In the *Περὶ μεθόδου δευνότητος* attributed to Hermogenes the term διατομή appears under the heading *Περὶ πειρατότητος* (section 5) and is defined as the "βραχέος διανοήματος ἡδικοῦ ἐκτασις, ἣν ἐμεινη τὸ ἴδος τοῦ λέγοντος ἐν τῇ γνώμη τοῦ ἀκούόντος."1

*) The following editions and standard works will be cited repeatedly throughout this study by the abbreviations indicated:

a. Editions

b. Standard Works

1) Hermogenes 418. The tradition that Hermogenes wrote this treatise should be abandoned in view of E. Bürgi’s studies entitled "Ist die dem..."
The author illustrates his definition by quoting the opening sentence of Demosthenes' oration Against Meidias "τὴν μὲν ἀσέλγειαν καὶ τὴν ὀβρον, ἣ πρὸς ἀπάντας ἀεὶ χρῆται Μειδίας, οὐδένα σοῦ ὑμῶν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ἀγνοεῖν οἶδαί, an expansion of the thought "τὴν μὲν ὀβρον Μειδίον πάντες ἴστε." The prooimion of Demosthenes' On the Crown is listed as a second example but not quoted.

The fact that Peri methodou is describing a rhetorical figure already was noticed by Johannes Ernesti in 1795 (p. 83). Ernesti gives commoratio, excursio, and ἔκπευσίδων, "quo orator subinde utitur, ornatus atque amplificationis gratia," as terms equivalent to diatribe in various rhetorical writings, including the Peri methodou, and his identifications are followed by the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG, Paris 1831–1865) in its article διατριβή (III 1359). Unfortunately, the widely-used Liddell–Scott–Jones Greek English Lexicon did not follow the TLG in this instance and thus became the probable source for some later confusion, when it defined diatribe in Peri methodou as a "short ethical treatise or lecture" and quoted only four words of the Greek definition, βραχέος διανοήματος ἠθικοῦ ἔκτασις.

Perhaps the error in LSJ would have been of little importance, if Franz Susemihl had not also encountered diatribe in Peri methodou and cited the first half of the Greek explanation (up to ἔκτασις) to describe the Diatribai of Bion of Borysthenes. Susemihl refers to Walz’s edition of the treatise (III 406), Hermogenes zugeschriebene Schrift Ἔρως μεθόδου δεσπότης echt?", in Wiener Studien 48 (1930), 187–197, and 49 (1931), 40–69. See also D.Hagedorn, Zur Ideenlehre des Hermogenes (Hypomnemata 8, 1964, 84–85; L. Radermacher, "Hermogenes", RE 8, 1, 872–873. I, therefore, will refer to the author of Peri methodou as Ps.-Hermogenes.

We should not ignore the possibility, however, that some of the material does go back to Hermogenes (cf. Bürgi, WS 1931, 69). Perhaps, as G. Kennedy has remarked (Roman 633), the work "contains genuine pieces of his theory loosely put together by some editor to supply a work whose existence was promised but not fulfilled."

2) Following the usual practice, I will treat all of the Latin and Greek names for rhetorical figures and technical terms as if they were English words. Most Greek terms, further, will be transliterated after their first appearance.

3) Revised ed. with supplement (Oxford 1968), 416, hereafter cited as LSJ.

4) Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexanderzeit I (Leipzig 1891), 36, note 105. The first modern scholar to apply diatribe to the works of Bion (but not in connection with its use in Peri methodou) seems to have been H. Usener in Epicurea (rep. ed. Stuttgart 1966, LXIX); cf. E.G.
but prints ἐκθέσεις, instead of Walz’s ἐκθεσις, a change which obviously alters the meaning. With this version in mind Susemihl wrote that diatribes are “nichtdialogische, und zwar wohl mehr oder weniger zwanglose kurze Aufsätze über ethische Themen.” His exclusion of dialogue was criticized by Rudolf Hirzel and Theodore Burgess ⁵, but neither of them corrected the misapplication of Ps.-Hermogenes’ definition. Later, the direct influence of Susemihl appears in the work of G.C. Fiske and D.R. Dudley. Fiske sees the diatribe of Bion as “a short disquisition of informal character upon an ethical theme,” and he quotes the first half of the definition from Peri methodou, using the reading ἐκθέσεις⁶. In his history of Cynicism Dudley writes “the definition of Hermogenes is worth quoting—διάτομα καὶ ἐντὸς ἰδιώματος ἔκθεσις ‘Diatribe is a moral exposition of some brief topic.’”⁷

Dudley, like Fiske, cites Walz, III 406, despite the fact that ἐκθέσεις does not occur there, but rather seems to have come into circulation through Susemihl. More recently, C.J. de Vogel, possibly relying on Dudley (whom she mentions in her bibliography), continues the unfortunate traditions of citing only part of “Hermogenes” definition and of employing the reading ἐκθέσεις⁸.

