ELEAZAR'S SECOND SPEECH ON MASADA
AND ITS LITERARY PRECEDENTS

Much has been written on Josephus' account of the events at Masada in 73 A.D. and of Eleazar b. Jair's two speeches there, when he exhorted his men to commit suicide. The purpose of this paper is not, however, to investigate the historical background of Eleazar's actions, nor the Jewish framework of Josephus' account - but rather to attempt to review some of Josephus' literary precedents in Greek literature, which seem to parallel Eleazar's second exhortation for suicide. Josephus brings two speeches which he ascribes to him: the first (B. J., vii. 323-336) is probably a set rhetorical speech on the theme of the God-determined course of the war against the Romans while the second (B. J., vii. 341-388) has been called a deuterosis and mishna of the first although, in actual fact, its main theme is the immortality of the soul and the preference of death over life.

It should be stated here that both speeches are long recognised as fictitious, artificial creations, being mainly literary reconstructions of what would have been delivered on Masada. The mass-suicide which immediately followed Eleazar's closing words (B. J., vii. 389) put an end to the testimony of the vast majority of potential witnesses to any speech which Eleazar would have actually made in circumstances such as these. Josephus, however, anti-

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4) Bauernfeind-Michel, op. cit. (above, n. 1), 267 and n. 3.
icipates this criticism and paints us the vignette of two females, who hid with some children while the others were intent on their immolation (vii. 399–400). These, it would seem, are Josephus' literary testimonies for his version of the account. His 'transcription' of Eleazar's speeches is, however, neither the words which he would have said in Eleazar's place⁵, nor a Thucydidean reconstruction of what Eleazar was likely to have said, for Josephus, as we shall see, falls back on Hellenistic stock-themes in Eleazar's deuterosis.

Eleazar's two speeches are basically different as though offering us alternative reasons for committing suicide. The theme of the first speech is the preservation of personal freedom (B. J., vii. 323–27, 329) through death (335–336); while the deuterosis is more interested in assuaging the fear of death (349–50) by various philosophical arguments. The arguments used in the first speech are based on the God-given privilege to die nobly and as free men (325), on the divine will to destroy the Jewish race (327–29) and to wreck vengeance on those at Masada for their misdeeds (329–333) with the conclusion that it were better to pay the penalty to God than to the Romans and thus to preserve freedom (333–336). It is unlikely that Eleazar would have employed some of these points⁶ though others may have Jewish precedents⁷. The deuterosis, which is the main topic of this paper, is, however, even more blatantly fictitious. Its framework is ostensibly a parakeleusis (cf. B. J., vii. 340, 389), a rhetorical exhortation, which is, in this case, aimed at instilling the love and fearlessness of death. It is this aspect which is of particular interest to those acquainted with the stock rhetorical arguments employed on this theme in Hellenistic times. The deuterosis is divided into four main sections: –

1) The immortality of the soul and its freedom (341–48);
2) The repose of sleep as reason for not fearing death (349–350);

⁵ Cf. H. St.-J. Thackeray, Josephus, III (Loeb, 1938), 601 n. b; Ladouceur, op. cit. (above, n. 2), 251.
⁶ Cf., e.g., B. J., vii. 332–33 which reflects Josephus' appraisal of the Sicarii (B. J., vii. 254 ff.); Nikiprowetzky, op. cit. (above, n. 1), 471.
⁷ Bauernfeind-Michel, op. cit. (above, n. 1), 268 and n.; Nikiprowetzky, op. cit. (above, n. 1), 470 ff. (on the Jewish background of the episode); Lindner, op. cit. (above, n. 2), 33 n. 1; Ladouceur, op. cit. (above, n. 2), 245–49 (on Josephus' religious terminology here). In general see: Thackeray, op. cit. (above, n. 5), 599 n. b; D. A. Schlatter, Die Theologie des Judentums, Gütersloh, 1932, 214–24, 252–63; P. Volz, Die Eschatologie der jüdischen Gemeinde, Tübingen, 1934, 264–70; Hankoff, op. cit. (above, n. 1), 938 ff.
3) The example of the Indians and their fearlessness of death (351–57);
4) The list of the horrors of war as proof that life is not worth living (358–88).

It is almost certain that the arguments used here are Hellenic in character and spirit. It is true that Josephus makes Eleazar describe the arguments brought here as if they were part of traditional divine precepts (vii. 343) and as if they stemmed from the injunctions of the Law (387). Scholars have, however, noticed the discrepancy between traditional Jewish precepts and the arguments used in the deuterosis as an incentive for the mass-suicide which followed. It is true that some scholars have found parallels with Jewish wisdom literature, but W. Morel has succeeded in drawing up a complete list of parallels between the deuterosis and the Platonic dialogues, which cannot be overlooked and which has been, with reservations, accepted by other scholars.

Morel has also made a case for connecting Posidonius and other ancient writers with the deuterosis. The case for Posidonius is, however, far from strong while the philosophical tradition of the deuterosis seems, on closer scrutiny, to be more in line with later Platonistic tenets than with the authentic Plato. It is basically for these reasons that I would like to reopen the issue of the exact philosophical and literary local of Eleazar's deuterosis.


We may with good justice suspect that Josephus intentionally refers us to well known, if not hackneyed, arguments on the immortality of the soul when he prefaces the deuterosis with the words: – ἔχειρις ἐνεχείρει (scil. ὀ Ἐλεάζωρος) λόγοις περὶ ψυχῆς ἀθάνατίας (B. J., vii. 340).12

Indeed, W. Morel has already shown that the thought and even language of Eleazar's argument on the soul are drawn ulti-

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8) Lindner, op. cit. (above, n. 2), 35, 39; Thackeray, op. cit. (above, n. 5), 601 n. b; Ladouceur, op. cit. (above, n. 2), 250–52.
9) Schlatter, op. cit. (above, n. 7), 260 and n.; Volz, op. cit. (above, n. 7), 269; Nikiprowetzky, op. cit. (above, n. 1), 470 ff; Bauernfeind-Michel, op. cit. (above, n. 1), 268, 270.
11) Lindner, op. cit. (above, n. 2), 38; Ladouceur, op. cit. (above, n. 2), 251 ff.
12) “He essayed in argument (cf. LSJ, s.v. encheirein, 4) with more brilliant proofs of the soul’s immortality” (cf. Ps-Pl., Ax. 370 b and n. 19 below).
mately from various Platonic dialogues (op. cit. (above, n. 10), 108): –

Josephus emphasizes the imprisonment of the soul in the body (344–45)\(^{13}\) and her separation and freedom from all bodily ills (344, 347, 348);\(^{14}\) the soul returns to her own pure abode (344, 346)\(^{15}\) after having been weighed down by the body (346)\(^{16}\), which the soul moves on and leads and uses as an instrument of perception (345)\(^{17}\); the soul has a Godlike force, which nothing can prevent, and a single nature, incorruptible and invisible (346–347)\(^{18}\).

