XENOCRATES THE METIC*)

My purpose in this paper1) is to look at the career of Xenocrates as a whole, and to examine a number of specific problems within it, in the light of the fact that he lived as a μέτοικος in fourth-century Athens. To consider the ways in which being a metic in Athens affected Xenocrates' life, and also what the evidence for Xenocrates' life can tell us about the condition of an Athenian metic, may produce results of interest to students both of Xenocrates and of the Athenian μετοικία.

Unlike the case of Aristotle, Xenocrates' own writings will not figure prominently in the discussion, as none of the surviving fragments reveal any views which he may have held, objective or subjective, about metic-status, or anything else pertinent to this inquiry2). However, the materials for reconstructing Xenocrates' actual life, while hardly superabundant, are markedly more substantial than for that of Aristotle. Dörrie insists that 'scharf ist zu scheiden die spätere, nur aus Anekdoten bestehende Tradition von der einzigen ernst zu nehmenden Quelle'3). By the former he means the vita by Diogenes Laertius (4. 6-15) and similar material in Plutarch, Athenaeus and elsewhere, while the source 'to be taken seriously' is the relevant section of Mekler's Index Academicus4); but this latter only covers three incidents within a twenty-five-year period (347-322) – and in any case it seems best to take all the individual data on their merits.

*) Mr. C.A. Rodewald kindly read a preliminary draft of this paper, and offered many constructive suggestions for improving it. That I have adopted only some of them is not his fault.

1) cf. my Aristotle the Metic, PCPhS n. s. 21, 1975, 94-9.


3) Dörrie, op. cit. 1512.

4) S. Mekler (ed.), Academicorum Philosophorum Index Herculaneensis, Berlin, 1902 [1958], 22-3 and 38-46. (Hereafter Ind. Asad.)
I. Early life

Εὐνοκράτης Ἀγαθήνωρος Χαλκηδόνιος was born in 396/5; we infer the date from Diogenes’ statements (4. 14) that he died in his eighty-second year and that he was head of the Academy, in succession to Speusippus, for twenty-five years from 339/8 (a position invariably vacated by the incumbent’s death – in 314/3, in this instance). Diogenes also tells us (4. 6) that Xenocrates was a pupil of Plato ἐκ νέου. If this is right, the youth from Chalcedon will have come to Athens, to the Academy, by the early 370’s. And in Athens, as all aliens other than fleeting visitors were by this period required to do, he became a μετοικὸς. As such, he might have been expected to arouse the distaste of his mentor Plato, the man for whom one of the incidental vices of democratic cities was the licence they provided for μετοικὸς and ἐξένων to become assimilated to ἀστόι (Republic 563 A); but in fact Plato evidently saw no connection between the mass of immigrant artisans who constituted the majority of metics and his own circle of non-Athenian pupils and intimates6) – even though the state made no distinction whatever. At any rate, Xenocrates became one of Plato’s favourites, even to the extent of accompanying him to Sicily (ἄλλα καὶ εἰς Σικελίαν αὐτῷ συναπεδήμησεν, Diog. Laert. 4. 6). Which of Plato’s three visits this was Diogenes does not say, either here or in ch. 11, where ‘Dionysius’ threatens to kill Plato, and Xenocrates insists upon dying first. However, Plato’s first visit (388–7), to Dionysius I, took place before Xenocrates can have arrived in Athens, so this must be one of the two visits (367 and 361) to Dionysius II7). If it was the 361 visit, we know that Plato’s nephew Speusippus, another Academician, went too. If, however, it was the 367 trip,

5) As with Aristotle (PCPhS n. s. 21, 1975, 94 with n. 3), general considerations are sufficient to prove this (see Ph. Gauthier, Symbola: les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques, Nancy, 1972, 107ff.; D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, PCPhS Suppl. vol. 4, 1977, 7–10), even without the corroboration of an anecdote in which he pays μετοικὰν (section V, infra).

6) See Whitehead, op. cit. 56.

7) Dionysius II must therefore be ‘the tyrant’ Dionysius who in Timaeus’ story (Athenaeus 437 B) offers a golden crown at the Festival of Pitchers to the first man to drain a large pitcher of wine; Xenocrates wins, and puts the crown on a Herm. A temporary lapse from σώφρωσιν (section VII, infra)? Perhaps, on the contrary, a proof of it – for the σώφρων can survive such tests.
we can deduce that Xenocrates was already secure in Plato’s esteem by the time that the seventeen-year-old Aristotle arrived from Stagira to join the Academy. Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Aristotle: these three (in that order) head Diogenes’ list of Plato’s most eminent pupils; and between them was to rest the succession to their master’s position and the fortunes of his school over the next thirty-five years.

II. The succession of 348/7.

The succession of 348/7 is the most important (and difficult) problem which arises out of a consideration of Xenocrates’ life, and it needs to be set out at some length.

We can begin with a recent and (ostensibly) clear statement of the question by G.E.R. Lloyd. ‘Plato died in 347 and the question of who should succeed him as head of the Academy arose. There were three possible candidates, Aristotle, Xenocrates and Plato’s nephew Speusippus. We do not know for certain what factors influenced the outcome, nor even whether the decision was Plato’s own or one taken by the members of the Academy, but the facts themselves are clear. Speusippus was chosen, and both Aristotle and Xenocrates left Athens. Some scholars have supposed that the principal reason for the rejection of Aristotle was his doctrinal unorthodoxy. But this was evidently not a sufficient cause for his being passed over, since Speusippus too rejected the theory of Ideas in its original Platonic form. If faithfulness to the teaching of the master had been the criterion, we should have expected Xenocrates to have been made head, since he was the most conservative of Plato’s three main pupils. One of the chief reasons why the succession passed to Speusippus may have been simply to keep Plato’s property in the family, and there may also have been legal difficulties in making over the property of an Athenian citizen to a non-citizen such as Aristotle, although these were overcome when Xenocrates, another non-citizen, eventually succeeded Speusippus to become the third head of the Academy.

