nössischen Redetheorie für die Praxis des Bühnenspiels gestaltet ist\textsuperscript{28}).

Saarbrücken Michael P. Schmude


**CICERO \textit{DE ORATORE} I**

AND GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION

Crassus’ praise of rhetoric (De or. I 30 ff.) starts with a tribute to its unsurpassed power which lies in its ability to influence the minds of men and change their wishes or inclinations\textsuperscript{1}). This same topic plays a dominant role in his next speech, the reply to Scaevola: \textit{Quis enim nescit maximam vim existere oratoris in hominum mentibus vel ad iram aut ad odium aut ad dolorem incitandis vel ab hisce eisdem permotionibus ad lenitatem misericordiamque revocandis?} (I 53)

In the prologue (I 17) Cicero already referred to this when giving reasons why rhetoric is so difficult and outstanding orators so rare: one has to have a thorough knowledge of human nature in order to influence the emotions of an audience, since \textit{omnis vis ratioque dicendi} is based on this ability. This idea is repeated often in \textit{De oratore}\textsuperscript{2}).

\textsuperscript{1) neque vero mihi quicquam, inquit, praestabilitis videtur quem posse dicendo tenere hominum [coetus] mentis, adlicere voluntates, impellere quo velit, unde autem velit deducere} (I 30).

\textsuperscript{2) Cp. in I 53 the pathos-part of rhetoric is said to contain \textit{maximam vim oratoris}, cp. I 60 \textit{quod unum in oratore dominatur}, cp. 165; 202; 219, cp. II 35; 189; 215; III 176, cp. \textit{Or.} 69; 128 παθητικόν . . . \textit{in quo uno regnat oratio}; Brut. 279; De opt. gen. 3.}
It was F. Solmsen\(^3\) who traced Cicero's views on emotions as brought forward in *De oratore* back to Aristotle's rhetorical theory. Although Solmsen only discussed the tradition for *De or.* II 185–214, scholars after him derive Cicero's views on emotions in *De oratore* generally, even outside of II 185–214, from Aristotle\(^4\). Here I am only concerned with the role given to emotions in Cicero's rhetorical theory of *De oratore* Book I.

It is true that we find expressed in Aristotle the importance of the pathos-element (as equivalent to Cicero's *omnis* or *maxima vis* I 17; 53), but it is observed by Aristotle in connection with rhetorical treatises written by others, and observed critically\(^5\); indeed it is the predominant role emotions play in the courts which makes Aristotle favor a legal system in which as little as possible is left for juries to decide\(^6\). For Aristotle the most important proof is not through πάθος but ἠθος\(^7\). ἠθος belongs to the field of πολιτική\(^8\), rhetoric is the offshoot of dialectic and political τέχνη. The rhetorical proofs peculiar to these two disciplines are those through argument (διὰ τοῦ λόγου)\(^9\) and character (ἐν τῷ ἠθεὶ τοῦ λέγοντος)\(^10\); the influence exerted by emotions is not taken into account\(^11\). Peripatetic rhetorical theory which did not deviate from Aristotel-

\(^3\) Aristotle and Cicero on the orator's playing upon the feelings, CPh 33, 1938, 390–404 (= Kleine Schriften, Hildesheim 1968, II 216–230).


\(^5\) Rhet. I 2, 1356 a 16.

\(^6\) Ibid. 1, 1354 a 31 ff.

\(^7\) Ibid. 2, 1356 a 13.

\(^8\) Ibid. a 25 f.

\(^9\) Ibid. I 2, 1356 a 1.

\(^10\) Ibid. a 2.

\(^11\) Ibid. 4, 1359 b 9; 8, 1366 a 9. Rhetoric is only an offshoot of dialectic and πολιτική, not an offshoot of the study of the soul as well. Solmsen (above n. 3) 402 observes rightly that the term ψυχή does not occur in Rhet. II 2–11. It might be
le’s views would not have agreed with Cicero’s statement at De or. I 17 and 53 f. that the power of speech consists mainly in its potential to sway human emotions and that, for this reason, a philosophical study of human nature is required.

