During the past decades, the First Isthmian has attracted particular attention among Pindar’s odes, but its ending continues to perplex interpreters. There is general agreement that this depiction of a miser foolishly unconcerned with posthumous renown is intended to provide a negative foil heightening by contrast the praise of the victorious Herodotus; and the specific link between these lines and an earlier passage in which athletic endeavor was favorably contrasted with the naked daily effort to ward off hunger (40–51) has been recognized. But what exactly the miser is supposed to be doing when he ἄλλοις ἐμπίπτων γελᾶ is far from clear.

Until recently, the communis opinio was that the miser is insulting and deriding people who differ from him – whether because they are poor or because they are extravagant is of small

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3) So most recently Privitera, Lettura (op. cit. [n. 2], 131 n. 56: “Dubbio il senso…” and Istmiche (op. cit. [n. 2], 155: “significato dubbio”).

4) Cf. Thummer, op. cit. (n. 2), 2.35; Privitera, Istmiche, op. cit. (n. 2), 154–55; and my op. cit. (n. 2).


6) So the scholia ad I. 1.96a (cited, here and hereafter, from A. B. Drach-
import. This interpretation was arrived at either by taking ἐμπίπτων to denote verbal abuse\(^7\), or by taking γελάω to refer to mocking, scornful laughter\(^8\), or both\(^9\). For those who sought covert historical references throughout Pindar’s poems, the miser, so understood, could easily be seen as an allusion to real critics of Herodotus’ athletic endeavors and expenses among the victor’s fellow-citizens\(^10\).

This supposed historical reference was sharply, and justifiably, criticized by Bundy\(^11\), and finds few supporters nowadays. But the distortions of the Greek language which the traditional interpretation of the sentence entails have proven harder to avoid. For all the evidence shows that ἐμπίπτω with a personal subject and a personal object can only mean to attack someone physically in the serious attempt to inflict violent harm upon him\(^12\), and that


7) So Dissen, loc. cit. ([n. 5] “Qui alter sentientes calumnians verbisque invidiosis laedens ridet...”), and Pindari carmina quae supersunt cum deperditorum fragmentis selectis ex recensione Boeckhii (Gotha and Erfurt 1830), 2.534 (“aliam autem alter sentimentibus insultans ridet, sibi placet insultans”), followed e.g. by Rumpel, op. cit. (n. 6), s.v. ἄλλος, γελάω, ἐμπίπτω; J. Sandys, ed., The Odes of Pindar. Including the Principal Fragments\(^3\) (Cambridge, Mass.–London 1968), 445 (“and rejoiceth in oppressing others”); and Slater, op. cit. (n. 5), s.v. ἐμπίπτω (“attack [with words]”).

8) So Bury, loc. cit. ([n. 6] “…and laughs when he lights on men of another sort… When the hoarder falls in with ‘other men’ [far other indeed than he] he laughs at the thought of their folly and his own superior wisdom”), followed by L. F. Farnell, ed., The Works of Pindar (London 1930), 2.341; and O. Werner, ed., Pindar: Siegesgesänge und Fragmente (Munich [1967]), 299 (“Und trifft er andre, lacht…”).

9) So the scholia ad loc. (Ὑμημβραίων καταγελά), followed e.g. by F. Mezger, Pindars Siegeslieder (Leipzig 1880), 311 (“wer über andere…herfallend sie [als Thoren] verlacht”), and A. Puech, ed., Pindare. 4: Isthmiques et Fragments\(^5\) (Paris 1952), 23 (“et ne sait que rire des autres et les insulter…”).

10) So especially Dissen, loc. cit. (n. 5); Mezger, op. cit. (n. 9), 307, 311; Bury, op. cit. (n. 6), 6–7; Wilamowitz, loc. cit. (n. 6); and Farnell, loc. cit. (n. 8).

11) Bundy, op. cit. (n. 2), 84–85.

12) So in Pindar (a wrestler, P. 8.81; Achilles, N. 6.51); and cf. Homer II. 16.81, 276; Od. 24.526; Aesch. Ag. 1468; Eur. Rh. 127, 409; Xen. Hipparch. 8.25, Cyn. 6.23; Cass. Dio 8.13.3; and cf. the closely related Eur. Phoen. 1146, 1154 (πύλαιοι). In Polybius 1.21.11, ἐμπίπτειν τοῖς πολεμοίς is usually taken to mean simply “ran into the enemy”: yet clearly an attack is described, even if an unplanned one, and its losses are enumerated. This general point is made by Bury, loc. cit. (n. 6), followed by Farnell, loc. cit. (n. 8); by Thummer, op. cit. (n. 2), 34; and by Privitera, Istmiche op. cit. (n. 2), 155.
γελάω with a personal dative object can only mean to smile benevolently upon someone\(^ {13}\). If, as seems natural, both ἐμπίπτων and γελά refer, by ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, to ἄλλοις, we must seemingly understand the miser to be smiling kindly upon the same people he is attempting violently to injure; and even if we separate γελά from ἄλλοις, we find him smiling kindly while he physically assaults people. The image is so patently absurd in itself and so alien to the context that it is hardly surprising that most scholars, in order to avoid it, have preferred to posit unattested and anomalous meanings for two of the three words in this phrase, nor that so many other scholars have felt obliged to emend the text to bring its language into better agreement with their conception\(^ {14}\).