The misinterpretation of Ps.-Hermogenes’ diatribe, however, is not limited to those influenced by Susemihl. For example, in his “Eclectisme philosophique et lieux communs: à

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⁵) R. Hirzel, Der Dialog, ein literarhistorischer Versuch I (Leipzig 1895) 369, note 2; T.C. Burgess, “Epideictic Literature”, Studies in Classical Philology III (Chicago 1902) 235. Burgess quotes the definition after Spengel’s text (II 429), which has ἔκθεσις.

⁶) Lucilius and Horace, A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature 7, 1920; rep. Hildesheim 1966), 180. In his footnote on the Hermogenes definition (note 136, p. 215) Fiske cites Walz III, 406, who, as we have stated, does not have the ἔκθεσις. Since Fiske cites Susemihl (I 36, n. 105) in his note 133, the influence of the German scholar’s citation may be taken for granted.


propos de la ‘diatribe romaine’” Alain Michel properly notes concerning “diatribe” that “les rhéteurs donnaient à ce mot un sens technique précis.” He then continues, “il s’agissait d’une forme littéraire dans laquelle l’orateur répétait et développait une pensée fondée sur l’‘éthos’ pour la graver dans l’esprit de l’auditeur; on voit qu’il s’agit plutôt de direction de conscience que de ‘philosophie populaire.’”9) Michel refers to TLG (III 1359 B) as his source, and he clearly is offering a paraphrase of the “Hermogenes” passage quoted there. The paraphrase is marred, naturally, by the insertion of the words “forme litté­raire,” which are not justified by the context of the Greek, and by the application of the description of the figure diatribe to the rhetorical genre commonly known as the Cynic-Stoic diatribe. Another scholar, Michael Coffey, seems to have realized that the “Hermogenes” passage was not quite sufficient for a de­scription of the genre, but he still neither quotes the full defini­tion nor corrects the misconceptions concerning it. Coffey writes of diatribe that “the word was defined narrowly by Hermogenes, a Greek theorist of the second century A.D. as ‘the develop­ment of a short ethical notion,’ but it also comprised a wide range of moralizing discourse, reports of the teachings of various sages, anecdotes, and ready-made ethical judgements.”10)

The one ben­efit that has resulted from the misunderstanding of Ps.–Hermogenes’ diatribe is the stress on the ethical content of the genre diatribe. The absence of references to an inter­locutor and the stress on brevity, however, can produce a dis­torted picture of the rhetorical form used by Bion, Teles, and others. For instance, Oswyn Murray has written of the diatribe that “its elements are short ethical discussions on a theme, rhe­torically developed and provided with numerous examples; these could easily be combined to form longer treatises on a general topic.”11) Further, Murray thinks that some sections of “philosophical works περὶ βασιλείας” supply the best examples of the diatribe. We cannot digress here to indicate the merits

9) Latomus 70 (1964) 485, n. 1.
10) Roman Satire (London 1976), 92. Coffey’s attitude seems to be close to that of E. J. Kenney (ed. Lucretius, De rerum natura, Book III, Cambridge 1971, 17), who cites the Greek definition, following Rabe’s text, but notes of “diatribe” that “in practice it approached the status of a subliterary genre, one of a number of such genres of a generally homiletic type.”
and disadvantages of such a view, but we should note that the basic description, with its omission of the interlocutor and its emphasis on brevity, seems to be related to those notions of *diatribe* based on Ps.-Hermogenes.

Thus far in the present study we have seen examples of the misapplication of Ps.-Hermogenes' comments on *diatribe*, occasioned largely by disregard for the context in which the word appears in *Peri methodou*\(^{12}\). It remains now for us to investigate that context and to show that *diatribe* there is a rhetorical figure, unrelated to the genre diatribe. In order to prove our contention we shall show that the term occurs in conjunction with three other figures, which we shall attempt to identify, and that, on the basis of the illustrations given by Ps.-Hermogenes, *diatribe* seems to be the equivalent of the figure ἕπιμονή, "dwelling on the point."