8) Diog. Laert. 3. 46. (In Ind. Acad. 33–4 four other names intervene before Aristotle.)
No philosopher, I confess to some relief at Dr. Lloyd’s insistence – following Jaeger – that the key to this celebrated crux is not primarily to be found in Academic doctrinal arcana; yet, in opting for what might be termed a substantive explanation, Jaeger and Lloyd scarcely do justice to the problems that it raises. For one thing, discussion, ancient and modern, of the 348/7 succession rarely avoids the intrusion of hindsight – Lloyd’s talk of Aristotle being ‘passed over’, even his ‘rejection’, reflecting a post eventum evaluation of the intellectual stature of the three protagonists (rather than ‘candidates’, which begs a question). Was Aristotle’s superiority so self-evident at the time? Doubtless, as Jaeger remarked, there were personal, factional interests at work here which we cannot hope to reconstruct; but even on a schematic level of age and seniority the facts are hardly as Lloyd represents them. Xenocrates, as Dörrie observes, had been in the Academy ‘a long time’ – ten years or more – before Aristotle, which, with his seniority in age (by twelve years) would have given him a strong claim to be regarded as the only genuine guardian of the Platonic heritage. And Speusippus was older still (born c. 410); when he entered the Academy we do not know, but it might reasonably be surmised that he was a founder-member (c. 386). By this criterion alone, therefore, the man of forty-eight (Xenocrates) had a better claim than the thirty-six-year-old (Aristotle) – and the sexagenarian (Speusippus) the best of all.

For anyone who is ready accept this age-and-seniority yardstick as the overriding factor in the 348/7 succession, the discussion need presumably go no further. But we have still to consider the relevance and significance, if any, of the legal status of the three principals: Xenocrates and Aristotle metics; Speusippus an Athenian citizen – and indeed actually a relative of Plato’s. The implication, in strict terms, of the Jaeger/Lloyd interpretation is that neither Xenocrates nor Aristotle possessed the right of ἐγκτησίας – which is probably true; so they could

11) Dörrie, op. cit. 1512.
12) ἐγκτησίας for either Xenocrates or Aristotle could only have come as the privileged concession of a right denied to ordinary μετοικεῖος, and there is no reason to suppose that either man had been granted it. (Aristotle: see PCPhS n. s. 21, 1975, 96. Xenocrates: as a payer of μετοικεῖον long after 348/7 (section V, infra), probability – if no more than that (Whitehead, op. cit. 12) – is against his having had ἐγκτησίας.)
not receive a gift of land by will\(^\text{13}\)). And Anton-Hermann Chroust has now extended this mode of argument to its logical extreme\(^\text{14}\)). Chroust maintains that under Athenian law there was simply no possibility of Aristotle's – or (I interpolate) Xenocrates' – succeeding, whereas Speusippus, no matter how unattractive personally and undistinguished intellectually, was the only possible and necessary successor: since 'Athenian law did not recognise the legal fiction of the "corporate personality"', the legal title to the grounds, buildings and contents of the Academy was the personal property of the scholarch, who made a will bequeathing it all to his intended successor in the scholarchate. (Hence the careful preservation of the wills of the early Peripatetic scholarchs Theophrastus, Strato and Lyco.) Had Plato died intestate, Speusippus, as his nearest agnatic male relative, would have succeeded anyway; by making a will Plato could contrive a few small bequests as well as ensuring (as the law required) that the bulk of his estate was kept together.

This is unacceptable. I begin with the supposed parallel between the Academy and the Lyceum/Peripatos, which tends rather to obfuscate than to illuminate our problem. That Aristotle's will\(^\text{15}\)) disposes of no land in Athens is but one of several good reasons for thinking that his "school" at first involved no ownership of land; the Λύκειον was, after all, a public gymnasium; so that when Theophrastus διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν (Diog. Laert. 5. 36) his inheritance was a mantle of authority, not a piece of real estate. This must have been effected by some other document, if not simply implicit; and it was quite separate from the transference of Aristotle's personal property to Nicomachus\(^\text{16}\)). However, through Theophrastus' friendship with Demetrius of Phalerum a κήπος and οἰκία (including the περίπατος (covered walkway) itself) were subsequently acquired – presumably at some time in the period 317–307 – and the σχολή did at last take on material shape. Some see this as a personal grant of ἐγκτησίας

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\(^{16}\) See Chroust, Aristotle, 268–9 (n. 70).
to Theophrastus\textsuperscript{17}); yet his will (Diog. Laert. 5. 51–7) disposes of no personal landed property in Attica – nor do those of his successors Strato of Lampscus (ib. 61–4) and Lyco of Troas (ib. 69–74) – and it seems rather that the school as a whole received the concession\textsuperscript{18}). Furthermore, the provisions of these three wills do not bear out Chroust’s interpretation of their function as the means of transmitting the scholarchate. Chroust states, repeatedly, that the legal title to any landed property owned by such bodies as the Academy and the Lyceum/Peripatos was vested in the person of the scholarch, who in his will would nominate and (thereby) validate his successor. But Theophrastus (Diog. Laert. 5. 52–3) leaves the κηρος, περίπατος and οἰκία to his colleagues as a whole, ‘to be their joint property, as if a holy place’ (ὅς ἀν ἱερὸν κοινὴν νεκτημένου); Strato is mentioned only third within a group of ten. Strato himself, to be sure, subsequently – and somehow – bequeathed all this ad hominem to Lyco (ib. 62), with the request that the others cooperate with him, but in Lyco’s own testament the heirs are again a (named) group, who are to choose the next scholarch from amongst themselves (ib. 70).

So Chroust’s assertion that ‘ Athenian law did not recognise the legal fiction of the “corporate personality”, whatever its validity as a juristic abstraction – and even this has been doubted\textsuperscript{19}) – is of no practical help here; far from it. The plot of land granted to (e.g.) the merchants of Citium for their temple to Aphrodit was their collective possession\textsuperscript{20}), whether or not in juristic theory Κτημεῖς were held to be one person or a group; and what Lycurgus did for them, Demetrius surely did for the Lyceum/Peripatos, viz. allowed it, as a διάσος, an or-

\textsuperscript{17) e. g. Diog. Laert. 5. 39; O. Regenbogen, Theophrastus, RE Suppl. 7, 1940, col. 1358; J. J. Keaey, Theophrastus, OCD\textsuperscript{a}; H. B. Gottschalk, Notes on the wills of the Peripatetic scholarchs, Hermes 100, 1972, 329; J. P. Lynch, Aristotle’s School: a study of a Greek educational institution, California U. P., 1972, 98.