There is one further reason why Cicero does not follow Aristotle: Solmsen\(^{12}\) is correct when stating that it is doubtful whether Aristotle conforms to Plato’s demand that the orator should adapt a specific kind of speech to the specific psychological dispositions of the public he is addressing (Phaidr. 271 b 2). But this we find in Crassus’ speech De or. I 54: after having elaborated on emotions because it is said that *maximam vim ... oratoris* consists in arousing or pacifying them (I 53 f.), he claims knowledge of emotions to be the property of philosophers, whereas that of the orator is defined as *oratio hominum sensibus ac mentibus accommodata*. The orator’s task is to speak in a manner appropriate to the mentality of the audience, and the insight required for this the orator owes to the philosopher. For Cicero’s expression *oratio hominum sensibus ac mentibus accommodata* there is no equivalent in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, as Solmsen correctly pointed out. Yet the phrase quoted from Cicero comes close to a formulation in the Platonic *Phaidros* (271 b 2) describing the orator’s task as *προσωπικόττων ἐκατοτον (γένος λόγων) ἐκάστῳ (ψυχής γένει καὶ πάθει).* In both passages it is speech which has to be adjusted (*προσωπικόττων, accommodata*)\(^{13}\) to the specific mentality of the audience. And for this a philosophic knowledge of the nature of man\(^{14}\) is required. The philosophy to which Cicero refers here for the study of human nature is not that of Aristotle. I believe that the tradition Cicero followed here is Platonic\(^{15}\) and that the influ-

\(^{12}\) Solmsen (above n. 3) 402 f.

\(^{13}\) Cp. De or. II 159 *oratio accommodanda*.

\(^{14}\) Even the term *ψυχής*, central for this part of the *Phaidros* (270 a 1; a 5; b 4; c 1 ψυχής ... ψύκον, c 9 ff.) occurs in Cicero, cp. 48 *natura hominum incognita*, cp. 53 *nisi qui naturas*, cp. 60; 165; II 186. When Solmsen sees “Cicero’s keeping his special precepts within the frame of a more general inquiry into the nature of these emotions” as an Aristotelian trait (397), he ignores that Cicero goes beyond this to a study of human *soul* for which there is, according to Solmsen’s own statement (s. above n. 11), nothing comparable in Aristotle.

\(^{15}\) It is remarkable that in Antonius’ report on the Athenian debate of philosophers, Demosthenes’ power to influence the audience emotionally is ascribed to philosophy, and the philosopher then mentioned is Plato: I 88 f.
ence of the \textit{Phaidros} in \textit{De oratore} I goes beyond the scenery in I 28\footnote{Differently Leeman-Pinkster I 66, acknowledging influence of the \textit{Phaidros}, except for I 28, only in Book III. Some of the passages from the \textit{Phaidros} I am comparing here are quoted by A. Michel, \textit{Rhétorique et Philosophie chez Cicéron}, Paris 1960, 94 ff., but only for Plato’s dealing with the \textit{ELXO<;}, not with \textit{lto<;}.}

In the \textit{Phaidros} the essence of rhetoric is given as \textit{ψυχαγωγία} (261 a 8; 271 c 10). Plato mentions Thrasymachos whose power was in arousing anger in the audience (267 c 8). Thrasymachos is expressly cited as an example of those writers on rhetoric who do not fulfil the requirements of the \textit{τέχνη} (269 d 6 f.)\footnote{Plato mentions the conditions under which he would be able to do so, 271 a 4.}, but deal only with preliminaries, \textit{τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα} (b 7). Perikles did much better (e.g.); through his acquaintance with Anaxagoras\footnote{Cp. Cicero De or. III 138.} he made the appropriate application of the study of \textit{φύσις} to the \textit{λόγον τέχνη}; by studying the \textit{φύσις}, nature of the soul, he produced the \textit{πειθό} he wanted\footnote{270 b 8 \textit{πειθό} ᾧν ἀν \textit{βούλη}, cp. Cicero De or. I 53 in the context of emotional influence by the orator and the necessary knowledge without which \textit{quod volet perficere non poterit.}}. In order for rhetoric to fulfil its task of \textit{ψυχαγωγία}, Plato requires a thorough study of the nature of the soul (270 b ff.), to which certain types of speech have to be accommodated (s. above).

