der Atheistenkataloge (s. Anm. 6), (c) eine kommentierte kritische Ausgabe des Diogoras und des Theodoros, die für ἀθεοί κατ' ἔξοχήν gehalten wurden (s. Anm. 2)36). Ferner müßte untersucht werden, in welcher Bedeutung die Wörter ἀθεος – ἀθεότης und ἀσβης – ἀσβεία – ἀσβήμα – ἀσβεῖν in der griechischen Literatur bis zum Ende der Antike verwendet wurden. Erst dann besitzt man eine Grundlage für die Abfassung einer neuen kritischen Geschichte des Atheismus, die sich auf antike Quellen stützen und die oben erwähnten methodischen Postulate berücksichtigen wird.

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AIGINA AND THE NAVAL STRATEGY OF THE LATE FIFTH AND EARLY FOURTH CENTURIES

The following investigation examines the role which the island of Aigina played in the struggle for naval hegemony between Athens and Sparta and offers insights both into techniques of warfare and into the balance of power at sea in the western Aegean. One important result of such an examination is the application to the classical period of the classification of Mediterranean naval warfare conducted by rowed ships into two discrete patterns, fleet operations and ληστεῖα by small groups of ships. The general military situation of Athens and Sparta and the political techniques available to either city for making use of their resources and for exploiting the weaknesses of their adversary affected the viability of fleet operations and raiding, the two modes of aggression.

A predominance of fleet operations during the Peloponnesian War is a correlate of the Athenian ἄρχη and “thalassocracy”. This
realization, along with our very ability to isolate this category of warfare, starting from the 5th century, is owed to Thucydides. His emphasis was on Athenian amphibious expeditions, the most characteristic form assumed by fleet operations, which, although justifiable in his context, obscures a “background” phenomenon, the continuous activity of raiders. Hence raiding activity is not differentiated according to its scale, and the term for it, ληστεία, does double duty in Thucydides both for pillaging by small forces, used opportunistically and without elaborate planning, and for larger expeditions conducting coordinated attacks. The latter involved forces with a capacity for attacking fortified positions and for fighting engagements on land, although their primary activity was still devastating enemy territory. For the sake of clarity, I shall use the expression “flotilla raids/raiding” to refer to this military pattern, and reserve ληστεία and “raiding” for the activity of small forces. Furthermore, in our analysis of the place of Aigina in naval strategy, it will be important to make this distinction, since flotilla raids and individual raids do not coexist within a single military repertoire. Moreover, privateering also deserves separate consideration as a sub-genre or variety of raiding, by which is meant the use of a privately owned or officered vessel, undertaking hostile acts with a governmental sanction. For Aigina as a naval base, the relative prominence of fleet operations or ληστεία varied as the geopolitical situation of the island and its preparedness for war changed.

Aigina during the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides attributes the Athenian decision in 431 to expel the Aiginetans from their island to two causes: a belief in Aiginetan guilt in fomenting the Peloponnesian War, and, more relevant for us, a judgment that it would be less dangerous for them to hold Aigina (which was) ἐπικεκάλομεν τόν Ἰταλόν ‘lying off’ the Peloponnesos (2.27.1). Commentators have suspected Thucydides’ text because it cites only the location of Aigina relative to the Peloponnesos rather than noting the danger of Aigina to Attica by virtue of its position off the Attic coast. Classen-Steup would remove the phrase τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ or emend to (τῇ τοῦ Ἀττικῆν καὶ τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ). Gomme agrees and compares 4.53.2 (cf. 4.54.3–4), where Kythera, later to be used as a base for Athenian (flotilla)

1) J. Classen (rev. J. Steup), Thukydidēs (Berlin 1914–1922) 2.70.
raids against Lakonia, ἔπικειται ‘lies off’ Lakonia). Even De Romilly, who declines to emend, still insists that it is Aigina’s position vis-à-vis Athenian territory that made the danger of a Spartan attempt on Aigina more serious. To support this understanding of the text, these and other commentators adduce Perikles’ remark on the need to remove Aigina, the “eyesore of the Peiraieus” (Plut. Per. 8.7; Arist. Rhet. 1411a15–16; cf. Cic. Off. 3.11.46). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, however, saw τὴν Πελοποννήσου ἐπικειμένην, a reading which, while not preferable to our manuscripts, has the same sense as the received text (De Thuc. 15). Therefore, I shall try to argue that Thucydides’ reference to the Peloponnesos and not to Attica is deliberate and that even in its compression his statement contains the essential point about Aigina in the Peloponnesian War: it was important as a fleet base.

First, we must consider the actual use of the island. Aigina could be used as a way-station for expeditions against and around the Peloponnesos, as a safe place for marshalling military forces. The first stop for the Sicilian expedition was Aigina (Thuc. 6.32.2). Similarly, when Demosthenes brought out the second expedition to Syracuse, he waited at Aigina for any units of his command that were delayed, presumably the νησίωται and subject allies that made up a large part of his strength (7.20.2–3). Demosthenes timed his departure from the island so as to rendezvous with Charikles, directed to take on Argive hoplites (7.20.1): with Charikles, Demosthenes was to make a περίταξις of the Peloponnesos (7.20.2). The two Athenian commanders ravaged Lakonia before parting company (7.20.2). The stop at the island of the first Sicilian expedition is noted because of a race there from the Peiraieus. Demosthenes’ stop was noteworthy for the delay to meet reinforcements, and the need for the rendezvous. Therefore, other similar expeditions may have used Aigina as a staging point, especially for linking up with allied contingents. There were,

5) The following expeditions may be noted: Perikles’ expedition of 430 against the Akte and Prasiai (with Lesbians and Chians) (2.56); Asopios’ ravaging of the Lakonian coast in 428 (3.7.1–2); a punitive attack on the Isthmos and Peloponnesos in 428 (3.16.1–3); an expedition around the Peloponnesos in 426 (3.91.1); the expedition of 425 to Sicily which fortified Pylos (4.2–15); Nikias’ expedition of 425

2 Rhein. Mus. f. Philol. 133/1
however, no special, extraneous reasons in these cases for mentioning calls at the island. This conclusion is borne out by the Athenian campaign against Epidauros in 419. Seizure of that city would have shortened lines of communication between Argos and Aigina, from where Thucydides assumes any aid to Argos would be mounted (5.53: ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης ... τὴν βοήθειαν). The participle ἐπικειμένη with reference to the Peloponnnesos takes on additional point from the narrative order in Thucydides. The first περίπλους of the War, an expedition of 431 which attacked Methone, could have demonstrated to the Athenians the usefulness of Aigina as a base (2.23.2, 25). This expedition, begun before the expulsion of the Aiginetans, is narrated directly before the reference to the expulsion. Newly colonized Aigina was used immediately, for the force returning from Lakonia stopped there, and was promptly redirected to support Athenian forces then attacking the Megarid (2.31.1). Although the Athenians could have maintained a station and garrison on Aigina regardless of the presence of the Aiginetans, their disaffection would have been a permanent distraction; better to have Athenian colonists who could eagerly provide the ancillary services useful for a base.

Yet, the Thucydidean formulation on the significance of Aigina subsumes not only its positive utility for the Athenians, but also the advantage in denying the island to the Spartans. As has been observed, he did not, however, anticipate its use as a base for raids against Attica (similar to those so prominent in the 4th century). Rather, there was a precedent for its use as a fleet base by Sparta: Leotychidas' fleet assembled at Aigina in 479 before venturing out into the Cyclades (Hdt. 8.131.1, 132.1–2; Diod. 11.34.2). Similarly, it would have been possible for the Spartans to concentrate smaller squadrons, based at Nisaia, Kenchreai, the ports of the Argolic Akte, and bases in Lakonia like Las (Ephorus FGrHist 70 F 117; cf. Paus. 3.24.6), for attacks on the Athenian ἄγχη. Some problems that Spartan fleets experienced during the Peloponnesian War are traceable to their lack of such a central

against Corinth and the Akte (with Milesian, Andrian, and Karystian allies) (4.42–45); the expedition against Kythera and Kynouria of 424 (with allied help) (4.53–57); an expedition of 414 against Kynouria (6.105.2; cf. 7.18.3).

6) The Spartans acknowledged the significance of Aigina as a base in their ravaging of the island in 411 (8.92.3). It was more important for them to ravage Aigina than to occupy it, at least in comparison to Eubeia, their eventual target (8.95.2–7). Compare a possible raid of Lysander: Plut. Lys. 9.3.

forward base\(^8\)). A bold stroke, the surprise attack on the Peiraeus, made do with ships stored at the Megarian dockyards at Nisaia (Thuc. 2.93–94). The seaworthiness of ships sent to sea in this manner was not of the highest quality, and the Peloponnesians got no further than Salamis. In contrast, a Spartan attack on the Peiraeus, mounted from Aigina during the Corinthian War, achieved great success. In 427, Alkidas’ expedition in support of the rebel Mytileneans lingered in its voyage around the Peloponnesos and returned piecemeal to Lakonia after wintering in Crete (Thuc. 3.29.1, 69.1), which insured that it would be out of contact for the greater part of its round trip. During the Corinthian War, Spartan squadrons regularly departed for Ionia from Aigina.

Even during the Ionian War, when the balance at sea had shifted in favor of the Peloponnesians, operations still showed Sparta’s disadvantage from lacking a base in the Saronic Gulf. The most vivid example concerns a Spartan squadron that left Kenchreai in 412 for Ionia. The Athenians intercepted these ships, which were forced to shelter at Speiraion, a deserted harbor where they were blockaded (8.10–11). With difficulty, the Peloponnesian ships escaped, only to withdraw again to Kenchreai (Thuc. 8.20.1). As far as can be determined, most Spartan forces bound for Ionia in 412/11 avoided sailing from northern Peloponnesian ports\(^9\). Although the Athenians were distracted by στάσεις concerning the 400, when Agesandridas sailed into the Saronic Gulf in 411, the Spartans started from a base in Lakonia. Once in the Gulf, they moved from base to base in a manner that seems ill-at-ease rather than purposive\(^{10}\).

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8) This disability would be amplified, if the number of Peloponnesian ships available at the beginning of the war has been underestimated. Concentrating squadrons rather than a shortage of triremes would have been their main problem. See T. Kelly, Peloponnesian Naval Strength and Sparta’s Plans for Waging War against Athens in 431 B.C., in M. A. Powell and R. H. Sack eds., Studies in Honor of Tom B. Jones (Neukirchen-Vluyn 1979) 245–55.

9) Chalkideus brought 5 ships to Chios from Lakonia (Thuc. 8.8.2, 12.3); 4 and later 6 of the ships that returned to Kenchreai sailed to Chios (8.23.1, 6); Hippokrates brought 12 ships, apparently directly from Lakonia, for they next appeared at Knidos (8.35.1); Antisthenes sailed with 37 vessels from Cape Malea (8.39.1, 3).