Our first concern must be with the nature of the *Peri methodou* and of the section entitled *Peri perittotetos*, which contains the definition under investigation. Study of the treatise would be greatly facilitated, if we could assume that Hermogenes is the author and therefore refer back to his *Περὶ ἵδεων* as the final authority on all questions involving technical terms. Since it is unlikely that Hermogenes is the author (see note 1 above), however, even though some of the material may go back to him, we must be cautious about any assumption that certain passages in the *Peri methodou* rest on an Hermogenean basis. The contents of the treatise have aptly been described as "a series of disconnected chapters, on figures and other aspects of style,"\(^{13}\) and bear little resemblance to the careful order of a work such as

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\(^{12}\) The most recent example of this common error seems to be G.L. Kustas, "Diatribe in Ancient Rhetorical Theory", *Protocol of the Twenty-Second Colloquy of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture* (Berkeley 1976), 1–15 (cited hereafter as Kustas, "Diatribe"). Compare my remarks in the same volume, 27–32. In my dissertation, *A History of the Diatribe from its Origin up to the First Century B.C. and a Study of the Influence of the Genre upon Lucretius III, 830–1094* (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1974), which Kustas cites on 1, 4, and 6, I quoted *Peri methodou*'s complete definition and gave a brief analysis, pointing out that it is explaining a figure and has nothing to do with the genre "diatribe" (pp. 16–18 and 319, notes 10–15). Kustas (6–9) includes a partial translation and paraphrase of Ps.-Hermogenes' discussion of *diatribe* and of the remarks on that passage made by the 12th century commentator Gregory of Corinth, who also is mentioned by Ernesti (83). The text of Gregory's commentary on *Peri methodou* is in Walz VII, pt. 2, 1090–1352.

\(^{13}\) Kennedy, *Roman*, 633.
Epimone and Diatribe: Dwelling on the Point in Ps.-Hermogenes

Among the chapters are found not only discussions of figures such as *epanalepsis*, *asyndeton*, and *antithesis* (Rabe’s chapters 9, 11, and 15), but also comments on how to anticipate the opponent’s “proposition” (chapter 23) and on the functions of deliberative speech, dialogue, comedy, tragedy, and the Socratic symposium. The variety of the material included naturally leads us to wonder whether the title attached to it actually belongs to the work or merely reflects an attempt to supply a missing treatise by Hermogenes through the easy method of adding its title to an anonymous writing (cf. note 1 above). The passages of the *Peri ideon* where Hermogenes refers to a *Peri methodou deinotetos* have been collected and discussed by Bürgi (*WS* 1931) and Hagedorn (pp. 84–85), who have demonstrated a lack of correspondence between the references in *Peri ideon* and the contents of *Peri methodou*. In fact, a perusal of Bürgi’s studies leaves one with the impression that little can be characterised as exclusively Hermogenean in *Peri methodou*. Further, although, as Bürgi (*WS* 1931, p. 54) has observed, we cannot know precisely what an ancient work on stylistic *deinotes* would have contained, still *Peri methodou deinotetos* does not seem to merit its title. There is no discussion of the meaning of *deinotes*, and several of the chapters, such as 1–3, seem to have no place in a study of the forceful style. What we probably do have here is an incomplete work which takes what coherence it has from the author’s tendency to use a catechistic style and from the predominance of rhetorical figures among its topics. Thus, we should not take it for granted that our definition of *diatribe* appeared in a finished treatise delineating only figures or concepts related to *deinotes*, but we need not rule out any connection between the figure and the stylistic form.

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14) On this point see especially Bürgi (*WS* 1930), 188–197.
15) Bürgi (*WS* 1930), 191–192, lists and partly translates the thirty-seven headings of *Peri methodou*. Rabe’s edition varies slightly in that it does not include heading number 6.
16) Both Radermacher (see note 1 above) and Bürgi (*WS* 1931, 61) have called attention to the fact that the term *deinotes* occurs only once in the treatise (in addition to its inclusion in the title). References to chapters and sections of *Peri methodou* which do not seem to belong to a discussion of *deinotes* are to be found in Bürgi (*WS* 1931) 55 ff.
17) The catechistic style of the treatise is analyzed by Bürgi (*WS* 1930), 192–193. In his 1931 (*WS*) study, p. 55, Bürgi mentions the prevalence of “Sinnfiguren”, which he listed in his 1930 (*WS*) article (191–192).
Problems concerning the title of the work, however, need not affect the discussion of our next point, which is the significance of the designation Peri perittotetos which heads section 5 of Peri methodou. The term perittotes seems to denote a quality or characteristic of style, probably related to auxesis or amplificatio, but it does not correspond to any one of the virtues or forms of style listed by authorities on rhetoric. Rather, it seems to be a subcategory which fits under one or more of the virtues and serves a descriptive or organizational purpose, perhaps in the same fashion as the heading Περὶ τοῦ πλεονασμοῦ in Phoibammon (Spengel III, 46), under which we find the figures periphrasis and epimone listed. The Byzantine commentator Gregory of Corinth thought that perittotes was a kind of περιβολή, not identical with that Hermogenean form, but “lying beneath it.”