\textsuperscript{18) F. Wehrli, Demetrius, RE suppl. 11, 1968, col. 514; D. J. Furley, Peripatetic School, OCD\textsuperscript{a}.

\textsuperscript{19) See (e. g.) Harrison, op. cit., 242 n. 1.

\textsuperscript{20) IG II\textsuperscript{a} 337 (from 333/2), mentioning an earlier grant of the same type to Egyptians for a temple to Isis; see J. Pečírka, The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions, Prague, 1966, 59–61. Cf. II\textsuperscript{a} 1283, Thracians and Bendis (Pečírka, op. cit., 122–30). In general F. Poland, Geschichte des griechischen Vereinswesens, Leipzig, 1909, 453–88.
organised corporate body\textsuperscript{21)}, to own a piece of Attic land whereon to establish its permanent physical home.

We can now return to the specific problem of the Academy; and at once we encounter an apparent contradiction. A view of its history as a whole, over nine hundred years until the formal dissolution by Justinian, clearly shows it to have been ‘eine mit Eigentum ausgestattete Genossenschaft, die rechtlich als Kultgenossenschaft, als religiöse Innung, als Thiasos zu Verehrung der Musen aufzufassen ist’\textsuperscript{22}). On the other hand, the Jaeger/Lloyd interpretation – attaining its clearest articulation in the hands of Chroust – has to view the school, land, and property as simply part of Plato’s personal \textit{κληρος}, which by the principles of \textit{ἀγγυστεία} was bound to pass to Speusippus. If both these viewpoints were valid, we would be left with a single question to determine – at what time after 348/7) was the Academy formally constituted as a \textit{θίασος} with collective ownership of its property? – and the likely answer would be at, or immediately preceding, the death of Speusippus and the succession of Xenocrates (section III, \textit{infra}). But in point of fact Chroust’s view cannot be accepted as it stands. Athenian custom, if not necessarily Athenian law, drew a distinction between a man’s inherited property (\textit{πατριός}) and what he himself added to it (\textit{ἐπικτησία}); and the latter – again, whether by law or custom – he could dispose of more freely in any will than the former\textsuperscript{23}). So there is an \textit{a priori} distinction to be made between Plato’s ancestral estate(s) and the site of the Academy, purchased in c. 386. And this brings us to the question of Plato’s will (Diog. Laert. 3. 41–3). On Chroust’s view we should expect, apart from a few minor bequests, a single

\textsuperscript{21} So constituted now, if not earlier. Organisation: note that Theophrastus’ will speaks (Diog. Laert. 5. 51) of ‘contributions’ (\textit{συμβεβλημένα}) at the disposal of a certain Hipparchus (mentioned throughout); as the Loeb editor (R. D. Hicks) comments, he is presumably the \textit{trustee} not only of T. but of the school as a whole. Funds in general: Poland, \textit{op. cit.}, 488–98.

It is only proper to note here that in recent years both Gottschalk, \textit{op. cit.}, 328–335 and (more fully) Lynch, \textit{op. cit.}, 106–34 have independently taken issue with Wilamowitz’ thesis that ‘die rechtliche Stellung der Philosophenschulen’ was that of \textit{θίασος} (Antigonos von Carystos, 1881, 263–91); but one can scarcely deny that that is what it was \textit{like} – see Gottschalk’s comments on Lynch in CR n. s. 26, 1976, 70–2.

\textsuperscript{22} P. Natorp, Akademie, RE I, 1893, col. 1134.

\textsuperscript{23} Harrison, \textit{op. cit.}, 125.
κληρονόμος – Speusippus. Not so. Plato speaks of two χωρία: one at Iphistiaedae, which is to be the property of 'the boy Adimantus', and one at Eiresiaedae 24). Since Plato states that the Eiresiaedae property was purchased from a certain Callimachus, whereas nobody is to sell (ἀποδόσθαι) or alienate (ἀλλάξασθαι) the Iphistiaedae land, it seems self-evident that the latter represents Plato's πατρίδα and the former his ἐπίκτητα 25). And the Academy site too, of course, was an ἐπίκτητον. Yet this will does not so much as mention the Academy or its site. Nor does it give anything to Speusippus, who is mentioned only as the second of seven named trustees (ἐπίτροποι). Unless the document is to be rejected as Plato's genuine last will and testament – and there is no good reason to do so – his κληρονόμος, certainly for the ancestral estate and probably for both, was Adimantus, apparently the grandson of his eldest brother 26). And as such he was the very heir which ἀναγματεία required 27).

On all counts, then, the question of the inheritance of Plato's personal κλήρος sheds no light whatever upon that of the succession to the 'scholarchate' of the Academy; and the reason why Speusippus succeeded rather than anyone else is not to be found in the Athenian laws of family and property but remains as open as ever. Or at any rate, if the simple argument from age and seniority is accepted, we still have to ask how and to what did Speusippus succeed. From rejecting the idea that the 348/7 succession was, perforce, simply a private family affair – the transference of inalienable property between a man and his next of kin – it does not necessarily and automatically follow that the only alternative for us to envisage is the whole formal machinery of election, as in 339/8 (section III, infra); for like the Lyceum/Peripatos, the formal organisation of the Academy stemmed in all probability from informal beginnings. Yet the analogies between the history and organisation of the two schools should not blind us to the differences. The wills of the early Peripatetic scholarchs, as we have seen, were carefully preserved, and even if this does not have quite the significance – in terms of the