10) From Las in southern Lakonia (Thuc. 8.91.2, 92.3), they advanced to Epidaurus, raided Aigina, returned to Epidaurus, and then withdrew to Megara before leaving the Gulf to attack Euboia (8.92.3–4, 94–95). Theramenes, however, interpreted these moves as collusion with the extremists among the 400 (8.92.3).
Just as Athenian anxiety over the existence on Aigina of a population friendly to the Peloponnesian cause helped to motivate a decision to expel the Aiginetans, the Spartans also appreciated the value of an Aiginetan base even before the War. Before the outbreak of hostilities, Spartan embassies demanded that the Athenians, along with withdrawing from Poteidaia and rescinding the Megarian Decree, leave Aigina autonomous (Thuc. 1.139.1). In answer, Perikles exposed the frailty of the Aiginetan claim to autonomy. The Aiginetans were not autonomous at the time of the Thirty Years Peace and the Spartans would not risk putting their case to arbitration (140–44). The vagueness of this claim to autonomy, mysteriously grounded in the σημερον (1.67.2), suggests that this cause was indeed ben trovato for the Spartans. They had evinced not the slightest solicitude for Aigina in the First Peloponnesian War, making no efforts to save the island from Athenian conquest. They had left Aigina in Athenian hands under disadvantageous terms: tributary, without fleet, and without fortifications, that is, without all the customary tokens of autonomy (Thuc. 1.108.4; cf. 6.84.3; 6.85.2; 7.57.4). The Spartans recognized the plight of the Dorian Aiginetans, winners of the ωθοτεία at Salamis, as good raw material for propaganda. Yet they also had practical ends in mind with all their demands.

A retraction of the Megarian Decree would strengthen the resolve of the Megarians, whose defection had been so disadvantageous to the Peloponnesians at the start of the First Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.103.4; Diod. 11.79.1–2). Similarly, an Athenian withdrawal from Poteidaia would strengthen other allies, the rebellious Chalkidians (Thuc. 1.58.1–2), and hearten the Corinthians. So too would Aiginetan autonomy deprive the Athenians of Aigina as a base and render possible an Aiginetan defection to the Spartan cause. The Aiginetans, formerly formidable adversaries of the Athenian navy, could then have been rearmed and


their island used as a base against the Athenians\textsuperscript{13}). That the Spartans did indeed have such considerations in mind is shown by the reiteration of their demand during the first part of the Archidamian War, perhaps when Athens explored peace terms in 430 (Thuc. 2.59.2; Diod. 12.45.5; cf. Thuc. 2.65.2)\textsuperscript{14}). In the Achauanians (652–54) of 426/5, Aristophanes speaks of a Spartan demand for Aigina, understood in comic terms as an attempt to procure his services as an advisor (on his affiliation with the island: Schol. Ach. 654b; Theogenes FGrHist 300 F 2). By that time, the Spartans are unlikely to have preferred scoring propaganda points to getting a peace on their own terms. When they repeated their demand for Aiginetan autonomy, they presumably had substantive reasons for wanting to separate that island from Athenian control.

The foregoing inquiry so far has supported the received text of Thuc. 2.27.1. As an actual Athenian base for operations against the Peloponnesos, and as a potential Spartan base against the Empire (unrealizable because of the Athenian colonization), Thucydides could justifiably stress Aigina’s position relative to the Peloponnesos, not Attica. Why, however, did Thucydides and (to believe him) his Athenian contemporaries not cite in 431 the danger of raids from Aigina against Attica? Such a campaign of raids had been mounted from Aigina in the late 6th century, after an initial attack that had struck Phaleron (Hdt. 5.81.3; 89.2). During the 4th century, intense harassment was worked from Aigina (see below, pp. 33–44). An answer is to be sought in two aspects of the military situation during the Peloponnesian War, which were unique to the second half of the 5th century.

Let us consider first some military prerequisites for a campaign of \textit{ληστεία}. Aigina possessed neither defensible walls nor a fortified harbor in 431. Still, it might have been possible for a Spartan fleet to sail to Aigina and, from there, to operate against the Empire. While the fleet stopped at the island, the Aiginetans (before their expulsion), could have provided manpower, supplies, and even some protection for beached ships. Hence, prudently, the Athenians expelled them. Yet, a campaign of raids necessitated a piecemeal commitment of ships, a policy of engagement which

\textsuperscript{13} Spartan military interest in Aigina suggests an intention to conduct an active naval war from the outset. See T. Kelly, Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War, AHR 87 (1982) 25–54, esp. 33, 38–39.

must have a protected (e.g., by a defensive squadron), fortified base. Once, from the 480's to the 450's, Aigina was surrounded by walls and possessed a military harbor, the κωπτός λιμήν (Paus. 2.29.11), which was a state of the art naval facility\textsuperscript{15}). The possession of this harbor, along with a powerful fleet, made Aigina a dangerous adversary for Athens. By 431, the harbor facilities had been thoroughly devastated; one assumes during or after the conquest of the island. Although commentators have introduced Perikles' calling of Aigina the λιμή of the Peiraeus into the issue of the island's military significance (in 431) for Thucydides (Plut. Per. 8.7; Arist. Rhet. 1411a15–16; Plut. Mor. 186C, 803A), that call for action was inappropriate at that juncture. The subject Aigina of the 430’s was no longer a threat to Athens' port, since there was no Aiginetan fleet and no facilities from which to mount raids similar both to those of the fighting of the late 6th and early 5th centuries and to those later of the 4th century. Perikles probably used the vivid metaphor of the λιμή to urge a more crucial decision, namely whether to subjugate the island, at a time when the Athenians were already at war with the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 1.105.1–2)\textsuperscript{16}).

Second, let us examine the place of λιματεία in the Thucydidean appreciation of naval warfare. My account will go into somewhat more detail than might perhaps be justified by the need to explain the silence of Thucydides on Aigina as a base for raiding, but the usefulness of the paradigm established here for understanding 4th-century fighting at sea provides ample reason for a fuller treatment. Unlike the Aiginetans, the Athenians do not appear to have had a tradition of maritime raiding or, in archaic terms, shall we say, piracy\textsuperscript{17}). Nothing suggests that the Athenians, unlike the Spartans, employed individual privateers against

16) Likewise, Cicero does not necessarily refer to the decision to expel the Aiginetans in 431 when he speaks of Aigina as a threat to the Peiraeus because of its propinquity (Off. 3.11.46): ...nimis enim imminebat propter propinquitatem Aegina Piraeo. His context is vague, both when the Aiginetans still possessed naval power: ...qui classe valebant, and when the Athenians ordered that the thumbs of Aiginetan captives be cut off: ...Aeginetis ... pollices praeciderentur. See below p. 43f., where the last condition is held to indicate a 4th-century context. Cf. D. Proctor, The Experience of Thucydides (Warminster 1980) 113–14, and the scholars cited in n. 4 above.
their Peloponnesian enemies. Rather, they ravaged enemy territory with large, coordinated flotillas\(^{18}\). Raiding Spartan territory (to a large extent, by land), however, was carried on by surrogates, Naupaktian or Messenian allies, and those hostilities approximated a guerrilla insurrection or a peasant revolt\(^{19}\).

The Athenian emphasis on flotilla attacks follows a traditional distinction in styles of naval warfare inherent in operations by oared warships in the Mediterranean\(^{20}\). Because of their hull-shape, crew size, and motive power, such warships, including the trireme, had a short range and low endurance. Depending on close-in tactics like boarding and ramming, large oared ships were inadequate vessels for sea-lane control and blockades where warships stood offshore\(^{21}\). Fleets operated within constraints created by the need to mobilize so many rowers and by the difficulty of keeping them supplied. Warfare by fleets of oared ships centered on amphibious expeditions aimed at hostile maritime strong-

\(^{18}\) Against the Peloponnesos: see n. 5 above; cf. e.g., 2.36.2; 2.85.6; 3.91.1–6; 4.130.1–2; 5.84.2; 8.35.4, 40.1. Both Perikles and Archidamos refer to such attacks at the beginning of the War: 1.143.5; 2.11.8. Note 4.41.3 for an implied distinction between flotilla raids and "νομεία." In general, see P. A. Brunt, Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War, Phoenix 19 (1965) 255–80, esp. 270–72. Compare H. D. Westlake, Seaborne Raids in Periclean Strategy, CQ 39 (1945) 75–84 = Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History (Manchester 1969) 84–100. He upholds the value of the sea raids (cf. Diod. 12.42.7–8, 45.3; Just. 3.7.5–6; Polyæn. 1.36.1). I would compare the flotilla raids to the Archidamian invasions of Attica, as both were restricted by defensive counteraction. By the same token, devastation from Pylos and Dekeleia could be compared as an intensification of destructiveness.

\(^{19}\) Mainly from Pylos, but also from Cape Malea and perhaps from Kephallenia: Thuc. 4.9.1, 41.2–4; 5.14.3, 56.3; 6.105.2; 7.26.2; cf. Xen. HG 1.2.18; Diod. 13.64.7; 14.34.2–8. After their success with Pylos, the Athenians also fortified Methana for use as a base for raids against the Argolic Akte (Thuc. 4.45.2), and they envisaged a similar use of Delion against Boiotia (4.76.5). Yet, even had the Athenians held their position at Delion, it is doubtful whether the political and economic topography of Boiotia, so different from Messenia, would have offered the right opportunities. The Boiotians, however, took the threat so seriously that they called up a strong allied force to attack Delion (4.100.1). For the raids of escaped Chian slaves from the Athenian fort at Delphinion, see 8.38.1.

\(^{20}\) I refer the reader particularly to the treatment of J. F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys (Cambridge 1974) 68–84, 95–122, who emphasizes the indispensable role of "fortresses" and the episodic character of the mobilization of great fleets.

pointst). Opposed to this grand warfare was a smaller-scale style of fighting by raids and privateering, an entrepreneurial, opportunistic, and low-risk mode of warfare, which existed commonly as a background to fleet operations, because its scale freed it from the logistical constraints experienced by fleets. A corollary of this classification is that amphibious, expeditionary warfare primarily endangered the military and political assets of the enemy, but a strategy of raids and privateering struck at an adversary's economic assets.

In company with his Athenian contemporaries, Thucydides associates effective power at sea with fleet operations. In large part he saw the history of naval warfare as an opposition of thalassocracy to ληστεία. It was characteristic of primitive Greece, with its limited resources, that ληστεία was universal (Thuc. 1.5.1–3, 7–8.2). Both Minos, the first of the Greeks to possess an empire held together by a fleet (1.3.4, 8.2), and those pioneers in seafaring, the Corinthians (1.13.5), cleared the seas of ληστεία. Thus Thucydides, who is Athenocentric to this extent, keeps his narrative emphasis on large-scale expeditions, especially those directed against the cities and strongpoints of enemies. ληστεία are mentioned only when the Athenians undertake expeditions to fortify positions from which they can be intercepted (Atalante against the Lokrians: 2.32; Minoa for the Megarians: 3.51) or because their existence had an impact on larger operations. Supposititious Megarian raiders collaborated in the seizure of Nisaia (4.67.3), and the guardpost against ληστεία at Boudoron on Salamis figured into an abortive Peloponnesian attack on the Peiraeus (2.93.4–94.3). Consequently, nothing prepares us for the possibility of Peloponnesian raiders in Magna Graecia before Nikias' mistake in seeing Gylippos as acting ληστωκτερόν 'piratically' (6.104.3). One doubts that we would even know that the Spartans anticipated

22) A topographical exception like the partial ability of the Athenians to interdict the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf from Naupaktos highlights rather than undercuts the usual role of blockades and interceptions (Thuc. 2.69.1; cf. 2.80.1), but note the inherent difficulties: Thuc. 2.81.1; 6.104.1; 7.17.3–4, 19.4–5, 34.1; Polyæn. 5.13.1.

