdrubal’s accord being ratified at home, 3.21.1; Roman riposte in Polybius’ own day, 29.1–3 (cf. n. 12).

16) Pol. 1.72.3 (generals and African taxes), 67.1 (Hanno τὸν ὑπάρχοντα στρατηγὸν ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ); 73.1 and Diod. 24.10.2 (capture of Hecatompylus); E. Meyer, Kleine Schriften (Halle 1924) 2. 355 n. 3; Groag (n. 2) 24 n. 1; Bengtson (n. 7) 159–61. An earlier general in Africa, operating in the later 250s, is mentioned by Orosius (dux, 4.9.9: another Hamilcar).
IV. Barcids independent?

In many ways, then, the Barcid ‘proconsuls’ carried on much like Punic supreme generals before them. No doubt they were more flamboyant. They ran Punic Spain pretty much to suit themselves – acclaimed in command by their troops, building a network of Spanish loyalties (both Hasdrubal and Hannibal married Spanish wives), fulfilling a rôle in many ways akin to that of charismatic Hellenistic princes of the same century. Little surprise then that, from Fabius Pictor their contemporary to G. C. Picard and K.-H. Schwarte in our own day, many an observer has deemed them independent.

But the evidence contradicts. They were legally appointed to their position by “the Carthaginians” at Carthage. Hannibal had “councillors” or “senators” (συνεδροι) with him in Spain – the Romans in 218 demanded that they and he be handed over in retribution for the sack of Saguntum – who must have been like, or the same as, the Punic γεουσοιαστα τά associated with him in the treaty with Philip. In Polybius various terms for the Punic senate occur: συνεδριον, γεουσια and συγκλητος, with γεουσια often distinguishing its inner council from its main body. And when Scipio took New Carthage in 209 his prisoners included two “from the γεουσια” and twenty-five “from the συγκλητος”.

Again, in autumn 220, when preparing his move against Saguntum, Hannibal sent to Carthage for orders on what to do about that troublesome town. Even if a mere propaganda gesture, in fact especially if a gesture, the action is significant. It is not surprising that to protest at the sack of Saguntum the Romans sent their envoys not back to Spain (unlike their earlier embassy in autumn 220) but to Carthage. Probably yet another propaganda gesture: and one equally significant. Whatever Fabius Pictor afterwards thought or claimed, in 218 the Roman Senate adjudged Carthage and Barcid Spain to be two parts of the same political and military entity. Hannibal taking steps, at that same moment, for the security of the two parts proves them right

17) Hannibal’s συνεδροι: 3.20.8, 71.5. Not Punic senators but simply the general’s advisors, argued Gsell, HAAN 2. 220 n. 4 (and others), but see Walbank 1. 334–35, 2.44. Polybius’ various terms for Punic senate: συνεδριον at (e.g.) 3.8.4, 3.20.9, 3.33.2 and 4, 14.6.9, 15.19.9; γεουσια (e.g.) 1.21.6 (with Walbank’s note, Comm. 1. 76), 1.87.3 and 4, 6.8.5, 15.19.2; συγκλητος 15.1.5; even γεουσιακόν 6.51.2. Scipio’s senatorial prisoners: 10.18.1, cf. Walbank 2. 218. Hannibal’s missive to Carthage in late 220: 3.15.8. Roman embassy to Hannibal in autumn 220: Pol. 3.15.2–13. His security measures: n. 12 above.
The Barcid generals, far from being—or wishing to be—independent of their home state, were its political bosses. To be sure, Fabius Pictor implied the opposite. And late sources, Appian and Zonaras (who draws on Cassius Dio), write that Hamilcar went to Spain against his fellow-countrymen’s wishes. Roman tradition was naturally prone to look for faults in the leaders who revived Punic power after 241 and then almost overthrew Rome in a new war. Appian remarks that the Spaniards whom Hamilcar set about conquering had done him no wrong. Other hostile claims circulated: immorality (Hamilcar’s supposed passion for his son-in-law), amorality (Livy’s famous character-sketch of Hannibal comes to mind, *nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deum metus* etc.), unscrupulous ambition and love of power—so Fabius depicted Hasdrubal, and declared that Hannibal learned from him.

The Carthaginians later on, defeated and humbled, and governed by aristocrats unfriendly to Hannibal, may well have seconded any such claims. Already in 203, before their general’s return from Italy to face Scipio, they were assuring the Roman commander that the war was all Hannibal’s fault. Here indeed, perhaps, the initial impetus for Fabius’ claims of his and Hasdrubal’s responsibility (and irresponsibility).

In any case the Romans had seen how Hannibal had sacked Saguntum, after being warned not to molest that city, and sparked off war. Moreover their postwar rancour against him personally was monumental. It would be only a small step to asserting that he acted out of his own pride and ambition, dragging his countrymen with him—and that his pride and ambition came from his Barcid predecessors. But assertions alone prove little.