Most of these parallels can be found in one single Socratic argument from *Phaedo*, viz. the reply to Cebes (78–80c), rather than with a number of dialogues as suggested by Morel\(^{19}\). This may imply that Josephus (or his source) exploited a well known Platonic commonplace, rather than that he had used Plato directly, where we would, perhaps, have expected him to bring a more diversified list of Platonic references\(^{20}\).

Moreover, I hope to show that the above Platonic passages were contemporary stock-quotations on death. We then have to examine three basic points: – a) Does the stylistic theme of the *deuterosis* show any connection with contemporary Hellenistic literature? b) How and where are the above Platonic common-

\(^{13}\) Cf. Pl., *Phd.* 81 e, 82 e, 91 e (the soul bound in the body).

\(^{14}\) Cf. Pl., *Phd.* 80 d, 114 b; the separation of the body and soul (also B. J., vii. 342, 344, 347, 348) is also Platonic (*Phd.* 64 c, 80 d, 81 b).

\(^{15}\) Cf. Pl., *Phd.* 80 d, 81 a, 84 b, 114 c, *Ax.* 365 e (also parallel to B. J., vii. 349) on the soul’s abode as divine and free from pain. Schlatter’s midrashic examples overlook our linguistic parallels (op. cit. (above, n. 7), 260, 262).

\(^{16}\) Josephus’ language goes back to Pl., *Phd.* 81 c, *Phdr.* 247 b, 248 c.

\(^{17}\) Although the self-movement of the soul (cf. Pl., *Phdr.* 245 e) is not raised here, we find the body moved by the soul (also B. J., vii. 345) which is the cause of bodily change (347; cf. Pl., *Phdr.* 245 e, *Lg.* 896 a–b) and which leads the body (B. J., vii. 345) and leaves the body to corruption on its departure (347; cf. Pl., *Phd.* 80 a, d). The soul’s use of the body as an organ of perception (B. J., vii. 345) is in this context closer to Pl., *Phd.* 79 c than to Arist., *De An.* 415 b 18 (cf. Morel, op. cit. (above, n. 10), 108 n. 1).

\(^{18}\) Cf. Pl., *Phd.* 78 d–80 a (that the soul is more akin to the *monoeides* and invisible than to compounded, visible bodies liable to destruction.

\(^{19}\) Eleazar’s essay in argument (above, n. 12) has a special relationship with the three *epicheiremata* of Socrates on the soul (cf. J. Burnet, *Plato’s Phaedo*, 1911, Oxford, 68).

\(^{20}\) Josephus probably used some author who cited these *loci communes* from Plato (Ladouceur, op. cit. (above, n. 2), 247 ff.) if he did not use some *florilegium* (M. Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism*, I. 1974, Jerusalem, 48) for the construction of the *deuterosis*. 
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places used in our sources? c) Does the deuterosis contain philosophical material which could connect it not directly with Plato, but with Hellenistic redactions of Plato?

a) As noted above, Eleazar’s deuterosis is a literary exhortation designed to assuage the fear of death (τούτων ἰδὼν Ἐλεάζορος ἀποδειλώντας . . . ἀνήκε τὴν παρακέλευσόν; vii. 339–340) and encompassing suicide as its end. The theme of suicide is, in ancient sources, practically a genre on its own especially, but not solely, in Stoic literature. In Seneca, we find exhortations used to assuage the fear of death (‘timemusque ne quando moriamur’; Ep., LVIII, 23–24) in his famous discourse on the various causes for suicide. Eleazar’s reasons are that death is a release from the greatest of ills at such a time when one should not hesitate nor wait for a counsellor (καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ μεγίστων ἀπαλλαγὴν παρακάτον, δέον ὑπὲρ τούτου μήτε μελήσαι μήτε σύμβουλον ἀναμείναι; B. J., vii. 342). Amongst others, Seneca lists these same reasons for suicide at a time when one should not hesitate to take the step (‘et fortasse paulo ante quam debet faciendum est, ne cum fieri debebit facere non possis; et cum maius periculum sit male vivendi quam cito moriendi, stultus est qui non exigua temporis mercede magnae rei aleam redivit’; Ep., LVIII. 34). Like Josephus, Seneca brings these arguments after a discussion on Plato’s discourse on the soul (LVIII. 25–32) and we shall examine this point presently. Seneca also composed a consolation-piece devoted to the theme of suicide (Ep., LXXVII)21), in which he sometimes exhorts the brave to this end: ‘Saepe autem et fortiter desinendum est et non ex maximis causis; nam nec eae maxime sunt quae nos tenent’; LXXVII. 4). Here the arguments for assuaging the fear of death occupy much of our text (5–6, 10); and like Josephus, he mentions the merits of freedom and liberty gained through suicide (14–15; for with death, ‘tam prope libertas est: et servit aliquis?’ – cf. B. J., vii. 344 on eleutheria given by death).

It is true that here Seneca is not trying to exhort the literary recipient of his letter to suicide; but we do find here an exhortation for a time when his recipient may need to assuage his fears and kill himself. It is also interesting to note that Eleazar closes the deuterosis with the bid for suicide being described as: τούτων τὴν

The Platonic common-place that one must not die πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ (Phd. 62 c) was a frequent topic in later suicide pieces as suicide was permitted in certain circumstances of danger (cf. D. L., vii. 130).