23) Similarly, Thucydides portrays the impact of land raiders from Pylos on Spartan morale (4.41.3; 5.14.3), but there is no close analysis of the raids in general, or even an account of a characteristic foray. Accepting Spartan fear as the motivation for the War, one might argue in defence of Thucydides that his lack of emphasis on the Pylian raids is excusable. Such raids might induce Sparta to seek peace, but they could not deter a reopening of hostilities as soon as Spartan confidence returned (cf. Thuc. 1.23.6). Note the effect of the victory at Mantinea toward restoring Spartan morale (Thuc. 5.75.3: HCT 4.128).
doing considerable damage with free-lance pillagers or privateers, except that Thucydides has noted the *carte blanche* granted them in 416 in order to illustrate the gradual movement of Sparta to full scale hostilities with Athens (5.115.2). Thucydides does not mention the existence of a similar Spartan proclamation at the beginning of the Archidamian War, although one undoubtedly existed (on the Corinthian War, see p. 33 below).

Yet it is a peculiarity of the period from the defeat of the Corinthians at Kekryphaleia and the subjugation of Aigina down to the debacle at Syracuse that Athenian fleet operations could so dominate war at sea, even though the Peloponnesians were so inferior in fleet operations that they, quite reasonably, depended heavily on privateering, which the Athenians had learned to eschew. Peloponnesian sea-raids were the maritime counterpart to the war of attrition which the Spartans adopted in their invasions of Attica²⁴).

Privateers operated from Lokris (Thuc. 2.32; cf. 5.18.7), Karia (2.69.1), Megara (3.51.2; 4.67.3), and perhaps from Herakleia in Trachis (3.92.4)²⁵). One of Nikias' gravest errors during the Sicilian campaign was his decision not to intercept Gylippos and his forces before they arrived in Sicily, because he believed that they were merely a raiding squadron (ἡπιστωτερον ἐδοξε παροικευαμένως πλείον: 6.104.3). In retaliation for raids from Pylos, the Spartans made the aforesaid proclamation that any of their allies could pillage the Athenians (5.115.2). One raid, perhaps typical, was the foray of Timolaos, a Corinthian, who, during the Dekeleian War, went on a pillaging expedition to the islands with 5 ships (Hell. Oxy. 7.3-4 [Bartoletti])²⁶). Later, with the establishment of the fortified camp at Dekeleia, the Spartans adapted this "franchise" system of warfare to raiding by land. Not only did the Spartans conduct military operations of their own

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²⁴) Brunt, Phoenix (1965) 264–70.
²⁶) Not all of Timolaos' ships were triremes, for it is with only 2 triremes that he subsequently sailed to Amphipolis (Hell. Oxy. 7.4).
from there (Thuc. 8.71.1-2; Diod. 13.72.3-73.2; Xen. HG 1.1.33-34), but free-lancing raids also took place (Thuc. 7.27.4) in which the Boiotians were particularly active (Hell. Oxy. 17.4). A Spartan harmost at Dekeleia supervised the raiders, since he was responsible for exacting a δεκάτη 'tithe' from them (Dem. 24.128)\(^{27}\). The harmost was also responsible for selling booty — the Boiotians were the best-situated buyers (Hell. Oxy. 17.4) — along with the λαφυροποιόλαι ‘booty-sellers’, in order to subsidize operations in course (cf. Xen. RL 13.11; HG 4.1.26; Ages. 1.18)\(^{28}\).

Athenian countermeasures included the interceptions, already mentioned, and the inclusion of anti-λησταί clauses in treaties made during the Archidamian War\(^{29}\). The treaty with Halieis stipulates that λησταί (clearly, privateers, individual operatives) are not to be received and that the citizens of Halieis themselves are not to undertake privateering (IG I\(^3\), 75.7-9)\(^{30}\). A similar clause has been restored in an Athenian treaty with a state whose name is not extant, but which may have been Mytilene (IG I\(^3\), 67)\(^{31}\). The threat of ληστεία was taken more seriously by the Athenians than Thucydides' narrative, silent on such clauses, suggests.

Nonetheless, the selectivity of subject-matter in Thucydides is justified by the military factors dominating the fortunes of war. For the period covered by his narrative, Peloponnesian-sponsored raids did not weaken Athens significantly. It is improbable that

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27) The Thebans and Spartans quarreled over the tithe to Apollo from Dekeleia: Xen. HG 3.5.5; cf. Just. 5.10.12; see H. W. Parke, The Tithe of Apollo and the Harmost at Decelea, 413 to 404 B. C., JHS 52 (1932) 42-46.


29) See B. R. MacDonald, ΔΗΣΣΕΙΑ and ΔΗΖΩΜΑΙ in Thucydides and in IG I\(^3\) 41, 67, and 75, AJP 105 (1984) 77-84.


they damaged Aegean commerce to the degree that the ability of the subjects to pay their tribute was affected. In any case taxes on commerce were only one resource from which tribute was raised. Allied revolt was a far more significant threat to the flow of tribute, and the Athenians met that challenge by mounting amphibious expeditions to subdue rebels. Sparta vanquished Athens only when it had created a duplicate of the Athenian fleet, one momentarily better subsidized and led. A siege, the characteristic outcome for fleet warfare, ended the War. As Peloponnesian ληστεία does not stand in the forefront of Thucydides’ attention and its impact on the war was, for him, limited, he did not state explicitly that Aigina as a base for ληστεία was not in the minds of the Athenians when they expelled the island’s inhabitants. Nonetheless, the commentators urging emendation should be resisted. It is more noteworthy that he neglected to note the singularity and the temporal delimitation of this predominance of fleet operations over ληστεία. Nevertheless, the institutions of ληστεία established in the Peloponnesian War become more important for Sparta and Aigina in the 4th century, especially the combination of raids with regular operations, the proclamation of immunity for privateers, and the use of raids to subsidize fleet operations.

During the Peloponnesian War, however, as I have argued above, Aigina was used as a fleet base by the Athenians, whose recognition of its importance in this guise motivated their expulsion of the Aiginetans. The potential value of the island to the Peloponnesians was appreciated by the Spartans, who demanded Aiginetan autonomy both before and during the war, and by the Athenians, who were determined to retain the island.

On the eve of the Corinthian War

After the defeat of the Athenians, the Spartans restored an independent Aigina, a home for as many of the Aiginetans as Lysander was able to gather (Xen. HG 2.2.9; Plut. Lys. 14.4). By this restoration, not only did the Spartans show their good faith concerning their demand for Aiginetan autonomy on the eve of the War, but also acquired an anti-Athenian population experienced in seafaring and a base conveniently near to Attica. A Spartan har­

most was in residence on Aigina between the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars (Hell. Oxy. 6.3, 8.1; Dem. 18.96)32). Although

there had been a general reaction against the imperialistic policies of Lysander, with their decarchies, exaction of tribute, and network of harmosts, this reaction did not extend to withdrawing the harmost from Aigina. Aigina was apparently a place which all Spartan factions held to be within Sparta’s sphere of influence.

Why the Spartans wanted a presence on Aigina can be determined from the following episode. In 397/6, there was considerable sympathy in Athens for the Persian opposition to Sparta, personified by Konon, who was acting as commander of the Greek forces under Pharnabazos (Xen. HG 4.3.11). Equipment and men had been sent secretly to Konon, and an embassy, intercepted by the Spartan navarch Pharax, had been dispatched to Persia (Hell. Oxy. 7.1; Isoc. Paneg. 142). Demainetos, presumably an Athenian trierarch, in collusion with the boule, collected a crew, launched a ship from the dockyards, and sailed to join Konon (Hell. Oxy. 6.1). Thereupon, both those wishing to avoid confrontation with Sparta and even anti-Spartans like Thrasyboulos were afraid of an untimely alienation of Sparta, so that a mission disclaiming responsibility was sent to Milon, the Spartan harmost at Aigina (Hell. Oxy. 6.3). Milon manned a trireme, and set out to intercept Demainetos, who was encountered at Thorikos (Hell. Oxy. 8.1). As Thorikos is on the east coast of Attica and not on the route to join Konon at Kaunos, perhaps Demainetos was trying to throw the Spartans off his trail. He decided to turn Cape Sounion as soon as he learned, while he lingered along the Attic coast, that the majority of Athenians would not second his actions and that the Spartans would receive news of his departure.


36) That the events of Hell. Oxy. 6.2–3, including a meeting of the boule, an assembly, and the delegation to Milon, did not take so long that Demainetos got clean away, suggests that he waited to hear news of Athenian reactions to his act.
Unfortunately, the London papyrus becomes fragmentary from this point. Aischines’ reference to the same incident ought, however, to serve as a guide in any restoration of the text (see. p. 29f. below). While Aischines may be exaggerating in maintaining that Demainetos defeated (συγκατευναμόχησε) the Spartan navarch, Cheilon (2.78), instead of the harmost Milon\(^{37}\), a hostile encounter must have taken place. So it is hard to agree with Grenfell and Hunt (followed by Bruce and Bartoletti) that Demainetos merely stole a ship from Thorikos (or some other place in east Attica) and escaped Milon\(^{38}\). First of all, why should an unguarded, unmanned trireme have been on hand to be taken in east Attica\(^{39}\)? After all, by the terms of their capitulation to Sparta, the Athenians had the right to possess only 12 ships (Xen. HG 2.2.20). Second, the explanation that the hull of Demainetos’ original ship was inferior to the hull of the second ship (col. III, 3) is meant to explain why Demainetos used the second ship: he had only one crew, enough for one ship. What is missing is an explanation how the second ship was taken. Nor is it clear why his specially chosen first ship suddenly became unseaworthy. An appropriate answer to both questions is that the second ship was taken in combat. Thirdly, we need not be troubled by the objection of Grenfell and Hunt that Milon would have been captured with his ship. There is no certainty that the name ending in -ομ in col. III, 6 is Milon. There are, after all, at least 24 missing letters before -ομ, ample space to finish the previous sentence (e.g., [Κόλονος]) and to introduce another Spartan officer (Cheilon?), who arrived only to withdraw to Aigina on missing Demainetos\(^{40}\). If Milon did not

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\(^{37}\) Cheilon was so famous a Spartan name that it could have usurped the name Milon or, possibly, Cheilon was another Spartan commander involved in the episode.

\(^{38}\) Grenfell and Hunt, POxy 5.206–207.

\(^{39}\) Bruce, Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 65, following J. H. Lipsius, Cratippi Hel lenicorum Fragmenta Oxyrhynchia (Bonn 1916) 9, reads μής νεώς αὐτῶν in col. III, 2, which suggests more than one trireme present on the spot, intensifying this difficulty. Cf. Hell. Oxy. 5.207, where τῆς is preferred; V. Bartoletti, Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (Leipzig 1959) 9.