24) This (καὶ τὸ ...) is presumably to go to Adimantus also.
26) Davies, op. cit., 332.
27) Harrison, op. cit., 144 with n. 1 (speaking of intestate succession). The criterion would be Adimantus' descent from a brother of Plato's, whether the eldest or not; Speusippus was the son of Plato's sister (Potone).
scholarchic succession – which Chroust and others would find in it, the fact that Diogenes preserves no such testaments for Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo and Crates (and only “private” ones for some of their successors) suggests that the Academy did not contrive the transference of its physical entity in precisely the same fashion. Moreover, although for the Lyceum/Peripatos the question of land-ownership did not arise until Demetrius secured ἑκτησις for it (so that no formal διασως need have existed before Aristotle’s death), the Academy was from the outset vested in land bought for the purpose by its founder Plato. During Plato’s lifetime, presumably, the land was his, and (again) no διασως had to be formally constituted to own it in common. But then what happened as Plato’s death drew near? It seems clear that another formal document, now lost, was involved, and that we must envisage one of three possible sequences of events, depending upon what it prescribed – and depending also upon whether Speusippus was nominated as ‘scholarch’ by Plato or (after Plato’s death) by his peers 28):

(a) Plato gave the Academy land to Speusippus personally, also designating him his successor;

(b) Plato gave the Academy land to Speusippus personally, without so designating him, but thereby leaving his colleagues little option but to choose him;

(c) Plato gave the Academy land to the Academicicians in common, which required them formally to constitute themselves as a διασως 29), and as such (and whether or not acting in accordance with any wishes of Plato) they proceeded to elect Speusippus as their head.

Since the formal establishment of such a διασως had certainly taken place at or before Speusippus’ own death in 339/8 (section III, infra), the choice between these three scenarios is not only impossible but not altogether crucial. But whatever the precise chronology and motivations involved 30), Plato’s suc-

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28) This is a choice usually left open (e. g. by Jaeger and Lloyd).

29) And to apply for the right (or rather privilege) of ἑκτησις? Possibly so – though in the light of the fact that one Athenian citizen had bequeathed the land and another might well succeed him, this may not have been imperative. At any rate, Dörrie’s (unsubstantiated) belief that already ‘unter Platon ... die Rechtsform der A. war die eines Kultvereins’ (Kleine Pauly I, 1964, col. 211, s. v. Akademeia), while not impossible, seems to me to raise avoidable difficulties.

cessor was Speusippus, and the Academy under Speusippus had to do without both Xenocrates and Aristotle, two of its most eminent μέτομοι.

III. The succession of 339/8.

Xenocrates and Aristotle (with Aristotle’s nephew Callisthenes) left Athens together. They went first to Assus, at the invitation of its ruler Hermias of Atarneus (himself a one-time student in the Academy); there Erastus and Coriscus had already set up what amounted to an offshoot of the Academy, and more colleagues, including Theophrastus, joined them later. This obviously implies that Xenocrates and Aristotle were on better terms with each other, in this period at least, than various anecdotes would suggest. However, when (at Theophrastus’ instigation) Aristotle left Assus in 345/4 for nearby Mytilene and thence (343/2) for Macedon, Xenocrates probably stayed with Hermias until the latter’s death in 341, returning thereafter to his native Chalcedon. And from there back to Athens – as Speusippus’ successor.

The most authoritative account of the 339/8 succession, as Merlan demonstrated, is that of Ind. Acad. 38–9, with which less specific versions are to be – and can be – reconciled: οἱ δὲ νεωσίσκοι γηρεύοντο ἔστις ἀυτῶν ἔκκλησιν παῦλον ὄντος τοῦ Αριστοτέλους, Ὀλίγον γε μετομον μὴν τῇ ἔκκλησιν ἔτη ἐν ἐκκλησίαν ἔκκλησιν. This detailed account of formal voting carries conviction, and serves to indicate that by this time the formal constitution of the Academy had come into being. Also of interest is that the four protagonists who are mentioned were all metics – a state of affairs which doubtless represented the overall composition of most of them (with Aristotle chiefly in mind). I am unconvinced by his theory that Aristotle and Xenocrates left Athens before Plato’s death.

31) Though N. B. Chroust (Aristotle, 120, cf. 159–60) would fit in, for Aristotle, a winter (348/7) in Macedon first.
32) Ind. Acad. 22–3; Strabo 13. 57.
34) Dörrie, op. cit. 1512.
the school more faithfully than the regime of the ailing Athenian septuagenarian Speusippus. The report that Speusippus, ‘already suffering from physical paralysis’, sent (sc. to Chalcedon) for Xenocrates to come and take over the scholarchate\(^{36}\) is, as Merlan pointed out\(^{37}\), not incompatible with the *Ind. Acad.* election, and suggests not merely that Xenocrates was Speusippus’ favoured candidate but that, whether for formal or practical reasons, he needed to be in Athens when the votes were cast. Had Aristotle too been informed and/or invited? Obviously we cannot say, but if the words of *Ind. Acad.* can bear a strict interpretation they seem to imply that Xenocrates’ succession only occurred because Aristotle was away from Athens and not a candidate, i.e. that Aristotle was considered (whether by Speusippus or the whole school) as an – or even the – obvious choice, but that when, deliberately or by default, Aristotle did not present himself the contest was tripartite, with Xenocrates winning only by ‘a few votes’ and both his defeated rivals leaving the school\(^{38}\).

Just as in 348/7 the precise reasons for and background to this succession remain obscure. But it was clearly a very different type of succession – not a (possibly) private arrangement between uncle and nephew but an open contest between the school’s principal luminaries. As they all happened to be metics, and unless any of them had been granted the rare privilege of ἐντοκτονεῖς, this (quite apart from the election procedure itself) is a clear terminus ante quem for the formal constitution of the Academy as a διάσωσαι – for, unlike Speusippus, none of these men could have inherited the Academy’s land personally; and it also means that legal status can have played no part in determining the outcome. According to the *Ind. Acad.*, Xenocrates was chosen for his σωφροσύνη, which showed up in sharp relief against Speusippus’ tendency towards hedonism\(^{39}\). In terms of age and seniority, Xenocrates had exactly the same advantage over

\(^{36}\) Diog. Laer. 4. 1; Dörrie, *op. cit.* 1512.


\(^{38}\) The departure now of Menedemus and Heraclides obviously calls to mind (pace Chroust) that of Xenocrates and Aristotle nine years earlier. Whether this is enough to damn either episode as a factitious borrowing from the other (cf. sections IV and VI, *infra*) I should not care to say.