There have apparently been only four attempts to reconsider this passage radically without resorting to such surgery; none has been successful.

(1) Norwood suggests that “we should take ἄλλοις as governed by γελά and with ἐμπίπτων understand πλοῦτῳ from πλοῦτον in the preceding verse: the miser defeo incubat auro. An excellent sense thus emerges: ‘he hoards his wealth secreted at home and laughs at others while he embraces it’\(^ {15}\)”. Unfortunately, this sense must be purchased at the cost of a thoroughly implausible word-order\(^ {16}\): only as a very last resort might we be inclined to divorce ἄλλοις from the immediately neighboring ἐμπίπτων, a word which can easily govern the dative.

(2) Bundy takes the image to refer to “the mockery [scil. by the rich] of those in evil circumstances”\(^ {17}\): “Herodotos may not and will not keep his wealth to himself, taking pleasure in the lot of others less fortunate than himself, but will labor and spend to achieve a fame on men’s lips that will live after him”\(^ {18}\). But this interpretation entirely ignores ἐμπίπτων\(^ {19}\), and, as we have seen, there is no evidence that γελάω with the datīvus personae can mean to mock.

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13) Cf. Hes. Op. 371; Philemon 110 Kock; Coll. Alex. p. 83 col. 3 line 1 Powell; for other constructions with a personal object, cf. notes 28–30 below. This point is made by Privitera, Isthmiche, op. cit. (n.2), 155.
14) The various conjectures are conveniently collected in Douglas E. Gerber, Emendations in Pindar 1513–1972 (Amsterdam 1976), 130.
16) So too Thummer, op. cit. (n.2), 35.
17) Bundy, op. cit. (n.2), 88.
18) Ibid. 90.
19) So too Thummer, loc. cit.
(3) Thummer paraphrases, “Wer im Kampfe mit anderen lacht, d.h. wer nicht ernsthaft kämpft, der wird es nie zu großem Ruhme bringen”20). But it is surely misguided to identify the miser himself as an athlete, even if only as a jovial one: the fact that the miser keeps all his wealth hidden indoors (67) ought to mean that he does not engage at all in expensive public activities such as athletic competition; if not only Herodotus, but also the miser is an athlete, the contrast in these closing lines becomes blurred. Furthermore, ἄλλοιωσι is on this interpretation pointless: surely a less colorless word could have been found to denote the jovial miserly athlete’s rivals. And is there any evidence that the ancients would have condemned a smiling athlete as unserious?

(4) Finally, Privitera tentatively suggests that ἄλλοιωσι refers to other activities favored by the miser but indicated by ἐμπίπτεται as being inferior to Herodotus’ athletic endeavors; he translates, “e ad altro sorride e si dedica”21), and paraphrases, “l’avaro tiene la ricchezza in casa e guarda con simpatia ad altre attività – diverse da quelle coltivate da Erodoto, che comportano spese e fatiche – alle quali si dedica senza riflettere che sono inferiori”22). But there is no evidence that ἐμπίπτεται ever has the meaning of dedicating oneself to some activity, nor that, despite its root notion of falling, the Greeks ever used it as equivalent to our “descend to, stoop to”. And it seems quite implausible in the immediate context that ἄλλοιωσι might mean, not “other than the miser”, but instead “other than Herodotus”.

Obviously, Pindar has chosen (or been compelled by the proximity of the ode’s end) to express himself so compactly and elliptically that, once his exact meaning has been problematized sufficiently, it is conceivable that no consensus about it might ever again be reached. If, nevertheless, a new suggestion is offered here, it is because there remains at least one, hitherto apparently unproposed, interpretation, which has the merit of being based upon well-attested meanings of each of the words in this passage.

It seems that the source of the interpreters’ difficulties lies in the physical violence ineluctably denoted by ἐμπίπτεται in this construction: neither attempting to minimize or rationalize that violence entailed by ἐμπίπτεται nor attempting to reconstrue it as arising from γελά has proven to be a successful strategy for dealing

20) Ibid.
21) Privitera, Istmiche, op. cit. (n. 2), 25.
22) Ibid., 155.
with this sentence. In fact, it is not at all necessary for Pindar’s logic that the miser assault or mock anyone, physically or verbally, or indeed that he perform any other action with regard to other people: he need only believe that his hidden wealth is enough to keep him out of harm’s way for Pindar to be able to make the point that against the greatest harms, death and the possible lack of posthumous fame, it offers no protection. We will not be able to get such a meaning out of ἐμπίπτων as the interpreters have construed it: but is this the only way to understand the word in this passage?