\(^{40}\) We might then return to M. Gigante’s (Le Elleniche di Ossirinco [Rome 1949] 18) suggestion for III, 7: με τὰ τῶν ἄλλων νεών ἐπέειος rather than something like με τὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ νεώς (or τριήμερος) ἐπάνησε (L. Castiglioni, rev. Lipsius, BFC 27 [1921–1922] 146–47; Bartoletti, Hellenica 9; Bruce, Hellenica 65; cf. Grenfell and Hunt, POxy 5.207). The latter suggestion, explaining that Milon
survive the encounter, the manner in which Aischines refers to the episode would be far more understandable\(^{41}\).

A reconstruction of the lacunose text might follow along these lines:

Col. II, 40 \(\ldots \varepsilon[\pi\epsilon][\delta][\delta] \ \delta \ \pi\rho\sigma\sigma\pi\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\varsigma \ \varepsilon\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu[\upsilon][\omega][\varsigma] \ \pi\rho\dot{\omega}[\varsigma]\)

Col. III  
Fr. 1  
Fr. 2

1  \([\tau\eta\nu \ \nu\alpha\upsilon\nu] \ \varepsilon\pi\varepsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\omega\nu[\sigma\nu\varepsilon\varsigma \ \varepsilon\mu\beta\alpha\lambda\varepsilon\iota\nu, \ \omega\mu\theta\mu\sigma\nu\nu \ \varepsilon\pi \ \pi\lambda\upsilon] \)

2  \(\ldots \epsilon\nu\nu \ \kappa\varphi\alpha\theta\iota[\varsigma\varsigma \ \delta \ \tau\eta\varsigma \ \nu\epsilon\omega\varsigma \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \ \tau\eta \ \mu\nu \ \upsilon\]\)

3  \([\varphi' \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu] \ \nu\alpha\upsilon\nu, \ \delta\mu \ \chi\varepsilon[\iota\rho\nu \ \eta\nu \ \tau\omicron\varsigma\alpha\rho\mu\nu\phi\omicron\varsigma, \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \ \kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\lambda\nu\iota\xi\varepsilon\nu] \)

4  \([\epsilon\iota\varsigma \ \delta\dot{\epsilon}] \ \tau\eta\nu \ \varepsilon\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu[\nu\nu \ \mu\mu\tau\alpha\beta\beta\iota\beta\alpha\varsigma\varsigma \ \tau\omega\varsigma \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \ \nu\alpha\upsilon\nu] \)

5  \([\tau\zeta \ \pi\rho\omicron\delta\epsilon\lambda\nu\iota\nu[\epsilon\nu\nu \ \varepsilon\pi \ \tau\omicron\alpha\theta\tau\epsilon\nu\mu \ \tau\omicron \ \mu\tau\dot{\alpha} \ \tau\omicron\upsilon\nu] \)

6  \([\mathrm{K}\sigma\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu \ \ldots \ \ldots \ \ldots \ \mathrm{e} \ \iota\varsigma \ \mathrm{A} \ \iota\gamma\iota\nu\iota\nu \ \mu\epsilon\nu\] \)

7  \([\tau\alpha \ \tau\omicron\nu \ \delta\alpha\ddot{\lambda}\nu\nu \ \nu\epsilon\nu\nu \ \nu\epsilon\nu\nu \ \nu\epsilon\nu\nu \ \nu\epsilon\nu\nu] \ldots \)

Remember first of all that the number of spaces to the left and right of fr. 1 are unknown. Grenfell and Hunt estimate 5–6 spaces at the left, and 8–9 at the right, but concede that there might be slightly more or less space available. In col. III, 1 on the left, read (e.g.) \(\tau\eta\nu \ \nu\alpha\upsilon\nu\nu\) or \(\tau\alpha\upsilon\nu\nu\) as the object of \(\pi\rho\dot{\omega}[\varsigma\] to denote action against Demainetos and the Athenians rather than movement toward a place. To the right in III, 1, continue to read \(\varepsilon\mu\beta\alpha\lambda\varepsilon\iota\nu \ \nu\) (after Grenfell and Hunt), and then after \(\varepsilon\pi\nu\) an adjective (\(\pi\rho\dot{\omega}\) Grenfell and Hunt, or \(\pi\lambda\dot{\epsilon}\nu\nu\)), with an infinitive describing a counteraction at the beginning of III, 2. Understand Demainetos as the subject of \(\omega\mu\theta\mu\sigma\nu\nu\)\(^{42}\). Then construe \(\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\) as the Spartans\(^{43}\). Thus, we have an attempt by Milon to disable Demainetos’ trireme which was countered by the Athenians, who then captured the Spartan trireme. Demainetos, with the captured ship, left the scene of the battle before the arrival of Spartan reinforcements.

The import of this episode in our understanding of the Spartan use of Aigina can now be considered. First, one notes that left with his own ship, provides what would be self-evident in the “runaway” interpretation of Demainetos’ actions, because only one Spartan ship would need accounting for. This restoration serves only to justify retrospectively a restoration for the earlier lacuna in III, 2, allowing it to describe Demainetos’ theft of the ship. It does not carry ahead the narrative.

\(^{41}\) Gigante, Elleniche 56–57.

\(^{42}\) On Demainetos as the subject: Jacoby, FGrHist 66, 2C.10. Some see a place after \(\epsilon\pi\) (Bruce, Hellenica 64), but such a conjecture makes the encounter occur over too great an area.

\(^{43}\) In opposition to Grenfell and Hunt (POxy 5.207) I find the use of \(\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\) for the inhabitants of the place of the incident unlikely. The object of \(\pi\rho\dot{\omega}[\varsigma\) in III, 1 could have been a place, but hardly an ethnic. Cf. Gigante, Elleniche 56.
Milon is able to react quickly to the news of hostile activities in Attica. The compressed time-frame for the whole incident suggests that he had a trireme ready for action, which he was able to man speedily. Milon would have brought more ships, had he the time to wait. A one-to-one fight against an Athenian warship was always a chancy business (correctly, in our interpretation of the affair). Those who guided Milon (Aiginetans perhaps) were well acquainted with the coastal waters of Attica. His vessel was able to sail directly to one or more of the likely stages of Demainetos’ journey in order to find him at Thorikos. The Spartan ship seems to have started the fighting. But no matter how one restores the papyrus, Milon did not simply miss Demainetos or Aischines’ allusion to the episode would be absurd. Thus, even before the Corinthian War, the Spartan harmost on Aigina was assigned the task of patrol and intervention along the Attic coast. In this case, he acted to insure that the Athenians did not break their alliance with Sparta. The Athenians were aware of this function, since they would never have reported the affair to Milon, unless they expected him to take preemptive action. An embassy to Sparta would have been the appropriate act, if their intention had been merely to disavow Demainetos.

The Corinthian War

In the Corinthian War, interpretation of the place of Aigina in naval affairs is hampered by the inadequacies of Xenophon’s account\(^{44}\). His selective, sketchy discussion of the fighting at sea follows a fuller treatment of the combat on land. His chronology is vague. A base line, however, is the eclipse of August 14, 394, which helps to date the contemporaneous battles of Knidos and Koroneia (HG 4.3.10; cf. Aristid. 46, 2.370 [Dindorf]; Lys. 19.28). Accordingly, Konon’s rebuilding of the Athenian walls is usually fixed in spring or summer 393 (cf. IG II\(^2\), 1656–57 = Tod, GHI 2.107; Xen. HG 4.8.9–10; Diod. 14.85.2–3). One principle of organization for a chronology thereupon (most prominently applied by Beloch) is to associate the various Spartan fleet commanders in Xenophon with Spartans holding the navarchy for a

\(^{44}\) A recourse is to supplement Xenophon with Diodorus, whose account is by no means unproblematical, but with whom we cannot dispense for this period. See G. L. Cawkwell, The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, CQ 23 (1973) 47–60.
year\(^{45}\)). Unfortunately, Xenophon’s terminology in referring to these officers is confusing, and several errors and irregularities must be posited. Even so, there is the problem of determining precisely at which point in the year a navarch assumed his duties; Beloch’s suggestion, convincing to me, of late summer, coinciding with the Spartan official year is the strongest, but only one, possibility\(^{46}\).

Xenophon first refers to Aigina at a time when the Aiginetans had already been at war with Athens for a time (5.1.1). Still earlier, the Aiginetans had been at peace with the Athenians (literally, enjoying social intercourse: \(\epsilon\pi\mu\mu\epsilon\iota\xi\alpha\iota\chi\rho\omega\mu\epsilon\nu\omega\nu\)). Konon’s route across the Aegean in the spring after Knidos illustrates how Aigina was not yet a military factor early in the war. From the Hellespont, Konon sailed through the islands to Melos, and then attacked Pherai, other places in Kynouria, and Kythera, before sailing into the Saronic Gulf for the Isthmos (Xen. HG 4.8.7–9; Diod. 14.84.3–5; 85.2). He therefore reversed the course taken to Ionia by some Spartan squadrons during the Ionian War, which suggests that Konon anticipated Spartan forces to be reorganizing in Lakonian ports and not at Aigina. The island had not yet begun its role as a staging point for Spartan forces well attested later in the Corinthian War. With the rebuilding of the walls of Athens and the resurgence of Athenian naval power under Konon, the Aiginetans may well have anticipated renewed Athenian expansionism. Yet with Spartan naval power in the Aegean in eclipse after Knidos and the Spartans considering a negotiated peace, the Aiginetans may still have thought it prudent to refrain from hostilities (Xen. HG 4.8.12–17).

During this period, Aigina became a haven for pro-Spartans dislodged by Konon’s sweep through the Cyclades and the fall of oligarchic governments that ensued, as demonstrated by the \(A\i g\i n\e t\i k\o s\) (19) of Isokrates. The aristocratic Siphnian speaker and

\(^{45}\) J. Beloch, Die attische Politik seit Perikles (Leipzig 1884) 346–59; id., Griechische Geschichte\(^2\) (Berlin 1924–1927) 3.2.221–25; followed by V. Puntoni, Senofonte: Le storie elleniche\(^2\) (Turin 1929) 2.xix.

his relatives (19.36) had been driven from their homes as the islands were attacked by democratic exiles (19.18–19), whereupon they travelled to Melos, Troizen, and finally Aigina (19.21–24). Even though the Siphnian exiles had already made one attempt to recover their island, Aigina was still at peace and an Aiginetan metic could commission a speech from an Athenian. An appreciable time, several years, since the outbreak of the Corinthian War must have elapsed for the events of the speech to have occurred\footnote{G. Mathieu and E. Bremond, Isocrate: Discours (Paris 1928–1962) 1.92, dating the speech to 391 or 390. See also F. Brindisi, Isocrate: Eginetico (Florence 1963) 4.}, which corroborates Xenophon on the initial non-involvement of the Aiginetans in the hostilities. As a sanctuary for pro-Spartans, the island played only a passive role in the struggle for control of the Aegean.