What factual evidence there is, set out above, refutes the notion of Barcid independence legal or *de facto*. As for the move to Spain, Polybius expressly reports that the Carthaginians sent Hamilcar off. There was little to gain in asserting this if, in reality, Hamilcar had defied them. Rather the opposite, for such an act

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18) Hamilcar went to Spain against the Carthaginians’ wishes: App. Hann. 2.4; Zon. 8.17.10; accepted by E. Täubler, *Die Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Punischen Krieges* (Berlin 1921) 70; Groag (n. 2) 21–25; Hoffmann (n. 2) 23–25; Picard, *Life and Death of Carthage* 209–10; Schwarte (n. 2) 56 n. 1. Spaniards had done no wrong: Iber. 5.17. Immorality: Nepos, Ham. 3.2; Livy 21.2.3, 3.4. Livy on Hannibal: ibid. 4.9. Fabius on Hasdrubal and Hannibal: Pol. 3.8.1–7 (*πλέονεξίαν καὶ φυλασχῆν, 1*). Carthaginian spokesmen in 203 blame Hannibal: Livy 30.16.5, cf. Pol. 15.1.7–8. Government after the war: cf. Livy’s account of Hannibal as sufete in 196 (above, n. 3; no doubt the same circles regained power after his overthrow, cf. Livy 34.61.4–16).
would well have fitted Polybius' image of the wrathful Barca, intent (come what might) on revenge for his country's defeat in 241 and recent humiliation over Sardinia. That the general was authorised by his state is supported implicitly by Diodorus' stress on his popularity, and explicitly in Justin's epitome of the late-first-century B.C. historian Pompeius Trogus.19)

How then did Barca gain his ascendancy and his successors keep – and maybe enhance – it?

V. Hamilcar and popular favour

The "demagoguery" of Hamilcar, which Diodorus mentions as following the mercenaries' war, may well have begun in its last stage. If appointed for the conduct of the war, both his and Hanno's commands would be at an end soon. Hence his drive to be elected to a new generalship, a sole or supreme one at that (we can guess that Hanno opposed it). As suggested above, the Spanish venture was probably mooted around the same time. The two items fit well together. A general had to have a campaign to command in.

The political contest was very likely in progress when the crisis over Sardinia erupted, for Hamilcar is not mentioned as holding his new generalship then. No doubt he had supported the preparations which were under way to recover the island when the Romans dropped their bombshell, though – to judge from the silence of the sources – he had not sought to lead the expedition. And for all we know, Hanno supported the preparations too. This was not a question of expansion but of repossession. Incidentally Cassius Dio, reporting a subsequent bogus crisis (an echo of the genuine one) with the Romans in 236 or 235, and Orosius, narrating the Sardinia crisis under the year 235, both tell of an outspoken Punic envoy to Rome named Hanno.20)

The confrontation with the Romans may have made Hamilcar's political victory certain. He may even have been elected to the generalship during it: for what if the Romans were to invade? Even if not elected until it was over, a little likelier since no source

19) Pol. 2.1.5; Diod. 25.8; Justin 44.5.4 Hamlcarem imperatorem ... misere [sc. Cartaginenses].
links him with the crisis, he was the obvious strong man for Carthage in such a time.

The loss of Sardinia, and paying the new indemnity on top of the old, in turn made the Spanish project essential. Hamilcar felt secure enough to take his ally and son-in-law Hasdrubal with him. Not only did they enjoy popularity with ordinary citizens, then, but support by the bulk of the aristocracy. Little real opposition—Hanno’s regular strictures can be and doubtless were disregarded—seems to have developed. Some while later Hasdrubal was sent back to deal with a Numidian revolt, and his success can only have strengthened the Barcid grip on affairs at Carthage.

Hamilcar’s popularity no doubt was owed in large part to his recent leadership, which had saved the state and the city itself from catastrophe. Diodorus tells how after the mercenaries’ war he enjoyed the respect of all citizens; but goes to report (disapprovingly) how he then wooed the commons’ favour—“he gave himself to demagoguery and to pleasing the masses” and thus got “the people” to give him the strategia.

It may seem natural, even inevitable, to connect this with Appian’s circumstantial account of how, after the revolt, Hamilcar staved off conviction in the courts—on charges of misconduct in Sicily in 241—by cultivating prominent Carthaginians: “of whom the most popular was Hasdrubal” his son-in-law. The next step is to infer that Hasdrubal was at this period a democratic political leader with an anti-aristocratic policy. “The lord of the Carthaginian streets”, in one picturesque portrayal.

Caution is advisable. First of all, Diodorus’ account and Appian’s are not notably compatible. In Diodorus, Barca wins his post-revolt strategia through his own popularity and demagoguery. In Appian he owes to others his being rescued from conviction; and curries favour only after going to Spain, by sending home Spanish booty.