Undoubtedly there is some post-Platonic rhetorical theory on \textit{πάθος} which could have influenced Cicero, but first of all he himself notes how unimportant that was in Hellenistic times\footnote{On the relative unimportance of this element in the Hellenistic rhetorical theory cp. De or. II 201, cp. I 87, cp. 203; Solmsen (above n. 3) 221 f.; cp. K. Barwick, \textit{Das rednerische Bildungsideal Ciceros}, Abh. Sächs. Ak. Wiss. Philol. Hist. Kl. 54, 3, Leipzig (1963) 77; G. Kennedy, \textit{The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World} 300 B. C. – A. D. 300, Princeton UP 1972, 116. C. Leeman–Pinkster I 62 (quoted above n. 4).}. Therefore, Cicero’s own emphasis on the emotional side of rhetoric does not follow the Hellenistic tradition\footnote{Solmsen (above n. 3, p. 396–400) pointed out that in his method of dealing with emotions and in the place assigned to them in his system Cicero did not follow the contemporary rhetorical \textit{techne} which reserved the emotions to certain parts in the speech, proem or peroration – but already the Auct. ad Her. I 11 prepares the ground for Cicero’s view that the emotions should be played on in the whole speech, not limiting them to parts of it, cp. Barwick (above n. 20) 72 f.} nor, as we saw, that of Aristotle\footnote{Although Solmsen acknowledges (p. 394; 402 ff.) that Aristotle was indebted to Plato’s \textit{Phaidros} he does not even consider that Cicero might have gone}. On the other hand, the correspondence in
Cicero’s own way of speaking about the emotional influence exerted by the orator and the necessary study of the human nature as its basis to that of Plato in the *Phaidros* seems evident\(^{23}\).

Particularly close to a passage from Antonius’ speech (I 87) is Plato’s above-mentioned remark from the *Phaidros* about producing the πειθώ the orator wants\(^{24}\). This is no surprise because Antonius’ statement is attributed to Charmadas, the academic philosopher whose familiarity with Plato is expressed in De or. I 47\(^{25}\). Even Cicero’s insistence on knowing the causes for emotional changes has its correspondence in Plato\(^{26}\).

back to the origin of Aristotle’s ideas in Plato. This has to do with his thesis that only Aristotle extricated the theory of πάθη from the system of μέρη λόγου (p. 390ff.); but whereas it might be assumed that Thrasymachos, quoted by Plato Phaidr. 267 c 7 ff., linked emotions to parts of the oration (Solmsen 392 ff.), Plato’s own theory does not contain this element: he develops a program of study which aims at establishing certain categories of human natures, accommodates types of speeches to them προσωπαρχόντα καρμύτος τού τότε λέκτεον καὶ ἐπισχετέον (Phaidr. 272 a 4). The ‘Thrasymachean’ tradition of linking emotions only to certain parts of the speech is no longer taken for granted. It was questioned before Aristotle (Platonic influence is in a way considered by Leeman–Pinkster I 62: „(aber vgl. schon Plato, Phaedr. 270–3)” and Cicero was not the first to reintroduce it, cp. above n. 21.

\(^{23}\) Cp. as well Or. 15.