Xenophon tells us that Eteonikos was harmost on Aigina for the second time when the Aiginetans decided to respond to the appeal of the harmost that anyone, so wishing, might take booty from Attica. They did this, according to Xenophon, when it was clear that the war would be fought at sea. Eteonikos was acting under the authorization of the ephors (συνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις). The language of his appeal was formulaic: λήγεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς (cf. Thuc. 5.115.2 on the proclamation of 416: εἰ τις βούλεται παρὰ σφῶν Ἀθηναίους λήγεσθαι). Therefore, this exhortation was not limited to the Aiginetans, but applied to Spartan allies and pro-Spartans in general. Eteonikos had simply reiterated Spartan policy, probably of long standing, because the proclamation of 416 came at the beginning of hostilities.

To determine the lower terminus of the period of Aiginetan inactivity, consider the actions of the Spartan admiral Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The Aiginetan raids provoked an Athenian reaction, a siege eventually broken by Teleutias (HG 5.1.2). Sometime earlier, he had superseded the previous Spartan commander in the Aegean, Ekdikos (HG 4.8.20, 23). To follow Beloch, Ekdikos was navarch for Spartan year (SY) 391/0 and Teleutias succeeded as navarch for 390/89\footnote{Beloch, Politik 350–52.}. Underhill objects to Ekdikos’ being so long inactive before supersession by Teleutias; so Teleutias succeeds Ekdikos early in SY 391/0 and continues as navarch for 390/89\footnote{G. E. Underhill, The Chronology of the Corinthian War, JPh 22 (1894) 129–43, esp. 138–39; id., A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon (Oxford 1900) l–lv.}. He, therefore, spent at least 18 months as
navarch, even though multiple holding of that office was irregular (cf. HG 2.1.7). It is maladroit, however, to reconstruct the rhythm of military activity as coinciding with official terms. Ekdikos may well have been sent out during the course of SY 391/0, as Diodorus suggests\textsuperscript{50}, in reaction to the Athenians. His dispatch was probably in the campaigning season of 390, since the Spartans would hardly have reacted to his inactivity by sending out Teleutias if it had been winter. We should accept Beloch’s theory of Ekdikos as navarch of SY 391/0 (cf. HG 4.8.20), but modify it by placing only the later part of his term in Ionia. Teleutias, navarch for 390/89, then succeeded Ekdikos in command of the fleet near the end of SY 391/0.

Thereafter, the Athenian στρατηγός, Thrasyboulos of Steiria, arrived in Ionia (Xen. HG 4.8.25–30; Diod. 14.94.2–4; 99.4–5). Diodorus begins Thrasyboulos’ activity in Attic Year (AY) 392/1, and relates his last actions and death in AY 390/89, ignoring the intervening year, AY 391/0\textsuperscript{51}. According to Xenophon, however, his arrival followed that of Teleutias at Rhodes, not earlier than 390 (HG 4.8.25). Yet, Thrasyboulos’ strong fleet must have been long in preparation. Thus, Diodorus may have misplaced the activities of Thrasyboulos in 392/1, which may be only the year of the authorization and preparation for his departure (i.e., the first mention of his expedition in Ephoros, Diodorus’ source). Rather, his first activities may belong in late AY 391/0, the year about which Diodorus is silent, or even early in AY 390/89, as Xenophon suggests, and his death in 390/89. Here is the reason for the dissatisfaction with Ekdikos in spring or summer 390, anxiety over the impending appearance of Thrasyboulos.

Thrasyboulos died while collecting money for future campaigning, probably in spring 389. Possibly, the lull in Athenian activity thereafter freed the hands of Teleutias, so that he, in turn, could collect money in the Cyclades, his last endeavor before

\textsuperscript{50} Diod. 14.97.3–4 reports for AY 391/0 the dispatch of three commanders to Rhodes: Eudokimos (= Ekdikos), Diphilas (= Diphridas), and Philodokos. If this date is correct, Diodorus’ date of AY 390/89 for the death of Thibron must be wrong (14.99.3), since Xenophon has Diphridas, as colleague of Ekdikos, sent out to replace the dead Thibron (HG 4.8.21). Cf. Pareti, Studi minori 2.99–100.

\textsuperscript{51} Beloch (Politik 353–55; GG\textsuperscript{2} 3.2.224–25, citing Aristoph. Plutus 549–50) puts the death of Thrasyboulos in 388. Cf. R. Seager, Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396–386 B.C., JHS 87 (1967) 95–115, esp. 109; Underhill ([Ph [1894] 139–40], following Diodorus, keeps his death in 389, which conveniently maintains the chronological integrity of the order of events in Xenophon. See also S. Accame, Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia (Naples 1951) 131–47.
reaching Aigina. On Aigina Teleutias raised the Athenian siege, and then handed over his fleet to his successor, Hierax, ostensibly in late summer 389 (Xen. HG 5.1.3). After the lifting of the siege, the Athenians were forced to rescue their hoplites in SY 389/8, who had been on the island over four months\(^{52}\). Since reckoning back four months from this rescue does not take us very far back into SY 390/89, and the siege had lasted for a time before ended by Teleutias, Teleutias did not reach Aigina until a month or at most two before the end of his term in summer 389.

In that summer of 389, Aiginetan raids had become serious enough that the Athenians could be said to be besieged by the Aiginetans (5.1.1–2). Therefore, Eteonikos’ assumption of command precedes the Athenian expedition and summer 389 by some time. Unfortunately, Xenophon’s remark that Eteonikos was again (πάλιν) on Aigina is not helpful, because there is no hint in the narrative that he had ever been there before (cf. HG 7.1.41). The ephors’ proclamation had been made as soon as the Athenians joined the anti-Spartan coalition (395/4). Yet no notice had been taken of Aigina when Konon entered the Saronic Gulf, although a Spartan harmost had been on the island between the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars. The presence of a harmost seems incompatible both with Konon’s disinterest in 393/2 and the continuation of pacific relations between the islanders and the Athenians. Thus, the Aiginetans signalled their unwillingness to become involved in the Corinthian War by requesting the withdrawal of the harmost, who, in the absence of a garrison, had no choice other than to acquiesce. In turn, the Aiginetans recalled the harmost when they decided to enter the war. Both harmosts may have been the same man, Eteonikos; hence, the “again” of Xenophon’s text. Eteonikos was a third time sent to Aigina during a crisis later in this war, suggesting that he had a special rapport with the Aiginetans.

When Hierax succeeded to the navarchy in late summer 389, he replaced Eteonikos with his ἐπίστολος, Gorgopas (HG 5.1.5). Thus, Eteonikos ended his term with Teleutias, the navarch of the previous year. Would Eteonikos have been superseded if he had not served a term of, at least, a year? A year in any case appears a reasonable minimum duration for the raids before the Athenians

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52) The Athenian commander, Pamphilos, was tried in winter 389/8, for he is mentioned in Aristoph. Plutus 174 of that winter: Beloch, Politik 351; cf. Schol. Plutus 174a–b; Plato Comicus, fr. 14 K. Pamphilos may be Pamphilos Keiriades (PA no. 11545: Lys. 15.5; Dem. 40.20, 22).
could be said to be under siege. Hence, it is reasonable to look for a point in SY 391/0 at which Spartan resolution to fight at sea became credible to the Aiginetans. The best moment for this realization and the establishment of Eteonikos on Aigina will have been the dispatch of Ekdikos and his colleagues in spring or summer 390\(^53\). If the impending expedition of Thrasyboulos awakened the Spartans to a renewed threat at sea, it will not have been missed on Aigina. The preemptive advance of Ekdikos to Rhodes would have reassured the Aiginetans of the Spartan will to resist. Xenophon’s missing allusion to Eteonikos should perhaps have been made in a description of a call by the Spartan squadron under Ekdikos at Aigina.

That the Athenians were forced to besiege the city of Aigina demonstrates that the town was fortified (HG 5.1.2)\(^54\). This precondition for conducting ληστεία, in default in 431, was put in place before the Corinthian War. By their siege of Aigina, the Athenians showed their continued fidelity to Mediterranean fleet warfare; answer raids not with other raids, but with an amphibious expedition aimed at taking or closely blockading (from a nearby station) the enemy’s base. Just as the Athenians had obliterated their Aiginetan eyesore by taking the city and levelling its harbor and fortifications in the 450’s, refortification of Aigina elicited Periklean countermeasures. Xenophon calls their siege an ἐπιτείχισμός. In Thucydides, this term is used by Archidamos for the establishment of a fortified position in Attica, a role later fulfilled by the Spartan fort at Dekeleia\(^55\). One can think, however, of no clearer indication of the straitened resources of Athens in the early 4th century than the forces available for a decisive blow against Aigina: only 10 triremes. At the arrival of Teleutias’ fleet, the Athenian ships were driven away. Athenian land forces attempted to retain their fortified position, although it was now the Athenians who were, so to speak, besieged. Even so, the Athenian determination is noteworthy, because a ὄργανον was later necessary to remove the hoplites (HG 5.1.5). Therefore, it appears that

\(^{53}\) Note that when Teleutias took over Ekdikos’ command, he sailed around the Peloponnesos directly to Samos (HG 4.8.23).

\(^{54}\) It is noteworthy that the rich Aiginetan metic Lampis, who embellished the city and emporion of Aigina, is not said to have contributed to the rebuilding of the city’s walls. Lampis’ benefactions appear to have been in the 360’s and 350’s. See Dem. 23.211 (from 352); cf. Plut. Mor. 234E, 787A; Comm. in Hesiod fr. 59; Cic. Tusc. 5.14.40; Stob. Flor. 29.87.

\(^{55}\) Thuc. 1.122.1; cf. 5.17.2; 7.18.4, 28.3 (Dekeleia); cf. also ἐπιτείχισμος: 1.142.2; 6.91.7, 93.2; 8.95.6(?).
the authority to withdraw the besiegers had been removed from the discretion of the στρατηγοὶ. Athenian dissatisfaction was marked by the trial of the στρατηγός commanding the hoplites, Pamphilos.

The choice of Aigina as the point at which Hierax succeeded Teleutias demonstrates again the island’s other naval role as a fleet base. In contrast with the Spartan situation during the Peloponnesian War, Aigina served as a point of concentration for operations in the Aegean in 389, and especially among the Cyclades, where Teleutias had raised tribute before his arrival. To protect Aigina, Hierax left 12 ships, a token of the island’s importance, since his entire fleet numbered only 37\(^{56}\). Gorgopas’ detachment on Aigina was a covering force, meant to thwart a disruption of raiding like that caused by the Athenian siege. This force could be maintained out of ληστεῖα, which gave it the additional attraction of not being a drain on Spartan resources (see below pp. 40f.). Its size was calculated to offset the flotilla of 10 ships which the Athenians had previously advanced in support of their ἐπιτευχεῖσθαι.

The 12 Spartan ships, however, do not appear to have been the only or even the main vessels with which raids were conducted against Attica, because the raids had taken place previously, independently of the presence of a squadron on the island. While attacks were made by the Spartan triremes, there may have been only a few other large ships involved, for example, a handful of Aiginetan triremes. We lose track of four triremes captured by Gorgopas (HG 5.1.9), which might have been assigned to raiders in the absence of additional Spartan crews to man them. Possibly, pentekonters and triakonters carried out much of the ληστεῖα. Xenophon’s failure to discuss the conduct of these raids is to be attributed to his concentration on fleet operations, an emphasis which I have traced in Thucydides. The use of small ships may have intensified his disinterest.