ἐμπίπτω, as noted above, always denotes a violent physical assault when used with a personal subject and a dativus personae. But it also occurs with a personal subject and a dativus rei in the meaning “to encounter, to be exposed to [especially a misfortune]”. Pindar himself provides one parallel in an athletic metaphor, αἴθων πρὶν ἄλω γυνώ ἐμπεσεῖν (N. 7.73)23); another is provided by Polybius, Πυθνεῖς ἐνέπεσον παραλόγῳ συμφορῇ (33.6.1). Such phrases can be understood as a variant of the very common usage of ἐμπίπτω with a personal subject and a prepositional phrase (usually εἰς24), sometimes ἐπὶ25 or ἐν26) to mean “to fall into, to encounter [usually some misfortune]”.

To understand ἐμπίπτων in this way requires that we recognize in ἄλοιποι not the masculine, but the neuter dative plural27). If we turn back to the other problematic verb in this passage, we recall that γελάω with a dativus personae means “to smile benevo-

23) Cf. Slater, op. cit. (n.5), s.v. ἐμπίπτω c (“light upon, i.e. be exposed to”).
24) Soph. El. 215 (ἄτας); Antiphon 1.20 (νόσσον), 2.2.3 (ὕποψιας); Plato Theaet. 174C (φρεάτα τε καὶ πάσαν ἄροιαν); Xen. Hell. 7.5.6 (ἀθυμίαν), Mem. 3.12.2 (τὰς ἀνάγκας τὰς ἀλγεινοτάτας); Antiphanes 235.3 Kock (ἐρωταί); Menander Aspis 401–2 (τοσοῦτον . . . πάθος), Samia 220 (τοιαύτην . . . ταφοχήν).
25) Hdt. 7.88 (σύμφορῇ).
26) Plato Hipp. maj. 298C (τῇ αὐτῇ . . . ἀπορία), Euthyd. 292E (ταύτη τῇ ἀπορίᾳ).
27) As far as I know, this has only been suggested twice: by Tyrrell apud Bury, loc. cit. (“Mr. Tyrrell suggests that ἄλοιποι might be taken as neuter, κτήμασι being supplied from πλοῦτων; then the meaning would be ‘as he pounces on more’; cf. δς ἐν κτήμασι πιπτεῖς, Soph. Ant. 782”), and by Privitera, loc. cit. (n.21). But the former suggestion is rendered implausible (1) by the difficulty of supplying the required κτήμασι and (2) by the fact that the resulting meaning would have to be the nonsensical “as he attacks more” (the Sophocles passage means “who makes havoc of wealth,” cf. R. Jebb, Sophocles. The Plays and Fragments. III: The Antigone [Amsterdam 1962], ad loc.). The latter suggestion is criticized above.
lently upon someone”; whenever the verb means “to laugh at, ridicule someone” it always takes either ἐπὶ with a dativus personae\(^{28}\), or (rarely) ἐἰς\(^{29}\) or an accusativus personae\(^{30}\). But there are a number of parallels for γελάω with a dativus rei in the meaning “to laugh at, take lightly [usually misfortunes]”\(^{31}\):


961–62: οἱ δ' οὖν γελώντων κατ' ἀριθμόντων κακοῖς / τοῖς τοῦδε.

1042–43: κακοῖς / γελῶν.


IT 276: ἐγέλασαν εὐχαῖς.


Eq. 696: ἐγέλασα πυλοκυμίαις.

Epicurus Frg. 600 Usener (= Plut. Mor. 1088B): γελάν ἔντυσα ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς τοῦ περί τὸ σῶμα νοσήματος πολλάκις κάμνοντα τὸν σοφόν.

Plut. Mor. 169D: τὸν ἄθεον γελώντα μὲν μανικὸν καὶ Σαρδά- νον γέλωτα τοῖς ποιουμένοις.