Second, Hamilcar took his son-in-law to Spain with him. E. Groag was obliged to suppose a gentlemen’s agreement: the anti-Barcids promised not to make trouble at Carthage in return for being rid of the lord of the streets. In reality it would have made

21) Hasdrubal sent back: Diod. 25.10.3.
22) Diod. 25.8 (δικαίως ἀπὸ δοχῆς ἐτύχανε παρὰ πάσι τοῖς πολίταις. ὤστερον δὲ ... [αὐτὸν] δοῦσ εἰς δημοκρατίαν καὶ πλῆθους ἀφέσκειαν ...); App. Iber. 4.16; Groag 24 (with picturesque phrase), followed still by, for example, Hoffmann, Hannibal 20; H. H. Scullard, Hist. of the Roman World (4th edn. 1980) 196, and in CAH 8 2 (n. 10) 22; Caven (n. 2) 69, 75–77.
much more sense to leave Hasdrubal at home, had he been such a people's pet, to watch over the interests of both men.

Third, Appian's own description of Hasdrubal, even if accurate, does not thereby imply a political programme, still less an anti-aristocratic attitude. Now Diodorus (not naming Hasdrubal in this context) does describe Hamilcar – Hamilcar again – "forming a political group [or party] of the most villainous men". This sort of value-judgement, without further detail, is as useful a guide as are Plutarch and Appian characterising the clash over Ti. Gracchus' agrarian bill as simply the rich versus the poor. Hasdrubal might be popular, even might be democratically inclined: that would make him no more anti-aristocratic than the reforming nobiles Ti. Gracchus and his brother a century later. According to Appian again, he was not Hamilcar's sole ally: credible enough, especially as the general took him to Spain. These allies and Hasdrubal too were "men in public life". Some at least, then, were aristocrats23).

Aristocrats themselves Hamilcar and his family surely were. The Romans, who loathed them as much as they admired them, never accused them of low birth. On the contrary, Silius Italicus claims – whether on historical authority or by poetic licence – that they were descended from one of the companions of Queen Dido. Be that as it may, Hamilcar, son of a Hannibal, had been appointed to the command of Punic forces in Sicily in 247 when "still a young man" according to Cornelius Nepos: which also suggests a member of the elite. So too the estates that his eldest son owned in 195 in the rich region of Byzacium south-east of Carthage. These may well have been inherited, for neither Hannibal nor his father spent much of their lives in North Africa24).

Whether there is anything to this tale of Appian’s, about Hamilcar being threatened with prosecution for conduct during the First Punic War, save some earlier anti-Bareid writer's inven­tiveness is all but impossible to tell. What is surely all but certain is that Appian's date for it – after the "African" (i.e. mercenaries') war and before the spurious Numidian war jointly undertaken by

23) Diod. ibid., συντηρημένος έταιρείαν τῶν πονηροτάτων ἀνθρώπων; App. ibid., θερατεύοντες . . . , τοὺς πολιτευμένους, ὁν ἦν δημοκριτικώτατος Ἀσ­δρόύβας.

24) Silius, Pun. 1. 71–99; Nepos, Ham. 1.1 (admodum adulescens); Livy 33.48.1 (estates), cf. Picard, Hannibal 20–21. Picard suggests family links to other Hamilcars and Hannibals who held generalships in the First Punic War (ibid. 16). To Scullard by contrast the Barcids seem "new men" (CAH 82. 22).

18 Rhein. Mus. f. Philol. 137/3–4
Hamilcar and Hanno – is misplaced. As F.W. Walbank has noted, threats to prosecute Barca on such grounds more probably occurred, if they ever occurred, after the peace with the Romans in 241\textsuperscript{25}).

Some resentment against him in late 241 or early 240 is at least believable. It was the mercenaries whom he had commanded in Sicily who were now in revolt. If Hasdrubal did save his father-in-law from conviction then, all the same, the subsequent value of the alliance to Hamilcar was distinctly limited. His fortunes, both military and political, varied throughout the war in Africa, to reach their zenith only from 237 on. That certainly matches what Diodorus indicates. Rather than Hamilcar owing his dominance in the state to his son-in-law’s popular pull, it looks likelier that things were the other way round.

\textit{VI. Radical reforms?}

Nothing really points to the two championing a radical or reforming programme against the Carthaginian oligarchy. The generalship did not now become elective: as shown above, it already was. Nor was any other state institution, on the evidence, much affected. That the two annual eponymous sufetes were from now on elected by the citizen-assembly (having hitherto been co-opted from among the senate) is really a guess. Likewise that the assembly acquired some power over the membership of the other organs of the republic, notably the senate itself and the judicial Court of One Hundred and Four.

These bodies do seem from now on to have backed the Barcids. That does not prove reform: political reasons are no less, and may be more, likely. After 201 the Court enjoyed great power again (we know this from Livy) although no fresh constitutional change had taken place. Likewise the assembly of citizens: new legislative powers thanks to reforms supposed for 237 are improbable. For although Hannibal is on record as carrying other reform measures through the assembly when sufete four decades later, we have seen the citizens intervening during the mercenaries’ war – thus before 237 – in Hamilcar’s feud with Hanno. And a century before that, Aristotle described it as having the right to come to

\textsuperscript{25} App. Iber. 4.16, Hann. 2.3 (here the charge becomes peculation); Walbank, Comm. 1. 140, 151. Picard, Les sufetes de Carthage dans Tite-Live et Cornelius Nepos, REL 41 (1963) 120, \textit{et alibi}, still accepts Appian’s account and date of the failed prosecution.
independent decisions on matters put to it, whether or not the authorities were agreed on an issue\(^{26}\).