As a covering force, Gorgopas’ squadron was entirely successful. A large Athenian fleet was mobilized to rescue the isolated hoplites, but could do nothing more (HG 5.1.5). Subsequently, the Athenians began to be molested by the λῃσται and Gorgopas. The mere presence of the Athenians on the island had afforded Attica some protection from λῃστεῖα, since the Aiginetans were

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56) Teleutias had 27 ships when he captured 10 Athenian ships on his way to Rhodes (Xen. HG 4.8.24; cf. Diod. 14.97.4). Nikolochos, deputing for Antalkidas in 388/7, had only 25 ships, discounting the 12 on Aigina (5.1.7).
compelled to keep men tied down manning defensive works, men who would otherwise have participated in raids. Also, without the ἐπιτευχομένος, Gorgopas may well have believed that a naval attack alone could not take the town of Aigina, so that Spartan warships could be active in λῃστεία.

As navarch for the year 388/7, Antalkidas again used Aigina as a fleet base. There he took over Gorgopas’ squadron to escort him on his way to join the main Spartan fleet at Ephesos (HG 5.1.6). Yet, even though Athenian forces in the eastern Aegean would outnumber him (at least 32 to 25 ships: HG 5.1.7), Antalkidas sent Gorgopas back to Aigina. The good sense of his decision was amply borne out, for, near Aigina, Gorgopas met the Athenian general Eunomos. That he had been dispatched with 13 ships against Aigina in the absence of Gorgopas indicates the important defensive role of the squadron based on the island. Gorgopas fled this contact into the haven of Aigina, and Eunomos withdrew toward Attica. Eunomos may have hoped to surprise Aigina in an attack similar to that later tried by Chabrias (Polyaen. 3.11.12), but it is more likely that he merely intended to ravage the island in a fashion like that of the large Athenian raids on the Peloponnesos of the Peloponnesian War. Without a landing force, Eunomos could not take the city, and 13 ships had been shown to be too few to support a siege.

Gorgopas re-embarked his men and followed the unsuspecting Eunomos, who was surprised in the midst of his disembarkation at Cape Zoster (Xen. HG 5.1.8–9, for the whole episode). In a night engagement, Gorgopas captured 4 triremes, and the rest of the Athenians fled in disorder to the Peiraieus. Once again, the value of a secure base at Aigina had been demonstrated, inasmuch as Gorgopas was able to choose the time and place for engagement with the enemy, or even to refuse to fight at all. The support of the Aiginetans enabled the pilots of the Spartan ships (perhaps Aiginetans themselves) to become so acquainted with the Attic coast that Gorgopas could risk a night attack just offshore. A comparison with the Demainetos/Milon confrontation is appropriate: both suggest Peloponnesian proficiency in operating within Attic coastal waters. Nonetheless, the discomfiture of Eunomos elicited a greater and better organized effort by Athens against Aigina, a sign of the havoc wrought by the λῃστεία.

Chabrias was to be sent to help Euagoras in Cyprus. On his arrival in Athens with 800 peltasts, troops he had inherited from Iphikrates, and 10 triremes (Xen. HG 5.1.10–12), he picked up
more ships and a hoplite force under the command of Demainetos, perhaps in fall 388 or at the latest in spring 387\textsuperscript{57}). Landing on Aigina, Chabrias laid an ambush at night with his peltasts while disembarking his hoplite force at dawn as bait. Gorgopas and the Aiginetans seem to have been anticipating another effort at \textit{ἐπιτελεχισμός} because they marched out against the Athenian hoplites, who had advanced inland. Gorgopas may have felt unequal to withstanding a siege supported by so many men and ships, for he cannot have known that Chabrias, commanded to Cyprus, could not persevere in an investment. As the sequel to the episode shows, the Spartans were dependent on \textit{ληστεία} in order to subsidize their operations, so that a siege deprived their sailors of pay. Chabrias then cleverly exploited the threat of a siege to achieve a decrease in raiding activity, inasmuch as the Aiginetans and Gorgopas fell into his ambush, which was supported by the hoplites disembarked from the Athenian triremes. Gorgopas and his staff of Spartiates were killed, and their forces routed (cf. Dem. 20.76).

The description of this defeat elucidates the forces available on Aigina for military action. Aiginetans, marines from the Spartan triremes, and free sailors, variously armed, marched out. Out of this force, there fell 150 Aiginetans and 200 \textit{ἐξόριοι}, metics, and sailors. No casualties among the marines are noted. The vanguard (οἱ \textit{μὲν πρῶτοι}) had been overrun, not the phalanx (οὐδὲνός ἄθροον ὄντος: 5.1.12; cf. 4.1.19), so that the dead were not Aiginetan or Peloponnesian hoplites, but light-armed skirmishers. The Aiginetans were probably some of those previously engaged in raiding Attica. The \textit{ἐξόριοι} and metics are people of those statuses on the island of Aigina. These \textit{ἐξόριοι} and metics had been available for service on Aiginetan privateers, and, on this occasion, they were ready to fight in defense of the island\textsuperscript{58}). They should be differentiated from the sailors from the Spartan squadron, who were later addressed as though Sparta was their homeland by Teleutias (Xen. HG 5.1.16). They were probably enfranchised helots and perioeci (cf. HG 7.1.12). The defeat of Gorgopas led to a near cessation of \textit{ληστεία} against Attica (HG 5.1.13). Many Aiginetans, metics, and \textit{ἐξόριοι} had been killed, and it would have been difficult to replace them in the crews of privateers. The activity of the harmost at

\textsuperscript{57} Demainetos was at Abydos (Xen. HG 5.1.26) in the campaigning season of 387, when Antalkidas returned to the sea. See Beloch, Politik, 356.

\textsuperscript{58} Many of them will have been pro-Spartan obligarchs driven from the Cyclades by anti-Spartan forces, just like the Siphnians of Isoc. 19. See pp. 32f. above.
Dekeleia suggests that the harmost on Aigina may also have levied a percentage of the booty. Thus an ebbing of the raids undermined Spartan ability to support their ships. Hence, when the Spartans ordered Eteonikos to Aigina to retrieve the impasse caused by Chabrias’ victory, he was stymied by a lack of money: the sailors refused to sail without wages (HG 5.1.13).

Teleutias was then sent to Aigina. Xenophon describes him as a navarch, although Antalkidas seems to have continued to command the Spartan fleet in the Hellespont. This conjunction suggested an inconsistency to Beloch. Xenophon’s order of events is incorrect, and the operations of Teleutias belong to SY 387/6. In that year Teleutias was again navarch, according to Beloch for the third time⁵⁹). There is, however, evidence to suggest that Beloch is mistaken. Lys. 22.8–9 describes the actions taken by the στοφύλακες Anytos to hold down swiftly rising grain prices in the winter, 387–86, before the Peace of Antalkidas. The speaker alludes to rumors maliciously spread at that time about the destruction of grain ships in the Pontus, their interception in the Hellespont, a closing of the Pontic markets, and a breaking of the στονδαί (Lys. 22.14). No rumors were disseminated about Aiginetan attacks on grain ships bound for Attica, although, as shall be seen momentarily, Teleutias achieved striking success in this very activity. Consequently, while Spartan ships remained in the Hellespont, making the rumors credible, the squadron and harmost seem to have withdrawn from Aigina, and the raids terminated. If there had been a navarch in SY 387/6, he would have been in the Hellespont and not on Aigina. This suggests that Teleutias’ activities belong to SY 388/7⁶⁰), as the order of Xenophon’s narrative indicates. Teleutias was not navarch⁶¹), but he may have had special authority, the better to draw on his tremendous emotional ascendancy with the Spartan forces (cf. 5.1.3). Since the Spartans could not have anticipated that Teleutias would solve the Aiginetan impasse so decisively, without calling for reinforcements from the Hellespont, he might, in the absence of Antalkidas, have been authorized to give instructions to Nikolochos, Antalkidas’ ἐπιστολεύς and deputy. As soon as a durable peace appeared likely, the Aiginetans ceased

⁵⁹) Politik 352. See also Pareti, Studi minori 2.101–102.
⁶⁰) Underhill, JPh (1894) 141–42, who thus removes the third navarchy of Teleutias. A first navarchy in 392/1 in the Corinthian Gulf is also questionable: E. Aucello, Ricerche sulla cronologia della guerra corinzia, Helikon 4 (1964) 29–45, esp. 42–44.
⁶¹) Breitenbach, Hellenika 3.7–8.
hostilities. Their willingness to indulge their hatred of the Athenians was predicated on a sufficient Spartan commitment to confront Athenian seapower.

Taking advantage of the enthusiasm created by his arrival, Teleutias decided that only a bold stroke would set matters right. He chose to attack the Peiraieus itself in a daybreak assault which achieved total surprise (5.1.18–22). The Athenians had assumed that the victory of Chabrias had neutralized any danger from Aigina (Xen. HG 5.1.20). The Spartan ships were ordered to ram Athenian triremes, but to seize merchant ships and the merchants and ship captains themselves. The captured ships were then convoyed to Aigina, while Teleutias swept the Attic coast down to Sounion, where he captured more merchant ships, some laden with grain (HG 5.1.23). Selling his booty, Teleutias gave a month’s pay to his men (5.1.24), and was thereafter able to act with impunity against the Attic coast, subsidized by ληστεία.

Traditions on the life of Plato preserve valuable information on Aiginetan ληστεία, and specifically on 388/7, the final year of the raiding. Plato, on his return from Sicily, was sold as a slave on Aigina62). Unfortunately, the accounts of his return are filled with commonplaces and moralizing appropriate to a philosopher’s life. A bewildering array of variants exists, among which one can only pick out certain common elements and themes as the basis of a historical discussion63). There seems to be, however, 4th-century evidence for the historicity of the sale of Plato as a slave on Aigina64).