Both ἐμπίπτων and γελᾶ will be able to have meanings entirely appropriate to this context if we succeed in identifying ἄλος as a neuter plural denoting misfortunes. But can ἄλος mean not only “other”, but also “other than what is good or expected, i.e. bad”? The euphemistic usage of ἐτερος is fairly common\(^{32}\) – Pindar himself provides two examples (P. 3.34, Ν. 8.3\(^{33}\)) – and the fact, recognized by both ancient and modern scholars\(^{34}\), that ἄλος is

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28) Homer, Il. 2.270; 23.784; Od. 20.358, 374; 21.376; Xen. Oecon. 2.9, Symp. 2.17, 23.
29) Soph. Aj. 79.
30) Theocr. 20.1, 15 (cf. A. S. F. Gow, ed., Theocritus [Cambridge 1965], 2.365 ad loc.).
31) There is also at least one passage in which ἐμπίπτων, with this meaning, takes ἐπὶ: Soph. El. 879–80.
32) Cf. LSJ s.v. ἐτερος III.2, V.3.
33) Cf. Rumpel, op. cit. (n.6), s.v. ἐτερος; Slater, op. cit. (n.5), s.v. ἐτερος c (“as euphemism, bad”). The Schol. ad P. 3.62a gloss δαίμων δ' ἐτερος as ὁ κακοποιος, ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἁγαθόν.
34) Schol. A ad II. 1.120, and cf. Schol. A and T ad II. 9.313, Schol. A ad II. 9.473; Eustath. 1573.48 ff. ad Od. 7.124; Casaubon on Strabo 1.2.5 (cited from Strabonis Rerum Geographicarum libri XVII [Amsterdam 1707], 1.33); Gow on Theocr. 7.36 (op. cit. [n.30], 2.140); and idem and D. L. Page, ed., The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams (Cambridge 1965), 2.77 ad 550.
often found in passages in which, from a strictly grammatical point of view, only ἐτερος would have been correct, might we suggest the possibility of a similar usage of ἄλλος. What is more, the euphemistic usage of the adverb ἄλλος = ματαιως is well established\(^{35}\), and there are several passages in which various forms of the adverb seem to be synonymous with κακῶς\(^{36}\). With regard to the adjective, such an euphemistic usage seems to be less well recognized\(^{37}\), yet there are in fact at least four certain examples of it\(^{38}\):

Hes. Op. 344: εἰ γάρ τοι καὶ χρήμα ἔγχωρισον ἄλλο γένηται\(^{39}\).
Demosth. 21.218: ἄλλου τινὸς ἕττησθαι.
Xen. Eph. 1.10.10: εἰ δὲ ἄλλο συμβαίνῃ\(^{40}\).
Plut. Mor. 187D: ἄν ἄλλο τι γνώση.

My suggestion is that ἄλλοσιν in I. 1.68 be taken as a fifth example of this euphemistic usage, and that the sentence as a whole be translated, “But if someone administers hidden wealth indoors and, if he encounters misfortune, laughs at it, then he does not consider that he will pay his soul to Hades without fame.” That is, the miser feels adequately protected against life’s unforeseen circumstances by the wealth he has hoarded; he thinks that he can laugh at calamities that would destroy other men, for he can always retire to the riches he has accumulated and reserved for his private use. But there is one anthropological universal he thereby

\(^{35}\) Cf. Etym. Mag. and Hesych. s.v. ἄλλος, LSJ s.v. ἄλλος II.3.
\(^{37}\) Thus, LSJ s.v. ἄλλος III.4 cite only two passages, Demosth. 21.218 and Plut. Mor. 187D. I do not know of a systematic study of this phenomenon.
\(^{38}\) There are also several uncertain examples. Stephanus, Thesaurus 1.1542 s.v. ἄλλος adds Hom. II. 10.511 and Chariton 4.4 (comparing Thuc. 7.64), but both of these passages can also be interpreted non-euphemistically.


\(^{40}\) Cf. P. H. Peerlkamp, ed., Xenophontis Ephesii de Anthia et Habrocome Ephesiacorum libri V (Harlem 1818), ad loc. The most recent editor of the text, A. D. Papanikolaou (Leipzig 1973), accepts Tresling’s conjectural (τι) after ἄλλο; this seems possible, but hardly necessary, and is difficult to justify palaeographically.
overlooks: the misfortune of misfortunes, death, which will come to him just as it does to everyone else and will demand from him the same payment of his soul (ψυχὴν τελέων) which it requires from all men. When that happens, the miser’s hidden wealth will be of no avail, for it will not have purchased for him posthumous fame, the only bulwark of mortals against their mortality. On the other hand, Herodotus and his father, who have devoted their wealth and efforts (δαπάνας τε καὶ πόνος 42) to the pursuit of publicly recognized excellence, have earned the largest profit (κέρδος ὑψιστον 51), namely renown at home and abroad. The miser is good at counting; but he did not count on this.

Innsbruck

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EIN NEUES ARGUMENT FÜR DIE ECHTHEIT DES LYSIANISCHEN EROTIKOS

Die vielfach diskutierte Frage, ob die erotische Werberede des Lysias in Platons Phaidros 1) fingiert oder ob sie ein echter Text des berühmten Redners sei, ist vor einigen Jahren von S. Döpp 2) noch