Not only that, but the assembly – in practice – seems scarcely more active after 237 than before, whenever a glimpse is given. It elected the general: again after the matter was put to it on initiative from elsewhere. In 218 it did not vote independently on war (if it voted at all): even Polybius’ narrative has the Carthaginian senate accept the Roman war-declaration. Or later on peace: in 202 after Zama Scipio’s terms were put directly to the senate.

Polybius’ account (admittedly excerpted) of events in North Africa in 203–202 supplies our closest look at the workings of Punic government in the late third century. There is only limited notice of the citizen assembly’s involvement. Thus, after the disaster in 203 to the Punic and Numidian camps at Scipio’s hands, the Punic senate decided to summon Hannibal home, and it sent senators off to him with the summons. Early in 202 envoys from Scipio “were first heard by the senate and later were presented to the popular assembly”; the envoys managed to annoy both and, at the assembly’s behest, were sent back without reply. For a body supposedly no longer enjoying “the most power in deliberations”, the senate of Carthage shows itself curiously vigorous\(^ {27}\).

What, then, to make of Polybius’ statement that the most power now lay with the people? On the evidence, a generalisation too sweeping as it stands. But the Barcid generals were elected by the people and enjoyed popularity greater than any other leading figure’s. Consistent popularity and success would enable them to build support in turn in the other institutions of state. As time passed, it would be no surprise if other offices were gained regular-

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26) Post-201 dominance of ordo iudicum, generally taken to mean the Court of 104: Livy 33.46.1–2 (cf. J. Briscoe, Historical Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI–XXXIV [Oxford 1973] 336; Huss, Gesch. der Karth. 464 n. 67). Aristotle on the citizen assembly: Pol. 2.11.1273a (“the reference of some matters and not of others to the popular assembly [πρὸς τῶν δημούν] rests with the kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree unanimously, but failing that, these matters also lie with the people; and when the kings introduce business in the assembly . . . the people have the sovereign decision, and anybody who wishes may speak against the proposals introduced”: tr. H. Rackham, Loeb edn.). Picard (1963: prev. n.) 123–29, and in Hannibal (1967) 76–77, infers important changes in all the chief institutions of state.

ly by their supporters, and if the number of Barcid backers in the senate and the Court of 104 steadily grew. Nothing suggests that the Punic senate took actions displeasing to either the Barcid generals or the bulk of the citizen body. Hence, perhaps, the assembly’s willingness to leave initiatives to it.

VII. The opposing side: Hanno and his friends

Hanno’s commanding position in Africa, during the last years of the First Punic War and into the first stage of the mercenaries’ revolt, suggests who was foremost among Carthaginian principes vīri down to about 240. Hamilcar replacing him as general-in-chief was a blow to this eminence – all the more critical because success by the new commander might well displace Hanno, and Hanno’s friends, from primacy. Hence one reason at least for the bitter quarrel between the two, which Polybius makes no effort to explain.

Whether Hanno had had a hand in the possible accusation against Hamilcar after the close of the First Punic War cannot be guessed. Despite being the Carthaginian republic’s plenipotentiary in the peace negotiations with the Romans in 241 – or because of it – Hamilcar had played no part in ensuing events (unless in the possible saga of prosecution by enemies and his escape from conviction) until appointed to the generalship at the height of the African war. This hiatus was probably due not to a wish for retirement but rather to being under a cloud with at least some elements in the oligarchy. He had won no sizeable or decisive victories over the enemy in his six years of command in Sicily. He had had to accept severe terms from the Romans – notably, loss of Punic Sicily and payment of a sizable indemnity. And he had made promises to his mercenary troops which, arguably, encouraged them to demand more recompense from the state than it could afford: hence some responsibility for the revolt. It would hardly surprise that he may temporarily have been under a cloud. Hanno by contrast could point to victories in the interior of North Africa, and to efficient (if merciless) revenue-raising from the Carthaginians’ subject peoples, over much the same period.28

These doings of Hanno's, added to the view that the Barcids were radical democrats, have encouraged seeing their side of politics as crucially at odds with Hanno's side over the future dynamics of the Carthaginian state. On this theory the Carthaginians in the 240s, frustrated at the stalemate in the Roman war, had turned to expansion in their North African hinterland, led by a new or newly powerful element in the aristocracy: one interested in African territorial development rather than in trading overseas. Hanno "the Great" is then seen as the standard-bearer of this element. Thus in turn a neat additional explanation for his enmity towards Hamilcar: Hamilcar's men standing for overseas expansion and continuing antagonism towards the Romans, Hanno's for self-sufficiency in Africa and appeasement of Rome. And, to be sure, Hanno appears in Roman tradition as precisely the arch-appeaser of the Romans and undying foe of all the Barcids\(^{29}\).