The main tradition takes as its background an embassy of the Spartan Pollis to Syracuse (Plut. Dion 5.5–6; Diog. L. 3.19; Aris­tid. 46, 2.305–306 [Dindorf], Olympiodorus, In Gorg. 41.8; cf. Diod. 15.7.1). In 393/2, Pollis had been the επιστολεύς to the navarch Podanemos, when Podanemos was killed and Pollis wounded in fighting in the Corinthian Gulf (Xen. HG 4.8.11). Pollis is not mentioned again in Xenophon’s narrative on the Corinthian War. There is no reason to question an embassy to Syracuse in order to acquire for Sparta naval reinforcements like those sent during the Ionian War. Such help arrived in the form of 20 ships from Syracuse and Italy, commanded by Polyxenos, who joined Antalkidas in spring 387 in time for the final campaign of the war (HG 5.1.26). Plato was returning to Athens sup­posedly unaware of the fate awaiting him (e.g., Dion 5.6; In Gorg. 41.8). Since Aigina is hardly a way-station for a return to Sparta, Plato must have known that Pollis had a reason for passing near Attica, or he would never have taken ship with him (cf. Olympiodorus, In Alcib. 2.121–26, for Pollis as an Aiginetan mer­chant!). If Pollis was accompanying with his own ship the 20 ships of Polyxenos on their way to the Hellespont, his presence in the vicinity of Attica is no problem. Because the whole force stopped at Aigina in a fashion similar to that of other squadrons bound from the Peloponnesos to the eastern Aegean, Plato ended up on Aigina. The evidence from the career of Plato accommodates a date of 388/7 for Plato’s sale on Aigina. Plato was born in 429/8

Menander. Gaiser, Festschrift Muth 123–24, also adduces a restoration of col. II, 36–42 of the Index Herculanensis, which yields a reference to Plato’s sale on Aigina. For his evidence, the author of the treatise cites Neanthes of Kyzikos, probably the elder Neanthes, c. 300 (FGrHist 84 F 21). See R. Laqueur, Neanthes, RE 16.2 (Stuttgart 1935) cols. 2108–10; cf. Jacoby, FGrHist 2C, Komm. 144–45. Neanthes’ source was the Aiginetan Cynic philosopher Philiskos (Diog.L. 6.75, 80), who tutored young Alexander (Suda s. v. Φιλίσκος Αἰγινητής; Ael. VH 14.11). Philiskos would provide contemporary Aiginetan confirmation for the story of the sale.

65) Sparta also sought reciprocation for help brought to Dionysios by Pharakidas (= Pharax: HG 3.2.12, 14; Diod. 14.79.4; Hell. Oxy. 7.1) in 396 (Diod. 14.63.4; cf. 14.79.4; Polyæn. 2.11; Theopompos FGrHist 115 F 192). Pollis may have countered an Athenian embassy, promoted by Konon (Lys. 19.19); see Seager, JHS (1967) 103.


67) Further confirmation could be found in the report that Annikeris, Plato’s ransomer, was on his way to Olympia, presumably for the Games of 388, when diverted to Aigina (Philoponus CAG 16.324.17–23; Olympiodorus, In Alcib. 2.121–26; In Gorg. 41.8), but there are reasons for doubting this detail,
(Neanthes FGrHist 84 F 20; cf. Diog. L. 3.2, 40) or 428/7 (Apollodoros FGrHist 244 F 37; Hippolytos 1.8.13 [Diels]; cf. Philochoros FGrHist 328 F 223). He departed for Syracuse at c. 40 years of age (Plato Ep. 324A6–7).

It is not necessary to determine the degree of Dionysios’ guilt or of Pollis’ complicity in a plot (68), because the rest of the story turns on the existence of laws on Aigina which provided for legal action if an Athenian disembarked on the island. In other words, regardless of the involvement of Dionysios and Pollis, Plato as an Athenian would have been vulnerable (69). In one tradition, Athenians could be executed when they landed on Aigina by virtue of a law of Charmandros (Diog. L. 3.19; Aristid. 46, 2.306 [Dindorf]). Alternatively, Plato was to be sold in the slave market according to Aiginetan law (Plut. Dion 5.7; Index Hercul. p. 12 Mekler = p. 174 Gaiser; cf. Olympiodorus, In Gorg. 41.8). The two traditions are sometimes harmonized by asserting that Plato escaped the death penalty only to be sold, in most stories to a Libyan Annikeris, who freed him (Diog. L. 3.19–20; cf. Plut. Dion 5.6–7; Aristid. loc. cit.).

The existence of a special law prescribing the death penalty for any Athenian landing on Aigina is not difficult to believe. Athenian laws mandating mutilation of the hands for Aiginetans taken prisoner provide a parallel and perhaps precedent (Cic. Off. 3.11.46; Ael. VH 2.9; Val. Max. 9.2. ext. 8). These provisions represent a sequel to the decision made by the Athenians shortly before Aigospotamoi to mutilate the hands of captured sailors, which, at the time, was considered an outrage against usual military customs (Xen. HG 2.1.31–32, Plut. Lys. 9.7). Before their restoration to their homeland, individual Aiginetan sailors, serving in Spartan ships, could not have been identifiable as such. So laws specifying Aiginetans did not make sense until the 4th century, when an Aiginetan navy (of sorts) existed once again. The Aiginetan law probably envisaged the death penalty for Athenian soldiers taken prisoner in the course of military action on Aigina, and so

chiefly the relative geographical positions of Kyrene, Olympia, and Aigina. See Gaiser, Festschrift Muth 115.


69) Plut. Dion. 5.5–6 has Pollis help Dion save Plato from the anger of Dionysios by getting him away (followed by Olympiodorus, In Gorg. 41.8). In Aristid. 46, 2.305–306 [Dindorf], Pollis does Dionysios, who wanted Plato sold, one better by going to Aigina, where he could be killed. See also Diog.L. 3.20, citing Favorinus, on the divine retribution which befell Pollis.
may have been of only dubious relevance to the case of Plato. More applicable was the provision for his sale as a slave which treats the philosopher like any other prisoner who had been taken by the Spartans or their Aiginetan allies (e.g., like those seized in the Peiraeus in Teleutias' attack or Nikostratos in [Dem.] 53.6: below pp. 47f.)\(^7^0\). To insure that their captors did not appropriate their entire ransom, all hostile nationals had to be sold in the slave-market, where the share accruing to the state could be exacted.

In summation, one need not accept the factuality of every detail in these traditions, in order to recognize that their context is eloquent about Aiginetan ἔντονα υπερ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων. The taking of booty appears to have been both profitable and well-supervised, and persons, ransomed or sold, may have constituted much of the booty. The story takes for granted that any Athenian maneuvered into Aiginetan hands was at great risk to his life, a testimony to the continuing bitter hatred between the two cities.

Xenophon's account of the end of the Corinthian War gives the motivations for the Athenian decision to make peace in 387 as follows. The Athenians feared a second Aigospotamoi with the King aiding the Spartans (HG 5.1.29), and they were besieged by ἔντονα from Aigina, with the same term, πολεοδομοῦμενοι, used as in 5.1.2. On the former, it is easy to see how Antalkidas through military operations and diplomacy had maneuvered the Athenians into a situation of local, tactical disadvantage, while he threatened their access to Pontic grain\(^7^1\). For the latter, however, Xenophon's narrative fails to provide enough to gauge directly the impact of the Aiginetan raids. An affirmation can be reached indirectly by noticing the intensification and acceleration of hostilities in the last year of the fighting with the defeat of Eunomos by Gorgopas, the defeat of Gorgopas by Chabrias, and the raid by Teleutias on the Peiraeus. Given his final conclusion on the role of Aiginetan raids in the Corinthian War, Xenophon's emphasis on flotilla operations is far less justifiable than that of Thucydides, who would never have attributed (even partially) the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War to ἔντονα. The military resources of Athens had diminished so radically that grand naval warfare

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70) This consideration seems implicit in the main tradition, but is made explicit in late antique versions of the story where Plato is captured by pirates (e.g., Jer. Ep. 53.1; see Riginos, Platonica 91).
71) See F. Graefe, Die Operationen des Antalkidas im Hellespont, Klio 28 (1935) 262–70.
had lost significance relative to raiding. Xenophon, insufficiently appreciative of this change, only partially helps us understand how and why the activities of the ἄντωαί from Aigina harmed Athens.

Later fourth-century operations

The policy of sapping Athenian strength through raids from Aigina, deployed to such effect in the Corinthian War, was reused in later military operations. The growing sketchiness of Xenophon’s account, especially on naval warfare (he misses, after all, the foundation of the Second Confederacy), impedes a full reconstruction, so that only a few, albeit suggestive, episodes can be introduced. After the decision of the Athenians to help Thebes in 378/7, and the foundation of the Second Confederacy late in the same year, the Spartans, after some initial hesitation, decided to contest Athenian seapower (Xen. HG 5.4.61). Eventually, Pollis was chosen navarch for 377/6 with 60 warships. According to Xenophon, Pollis interdicted the route for the grain ships, which were thereby held up at Cape Geraistos, the southern promontory of Euboia, while he operated from stations at Aigina, Keos, and Andros (HG 5.4.61: the latter two places had fallen under Spartan influence after the Peace of Antalkidas). Diodorus, describing the same strategy, awards less success to Pollis: his ships attempted, with mixed success in the face of Athenian escorts, to intercept the grain ships, much as Teleutias had done after his victory at the Peiraeus (Xen. HG 5.1.61, cf. Polyæn. 3.11.2; Plut. Phoc. 6.5–7; Cam. 19.6). Pollis’ targets were economic assets of the Athenians and the Peloponnesian fleet was being used like a fleet of ἄντωαί, he was using Aigina as a fleet base in a mixed strategy that hoped to establish quickly a blockade, an aggravated form of the πολιορκία gradually created by raiders from Aigina in the Corinthian War.

Such a strategy was vulnerable to a diversion, which Chabrias provided in the form of an attack on Naxos. Pollis was tempted into coming to the defense of the pro-Spartan government of the island, whereupon he was decisively defeated on 16 Boedromion AY 376/5 (Diod. 15.34.4–35.2; Xen. HG 5.1.61, cf. Polyæn. 3.11.2; Plut. Phoc. 6.5–7; Cam. 19.6). Pollis diverged from the conservative strategy of previous Spartan navarchs, with calamitous results. Rather than forcing the Athenians to dislodge him from his island bases, he not only chose to attack a superior force (87 Athenian triremes to his own 65), but also seems to have
stripped Aigina of covering ships. Possibly, the Second Athenian Confederacy threatened all too credibly to Pollis a reconstitution of the 5th-century thalassocracy, to the extent that even rash actions became attractive, but his confounding of the two genres of maritime warfare suggests otherwise. The initiative for a more active prosecution of the naval war came from Sparta’s allies (disenchanted with a war of attrition), who envisaged a single, decisive defeat of Athens, leading to a siege of that city (Xen. HG 5.4.60). So the Spartans discarded their mixed strategy of necessarily slow-acting ληστεία and a defensive stance for their fleet in favor of first an infeasible blockade and then of provoking a climactic battle. Not for the first time, their allies had caused them to diverge from the caution so deeply engrained in their character, with a disastrous outcome.

Enemy naval activity against Attica continued in its second mode, privateering. In Xenophon’s list of the Athenian motivations for sending a peace embassy to Sparta in 375/4, damage from ληστησια operating out of Aigina is again cited (along with anxiety over Thebes, serving in garrison duty, and the burden of the εἰσοφοραί: HG 6.2.1). ληστεία is less prominent in this set of motives, and there is no suggestion that its effects approximated a siege, as previously. At Naxos, Chabrias had taken 49 triremes (Diod. 15.35.2: 24 destroyed; 8 captured; cf. Aesch. 3.222), and he returned to Athens with 3000 prisoners, 110 talents in booty, and another 20 captured ships (Dem. 20.77, 80). He brought over most of the islands (capturing 17 cities) that had been in Spartan hands. That the Aiginetan raiders continued even after Naxos and that Aigina stood aloof from the Second Confederacy, indicates that the Aiginetans were confident, apparently with reason, in their ability to resist Athenian subjection. At the same time, the diminished role of ληστεία from Aigina also implies that the lack of Spartan naval support was significant. No participation by Spartan ships detracted from the intensity of the raids, and the absence of Spartan forces may have forced the Aiginetans into a more defensive posture. It is tempting to carry this line of thought a little further by noting the absence of ληστεία from Xenophon’s account of the factors leading to Athenian adherence to the Common Peace of 371. Does that represent a next stage in the diminution of the effectiveness of ληστεία? Yet the hurriedness of Xenophon’s narrative makes for reluctance to press the argument.