\(^{24}\) 270 b 8 πειθώ ἦν ἔν ὑπολή, cp. De or. I 87 *ut ei, qui audirent, sic adficere rentur animis, ut eos adfici vellet orator; quod item fieri nullo modo posse, nisi cognosset is, qui diceret, quot modis hominum mentes et quibus et quo genere orationis in quamque partem moverentur; haec autem esse penitus in media philosophia retrusa atque abdita . . . ; cp. below n. 26 where Phaidr. 271 b is quoted. It was probably Plato who had Gorgias Vors. DK 82 B 11, 13 ἴ πειθώ . . . τὴν ψυχήν ἐτυπώσατο ὅπος ἐβουλέτο in mind, cp. the close parallel Rep. II 377 b 2 ἐγνώσαται τύπος ἔν ἔν τις βούληται . . . whereas Cicero followed Plato, not Gorgias. For a similar case see W. W. Fortenbaugh, Cicero’s Knowledge of the Rhetorical Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus, Rutgers Studies vol. 4, 1988, 39–60.

\(^{25}\) Together with him Crassus read Plato’s *Gorgias*. In any event, the alternative seems to be indirect Platonic influence via Charmadas (so Barwick [above n. 19] 330) – perhaps going back to Cicero’s „Bildungserlebnis“ in Athens (Leeman–Pinkster I 61) – or direct influence from Plato, as I believe it to be; but if the Platonic influence was indirect, it came very close to the original. Whether Charmadas actually wrote a dialogue in which he repeated Plato’s criticism of rhetoric (Kroll, Studien über Ciceros de oratore, RhMus 58, 1903, 586 n. 1; id. RE Suppl. VII [1940] 1086, cp. Barwick [above n. 20] 32 n. 2; Leeman–Pinkster I 173) seems doubtful.

\(^{26}\) causas I 53, cp. 60 *sine diligentissima pervestigatione earum omnium rationum, quae de naturis humani generis ac moribus a philosophis explicantur*. Phaidr. 271 b 1 Τρίτον δὲ ἄντι διακατάξασιν τὰ λόγον τι καὶ ψυχῆς γένει καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα δεινοὶ πάσαις αἰτίας, προσαρμόστως ἐκατον ἐκάστῳ καὶ διδάσκοντον οὐδ’ οὐδὲ τούτων λόγον δι’ ἢ αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ μὲν πείθεται, ἢ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ. Cp. above n. 14 and n. 24 where De or. I 87 is quoted.
We have more than one single motif common to Plato and Cicero; there is an internal connection between several arguments in both authors that corroborates the opinion developed here regarding the tradition Cicero was following.

In De or. I 19, in the proem, Cicero bases his recommendations for a proper study of rhetoric on the description of the present state of affairs in rhetoric: one has to go beyond the traditional instructions of the teachers of rhetoric if rhetoric is to become a discipline with outstanding representatives as in other arts. This seems to be inspired by the step made in the Phaidros from τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης, which form the content of the handbooks on rhetoric, to the real τέχνη. A later passage where Crassus takes up the subject just mentioned from Cicero’s proem confirms this view. Crassus illustrates (enim) his criticism of the teachers of rhetoric who leave out many subjects (I 52) with a reference to the unquestionable fact that the power of rhetoric lies in its influence on emotions. This passage (quoted above p. 310) contains, as was pointed out, views about rhetoric which are contrary to those of Aristotle, but which conform to Plato’s. The context implies that Crassus misses in the traditional teaching of rhetoric exactly those topics which, according to the Platonic Phaidros, are the necessary basis of the true,

---

27) Here, as elsewhere, Cicero anticipates viewpoints expressed later in the dialogue, cp. De or. I 109 ff. – It is true that Isokrates as well was opposed to the conventional practice of teaching rhetoric, cp. R. Müller, Die Wertung der Bildungsdisciplinen bei Cicero. Bios praktikos und Bildung, Klio. Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte, 43–45, 1965, 122 f., but e.g. in 13, 10 f. not for the reasons on which Plato and Cicero agree. When Isokrates expresses that he refuses to appear in courts or meetings (15, 38 et alibi), there is no parallel to this in Cicero (differently Müller 122) who does not want to exclude himself from appearing in courts or political assemblies even if he was opposed against a restriction of rhetoric to this field.