The foregoing comparison may possibly suggest that the literary style of Eleazar’s exhortation and some of his themes have a general resemblance to other suicide pieces of Hellenistic times although, even if this is so, one cannot deny that Josephus adapted such motives to his particular narrative.

b) It is particularly significant that the Platonic common-places, which we examined above (p. 28), were an important part of the citations brought in Hellenistic discourses on death and suicide. Seneca’s argument for suicide (‘stultus qui doloris causa vivit’; Ep. LVIII. 36) concludes the Platonic discussion on the solubility of the sensible world and the eternity of the continuation of the soul (‘quod omnia ista quae sensibus servint, quae nos accendunt et inritant, negat Plato ex iis esse vera sint . . . Inbecilli fluvidue inter vana consistimus: ad illa mittamus animum quae aeterna sunt’; 26–27). Josephus’ description of death as making the souls πάσης σωμφορᾶς ἀπαθείς (B. j., vii. 344) carries with it the same pessimistic outlook on physical life. He likewise stresses the same Platonic description of the eternity of the soul (347–349).

The Platonic common-places of the deuterosis are, however, closer to those found in the general Hellenistic discussions of death, especially in the consolation-literature, rather than to the ancient suicide-pieces. The imprisonment of the soul in the body (B. j., vii. 344, dedemenai; 345, synedemene) is a Platonic reference raised in such consolation-pieces as Seneca’s Cons. Marc. 24.5 (‘Haec quae vides circumicieta nobis . . . vincula animorum’) and Cons. Polyb. 9.3 (‘velut ex diutino carcere emissus’). Similarly, the liberty of the soul (eleutheria) on her return to her own

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22) Summers, op. cit. (above, n. 21), 252–53; Ladouceur, op. cit. (above, n. 2), 251) but see Morel (op. cit., above, n. 10), 113) and Lindner (op. cit. (above, n. 2), 37 n. 6).
23) Cf. also the mortality (B. j., vii. 344, 345) and terrene qualities of our bodies (346) which infect the soul with our ills (344).
24) Cf. also B. j., vii. 344 with works influenced by the consolation-literature as Ps-Plu., Ax. 365a6–366a1, Cic., Tusc. I. 58 (see R. Kassel, in: Lexikon der alten Welt, s. v. Trostliteratur), which here reflect this genre’s interest in Pl., Phd. 66 b (as, e.g., Ps-Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 107 f–108 d).
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(oikeios) pure place (B. J., vii. 344) is the same Platonic reference as made in Sen., Cons. Marc. 23.1 (‘liberati leuiores ad originem suam reuolant’). According to Josephus, the soul is infected with (synanapimplasthai) the ills of the body (B. J., vii. 344) while according to Ps-Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 107 f., the mind is filled up/defiled by (anapimplasthai) mortal rubbish. Josephus’ Platonic description of the souls of the dead as free from all calamity (πάσης συμφοράς ἀπαθείς, B. J., vii. 344) may recall such consolation themes as Sen., Cons. Polyb. 9.2 (‘Nam si nullus defunctis sensus superest . . . et expers omnis mali nihil timet, nihil cupid, nihil patitur’), Cic., Fam. V. 16.4 (‘nihil mali esse in morte etc.’) and Plu., Cons. ad uxorem 611 c (that his daughter has passed to a state which is alypon). More important, perhaps, is Josephus’ Platonic description of the soul’s divinity (κοινωνία γὰρ θείω, 344; ὄσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ θεός, 346–347; θεὸς ὁ̄ δ’ ὄμιλούσαι κατὰ συγγένειαν, 349), which may recall similar discussions of the soul’s divinity in Cic., Tusc. I. 51 (divinus animus, see above n. 25), Ps-Pl., Ax. 370 b–c (οὐ γὰρ ἡθητή γε φύσις τοσόνδε ἐν ἣρατο . . . εἰ μὴ τιθεῖν ὄντως ἐννὶ πνεῦμα τῇ ὑππῆ) and Sen., Ep. CXX. 15 (‘animi ab altiore sedentis’). Likewise, is Josephus on the soul as, like God, of one incorruptible and invisible nature (ἀδόρατος μένουσα τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις ἡμίμοιρος ὄσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ θεός’ οὐδέ γὰρ ἔως ἐκτιν ἐν σώματι θεωρεῖται πρόσεις γὰρ ἀφανὸς καὶ μὴ βλεπομένη πάλιν ἀπαλλάττεται, μίαν μὲν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχουσα τὴν ἀφθαρτον, 346–347). Here, we should recall Cicero’s Platonic discussion of the soul (Tusc., I. 70–71) as invisible like God (‘Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non vides, tamen, ut deum agnosces ex operibus eius, sic . . . vim dividam mentis agnosci . . . ut deum noris, etsi eius ignores et locum et faciem, sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiam si ignores et locum et formam’) – indeed, the soul is not only invisible, but also non-compounded and simple in its nature (‘quin nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagamentatum, nihil duplex: quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni nec dividi nec discerpi nec distabi

25) Cf. B. J., vii. 344 with Ps-Pl., Ax. 365 e4, Cic., Tusc. I. 51, 58, Sen., Ep. CXX. 14 on the soul going to its own place (oikeios topos/domus sua) and gaining eleutheria from the body (corporis liberatum).

26) Also Ps-Pl., Ax. 366 a, Plu., Cons. ad. uxorem 611 e that the soul and bodily feelings are necessarily mixed up (anakekramen/symplekomene).

27) In greater detail in Cic., Tusc. I. 85 ff., 87 ff.

potest etc.\(^{29}\)). Here, we find the three main ingredients of Josephus’ account of the soul – it is like God invisible, of one nature and incorruptible\(^{30}\)). Finally, it may be added that Josephus describes the soul as making the body its organ of perception, which it moves and leads on (vii. 345–346: ποιεῖ γὰρ αὐτῆς ὁργανον ἀισθανόμενον ἀσβάτως αὐτὸ κινοῦσα καὶ θυμῆς φύσεως περαιτέρω προάγουσα ταῖς πράξεσιν – cf. 347: αἰτία δὲ σώματι γινομένη μεταβολῆς). A similar idea is common in such ancient discussions of death and the soul as Cic., *Tusc.* I. 46, 53, Ps-Pl., *Ax.* 365\(^{31}\), which were influenced by the *consolationes*.