It is worth noting other features. Hanno's doings in Africa and Hamilcar's later activities in Spain have similarities as well as obvious differences. Hanno's drive into the interior is the more notable because the Carthaginians had not, it seems, widened their hinterland since the fifth century, when they had brought the city's nearer surroundings under their rule - the river Bagradas valley and the coastal plain of Byzacium. In the new Punic expansion, therefore, Hamilcar's was not the first move.

Both leaders were extending Punic power: no doubt acquiring booty and slaves in the process, to their country's benefit and their own. Hanno, almost as surely as Hamilcar afterwards, acted under the prompting of the war with the Romans. For his expansion in the 240s is hard to divorce from the exploitation of the African subjects of Carthage simultaneously taking place. One important motive for both was, it can scarcely be doubted, the republic's need to develop new revenues to carry on the war and to replace the income lost from Punic Sicily. The drain of the war is illustrated by Appian's story (which we may cautiously believe) that around 252 the Carthaginians approached Ptolemy, king of Egypt, for a loan of 2000 talents - which tactfully he declined to offer\(^{30}\).

\(^{29}\) See n. 5 above on supposed overseas-expansionism vs oligarchic African-expansionism. Hanno's later opposition to the Barcids: Livy 21.3.2–4.1, 10.2–11.1, 23.12.6–13.7; Zon. 8.22, 8.26, 9.2.

In other words the Carthaginian state was reacting in classic style to drastically straitened conditions. Confronted by loss of revenues and heavy financial liabilities, and like any pre-modern economy unable to increase their own productivity dramatically, they went in for territorial aggrandisement. Was the crucial difference between Hanno and Hamilcar, then, a difference over where to aggrandise?

Perhaps so. But Hanno’s devotion to expansion within Africa is not to be overstressed. His one recorded exploit is the taking of Hecatompylus-Theveste. And even then there is practically no sign that the region roundabout became a closely governed part of Punic North Africa. Picard himself excludes it from Punic territory proper (though St. Gsell did not). Really it looks as the Carthaginians were not all that excited about the distant interior. They drove into it in the 240s when they had nowhere else to expand. Had they still had nowhere else to go after the mercenaries’ war and the loss of Sardinia, they might have persevered with it. But they had Spain. Farther away but more populous, more naturally wealthy, easier to exploit and swifter to yield rich returns.

**VIII. Economic and social crisis by 237?**

Things can be taken much further, as by G. C. Picard. The middle and later years of the century saw a flood of Italian and other imports into North Africa, revealed by finds at Carthage itself, at the Punic city (name unknown) at the site of Kerkouane on the Cape Bon peninsula, and elsewhere. So Punic trade and manufactures, the argument runs, were suffering – with no relief from the entrenched landowning oligarchy, which could see only a threat to social stability and its own position. Hence Hanno’s and his supporters’ affinity for the no less oligarchic ruling class at Rome. Hamilcar and his son-in-law, in contrast, championed greater popular participation in government, and economic revival for the commons, and they emulated the charismatic Hellenistic leaders of the last hundred years – personal and military leadership and an ideology of victory and good fortune. Hence the (inferred) revolution of 237.

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32) Italian imports: see (e.g.) J. Morel, L’atelier des petites estampilles, Mél. de l’Ecole franç. à Rome 81 (1969) 59–117, and Kerkouane, ville punique du Cap
This reconstruction is bold rather than believable. As shown above, evidence for any political revolution is lacking. Certainly, Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and Hannibal enjoyed popularity with army and people. And Hannibal had a reform policy when suflete in 196–195; but of course that is not evidence for the Barcid leaders likewise having one in the 230s and 220s. And while the resemblances between them and Hellenistic monarchs are strong, we know so little about earlier Punic traditions and conventions of leadership that it would be rash to treat the Hellenistic resemblances as altogether novel or un-Punic. Leadership based on popularity at home and in the field, and on the lustre of success, was hardly a Hellenistic invention.

A social crisis, still less a social revolution, in or around 237 is not persuasive either. To start with, no evidence makes Hamilcar and his son-in-law popular with traders and artisans especially, or shows Hanno and his friends hated by the same. True, Diodorus avers that Hamilcar’s following consisted of “the most villainous men” – adding that this helped make him rich! – but such language is emotive rather than analytical. It cannot be taken as evidence that Barcid supporters were lower-class or anti-aristocratic.

Italian imports aplenty there certainly were. But this was not the first time, archaeologically speaking, that imports were dominant at Carthage. Before about 480 imports had supplied the Carthaginians with nearly all their quality manufactured goods. Then there was a long, apparently deliberate, suspension of such supplies; but in the fourth century the import trade began again, and again reached a high level. Even during the fifth century, at Kerkouane anyway, Attic ware in quantity had still been brought in.

A high volume of imports is not surprising. Punic manufactures (even according to Picard) were mainly cheap and everyday goods, more attractive to unsophisticated western barbarians than to the Hellenistic East – or Italy. Carthaginians themselves preferred Rhodian wine to African. Campanian ware too was appearing in quantity before 300.