28) Neither A. Michel (above n. 16) 85, nor Leeman–Pinkster I 38 f. explain what kind of philosophy Cicero comes closest to when going beyond the textbooks of teachers of rhetoric to philosophy.


30) Cp. above 311 ff.

31) Cp. Leeman–Pinkster I 146 ad loc. maxime. vis I 53 could be οὐθένος Phaidr. 267 c 9, ὑγιή there cp. Cicero I 53 ad iram first on a list of emotions, cp. 220 iratum.
philosophic rhetoric as he envisages it\textsuperscript{32}), namely profound knowledge of human emotions and the nature\textsuperscript{33}) of man.

In the description of the elements which are regarded as insufficient to establish a techne, the two authors agree again. For Plato rules about e.g. proems or epilogue belong only to the preliminary requirements, τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαία (Phaidr. 266 d 7; 267 d 30). In De or. I 86 Antonius reports that Charmadas, the reader of Platonic works on rhetoric, referred in derogatory terms to handbooks on rhetoric which are filled with \textit{de prooemis et de epilogis et de huius modi nugis} \textsuperscript{34}). A comparison with Aristotle who deals with the same subject is instructive. When Aristotle Rhet. I 1, 1354 b 18 talks about the fact that the authors of rhetorical handbooks limit themselves to proems, narrative and other parts of the speech he objects to this for no other reason than that their only interest is to influence the judges (b 20). Neither Plato, with his emphasis on ψυχογογία, nor Cicero, for whom the power of rhetoric lies exactly in this ability, would worry about that. Again Cicero does not follow the Aristotelian tradition.

In the \textit{Phaidros} the rhetoric which meets the philosophical requirements Plato demands has still to be established; it does not yet exist and is different from that taught today, as in Cicero \textit{De oratore} I\textsuperscript{35}) – this is another topic on which Plato in the \textit{Phaidros} and Cicero in \textit{De oratore} agree\textsuperscript{36}). Both, Plato and Cicero, share a critical attitude towards the prevailing practice of rhetorical training\textsuperscript{37)}, and, what is decisive, for the same reasons and concerning the same aspect of rhetoric, namely its power to sway human emotions.

The important point is that in this extension of the traditional

\textsuperscript{32}) Cp. below n. 35; Leeman–Pinkster I 146. φιλόσοφος in Phaidr. cp. 278 d.

\textsuperscript{33}) Cp. above n. 14.

\textsuperscript{34}) Other references, but not this, are given by Leeman–Pinkster I 173.

\textsuperscript{35}) Cp. I 54 after discussing the prerequisite of knowledge of human nature in order to influence emotions: \textit{totus hic locus philosophorum proprius videtur}; cp. 60 a \textit{philosophis explicantur}, in particular 87 \textit{in media philosophia}; s. above n. 32.

\textsuperscript{36}) S. above p. 315ff. He comes back to it 202, cp. Antonius II 35.

\textsuperscript{37}) This view is expressed in Plato’s \textit{Gorgias} by Kallikles who questions the value of philosophy if it comes to someone’s having to defend himself, Plato Gorg. 484 c; Cicero De or. I 223, cp. II 153, cp. 156 \textit{ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint} with Gorg. 484 c 5–7: “Philosophy is an intellectually stimulating subject to pursue as long as one does this moderately at an appropriate age”. As Kallikles refers to Zethos (485 e 3) so does Antonius II 155, quoting from Pacuvius’ translation. For Antonius repeating Kallikles’ view cp. J. van Vessem, De Marci Tulli Ciceronis de oratore libris, Galopiae 1896, 88.
pathos component of rhetorical theory to a philosophical study of human nature which Cicero personally requires in the proem, he does not deal with a topic of subordinate importance; this task of rhetoric is emphasized by Crassus. Needless to say this requirement is the background for Antonius’ speech (I 219 ff.), in which he attacks these philosophers’ ‘tragedies’, horror stories, that one has to study human nature in depth. All one needs, according to Antonius, is a familiarity with the fashionable trends in a society.