It should then seem to be an oversimplification were we to say that our Josephus-passage is based on Plato. It is more than this – it stands in conformity with the standard selections from the Phaedo and other dialogues made in Hellenistic times in discussions on the soul and death. It was especially in the consolation-literature and works influenced by it that we find these selections and quotations taking on a fixed, almost stereotypend form\(^{32}\). Just as Josephus uses these Platonic selections in order to assuage the *fear* of death (τί δὴ δεῖ δεδεινεὶ θάνατον κτλ. – B. J., vii. 350 and see above p. 28), so the basic aim of the *consolationes* was to assuage *grief* over death by these self-same Platonic selections\(^{33}\) – while those *consolationes* devoted to suicide, and the discussions of death influenced by the *consolationes* do use these Platonic *loci communes* in order to assuage the *fear* of death\(^{34}\). It is interesting to note that Eleazar uses his arguments in order to spur on his men, who stand in tears before him (B. J., vii. 340–41), his aim being to counter their fear of death by the use of *rhetoric* (350–51) and by mocking their weak-spiritedness (357, 342). It is this type

\(^{29}\) Cf. Plu., *Cons. ad uxorem* 611 d; Ps-Pl., *Ax.* 365\(^{e}\) (above, n. 24), 366a7, Sen., *Cons. Marc.* 24.5–25.1


\(^{31}\) Cic., *Tusc.* I. 46, 53 denies sensibility to the body itself and discusses the Platonic motion of the soul (above, n. 17); Ps-Pl., *Ax.* 365\(^{e}\) describes the body as the *skenos* of the soul which suffers from the bodily evils.


\(^{34}\) See above, pp. 4–5; also Ps-Pl., *Ax.* 365 a–366 a, Cic., *Tusc.* I. 24 ff.
of rhetoric which is reflected in the consolationes and the works
influenced by them\(^{35}\). Thus we find both in the latter and in
Josephus: –
1) The contrast between the orator, who instils courage, and even
a love of death, and the subject who is abject in tears\(^{36}\);
2) The mockery of the fear of death coupled with ironic refer-
ences to the former courage of the subject\(^{37}\);
3) Rhetorical lists of the horrors of life and the description of the
beauty of the world-to-come\(^{38}\).

In Hellenistic times, this type of material had a fixed, almost
hackneyed format. It would then be not inappropriate for
Josephus to base an artificial speech on the profit of death upon the
rhetorical arguments used to console a subject of the dolor of
death, or to assuage his fears of death. It would be, in fact, entirely
natural for someone writing an artificial exhortation-to-commit-
suicide to draw on the ‘consolatio pervulgata’ (Cic., Fam. V. 16.2)
which instilled a man with the correct attitude to death, or, where
possible for him, to draw on those consolationes devoted to sui-
cide\(^{39}\). This genre was one of the more popular forms of Greek
literature in Josephus’ time, so that it would be easier to explain
the Platonic framework of Eleazar’s deuterosis in this way than by
understanding that Josephus deliberately turned to the dialogues
himself.

c) It should, however, be pointed out that this section of the
deuterosis also contains ideas which are more developments of
Plato than his true spirit. Of special interest is the argument that
‘Life, not death, is man’s misfortune’ (B. J., vii. 343). It is for this
and other reasons that Bauernfeind-Michel refer us to Jewish
sources and Lindner tries to find a compromise (see above pp. 26 f.

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35) On the rhetorical elements in the consolationes and works influenced by
them as Cic., Tusc. I and Ps-Pl., Ax., see: Kassel, op. cit. (above, n. 33), 6, 10; De
Lacy-Einarson, op. cit. (above, n. 32), 577; Souilhé, op. cit. (above, n. 32), 135.
36) Cf. B. J., vii. 339, 341 with Ps-Pl., Ax. 364 c, 365 a; Ps-Plu., Cons. ad
Apoll. 117 f, 102 a. The normal theme is to spurn tears over a third party (Plu.,
Cons. ad uxorem 608 d ff.; Cic., Fam. V. 16. 1–2, IV. 5.5 and sources in Summers,
op. cit. (above, n. 32), 244).
37) Cf. B. J., vii. 341, 305–51 with: Ps-Pl., Ax. 365 a; Sulp. in Cic., Fam. V.
16. 1–2; Sen., Cons. Polyb. 2; Ps-Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 114 f.; Cic., Tusc. I. 13–14.
38) Cf. B. J., vii. 358–88 to the ‘enumeratio malorum’ (Cic., Tusc. I. 116) in
Ps-Pl., Ax. 366 d ff., Ps-Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 107 a–b. H. Herter, Würzb. Jahrb. 1,
1975, 83 ff.
39) Sen., Ep. LXXVII; the effect of the oratio is to make the conversant
desire death (Cic., Tusc. I. 112; Epic. in D. L. X. 127; Ps-Pl., Ax. 366 b–c).
and notes), by which Josephus uses Greek arguments as part of Jewish or Zealot ‘Torainterpretation’\(^{40}\). These scholars feel that we may, in this way, also solve the problem of why Eleazar describes the arguments he here uses as ‘traditional’ and part of ‘our Laws’ (see above p. 27). We should, however, note that there is no detaching the argument on life as man’s misfortune from the Platonic description of the soul listed above. In fact, the Platonic description of the soul is the proof given for the dictum that death is better than life. Eleazar’s men could not (dramatically speaking) deny the misfortune of life, but they would still fear death, were Eleazar not to bring the Platonic proof of the soul’s immortality. It would then seem that there is no \textit{a priori} reason for detaching the dictum on the misfortune of life from the Platonic argument on the soul’s immortality without previously checking to see whether the dictum itself does not belong to the same tradition. If it can be shown that the so-called Jewish ‘chokhmah’ of life as a disaster for man (see notes 7, 9) is, in reality, Platonistic, we could then understand that Eleazar’s speech is here based on a single original argument.