\(^{39}\) *Ind. Acad.* 39–40, with parallel texts. On X.’s σωφροσύνη, section VII.
Aristotle – needless to say – as in 348/7; though the implication now is that, had Aristotle stood, this might not have told against him. Of the two other men who did seek the position we know little or nothing of Menedemus, but Heraclides ‘Ponticus’ was a thinker of considerable stature, who moreover had already (during Plato’s third visit to Sicily, in 361) filled the position of acting head of the school, and who must therefore, surely, have been senior even to Xenocrates 40). As a pupil, furthermore, of Speusippus (Diog. Laert. 5. 86), Heraclides might well have expected to receive the dying scholarch’s commendatio in preference to the man from Chalcedon; but whatever factors combined to influence the result, it was Xenocrates who won the day.

IV. The supposed embassy to Philip.

At the age of fifty-seven, then, Xenocrates became scholarch of the Academy. We learn that he actually lived on the premises (Diog. Laert. 4. 2; Plutarch, de exilio 603 C) – as Plato had done, though not Speusippus – and that he came into Athens very rarely; only once a year, according to Plutarch, in order to see the new tragedies at the Dionysia. And yet he was by no means detached from the preoccupations of contemporary political life – which at this time meant, above all else, the relationship between the Greek cities and the growing power of Macedon. I postpone comment on the general questions at issue here until sections VI and VII; but we can consider the story (in Diog. Laert. 5. 8–9) that Xenocrates, ‘with others’, went on an embassy to Philip, where he was the only member of the Athenian party not to accept bribes from Philip, nor even to speak to him.

I believe this story to be spurious. That Xenocrates was a metic was, in itself, no obstacle in the way of his serving as an official Athenian ambassador, for his part in an embassy to Antipater in 322 (section VI, infra) is beyond dispute; but this earlier episode carries no conviction. The fact that it does not appear in Ind. Acad. was, I take it, sufficient cause for Dörrie not to mention it at all; and Gomperz explicitly cited this as a reason for rejecting the tale, together with its appearance in Diogenes

40) Why (one wonders) is he not to be found prominent in the succession of 348/7?
as a ἴδος\textsuperscript{41}). Gianfranco Maddoli\textsuperscript{42}) finds Gomperz’ arguments inconclusive, pointing out that *Ind. Acad.* ignores altogether the first seventeen years of Xenocrates’ scholarchate (i.e. until the 322 embassy), and that Diogenes’ account of the Philip embassy contains particulars not to be found in the various versions of the embassy to Antipater. This is true enough, on both counts – yet both are curious reasons for positively believing in the story; and the various version of the μετοίκιον incident (section V, *infra*) prove, if proof were needed, that different sources can relay different – even incompatible – details of the same event. The story of Xenocrates’ embassy to Philip came about, I would suppose, in one of two ways:

(a) By confusion with the embassy to Antipater. Besides the general likelihood of this, it may be that Diogenes’ claim that only Xenocrates refused to speak to Philip is a confused inversion of Plutarch’s statement (*Phoc. 27. 2*) that Antipater refused to speak, or listen, to Xenocrates\textsuperscript{43}).

(b) By confusion between Xenocrates and Aristotle. Aristotle’s connections with the Macedonian court are clear enough, and Diog. Laert. 5. 2 (citing Hermippus) maintains that Aristotle was acting as an (Athenian) envoy to Philip when Xenocrates was elected to the scholarchate\textsuperscript{44}). Be that as it may, the Xenocrates/Aristotle conflation seems to have been one-sided, i.e. entailing the transference to Xenocrates of Aristotelian biographical details—even the well-known tradition of Aristotle’s tutoring the young Alexander\textsuperscript{45}).

**V. The μετοίκιον incident.**

Athenian metic law was no respector of persons: in its eyes Xenocrates was simply a μετοίκιος, a man (as Pollux 3. 55 says) who paid μετοίκιον. And in point of fact Xenocrates is one of only two individuals who are explicitly recorded as μετοίκιον—


\textsuperscript{42} G. Maddoli, Senocrate nel clima politico del suo tempo, D Arch, 1, 1967, 322 (n. 6).

\textsuperscript{43} The detail about X. standing firm and alone against Philip’s bribes is obviously intriguing, but it might be over-ingenious to attempt to specify too narrowly how and where it arose.

\textsuperscript{44} See Chroust, Aristotle (*cit.*), 35 with n. 66 and passim.

\textsuperscript{45} Chroust, Aristotle (*cit.*), 125–32, esp. 127.
payers (the other being the woman Zobia in Demos. 25. 57). The story — which, as I had occasion to remark elsewhere 46), is in very marked contrast to what is otherwise great reticence about the legal status of “intellectuals” like Xenocrates — appears in a number of variant forms, and with an amazingly assorted drama-tis personae:

(a) Diog. Laert. 4. 14 (citing Myronianus of Amastris, Chapters on Historical Parallels, I). Xenocrates is sold as a slave for failing to pay his μετοίκιον, but he is rescued and set free by Demetrius of Phalerum.

(b) Plut. Phoc. 29. 4. When Phocion sees Xenocrates paying μετοίκιον 47), he wants to enroll him as a citizen; but Xenocrates refuses, saying that he could not share in a πολιτεία which he had served on an embassy (sc. to Antipater) to prevent.

(c) Ind. Acad. 42. When Demades 48) is enrolling him as a citizen, Xenocrates refuses to be enrolled, saying that it would be wrong to share in a πολιτεία which the δήμος had voted him a πρέσβυς to try to prevent.

(d) Plut. Tit. 12. 4. When Xenocrates is being taken προς το μετοίκιον by the τελώναι, Lycurgus intervenes to rescue him and punish them for their δασέλευς. Xenocrates subsequently meets Lycurgus’ sons, and through them expresses his gratitude to Lycurgus.

(e) [Plut.] Vit, X Or. (Lycurgus) 842 B. A τελώνης hauls Xenocrates προς το μετοίκιον but Lycurgus intervenes, strikes the man and frees the philosopher. The τελώνης is imprisoned for not doing τὰ πρέσποντα, and Xenocrates later meets Lycurgus’ sons and expresses his gratitude.