Cicero must have felt that the Platonic concept of ὑποκαταστάσεις of the Phaidros was more favorable towards rhetoric than the one found in Aristotle, and more positive than that in other Platonic works, e.g. the Gorgias, or the Apology where Sokrates refuses to move his judges to mercy by making his children appear, an attitude later attacked by Antonius (I 227 f.), or the Republic where every influence on the irrational is regarded as a serious moral danger.

* * *

38) Cp. Crassus 165 quae neque ego ita teneo ut ei qui docent, cp. III 75; Cicero Ep. ad Fam. I 9, 23: abhorrent (sc. tres libri de oratore) enim a communibus praeceptis; cp. Barwick (above n. 20) 71–73: „Kritik an Einzelheiten der vulgär-rhetorischen Theorie.“ Those elements of the ἀρσ that are discussed by Cicero in De oratore II/III are not presented in the manner of „Schulrhetorik .. “, Leeman-Pinkster I 231, cp. 61 and 26 for Ad Au. IV 16, 3.

39) Cp. on the orator of the future Scaevola I 76; Crassus I 79 (an idea taken up by Antonius I 80), cp. 95; 118 (tingendus), cp. Leeman-Pinkster I 25 „Zukunfts-ideal“; De or. III 54 reminds one of Plato Phaidr. 269 b, c, cp. Leeman-Pinkster I 66.

40) Cp. I 19; II 10; 70; 75; 92; 133; III 54.

41) Cp. Müller (above n. 27) 129.

42) Cp. R. Hirzel, Der Dialog. Ein literarhistorischer Versuch, I, Leipzig 1895, 487. In the Gorgias Cicero or his Crassus come closer to Gorgias’ views than to those of Sokrates. Definitely antiplatonic is Cicero’s positive assessment of the Sophists, reestablishing their views, cp. Kroll, RE Suppl. VII (1950) 1087, cp. R. Müller, (above n. 27) 126; 129; 134 f.; Leeman-Pinkster I 137: „Dieses Idealbild (i.e. des orator perfectus) scheint doch wieder an die alte Tradition eines Gorgias und Isokrates anzugänzen“, cp. 58; 105. Cicero sides with the Sophists against Sokrates who is responsible for the separation of philosophy from rhetoric, De or. III 60 ff.

43) Antonius imputes to Crassus that he would not leave out any means to achieve such effects: complexus esset filium flensque eum centum viris commendasset (I 245).

In his prologue to *De oratore* I Cicero raises the question why perfection in oratory was so seldom, if ever, achieved (I 2, 6 ff., cp. 4, 16). Certainly the study of rhetoric did not lack incentives (4, 13). Neither in Athens nor in Rome was any discipline studied with greater intensity. This remark leads to a short history of the study of rhetoric in Rome: after the establishment of Roman rule over all nations had allowed *otium*, every young man threw himself into speaking. At the beginning (primo) one had no understanding of the method of speaking because nobody believed that practice or rules of art would make any difference. Everybody performed as best as he could with his talent or intelligence. Later (post autem) the influence of Greek orators whom they heard, the knowledge of their writings, and the use of their teachers stimulated the study of learning rhetorically. nam postea quam imperio omnium gentium constituto diuturnitas pacis otium confirmavit, nemo fere laudis cupidus adulescens non sibi ad dicendum studio omni entendum putavit; ac primo quidem totius rationis ignari, qui neque exercitationis ullam vim neque aliquod praecipitum artis esse arbitrarentur, tantum, quantum ingenio et cogitatione poterant, consequatabant; post autem auditis oratoribus Graecis cognitisque eorum litteris adhibitisque doctoribus incredibili quodam nostri homines discendi studio flagraverunt (I 14).