That life, and not death, is a disaster for man (\textit{B. J.}, vii. 343: – \textit{συμφορά τὸ ἔτη ἔστιν ἀνδρώπωσις, οὐχὶ θάνατος}) may be an exaggeration of Plato’s stand\(^ {41}\), but it certainly was an important tenet held by Plato’s pupils at the Academy and especially by the younger Aristotle and Crantor of Soli. The traditional stand on life as a disaster was adopted by Crantor as the basis of his work, ‘\textit{On Grief}’: – \textit{Πολλοῖς γὰρ καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδρῶσαν, ὡς φησι Κράντωρ, οὐ νῦν ἄλλα πάλαι κέχλανσαι τάνθρώπινα τιμωρίαν ἡγομένοις εἰναι τὸν βίον καὶ ἄρχην τὸ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον συμφοράν τὴν μεγίστην}\(^ {42}\). It is difficult to overestimate the influence of Crantor’s “golden little book”, \textit{On Grief}, “which we have all read . . . and ought to be studied word by word” (Cic., \textit{Acad.} II. 135; cf. also \textit{D. L.} IV. 27). It was especially the \textit{consolationes} of Hellenistic times which bore its impress heavily\(^ {43}\); and here we frequently find discussions on Crantor’s

\(^{40}\) Lindner, \textit{op. cit.} (above, n. 2), 39 – criticised by Ladouceur (\textit{op. cit.} (above, n. 2), 252), who, however, is too general in his comparison with Hellenistic literature.

\(^{41}\) Cf. \textit{Pl.}, \textit{Phd.} 60 b, 65 c, \textit{Resp.} 586 b–c, \textit{Ap.} 40 c–e – but nowhere does Plato describe life as a disaster or a necessary evil as in the later Platonic tradition (Ps-Pl., \textit{Ax.} 366 a, d).

\(^{42}\) F. Kayser, \textit{De Crantore Academico}, 1841 (diss. Heidelberg), 47 fr. 12 (= Ps-Plu., Cons. \textit{ad Apoll.} 115 b); \textit{D. L.} IV.27 on Crantor’s work.

\(^{43}\) Kassel, \textit{op. cit.} (above, n. 33), 35 ff.
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philosophy of the misfortune of life coupled with the very Platonic arguments on the soul which we examined above⁴⁴).

The parallel between the deuterosis and consolatory discussions on death and the soul is thus two-fold: – we should not be grieved about death since 1) life is a misfortune and 2) the soul enjoys immortal life on its release from the prison of life. By Josephus’ time, works influenced by the consolationes frequently hold that to quit life is a change from the bad to the good: ὅστε ἵ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπαλλαγῆ τοῦ κακοῦ τινὸς ἐστὶν εἰς ἀγαθὸν μεταβολῆ (Ps-Plu., Ax. 366 a-b), much as Eleazar chides his men for fearing a release from evil: – οἶ γε καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ μεγίστον ἀπαλλαγῆ κακῶν φοβεῖσθε θάνατον (B. J., vii. 342⁴⁵). In fact, the theme of death as a cessation of the evils of life is a common one in Hellenistic literature⁴⁶).

In the final section of the deuterosis, Eleazar combines these points with that of the misfortune of life when he ironically chides his men (B. J., vii. 358): ἀλλ' εἴ γε καὶ τούς ἐναντίον ἐξ ἀφής λόγους ἐπαιδεύθηνες, ὡς ἀρα μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν συμφορὰ δ' ὁ θάνατος κ.τ.λ.)⁴⁷. That death not only is no evil but is even the greatest good (as Eleazar here implies) is raised in our parallel traditions: – “Ut doceam, si possim, non modo malum non esse, sed bonum etiam esse mortem” (Cic., Tusc. I. 16). The idea that death is better than life, or at least a good, ultimately goes back to Theognis and Sophocles⁴⁸) although the custom was often to quote the younger Aristotle on this⁴⁹) in the consolationes: – ὃς ἀρα μὴ γενέσθαι μὲν,

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⁴⁴) Cf. Cic., Cons. ap. Lact., Inst. III xvi iii fin., Tusc. I. 83; Ps-Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 104 c-e, 106 b-d, 107 a-c, 119 f, 115 f; Cic., Fam. V. 16.2, 4; Sen., Cons. Marc. 22. 1-3; Cons. Polyb. 9.2; Ps-Plu., Ax. 366 a, d.

⁴⁵) The idea goes back to Pl., Phd. 66 a-b and was probably raised in Crantor’s ‘On Grief’ (cf. Ps-Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 109 d = Kayser, op. cit. (above, n. 42), 44 ff.; Cic., Tusc. I. 115).


⁴⁷) Thackeray (op. cit. (above, n. 5), 605 n. e) compares Eur., fr. 638 (Nauck), which is sometimes quoted in discussions of death (S. E., Hyp. Pyrrh. III. 229).

⁴⁸) Thgn., 425-28 (quoted by Plu., Cons. ad auxorem 611 f, Sextus and Epicurus – above, n. 46); Soph., O. C. 1124-26 (a variation of Theognis).

⁴⁹) Cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, 1955, Oxford, 18-19 fr. 6 (Eudemus), quoted by consolation-writers (Ps-Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 115 b-e; Cic., Cons. (above, n. 44)) and the like (Cic., Tusc. I. 114).
It would then seem that Eleazar is made not only to employ arguments on the immortality of the soul and the misfortune of life which were common in Hellenistic and especially consolation literature, but also to use them in order to prove the two themes found in this somewhat stereotyped genre, viz. that one should not grieve about death, which is in reality a great good and better than life itself. Furthermore, the moot point of life as a disaster being ascribed by Eleazar to oί πάτριοι καὶ θείοι λόγοι (B. J., vii. 343), and the call to commit suicide being based on what the Laws bid us (387 -- see above pp. 27, 33 f. and notes) could well be explained by the custom in the consolationes and other ancient discussions of death to describe their themes in terms of ancient lore, passed on by our fathers. In these terms, we should not seek Jewish parallels for this theme (see above n. 7, 9), or even be perturbed by the fact that these arguments are placed in the mouth of a zealot and ascribed by him to the Laws. The reference to traditional and divine precepts (vii. 343) is part of the original Greek source. In fact, even the point that the philosophy of life as man’s misfortune is confirmed by the deeds and noble spirit of our forefathers (B. J., vii. 343) would seem to recall similar stock arguments in our ancient sources.