Nevertheless, Aiginetan ληστεία was serious enough for the Athenians to make at least one more attempt to seize the island.
Chabrias, perhaps in the afterglow of Naxos, was again in command, as reported in a stratagem in Polyaeus (3.11.12). In combination, the presence of Chabrias and the absence of a harmost or Spartan squadron excludes the Corinthian War as a context. Chabrias again tried to capture the town of Aigina without committing his forces to a siege, for which the Athenians presumably lacked the resources. He sailed to Aigina at night and landed a force of 300 men. The Aiginetans marched out against them. They may have feared another ambush, like the one sprung on them by the same general during SY 388/7. This time, the Aiginetans fared much better, killing many in the landing force. Chabrias, however, having diverted the main strength of the Aiginetans, made an attempt by sea on the city of Aigina itself. As it turned out, he was unsuccessful, but the Aiginetans were forced into retreat to cover the town.

Further Aiginetan ληστεία with the Athenians as victims is attested, but only by scattered data. In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle mentions as a typical vicissitude the accident of being diverted to Aigina either by a storm or through capture by λησταί (1025a25–27). In his treatment of those attempting to establish tyrannies because they squandered their own estates, Aristotle mentions an Aiginetan (whom he does not name) who had been involved in some activity (τὴν προζειν τὴν πρὸς Χάρωντα), either conspiratorial or military (cf. Ath. Pol. 18.2), in juxtaposition with the Athenian general Chares (Pol. 1306a4–6). It is uncertain whether Chares conspired with this prominent Aiginetan to overthrow the island’s anti-Athenian oligarchs, or was thwarted in an attack on Aigina by Aristotle’s Aiginetan who exploited his success for an attempt at tyranny. Nevertheless, the background to the incident seems to have been Aiginetan ληστεία. In a speech preserved in the Demosthenic corpus, which was written for Apollodoros, the abduction of one of his neighbors, Nikostratos, is described ([Dem.] 53.6). Nikostratos was pursuing runaway slaves when he was captured by a trireme, brought to Aigina, and sold as a slave. His ransom was 26 minas. The misfortune befalling Nikostratos occurred during a trierarchy of Apollodoros in which he conveyed ambassadors to Syracuse. It is dated to 368.

Chares’ long career was begun, to the best of our knowledge, with

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72) F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit (Leipzig 1893) 3.1.519; see also E. Ziebarth, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten Griechenland (Leipzig 1929) 15.
the στρατηγία in 367/6 (Xen. HG 7.2.18–23; Diod. 15.75.3). Chares' intervention on Aigina has been dated to 366, when the general brought a force to Kenchreai in order to stage a coup against the Corinthian government (Xen. HG 7.4.4)\(^\text{73}\). Continuing ληστεία, demonstrated by the Nikostratos incident, and the presence of Chares in the Saronic Gulf make this an attractive conjunction. One's belief in it will depend on a judgment of the probability that two similar coups against Corinth and Aigina, albeit unsuccessful, were mounted in such close succession.

Chares remained active as a commander until 324 (Plut. Mor. 848E), so that there are several other contexts in which hostility between Athens and Aigina could have motivated his intervention on Aigina. The whole period saw much activity by ληστεία (e.g., Isoc. 4.115; Dem. 7.14–15). The Aiginetans could have preyed on the Athenians during the period (366–64) when Epaminondas threatened Athenian maritime interests\(^\text{74}\). Another likely juncture is the raiding campaign of Alexander of Pherai in 362–61 against the Cyclades (Diod. 15.95.1–3; Dem. 50.4–5; cf. Xen. HG 6.4.35), especially when his duplication of Teleutias' attack on the Peiraieus is remembered (Polyaen. 6.2). During the fighting against Alexander, Chares replaced Leosthenes, but, to believe Diodorus, he immediately sailed to Corcyra (15.95.3; cf. Aen. Tact. 11.13–15). Also, raids in cooperation with the rebels during the Social War of the early 350's would not be impossible (Diod. 16.7.3–4, 21–22.2)\(^\text{75}\). A determination is difficult, because all the actions prejudicial to Athenian interests at sea in the 360's and 350's were interconnected.

Even later dates for Chares' intervention cannot be excluded. Demades echoed Perikles in demanding the removal of Aigina, the eyesore of the Peiraieus, in what must have been a similar context (Athen. 99d; cf. Plut. Dem. 1.2)\(^\text{76}\). Demades was associated with Athenian sailors (note his father's status: Suda s.v. Δημάδης [415


\(^{75}\) See, most recently, S. Hornblower, Mausolus (Oxford 1982) 200–18.

Aigina and the Naval Strategy

Adler]; Sex. Emp. Adv. Math. 2.16; Polyeuktos fr. 1 [Sauppe]), and his Periklean echoes are deliberate. Born around 380, his political prominence was achieved no earlier than the late 340’s (IG II², 1623.188–89; Plut. Dem. 8.7, cf. 13.3). His advice against Aigina may well belong to an early militaristic/nationalist phase of his career⁷⁷). If our hypothetical attempt on Aigina by Chares occurred after 350, it could be the implementation of Demades’ advice. It is conceivable that Aiginetans acted against the Athenians in support of Philip during 340/39, for example, when Philip was intercepting grain freighters in the Hellespont (Philochoros FGrHist 328 F 162; Theopompos FGrHist 115 F 292; cf. Dem. 4.34). Nonetheless, by the 320’s Aigina could be considered a place of refuge for anti-Macedonian statesmen like Demosthenes and Hypereides (Plut. Dem. 26.5, 27.6, 28.4; Mor. 846E⁷⁸).

Conclusion

Aigina was an excellent base for military operations of two types. As a fleet base, it could be used both for launching raids around the Peloponnesos and for a staging point in operations in the Aegae. The Spartans appreciated this fact when they called for Aiginetan autonomy before and during the Archidamian War. In their turn, the Athenians took precautions for their exclusive use of the island by expelling the inhabitants. The record of Spartan operations from Aigina indicates that the island was more valuable to Sparta. After Leotychidas in 479, certain users of the island as a fleet base are Teleutias in SY 390/89, Hierax in 389/8, Antalkidas in 388/7, and Pollis in 376/5, while possible cases are Ekdikos in 391/0 and Pollis with the West Greek reinforcements in 388/7. A special case is the surveillance exercised over Attica in the period between the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars by the Spartan harmost on Aigina. Spartan squadrons on Aigina under Gorgopas and Teleutias (388–87) fought several conventional engagements to protect Aigina from Athenian aggression, provoked by ληπτεία.

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⁷⁸) Compare the Aiginetan submission to Dareios in 491 in order to carry on hostilities against Athens; but they joined the Hellenic League when Xerxes marched on Greece. Similarly, we find them resisting Macedonian hegemony.

⁴ Rhein. Mus. f. Philol. 133/1
The second employment of the island was as a base for ἄροι. As raiders of the Athenians, 4th-century Aiginetans were reviving a mode of activity used against Athens by their late 6th- and early 5th-century forebears. These raids were most damaging during the Corinthian War, when they were supervised by Spartan harmosts and seconded by a Spartan covering squadron. So long as the Spartans themselves were ready to commit resources to a war at sea, Aiginetan hatred of the Athenians made them ready (and with their tradition of seafaring, valuable) tools of Spartan policy. Aigina stood as a permanent maritime Dekeleia poised off the Attic coast, the length of which made a defense of specific points ineffective. Stationing guard ships up and down the coast would have been expensive, even if such ships could have avoided being picked off by Spartan triremes. As merchant vessels reached Sounion, there was still a considerable voyage ahead, during which they could be taken by Aiginetan privateers. The Athenians had two techniques with which to counter. They could raid Aigina in force, as Eunomos tried, and as Chabrias pretended to try. But this would hardly offset their losses. Alternatively, they could subjugate Aigina by a land and sea attack. In the early 4th century, Athens lacked the military strength to accomplish this Periklean goal while sustaining operations against Sparta elsewhere. Furthermore, the mere existence of even a few Spartan ships on Aigina necessitated that ships be held in reserve in the Peiraieus (perhaps as many as 20: Xen. HG 5.1.20). That reservation withheld men and ships from other designs. The presence of Spartan covering ships raised the level of Athenian forces needed for engagement on Aigina to a still higher level. It is not coincidental that the Athenians repeatedly ravaged Lakonia during the Peloponnesian War, when Aigina lay in their hands, and, during the Corinthian War, they raided Lakonia only when Aigina had not entered the conflict.

One is left then with a new appreciation of the importance for Athenian power of the subjection and disarming of Aigina in the 450’s. Concomitantly, the restoration of an independent Aigina raised the cost of Athenian expansionism, since any attempt to recreate the 5th-century ἄροι would be accompanied by higher prices for imported goods (especially grain) and by harsher conditions for the commercial sector of the Athenian economy. These new costs of imperialism provided an impetus for peace in 387 and 374. The success of privateering sponsored by Sparta supported a defensive stance by the main Spartan squadron in the Aegean,
which sought to impede Athenian operations and succor pro-Spartans rather than to provoke a decisive encounter. Spartan forces operating from Aigina shared in the profits of the raids, which could be substantial as so well illustrated by Teleutias' attack on the Peiraiaeus. Profits from \( \lambda \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \alpha \) cross-subsidized the Spartan force on the island. Even Antalkidas, with a force distinctly superior to his Athenian opponents, was content to intercept grain ships and to hold himself ready to counter an Athenian attack. Autarkic Sparta needed only to deny the passage of the seas (both around Attica and in the Straits) to Athens; it need not have ensured safe passage for itself. At length the ineptitude of the navarch Pollis and the impatience of Sparta's allies dissipated this advantage.

Nonetheless, the \( \lambda \iota \sigma \tau \alpha i \) from Aigina continued to take their toll on Attica. The Aiginetans, unlike other Spartan allies, did not become reconciled to the Athenians after the rapprochement between Athens and Sparta in 370. It was the activity of Sparta or any other strong power as a counterpoise to Athens that commanded Aiginetan allegiance rather than some more fundamental congruence of attitudes.

The major historians of the long series of conflicts between Sparta and Athens, Thucydides and Xenophon, appreciated the roles of Aigina with varying acuity. Thucydides' emphasis on large-scale amphibious naval warfare fit the political and military situation of the Peloponnesian War, especially before the defeat of the Sicilian Expedition. Xenophon continues this same focus, but far less justifiably, because the record of military activity in the early 4th century indicates the increased importance of \( \lambda \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \alpha \) and with it privateering\(^{79}\).

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