This passage reminds one of Aristotle Pol. VIII 6, 1341 a 26 ff. where the philosopher discusses the use of the *aulos* in education, approves of the practice of earlier generations not to allow it but adds that in the beginning (τὸ πρῶτον a 27) it was actually used. In a historical flashback he explains this fact: When people had more leisure at their disposal because of an increasing wealth and when they became more self-confident even before the Persian wars and after them because of their achievements, they flung themselves into every kind of learning which at the beginning they did indiscriminately (οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες a 31), so that they included the *aulos* as well. But later (ὑστερὸν ὅτε, a 37) they disapproved of its use.

διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρήσιν ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικῶν τεροί γὰρ γιγνόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, ἔτι τε πρότερον καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν

45) Reading the conjecture *studio discendi*, not *dicendi* of the ms, cp. Leeman–Pinkster, 51.
Both texts deal with the beginnings and later changes of the subject under consideration. In the passages of Aristotle and Cicero there are two stages contrasted: the first (τὸ πρῶτον, *primo*) is characterised by the opportunity to enjoy leisure (*σχολαστικότεροι* a 28, *otium* 46)), the military achievements are linked to a new spirit resulting in an eagerness for learning which was carried out in an unsatisfactory way (*οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες, *ignari*). The second stage (*ὕστερον δ’, *post autem*) is marked by advancements, in Aristotle experience (a 37) 47), which allowed them to judge better the musical instruments adopted before, in Cicero the exposure to Greek rhetoric as it was practised, written down and taught.

There are so many points of agreement in both these short passages that one should not call them merely coincidence. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Cicero used the Aristotelian passage and adapted it to his purpose 48). I rather believe that he had a Peripatetic source in mind in which Aristotelian ideas were used for the explanation of the beginning and development of rhetorical

46) Although in Brut. 45 Cicero connects as well *pax* and *otium* with the development of rhetoric we find here no further example of the many coincidences observed above. It is true that in Brut. 46 Aristotle is mentioned but here his explanation of the beginning of rhetoric in Sicily had to do with the restoration of freedom after the expulsion of the tyrants, a motif not found in Pol. VIII or De or. I 14.

47) The lack of which was characteristic for the early stage in Cicero: *totius rationis ignari, qui neque exercitationis ullam vim neque aliquod praeceptum artis esse arbitrarentur* .

48) Aristotle does not seem to have explained the beginning nor development of rhetoric the way we find it in De or. I 14, cp. his account Soph. El. 34, 183 b 26 ff., cp. above n. 46. When writing *De oratore* Cicero does not seem to have first hand knowledge of Aristotle’s works in the extant corpus, cp. D. Earl, Prologue-form in Ancient Historiography, ANRW I 2, 1972, 850 ff., in particular 853 f.: only in *Orator* can the direct influence of Aristotle’s pragmaties be made out, cp. Leeman–Pinkster I 63 f. Leeman–Pinkster I 37 do not mention any Greek source for De or. I 12–16, they only point out, correctly, that Brut. 25–51 is not comparable, rather Sall. Cat. 6–13 where, contrary to Cicero, *otium* does not stimulates oratory but leads to decadence, cp. De or. III 122 for the *otium* (of philosophers) that caused the unfortunate separation of philosophy and rhetoric.
studies. It is worthwhile noting that in general the idea expressed in Pol. VIII 6 has something in common with the description of the beginning of philosophy in Met. A 1, 981 b 17 ff. which was only possible where leisure was guaranteed. We find here a principle of explaining cultural developments which could easily be adapted to rhetoric as well.