The foregoing evidence would seem to imply that when Josephus came to construct the deuterosis, he turned to a contemporary and popular genre, which had been used for discussions on the fortification of the soul in the event of suicide and death. It is immaterial for us here whether Josephus used some particular source directly, or used some collection or anthology (see above n. 20), for the result would be the same: he transferred from this genre the conventional quotations from Phaedo on the immortality of the soul, and with them, the post-Platonic argument on the

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50) Ross, op. cit. (above, n. 49), 19 fr. 6 (Eudemus) – cf. Cic., Tusc. I. 114–115. Aristotle probably looks back to Sophocles (above, n. 48) and later writers quote him on this.

51) Eleazar calls these logos divine and patrioi (B. J., vii. 343) – cf. a) the ancestral in: Sen., Cons. Marc. 18 fin.; Plu., Cons. ad uxor. 611 d; b) the divine in: Cic., Tusc. I. 113; Ps-Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 108 e.

52) Josephus does not bring examples here though “the custom (in consolationes) was to begin with precepts and end with examples of persons who had borne affliction bravely” (Summers, op. cit. (above, n. 21), 244 – cf., e.g., Sen., Cons. Marc. 2.1).
misfortune of life. As part of his literary debt to this genre, Josephus also received the traditional Greek argument that life is not worth living and somewhat inconsistently turned this into a traditional argument for Eleazar and the Sicarii as well\(^5\). The rhetorical element in Josephus’ sources would have formed a suitable basis, on which to build Eleazar’s speech and from which to transpose the dramatic relationship between the counsellor assuaging the fear of death by mockery and exhortation.

2) \textit{B. J.}, \textit{VII. 349–350}.

W. Morel has proposed that the second half of the \textit{deuterosis} (vii. 349–57) is connected with Posidonius and Megasthenes\(^5\). Theories based on Posidonius have in recent years gained much discredit although, in this case, Morel does refer us to the avouched testimony of Posidonius himself – the subject being Posidonius’ three modes of dreams experienced on the approach of the Gods (Cic., \textit{De Div.} I. 64). The point here is that, according to Morel, Josephus’ remarks on sleep, in which the soul “holds converse with God by right of kinship, ranges the universe and foretells many things” (\textit{B. J.}, vii. 349), should remind us of Posidonius’ first and second modes of prophetic dreams\(^5\).

It is, however, significant that the correspondence is not exact. In Josephus, the soul holds converse with God when it ranges the universe while its kinship with God is the soul’s right to converse with him (\textit{B. J.}, vii. 349): – \textit{θεῶ δ' ὄμιλούσαι (scil., αὐτή ψυχαί) κατὰ συγγένειαν πάντη μὲν ἐπιφοιτῶσι, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων προσθεσπίζουσιν.}

For Posidonius, the soul’s kinship with the Gods (‘deorum cognatio’) is its reason for prophesying ‘ipse per sese’ (viz. the first mode) and not for prophesying through converse with the Gods, ‘ipsi di cum dormientibus conloquantur’ (viz. the third mode)\(^5\).

\(^{53}\) \textit{Eccl.} 4. 1–5, 9. 4 is not the general Jewish tradition on life whereas the \textit{symphora} of life is so in Greek literature.


\(^{55}\) Cic., \textit{De Div.} I. 64: – “Sed tribus modis censet (scil. Posidonius) deorum adpulsu hominem somniare; uno quod provideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur, altero quod plenus aer sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant, tertio quod ipsi di cum dormientibus conloquantur”.

\(^{56}\) Philo’s third mode of prophetic dreams (\textit{De Som.}, II. 1. 1–2 (569)) is also thought to come from Posidonius’ “\textit{On Divination}” (Morel, \textit{loc. cit.}, above, n. 54; W. Jaeger, \textit{Aristotle}, 1967, Oxford, 162–163 n. 2).
It could be claimed that Josephus is just inexact here although the fact, that nowhere it is claimed in the Posidonius fragment that the soul wanders through the universe\(^{57}\), makes me inclined to doubt the whole of Morel's hypothesis\(^{58}\). It is possible that the idea of the souls' leaving the body to learn of the future from the Gods and then returning to it could have passed to Josephus through such a source as Clearchus' work, 'On Sleep', which we know to have been used by Josephus in Adv. Ap. I. 22\(^{59}\). In fr. 7 of 'On Sleep' (Wehrli), Clearchus discusses the egress and ingress of the soul at time of sleep when it uses the body as an inn of refuge (\textit{katagogion})\(^{60}\) while in fr. 8 (Wehrli), Clearchus related the story of Cleonymus who was released from the bonds (\textit{desmoi}) of his body and, transferred to heaven, converses with divine beings before returning to his lifeless body. Clearchus of Soli, however, does not mention the prophetic powers of the soul in his extant fragments though there is a general resemblance with Josephus' account of the soul\(^{61}\).

Of more significance, however, is the thematic context of our Josephus-passage. At the very best, it could be claimed that Josephus here used Posidonius, or Clearchus, only for a side-remark, which has nothing much to do with the main point. The aim of the whole argument in B. J., vii. 349–50 is not to prove the prophetic powers of the soul, nor even its kinship with God, but

\(^{57}\) In the Stoa, the air was full of spirits which caused dreams on earth (sources in: A. S. Pease, \textit{Ciceronis De Divinatione}, 1963, Darm., 208 n.), but Josephus' idea of sleepers' souls wandering above is not found here.

\(^{58}\) The soul's kinship with God (B. J., vii. 349) is no hall-mark of the Stoa, in as much as it goes back to Plato (\textit{Phd.}, 79 d, 82 b) and earlier.


\(^{60}\) Y. Gutman has made a good case for supposing that Josephus used this passage from Clearchus for his description of the Essenes in B. J., II. 154–55 (\textit{The Beginnings of Jewish-Hellenistic Literature}, I. 1958 (Jerusalem), 95 (Hebrew)). Since the ideas associated there with the Essenes are virtually indistinguishable from those in Eleazar's speech, it is likely that Josephus used the same source twice in the \textit{B. J.}.