(f) Photius, Bibli. 268 p. 497 a 34 Bekker (Lycurgus). When a τελώνης is taking Xenocrates προς το μετοίκιον, Lycurgus intervenes, frees Xenocrates and strikes the τελώνης on the head with a δάβδος for not doing τὰ πρέσποντα; he is then imprisoned. Lycurgus is much praised for this, and some days later Xenocrates meets Lycurgus’ sons, through whom he expresses his gratitude.

It is fairly clear that (a) is the least plausible version of the episode — particularly the idea that Xenocrates was actually sold

46) PCPhS n. s. 21, 1975, 95 with n. 3.
47) Or: Sees that he paid it (ὁρῶν δὲ τὸν Ξ. τελώντα τὸ μετοίκιον).
48) Δημάδως is Bücheler’s reading of the meaningless ΔΗΜΑ-ΦΟΥΣ. Although μετοίκιον is not mentioned this story is patently the same as (b).
Xenocrates the Metic

and then redeemed. The role of Demetrius may simply be a slip, or possibly a confusion with the Demetrius/Theophrastus relationship. So we are left with the two clusters b/c and d/e/f; and the choice between them is not self-evident. Dörrie, without discussing the alternatives, favours b/c⁴⁹), but since Xenocrates had a known relationship, via the Academy, with Lycurgus⁵⁰), and none with Phocion or Demades⁵¹), I would myself incline towards d/e/f⁵²). And there were certainly other metics who had reason to be grateful to Lycurgus⁵³). The termini for the episode will therefore be post 339/8 – unless, improbably, it was before 348/7 – but ante Lycurgus’ death (in 325/4 or thereabouts).

The episode itself raises a number of interesting points. As Clerc remarked⁵⁴), the tax-farmer(?) was in the wrong not, presumably, because Xenocrates turned out to be one of the privileged recipients of ἄτελεων τοῦ μετοικίου – which would surely have been mentioned as a suitable “punch-line” to the story – but because his μετοικίου had already been paid⁵⁵). If so, the episode displays obvious analogies with Demos. 25. 57, where Aristogiton (not – presumably – himself a τελώνης) hails Ζοβία πρὸς τὸ πολιτήμιν τοῦ μετοικίου; there, if her tax had not been found to be paid and recorded, she would have been sold as a slave (cf., erroneously, Diog. Laert. 4. 14 on Xenocrates). But there is a significant difference between the two stories as

⁴⁹) Dörrie, op. cit., 1513.
⁵¹) The fact that Plutarch (135 C) held Xenocrates and Phocion to be a pairing analogous to Theophrastus and Demetrius proves nothing – except, presumably, that the Phoc. 29. 4 version is no mere slip of the pen. Yet in that case it is odd that Plutarch failed to rationalise it with Tit. 12. 4!
⁵²) cf. M. Clerc, Les métèques athéniens, Paris, 1893, 16, taking the [Plut.] version as the best. It might be added that if we accept the account in Diog. Laert. (4. 9) of the reason for the embassy to Antipater in which Xenocrates participated – to secure (merely) the release of Athenians taken prisoner during the Lamian War – in preference to the larger, political aims implied in the b/c version, its dubiety would be manifest.
⁵³) e. g. the Κίνεις of IG II² 337 (section II, supra), and Eudemus the Platanean (II² 351) – both decrees proposed by Lycurgus; see Whitehead, op. cit. (n. 5), 161.
⁵⁴) Clerc, op. cit., loc. cit.
⁵⁵) It might be supposed that X.’s allegedly annual trip into Athens from the Academy (Plut. 603 C, supra) was in fact chiefly for the purpose of paying his μετοικίου; but in view of the rapid traffic of foreigners in and out of Athens (and the μετοικία) in the fourth century it seems unlikely that the whole 12 drachmas can have been deposited annually (Gauthier, op. cit. (n. 5), 122; Whitehead, op. cit., 9, cf. 76).
regards what happens to the person who has raised the presumption of non-payment in the first place: to Aristogiton, apparently nothing at all; to the tax-farmer(s) in the Xenocrates story, punishment – possibly even imprisonment. I think we must assume that this was not automatically the fate of any τελώνης (or anyone else) whose suspicions about tax avoidance of this kind proved to be unfounded, for if so their task would have been intolerable. And yet the ἀδελγεία against Xenocrates can hardly have consisted merely in impugning the integrity (and threatening the freedom) of a V.I.P.; at any rate, while Lycurgus may perhaps have felt this, even he could not secure anyone’s punishment on such grounds. No doubt the τελώνης pursued his task with excessive zeal and vehemence, and on Xenocrates’ behalf Lycurgus acted against the man by means of a γραφή ὑβρεως).

VI. The embassy to Antipater.

Three sources retail accounts of an Athenian embassy to Antipater, in which Xenocrates took part, in 322:

(a) Plut. Phoc. 27. 1-4. When (after the defeat at Crannon) Phocion and his fellow-ambassadors return to Thebes, to treat with Antipater, Xenocrates is added to the delegation, in the hope that his ἀγετή will melt Antipater’s heart. But Antipater’s reaction is exactly the opposite: he greets all the members of the delegation except Xenocrates, and refuses to hear what Xenocrates has to say. The talks proceed, and Antipater proposes four terms: the surrender of Demosthenes and Hyperides; reversion to the constitution based on a property-qualification; the establishment of a garrison on Munychia; and an Athenian indemnity to pay for the cost of the war, plus a fine. All the envoys agree – except Xenocrates, who accuses Antipater of treating them like slaves; for only to slaves would such terms appear generous. Phocion’s attempt to forestall the imposition of the garrison fails. (It is after this that Phocion supposedly offers Xenocrates Athenian citizenship – section V, supra.)

56) Alternatively, L. assisted X. (as σωφρονος?) in his own case (a δολὴ ὑβρεως, perhaps). If we insist upon the detail of imprisonment, what took place was probably some form of ἀπαγωγή, warranted by the fact that X. had been in danger of enslavement.
(b) *Ind. Acad.* 40–2. (the same story, more briefly). Antipater welcomes the other ambassadors, but when Xenocrates says what the people voted (*eitwv* *tav* *δοσα* *δφω* *η* *φ* *λασα* *το* *δ* *δημος* (c) Antipater does not treat him with the same respect. The other envoys gladly accept Antipater’s terms; only Xenocrates demurs, saying that what is fair for slaves is harsh for free men. And such is Xenocrates’ *einoia* towards the δημος that not only does he refuse to sacrifice to the Muses when the Macedonian garrison arrives but even refuses, from (?) Demades, the offer of citizenship (section V, *supra*).