No doubt the First Punic War cut down the scale of trade drastically. But even if the volume of imports later on reached new
heights, this in itself would not point to a crisis for Punic traders and manufacturers. Much of Carthaginian trade was still with western Mediterranean lands, including the peoples of North Africa. Much – even with the eastern Mediterranean – is thought to have consisted of grain and other agricultural produce, as it did in the second century. And a great deal of Punic economic activity was, it seems, in the carrying trade, transporting other producers’ goods by sea as middlemen and reselling them.\(^{33}\)

The war with the Romans, then (still worse) the massive three-year revolt in North Africa itself did surely inflict severe damage on Carthaginian wealth and resources. Nor did the indemnities exacted by the Romans, first in the peace of 241 and later in the settlement of the Sardinia crisis at the close of the mercenaries’ revolt, make recovery easier. But of social strains intense enough to activate class conflicts and political upheaval there is little or no evidence.

The great revolt began with aggrieved mercenaries, spread to many of the Carthaginians’ subjects and some neighbouring Numidians, and (finally and oddly) was joined – when close to its last gasp – by Carthage’s ancient fellow-Phoenician colonies, Utica and Hippo. This looks not like a social crisis but like a reaction to years of more and more painful Punic exploitation. While Polybius writes only of the demands made on the native Libyans, both in towns and in the countryside, exactions on allied cities are quite probable too.

Conceivably enough, the defection of Utica and Hippo was due to aristocratic leaders in those cities. No source so much as hints at social enmities in North Africa amid the revolt, not even in generalised terms like poor versus rich, debtors against usurers or the like. And – particularly striking – nobody has a word about slaves being recruited by the rebels, or taking part in any way. Yet slaves there were, and in some numbers. A would-be dictator in the mid-fourth century (also called Hanno the Great – maybe an ancestor) reportedly recruited 20,000 of them to back his bid for

power. For slaves not to put in an appearance amid supposedly critical social unrest is rather a surprise\(^{34}\).

Nor is there need to see the Barcids as champions, from ideology or economic conviction, of overseas-committed mercantile Carthaginian interests as against Africa-orientated, landbased elements. They themselves (it was noted above) were very probably landowning aristocrats. Nor was extensive landowning and intensive land-development new: Diodorus' account of Agathocles' invasion in 310–307 shows the hinterland of Carthage flourishing with rich estates already. Even those putative Punic magnates who might have made all their money in trade and money-lending would be likely to put some of the profits into land, the one gilt-edged investment in the ancient world. The Barcids may well have been among them. Hanno too\(^{35}\).

Picard does argue repeatedly and enthusiastically for a grand economic scheme of Hannibal's: to secure for Carthage the trade- and tin-routes between Celtic northern Europe and the Mediterranean. These were to be won by invading Italy overland, en route occupying key sites in southern Gaul. The case (it turns out) rests on various Punic archaeological finds in that region – a few dozen wine-jars and the statuette of a deity. These neither prove, nor even imply, the hypothesis. They need have no connexion with the Barcids at all.

The Barcid trio would in any case be odd champions of seaborne enterprise. Hannibal (according to Polybius, who quotes contemporaries) was indeed highly interested in making money: but that is not the same thing. None of the Barcid 'proconsuls' showed much sign of being interested in trade or shipping. Hannibal had to invade Italy by land, for his father, his brother-in-law and he himself had done little about the Punic navy. In 218 it was

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34) Heavy First Punic War taxing of Libyan cities and countryside: Pol. 1.72.1–5 (note wealthy persons among the oppressed: 72.5); Justin 21.4.6 (fourth-century Hanno the Great's bid for tyranny); cf. G. C. Picard, Daily Life 122–27. Picard regards the earlier Hanno the Great as ancestor of the later (Hannibal 15); for a different explanation of the epithet “the Great” see W. Huss, Die Stellung des \(rb\) im karthagischen Staat, Zeitschr. der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 129 (1979) 217–32.

weaker than the Roman. To be sure a war-fleet is not the same as a trade-fleet. Yet nothing suggests that the Barcid leaders had any greater interest in the latter kind than in the former\textsuperscript{36}).

Hardship both private and public, as noted earlier, there must have been on a large scale after the mercenaries' revolt and the Sardinia crisis. The policy of looking to fresh annexations to redress the balance, started in Africa by Hanno a decade earlier, will have seemed still more needful. The Sardinia affair only reinforced the need. New, and urgently accessible, resources were plainly vital not only to compensate for damage already suffered, but equally to enable the republic to withstand any later Roman high-handedness. Perhaps also (this is of course much debated) to ready a new war against them.

Diodorus and Cornelius Nepos describe Hamilcar as extending Punic boundaries in Africa once the revolt was over. There were indeed Numidians to punish for aiding the rebels. Such annexations can have been made after the end of hostilities with the mercenaries and Libyans, while Hippo and Utica were under blockade; another hint that the two men did not stand for mutually exclusive areas of expansion. But Spain was a bigger lure\textsuperscript{37}).