\(^{61}\) It is likely that the prophetic powers were mentioned by Clearchus (cf. fr. 8 (Wehrli) fin.) since Plutarch has a story judged to come from Clearchus' source (Wehrli, \textit{op. cit.} (above, n. 59), 48) which tells of a soul that not only left its body to visit heaven (as in Clearchus), but also learned the future (\textit{Moralia}, 563 b ff.) as in Josephus. Furthermore, Clearchus' Aristotelian sources ('\textit{Eudemus}' and 'On Philosophy' – see Wehrli, \textit{op. cit.}, 47, 69) discuss similar ideas (Ross, \textit{op. cit.} (above, n. 49), 79–80 fr. 12 a) in a manner similar to Eleazar as well. See my article in: \textit{Josephus Flavius ... Collected Papers} (ed. U. Rappaport), Jerusalem, 1982, 83–90 (Hebrew).
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to prove why we should not fear death (350). The argument here is that “sleep is a convincing proof” and grants us a delightful rest (from the evils of the body): – ὑπνός δὲ τεκμηρίων ύμιν ἔστω τῶν λόγων ἐναργέστατον, ἐν ὧ δραχαὶ τοῦ σώματος αὐτάς μὴ περισσότερος ἡδόσθην μὲν ἔχουσιν ἀνάπαυσιν ἑρ' αὐτῶν γενόμεναι (B. J., vii. 349). Josephus is not explicit here on how he concludes from this argument, “Why then should we fear death who welcome the repose of sleep?” (350); but it can be tolerably understood that his argument is meant to read that death too is a repose no less delightful than sleep. It would then seem that the remark on the souls' wandering through the universe is not the main theme in this section of the speech, and its sources could well be different.

The Platonic argument which greatly influenced Hellenistic literature is that death is one of two things: –
1) A state of senselessness like a sleep without dreams;
2) A passage to a better life (Ap., 37 c–e).
It was especially in the consolationes and the works influenced by them that this theme was expanded by which three options were offered: –
Death is:
1) A state of senselessness;
2) A repose of sleep without dreams;
3) A passage to a better (immortal) life62).
Either way, it is claimed, there is no reason to fear death. Josephus does not present us with an alternative, but rather with a combination of Plato's alternative: – We should not fear death since we love the repose of sleep and are promised eternity: – τί δὴ δεῖ δεδέναι θάνατον τὴν ἐν ὑπνως γινομένην ἀνάπαυσιν ἀγαπῶντας; πῶς δ' οὐκ ἀνόητὸν ἔστιν τὴν ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἔλευθεριάν διώκοντας τῆς ἀιῶνος φθονεὶν αὐτοῖς; (B. J., vii. 350–51).
Josephus’ argument on sleep as a repose is also an addition, or second argument, which follows that on the immortal nature of the soul (vii. 341–48, 349–50), much as the Hellenistic discussions of death gave two or three arguments on the correct attitude to death (viz., the immortal nature of the soul, the senselessness and repose of sleep-like death). It would then seem that this section of the deuterosis, has, like the first section, important parallels in contemporary, popular literature which drew stock-themes from the works of Plato.

62) Ps-Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 107 d–108 e; Sen., Cons. Polyb. 9. 2–3; Cic., Tusc. I. 97–99, 112; Ps-Pl., Ax. 365 d–366 a, 370 a–d.
3) B. J., VII. 351–357.

The third section of the deuterosis brings the famous comparison of the Jews to the Indians. Morel has suggested that we refer to Strabo (XV. 57.10–11 (711)) on Megasthenes’ Indica, which, in his opinion, reached Josephus by some source as Posidonius 63). One wonders, however, whether Clearchus is not a better parallel. Both Megasthenes and Clearchus are cited explicitly by Josephus in other contexts 64) and both compared the Jews to the Indians. The advantage of Clearchus over Megasthenes is in the point that the former’s comparison of the Jews to the Indians was made in the context of his work, On Sleep, which is included by Wehrli among the fragments of Clearchus’ Seelenlehre 65). We would, therefore, wonder whether the second section of Eleazar’s deuterosis on the soul and sleep (B. J., vii. 350) is not connected with the same source as the third section on the Indians and the Jews (351–57). The advantage of such an hypothesis over that of Morel is that we do not have to assume a lost connection between the Traumlehre of Posidonius and the work of Megasthenes when we already have a source, attested elsewhere as being at least an ultimate source for Josephus, which referred both to the comparison between the Jews and the Calani-Indians and also to the subject of sleep and the soul. It is also possible — though uncertain — that Clearchus made a similar comparison of the Jews and the Calani-Indians in his work “On Education” 66).

The most interesting facet of Josephus’ description of the Indians is that as brave men they “hasten to release their souls from their bodies; and though no calamity impels nor drives them from the scene, from sheer longing (pothos) for the immortal state, they announce to their comrades that they are about to depart . . . Then, after listening to these behests, they commit their bodies to the fire, so that the soul may be parted from the

63) Morel, op. cit. (above, n. 10), 111; Gutman, op. cit. (above, n. 60), 89–90. Though Megasthenes compared the teachings of the Greeks to the Brahmans and Jews (Stern, op. cit. (above, n. 20), 46 fr. 16), Josephus probably did not even know of this (p. 45) and Morel gives no evidence for assuming that Posidonius was his source.

64) Stern, op. cit. (above, n. 20), 45 n. 5; above, p. 38 and n. 59.