(c) *Diog. Laert.* 4. 9. When Xenocrates goes as envoy (*πρεσβευων*) to Antipater, to sue for the release of Athenians taken prisoner during the Lamian War, Antipater invites him to dine; but Xenocrates quotes Odysseus’ retort to Circe in similar circumstances (*Odyssey* 10. 383–5) and his wit so pleases Antipater that the prisoners are indeed released.

The disparity between the two versions, a/b and c, is clear: there is no detailed point of contact whatever, quite apart from the fundamental difference in the Xenocrates/Antipater relationship which they imply and illustrate. And here again it is the *Diog. Laert.* version which we should discard: besides conflicting with Xenocrates’ anti-Macedonian stance in general (57), the anecdote is patently another borrowing – this time from the accounts of Demades’ confrontation with Philip (58).

So a/b is the authentic version of the meeting between Xenocrates and Antipater. But what exactly happened? The

57) ‘X. hat also nicht, wie Speusippos, zur makedonisch orientierten Partei gehört, sondern im Gegenteil zu deren Kritikern’ – thus Dörrie, *op. cit.* 1513, as a simple inference from the a/b version. (Diog. Laert. is again ignored.) A broader path to much the same conclusion was taken, independently, by Maddoli, *art. cit.* (n. 42), 304–27. Some of his battery of arguments carry little conviction, e. g. we have already seen reason to doubt the embassy to Philip (which in any case, apart from the anecdotal element, constitutes no proof in itself of *any* political attitude, pro- or anti-); and Maddoli’s belief that Xenocrates’ *Πιθος* *Αγ(α)βαρ* (Diog. Laert. 4. 14) was a *political* work addressed to an enemy of Philip is no less arbitrary than Dörrie’s inclusion of it in the category of mathematics (Dörrie, *op. cit.* 1516, without explanation of his cavalier interpretation of Diog. Laert.; see Maddoli 325 n. 35). Overall, however, Maddoli’s case for regarding X’s political sympathies as “democratic” and anti-Macedonian is strong – and it points to an area of possible substance in the tradition of a rift, at some stage, between X. and Aristotle.

crux is Xenocrates’ precise status on the mission. Dörrie (following Crönert) infers from the fact that Antipater declined to greet Xenocrates that he did not recognise the philosopher as a legitimate member of the delegation; and Plutarch’s account of the episode testifies, for Dörrie, not merely to Xenocrates’ frank and uninhibited readiness to speak his mind but to his ‘special position’ (Sonderstellung) vis-a-vis the Athenian delegation – not confined by the credentials accorded to his fellow envoys but free to deliver a ‘philosophical lecture’ to Antipater and his retinue. This, however, is undue compression of several issues, even granted the rigours of RE concision. In the first place, for Xenocrates not to have been a proper member of the embassy and for Antipater not to have recognised him as such may be two quite different things; and if the phraseology of Ind. Acad. (supra) can be relied on, Xenocrates’ official status on the mission is beyond dispute. Furthermore it is highly dubious to assume from Xenocrates’ remark (in both Plutarch and the Ind. Acad.) about free men and slaves that he had been given, as head of the Academy, carte blanche to make a kind of detached ethical commentary on the proceedings. The statement as recorded is well within the tradition of ambassadorial bons mots, not a summary of a lengthy philosophical discourse.

Yet for all that I believe Dörrie must be correct to speak of Xenocrates’ ‘Sonderstellung’ here. As D. J. Mosley has pointed out, ‘almost invariably a man (sc. elected to an embassy) was a citizen of the state which he represented’. Michel Clerc claimed that the Athenians had no qualms about the use of metic envoys where it was thought that they would prove effective; however, even he felt doubtful about the first of the trio of cases he found, Lysias’ supposed embassy to Dionysius I of Syracuse in 393 – which leaves only this Xenocrates episode

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59) Dörrie, op. cit. 1513.
60) D. J. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, Historia Einzelschriften, 22, 1973, 39. It is noteworthy that, for his chosen period of c. 500-c. 338. Mosley saw no need to amplify this statement.
61) Clerc, op. cit. (n. 52), 181–3.
62) Lysias 19, 19–20. There are two distinct difficulties, (i) the status of the mission – as Clerc realised, this (apparently) successful attempt of Conon’s to persuade Dionysius not to send ships to the Spartans may not have been under the aegis of the Athenian δῆμος – and (ii) a textual problem over the MS reading καὶ Αὐτῶν, where Sauppe’s Δυνατοῦ has been generally accepted (though not, obviously enough, by Clerc, 182 n. 3).
and Plutarch’s report (*Demetr.* 46. 2) that in 288 the Athenians sent another elderly philosopher, Crates the Theban, to persuade Demetrius Poliorcetes to lift his siege (which he did). In general terms it is easy to see why metics were not chosen as envoys: whether strictly holders of an ἄγχος or not, envoys undoubtedly filled an extremely prestigious *political* position, and τὸ πολιτεύσαν in all its aspects was the prerogative of the πολίτης. Why Crates was sent to Demetrius, apparently alone, instead of one or more Athenian citizens we cannot say, but in our Xenocrates/Antipater episode it seems plain that Xenocrates was in some sense a *supernumerary* representative of his adoptive city: in Plutarch’s account the same ambassadors return a second time to Antipater, and Xenocrates is added (Ξ... τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσελομένων). Consequently, while Antipater could cheerfully disregard the cherished conventions of the Greek polis when it suited him to do so, we can perhaps see some reason – if not necessarily justification – for his refusal to give Xenocrates a hearing; and Xenocrates’ refusal, for his part, to accept the proposed διαλόγως would have been no obstacle to their reception and confirmation by the Athenian ἐκκλησία, on the recommendation of their citizen πρεσβευταί(64).

**VII. Xenocrates the metic.**

Having now surveyed the main events of Xenocrates’ life(65), I conclude with some remarks about its general substance and character.