\textit{IX. Maintaining political domination}

Spain was Barca's brainchild. Hanno and his supporters were outmanoeuvred. Active at home amid the war with the Romans, he had had only North Africa to work on. Maybe his feud with Hamilcar had other causes too (even hereditary ones) – but once Hamilcar took control of Punic foreign and military affairs and directed them towards Spain, Hanno and his friends were frozen out forever. No surprise, then, that his enmity to the Barcids became legendary.

If his group had a programme to offer, whether based on policies or (more likely) on personalities, it could not now match Barcid glamour and appeal. They retreated into opposition. Perhaps they did believe that a distant empire was a danger, though there is no evidence of this. Probably enough they were


\textsuperscript{37}Diod. 25.10.1; Nepos, Ham. 2.2; Pol. 1.88.1–3. Numidians to punish: cf. n. 8.
able to win election to magistracies at various times over ensuing decades: though at best that will have made them only nuisances to the dominant faction. Almost certainly they were convinced that they themselves and not the Barcids ought to be the dominant ones. They were not to get their chance – if it was they who finally did – until after Hannibal’s War.

By contrast Hamilcar’s and his successors’ popularity and power were cemented by thirty more years of victory. The citizens at home shared in the booty and revenues which resulted, as Nepos and Appian plausibly affirm. With the Carthaginians as agreeable to bribery as Aristotle and then Polybius aver (or even if not), we should expect a sizeable proportion of the men elected or appointed, down the years, to senate, Court of 104, sufeteships and the rest, to be Barcid supporters. It is not just Polybius but likewise the Roman historical tradition reflected in Livy that emphasize how the Barcids had the great majority of the Carthaginian senate on their side.

We do get one glimpse of Barcid management methods. When a first-class crisis became foreseeable – challenging the Romans over Saguntum – Hannibal made sure to flood Carthage with Saguntine booty so as “to evoke the goodwill of the Carthaginians at home”. This was fully in the style of his father, enriching Africa with goods and money from his conquests. Not that it indicates an insecure political footing, or a need for Hannibal to conciliate a potentially reluctant home government. Polybius soon clarifies: by so doing “he rendered the Carthaginians zealous to carry out his orders”. War with the Romans called for very careful political, no less than military, preparation.

From the start, the Barcid predominance had strong family aspects. To reward, and ensure, the vital loyalty of the Numidian...

38) Numidian revolt: Diod. 25.10.3, 26.23. Wealth sent back: Nepos, Ham. 3.1 equis armis viris pecunia totam locpletavit Africam; App. Iber. 5.18, 6.22; Hann. 2.4. Pro-Barcid senate: Pol. 3.8.9–11, 3.33.1–4; Livy 21.4.1 (though he uses it for an invented anecdote), 10.1–2, 11.1 etc. Gsell, HAAN 2. 256–62 sees the senate as increasingly pro-Barcid; O. Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager 2 (Berlin 1896) 393–94 as fluctuating; M. Gelzer (n. 11) 157–59, as mostly anti-Barcid until the end of 219; A. Momigliano, Annibale politico, in: Quinto Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici e del Mondo Antico (Roma 1975 [orig. publ. 1932]) 340 as always anti-Barcid.

39) Saguntine booty to Carthage: Pol. 3.17.7 and 10–11 ([ἐπέπεμπο] προ‐καλέσθαι δὲ τὴν εὐνοίαν τῶν ἐν οἷς Καρχηδόνιων [7], τοὺς τε Καρχηδόνιως ἐτοίμους παρεσχευάσθαι πρὸς τὸ παραγγελλόμενον [11: cf. Liddell-Scott-Jones, Greek Lexicon s.v. παραγγέλλω II]).
prince Naravas during the mercenaries' war, Hamilcar gave him (or at any rate promised to give him) one of his daughters as wife. In Spain Hamilcar's right-hand man was his son-in-law Hasdrubal; and behind them was growing up the obvious ultimate heir, his eldest son. Hannibal in turn entrusted much of the war-effort from 218 against the Romans to his brothers Hasdrubal and Mago; and one of his best lieutenants, another Hanno (son of Bomilcar), was according to Appian his nephew. It would go too far to see in these combinations of relationships and responsibilities the start of a dynasty; but in Spain at least the generals' status was close on princely, as highlighted by Hasdrubal marrying the daughter of a Spanish king and being acclaimed supreme commander by his subjects.

It would be mistaken to assume that this state of affairs implied no opposition (after all, Hanno's is reported) or no need for regular efforts to maintain Barcid dominance. Dominance from a distance – and the only recorded visit home by any of the commanders before 203 is Hasdrubal's as mentioned by Fabius Pictor – must always have called for care, effort and calculation. Hasdrubal's episode, going to Carthage to try for "monarchy" only to be foiled by "the leading men", may be a distortion of some genuine political clash. A last big effort by the Hannonians, spurred by the demise of the detested Barca? If so, then ultimately (pace Pictor) Hasdrubal must have won. Barcid supremacy in Spain was undisturbed, and Hannibal's elevation to the command in 221 was promptly confirmed in Africa.