65) Wehrli, op. cit. (above, n. 59), 48, frs. 6–7; Stern, op. cit. (above, n. 20), 47 ff. Thackeray (op. cit. (above, n. 5), 604 n. a) also compares our passage to Ap. I. 179 but does not note Clearchus as its source.

body in the utmost purity, and expire (teleutosin)” (B. J., vii. 352–356; tr. Thackeray). We find a similar description in Cicero of the self-immolation of Callanus himself: — “Callanus Indus, indoctus ac barbarus, in radicibus Caucasi natus, sua voluntate vivus combustus est” (Tusc. II. 52). Josephus also mentions the hymns of praise which accompany those who so destroy themselves (vii. 356) and the company of their friends (356). Similarly, Cicero continues, “Quae barbaria India vastior aut agrestior? in ea tamen gente primum ei, qui sapientes habentur, nudi aetatem agunt . . .cumque ad flammam se applicaverunt, sine gemitu aduruntur; mulieres vero in India, cum est cuius earum vir mortuus, in certamen iudiciumque veniunt quam plurimum ille dilexerit . . . quae est victrix, ea laeta prosequentibus suis una cum viro in rogum imponitur” (Tusc., V. 77–78). Of equal significance is the fact that Josephus brings his story of the Indians not only to show their courage, but also to contrast it with the reaction of Eleazar’s men to his bid for suicide (B. J., vii. 357). Likewise, Cicero brings his story in order to contrast the Indians with the Romans (“nos, si pes condoluit, si dens . . . ferre non possumus”; Tusc. II. 52 and so also V. 78). The least we can say, then, is that Josephus uses a standard example (the cremation of Indians alive) as proof of a standard argument (are the Indians braver than we?). It could be that both Cicero and Josephus here draw on Clearchus for this basic idea, which each exploited in a different context (the one in order to contrast the Indians with the Sicarii, and the other in order to contrast them with the Romans)\(^{67}\). If this is indeed the case, Clearchus’ contribution to the deuterosis as a whole could be seen in the discussion of sleep and the wandering soul (above, pp. 38–39), the comparison of the Jews to the Indians and perhaps also the description of Indian cremation. It is also possible that Clearchus is in some way responsible for some of the Platonic ideas in the first section of the deuterosis (above, n. 61). There is no evidence to show that Clearchus could have been in any way ultimately responsible for those sections of the deuterosis which discussed ideas similar to Crantor’s philosophy of the misfortune of life (above, pp. 34 f.) — although the works of Crantor and Clearchus do seem to overlap at some interesting points\(^{68}\). However,

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\(^{67}\) Cic., Tusc. II. 52 speaks of ‘Callanus’ while Josephus on Clearchus speaks of the Calani (above, n. 66).

\(^{68}\) Cf. Clearchus, fr. 4 (Wehrli) and frs. 11–12 on Crantor’s younger companion, Arcesilaus.
we cannot consider Clearchus as a sole transmitter of the ideas used to construct the passage in Josephus:

1) Clearchus seems to have raised the Platonic and Pythagorean prohibition of suicide (*Phd. 62c*)\(^{69}\);

2) Most of the parallels which we brought to the discussion on *B. J.*, vii. 341–51 do seem to point to the usages of later Hellenistic discussions of death and the soul.

It may then seem best to read into Josephus the use of a late source, which employed consolation or suicide themes and perhaps also quoted, or referred to some passages of Clearchus.

This source would have been responsible for the Platonic passages on the immortality of the soul (above, p. 28, 32 f.) and the sleep-like repose of death (above, pp. 37–39). It is, of course, possible that Josephus constructed his speech on the basis of a number of sources – but the fact that one refrain is current throughout the whole speech (viz., that one should not fear death) perhaps makes it more likely that we are here dealing with a single source, or at least not many.\(^ {70}\).

4) *B. J.*, VII. 358–388.

This passage opens with two literary themes which we mentioned above (*B. J.*, vii. 358): –

1) The suicide theme that it is permitted to kill oneself at the *ananke* and time of God (see above, p. 4–5);

2) The consolation theme that death is the greatest good and that life is a disaster (see pp. 33 f.).

The remainder is of more historic interest than philosophical, being as it is a résumé of the catastrophe of the whole war. As such, it is more in keeping with what we should have expected Eleazar to have actually said. It does, however, contain one minor literary point which could connect it with the previous sections. The list of ills described here has the dramatic function of convincing Eleazar’s men of the disaster of life itself (*B. J.*, vii. 358, 374) by listing the evils of life with the sole aim of assuaging their fear of death (378, 381) and proving that life is not worth living. The

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69) Fr. 38 fin. (Wehrli), where Clearchus reports, but does not necessarily support the Pythagorean prohibition.

70) From this aspect, it is immaterial whether Josephus used a *florilegium*, or directly consulted someone’s work (cf. above, n. 20).
list of the evils of life (‘enumeratio humanorum malorum’; Cic.,
Tusc. I. 116) is an important argument in the rhetoric of the Con­
solation-literature (see above, n. 38). It is possible that Josephus
reworked this rhetorical device into a more historically suitable
format, supplying the list of the evils of the present war and
working them into the framework of the ananke theme (B. J., vii.
358, 387).

The dramatic and rhetorical parallels between the deuterosis
and the suicide and consolation pieces of later times are too many
to be coincidental, especially when we remember that these
themes belonged to the consolatio pervulgata (Cic., Fam. V. 16.2)
and pertritum (Sen., Ep. LXIII.12) in Roman times. The rhetorical
element in this literature and its aims for assuaging the fear of
suicide, and the grief of death made it a particularly suitable vehi­
cle for set speeches of the type placed in Eleazar’s mouth by
Josephus. Furthermore, the stock Platonic common-places on the
immortality of the soul, and the repose of sleep, fit the general
scheme of discussions on death contemporary with Josephus. The
points where Eleazar does depart from the authentic Plato (the
disaster of life) are precisely those points raised in Hellenistic con­
solationes and works influenced by them. Though it cannot be
finally proven, Clearchus seems a better candidate for some sec­
tions of the deuterosis than Megasthenes and Posidonius. It is
uncertain finally whether Josephus used a single unknown source
in constructing his speech, or a number – but it is unlikely that he
used many.

If we accept some of the above suggestions, we will see that
Josephus worked his historical examples and Jewish tradition into
the framework of Greek philosophical oratory. A Greek reader of
his day would not have failed to notice the concepts, and even
language, behind this speech, but would not have been perturbed
by the discrepancy of a zealot and a Jew speaking in this way.
Such an ancient reader would have recognised a fictitious, set-
speech when he saw one.

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