63) See Mosley, *op. cit., loc. cit.*

64) Perhaps X. was granted προσόδος to the βουλή and ἐκκλησία in order to submit his “minority report”?

65) Nothing is known of the years between the embassy to Antipater and X.’s death in 314/3. The basic framework of his life is therefore as follows:

396/5 Born in Chalcedon

380 c. Comes to Athens, enters the Academy – and becomes a μέτοχος

367 or 361 Accompanies Plato on his second or third visit to Sicily

348/7 Plato dies, Speusippus succeeds; X. leaves Athens with Aristotle and Callisthenes, and goes to Assus – thence (c. 341) to Chalcedon

339/8 Speusippus dies; X. elected his successor

338? X. on embassy to Philip (probably spurious)

16 Rhein. Mus. f. Philol. 124/3-4
Dörrie judged the anecdotal material on Xenocrates to be ‘kaum verwendbar’ – the stories purveyed by Diogenes, Plutarch (in the Moralia) and others being in the main trivial, unattached to any definite biographical context\(^{66}\), and illustrating nothing so much as the wish of an anti-philosophical tradition to transmit details which would redound to the discredit of any philosopher. Nevertheless, as he pointed out, certain “themes” are detectable; and chiefly that quality in Xenocrates which appears variously as \(σεμνότης\) and \(σωφροσύνη\)\(^{67}\). Of course, all human characteristics are perceived subjectively – one man’s courage is another’s rash folly – so this Xenocratean \(σωφροσύνη\) sometimes presents itself as arrogance (e.g. Diog. Laert. 4. 10: Xenocrates ignores Bion’s banter, ‘for tragedy does not stoop to answer comedy’s jibes), or as awkward sullenness (Plato perpetually tells Xenocrates to ‘sacrifice to the Graces’ – Diog. Laert. 4. 6; Plut. 141F, 769D), or even as slow-wittedness: Plutarch read that Xenocrates was slow on the uptake in lectures (47E), and Diogenes (4. 6), to illustrate the fact that Xenocrates was \(τὴν \ φύσιν \ νωθρός\), cites two alleged remarks of Plato’s, comparing Xenocrates with Aristotle – ‘one needs the spur, one the rein’ (\(τῷ \ μὲν \ μύστης \ δεῖ, \ τῷ \ δὲ \ χαλινοῦ\)\(^{68}\), and ‘what an ass I am rearing against what a horse’ (\(ἐφ’ οἶνον \ ἵππον \ οἶνον \ ἄλειφω\)). This persistent tradition of Xenocrates’ – to put it as neutrally as possible – dour stolidity finds its reductio ad absurdum in Plutarch’s story\(^{69}\) that a hetaera was inhibited from indulging in anything \(αὐξάνει\) with her lover under an \(εἰκών\) (?bust) of Xenocrates (\(σῳρφον\); Dörrie\(^{70}\)) plausibly conjectures that this is an extension of the anecdote in Diog. Laert. 4. 7, where the hetaera (variously Phlyne and Lais) fails to elicit

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Before c. 325/4  \(μετοίκιον\) incident with Lycurgus
322  Supernumerary member of Athenian embassy to Antipater
314/3  Dies in Athens

66) An exception is Timaeus’ story (Athenaeus 437B) of X. winning Dionysius’ drinking contest (n. 7, supra).
68) This was evidently a \(mol\) into which virtually any pair of names could be slotted: the same comment is attributed to Isocrates, of Ephorus and Theopompus, and to Aristotle himself, of Callisthenes and Theophrastus.
69) \(Εἰς \ τὰ \ Ἑσύδου \ Ἑγγα\) fr. 85 Sandbach.
70) Dörrie, op. cit. 1513–4.
any sexual response from Xenocrates himself\(^{71}\). Sexual contin­ence of this extreme kind was, to an extent, expected of all philosophers – one thinks immediately of Alcibiades’ account (in Plato, *Symposium* 215B–22B, esp. 219B–D) of Socrates’ miraculous self-control in comparable circumstances; yet there is another dimension to Xenocrates’ assiduous cultivation of σωφροσύνη\(^{72}\) as a general mode of life which is worthy of note – the fact that σωφροσύνη was the proper and characteristic attitude of the good μέτοικος\(^{73}\).

In few other respects, of course, can Xenocrates be con­sidered a typical fourth-century metic – even had he not been a philosopher: the degree, above all, of his political involvement, while difficult to guage satisfactorily, seems clearly to go against the general dictum of another eminent metic, Aristotle, that the μέτοικος nurtures no aspirations to an active role in political life (*EE* 1233a28–30)\(^{74}\). Yet the events of 322, even presupposing others which led up to them (to account for Xenocrates’ promi­nence in the affair), seem to constitute a relatively small and un­characteristic interlude in Xenocrates’ long life; so indeed does his whole “external” biographical framework which I have at­tempted to establish here, but which ultimately remains a bare skeleton, likely to be clothed with flesh by the student of philo­sophy rather than of history. I make no claim, therefore, that ‘Xenocrates the Metic’ is an incantation which of itself can raise up for us a figure endowed with substance as well as form; but I trust it will be conceded that the example of Xenocrates indi-

\(^{71}\) Diogenes presents the incident as proof of X.’s ἐγκράτεια, but it may be that some urino-genital affliction left him with little choice in the matter: Diog. adds (again, as illustration of X.’s ἐγκράτεια) that he under­went τομής καὶ κυσίς πολλάς… περὶ τὸ ὀφοῖον; and this (rather than mere fastidiousness) would help to explain, if not to excuse, the disagreeable joke at X.’s expense attributed (by Athenaeus 530D) to Aristotle, who is said to have quoted Euripides, *Hippolytus* 317 (χεῖρος μὲν ὄρνι, φρίφ ἁ’ ἔχει μιασμά τι), in “explanation” of the fact that X. never touched his penis when urinating.

\(^{72}\) Note that X.’s ethical writings included a Περὶ σωφροσύνης.


\(^{74}\) See my comments in PCPhS n. s. 21, 1975, 98. It may be, however, that X. had involvement thrust upon him.
cates that the biographical tradition of the Greek philosophers—especially, though not exclusively, those living as non-citizens—often present problems which can repay the historian’s attention.