X. Conclusions

Thus to recapitulate. From 237 the Barcid generals both extended Punic rule and exploitation over southern Spain and, at the same time, dominated the affairs of their homeland. Their office

40) Pol. 1.78.8 (Naravas as son-in-law); App. Hann. 20.90 (Hanno as Hannibal's nephew, ὀδηγητός; the patronymic "son of Bomilcar" at Pol. 3.42.6, but not the kinship to Hannibal despite Picard, Révolution démocratique [n. 5] 117 – and Appian's sole word on this sort of item must be treated with caution); Diod. 25.12 (Hasdrubal's Spanish wife). Hannibal too married a Spanish lady (Livy 24.41.7) but her social rank is unknown. Silius Italicus' romantic ramblings on the subject should not be trusted (Pun. 3. 97–107, 4.774–807; a little more leniently Huss 280 n. 103, 297 n. 24). Incidentally if Bomilcar, father of Hanno, was a sufete – Polybius styles him "king", the term applied by Greeks possibly to that magistrate – he is a useful example of a Barcid supporter in office at Carthage. B. Caven even suggests that he might have been the "king" presiding over the Punic senate when the Roman envoys declared war (Pol. 3.33.3; Caven [n. 2] 97).
was the *strategia*, supreme in practice – perhaps also in express terms – over any other generals, combining military and administrative powers, but not all that novel in the history of Carthage. The Carthaginians in their army (and this was indeed novel) had a major say in their election though the legal vote, as before, lay with the citizen assembly at home. How they maintained their dominance of affairs can be surmised: victories and Spanish wealth will have won election of Barcid supporters, and maybe also relatives, to office. As the momentum of success continued across the years, the nexus of support would develop – and would push opposing elements further into the wings. If the Punic senate, as well as people, had *not* been heavily pro-Barcid by 219–218, we would have a right to feel surprised.

That Hamilcar and his successors particularly championed a commerce-driven imperialism against Africa-orientated landowning interests has no backing from what evidence there is. Their "party" was at odds with Hanno's over the fruits of office and over who was to direct the destinies of the state in practical terms. Had fortune turned out differently in the mercenaries' war, it might have been Hannonians and not Barcids who then carried the standard of Carthage into Spain. Of a specifically reformist domestic policy, or of drastic changes in the political institutions of state, no evidence at all.

The Barcid generals thus belonged more to the mainstream of Punic politics than sometimes is supposed. Indeed dominance of affairs over many decades by one political family was not unique in Carthaginian history. In the sixth and fifth centuries the house of one Mago had exercised an even lengthier predominance, by means of what office is uncertain. During the fourth the family of an earlier Hanno the Great may have enjoyed a rather more chequered eminence 41).

But Carthage had *not* been run by one family, or family faction, for a long time. The Barcid supremacy, based on a blend of personal popularity at home, army backing, and steady success, bears a clear similarity to leadership in the third-century Hellenistic world to the east (not forgetting their nearest such neighbour, King Hiero II of Syracuse). In that respect their dominance was a phenomenon both old and new. On the other hand, their virtually

independent handling of the new European empire, perhaps also
their total control of the republic's foreign affairs, seem unpre-
cededented. Surprising too, in Carthaginian leaders, their landlub-
berly preference for action on terra firma and lack of commitment
to (maybe appreciation of) naval warfare. What rôle in the state
and the empire they might have assumed, had a Punic victory
completed the second war against the Romans, is one of the most
intriguing questions in ancient history: second only to what form
that history would have taken overall.

Sydney

Dexter Hoyos

ENNIUS' 
'EUHEMERUS SIVE SACRA HISTORIA'

Ennius, geboren in Süditalien, hat in die lateinische Literatur
die Werke dreier griechischer Schriftsteller, Archestratos von Gela
(4. Jh. v. Chr.), Pseudo-Epicharmos und Euhemeros von Messene
(um 300 v. Chr.), die wahrscheinlich aus Sizilien stammten1), einge-
geführt. Die Schrift des Euhemeros 'Ἰεσὰ ἄναγγελον'2) knüpfte an
die im 4. Jahrhundert populären politischen Utopien und Reise-

1) So F. Susemihl, Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur in der Alexandri-
erzeit I, Leipzig 1891, 316 Anm. 32; A. Kappelmacher, Die Literatur der Römer
bis zur Karolingerzeit, Potsdam 1926, 92; J. H. Waszink, Problem Concerning the
Satura of Ennius, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique 17, 1972, 120; A. S. Grat-
Ed. by E. J. Kenney–W. V. Clausen, Cambridge 1982, 157 Anm. 5. Nähere In-
formationen über Euhemeros' Heimat, Leben und Werk sind, neben der umfang-
reichen Literatur, in meiner Ausgabe zu finden (Komm. zu T 1 C, 3, 8).

2) 'Ἰεσὰ ἄναγγελον = 'die Heilige Aufzeichnung, Schrift' (Jacoby) oder 'die