It seems to me that a trace of this same Aristotelian, or at least Peripatetic, idea is preserved in De or. III 15, 57: the Greeks liberis temporis multo plura, quam erat necesse, doctissimi homines otio nimio ... adfluentes curanda sibi esse ac quaerenda et investiganda duxerunt. According to Aristotle Met. A 1, 981 b 13 ff. inventions of τέχναι served first the most necessary needs. But once these were all provided some men discovered forms of knowledge which did not serve pleasure or urgent needs, and this took place where people could enjoy leisure (b 20–23): χρήσιν ενίσχυς τὰς ἔπιστήμας αὐτῶν. ὅτεν ἦδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατασκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἱδονήν μηδὲ πρὸς τάναγρα τῶν ἔπιστημῶν εὐφρένησιν, καὶ πρὸς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὕπερ ἐσχόλασαν. This is the positive version of Cicero’s slightly contemptuous remark that people who enjoyed leisure investigated things which went beyond necessary needs, this sort of speculation was for a Roman a waste of time, energies, and talents which one could make better use of.

I would like to add one more passage from De oratore: I 85 Crassus reports the arguments of Charmadas who stated that everything set down in a state with regard to religion, education, justice, other virtues and all those things sine quibus civitates aut esse aut bene moratae esse non possent has to be taken from philosophy. Indeed, we know of a philosopher who expressed himself that way. The words quoted in Latin come as close as

---

49) Cp. in Cic.: De fin. II 14, 46; De off. I 4, 13.

50) In both authors the observation is made about nations different from that of the writer, Aristotle refers to Egypt, Cicero to Greece.

51) Cp. Cic. De or. II 157; cp. I 105: Graeci alicuius cotidianam loquacitatem sine usu which is there compared with Crassus qui non in libellis, sed in maximis causis et in hoc domicilio imperi sit consilio linguaque princeps, cp. on Greek ineptiae II 17 f. the worst of which was de rebus .. non necessariis argutissime disputare, cp. 75 on Greek teachers of rhetoric who show contempt for the Romans but lack all practical experience; cp. De rep. I 18, 30. Crassus De or. III 77 (cp. 79) is confident enough to claim that in spite of his inferior education he will not yield to those who make philosophy their only concern. A Roman author had to justify that his activity of writing had benefits, cp. W. Steidle, Einflüsse römischen Lebens und Denkens auf Ciceros Schrift De oratore, MusHelv 9, 1952, 17 n. 35 with references; cp. Tac. Agr. 4: studium philosophiae acrius, ultra quam concessum Romano ac senatori, hausisse.
possible to Aristotle Pol. III 12, 1283 a 14 ff. where Aristotle contrasts basic requirements of the citizens like freedom and some wealth with justice and virtue without which a state cannot exist and adds οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων οἰκεῖοσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν· πλήν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖοσθαι καλῶς (a 20 ff.).

The contrast of οἰκεῖοσθαι and οἰκεῖοσθαι καλῶς corresponds with Cicero's esse - bene moratae esse, being expressed in both authors by infinitives depending on a verb which designates the possibility (in negative terms: ἀδύνατον, non possent). Both give virtues, in particular justice as condicio sine qua non (ἄνευ ἀφετῶν ... ἀδύνατον, sine quibus non possent) of a good state of political affairs 52). Finding these Peripatetic ideas in De oratore is not surprising given the fact that Cicero himself declared that in this dialogue he was following inter alios Aristotle 53).

Boulder/Colorado  
Eckart Schütrumpf

52) This correspondence of the two passages is not noted by Leeman–Pinkster I 179 ad loc.

53) Letter to Lentulus, Ad fam. I 9, 23: De or. is based on the classical (antiquam) Greek theory of Aristotle and Isokrates, as opposed to that of more recent authors, cp. Leeman–Pinkster I 61, cp. 65: Aristotle and Isokrates are the „Urquellen“, their importance has for a long time been underrated. Differently, as it seems, A. D. Leeman, Orationis Ratio (above n. 29) 113 f.: in this statement of the Lentulus-letter Cicero is the victim of ‘self-delusion’.