Although the word perittotes does not occur anywhere in Hermogenes’ discussion of peribole in Peri ideon, the adjective perittos (in the form περιττός, p. 279) and the verb περιττεύει (p. 286) do. Thus, Gregory may have inferred a connection between perittotes and peribole from the use of περιττός and περιττεύει, and from the fact that perittotes, like peribole, is related to auxesis. We, however, should remember that Gregory thought that he was commenting on a genuine work by Hermogenes and that he therefore turned to the Peri ideon, when he needed a category under which he could fit perittotes. Unlike Gregory, we cannot take Hermogenean authorship of the Peri methodou as a

18) Walz VII, pt. 2, 1147, 2–6. Vide Kustas, “Diatribe”, 11, who cites Gregory (1147) and refers to peribole as Amplitude, a translation which he also uses in his Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric (Analekta Blatadon 17, Thessalonike 1973, 13). I prefer the translation “amplification” (LSJ 1370), which better indicates the nature of the form and its connection with auxesis (on which consult Hagedorn, 46–47).

Concerning the date of Gregory of Corinth and his tendency to indulge in “oft etwas kritiklos und eilfertig zusammengetragenem Material”, see B.A.Müller in RE 7, 1849–1850; cp. H.Hunger, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner I (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 12, 5.1; München 1978), 84–85.

The recension and origin of Gregory’s work is discussed in T.F.A. Gerber, Quae in commentariis a Gregorio Corinthio in Hermogenem scriptis vestitiorum commentariorum vestigia deprehendi possint (Dissertation Kiel 1891), 7ff., on which see Hammer, Berlin. Phil. Wochenshrift 10 (1873), 456–458, and RE 7, 1850.
rationale for postulating a relationship between *perittotes* and *peribole*, but neither must we reject the possibility that Gregory’s disposition has some validity. The scholiast defines *perittotes* (1147.1–2) as “τὸ παρέλκων καὶ ἡ περίσσεα καὶ ἡ περιβολὴ τῶν λέξεων καὶ τὸ ταῖς αὐταῖς λέξεωι χρήσται”, a description which is broad (and vague) enough to cover the contents of Ps.-Hermogenes’ section 5, in which no specific definition of the term is given. If, on the basis of the figures listed as parts of it, we grant that *perittotes* is compatible with Gregory’s definition, then we may say that this quality and its figures could have been subsumed under *peribole*. What we cannot prove, lacking an authority other than Gregory, is that they all were ever so classified.

*Perittotes* in *Peri methodon* generally has been translated into English as “redundancy” (cf. *LSJ*, 1387), perhaps under the influence of Ernesti’s rendering of the term as “redundantiam dictionis” (261). Redundancy, however, has a rather negative connotation and would be a suitable translation only if the author were depicting a stylistic fault, which he clearly is not doing. There are, of course, words associated with bad style which share the root *perissos* with *perittotes*. For instance, Quintilian (8, 6.61; cf. Lausberg 593) mentions *peisioslogia* as a *vitium* contrasting with *periphrasis*. Demetrius (5.247; cf. Lausberg 1073), further, provides us with the term *peirissotexnía*, when he warns of the danger involved in using *antitheses* and *paromoia* in periods, if one is striving for *deinotes*. Both of these examples convey the notion of “too much” of something, however, while *perittotes*, as a chapter heading, is the common denominator, so to speak, of figures which are redundant or “superfluous” only in the sense of being nonessential for the meaning of a passage.

*Perittotes* may be closer than the other two words to the positive rhetorical connotation of *perittos*. When found in discussions of style, *perittos* can have a variety of meanings ranging from “unusual” to “richly-wrought,” but it generally implies the use of “grand diction.”19) From a reference in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Isocrates* 3; cf. Hagedorn, 46) we see that Theophrastus mentioned the production of “τὸ μέγα καὶ σημεῖον καὶ

περιττόν ἐν λέξει,” and this collocation of terms would seem to link perittos with the high style20). A similar link is evident, when Dionysius writes of Thucydides, “νῦν δὲ περί μὲν τὴν ἔκλογην ἔστιν ὅτε διαμαρτάνει, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν οἷς ἂν τὴν ψηλήν καὶ περιττήν καὶ ἐγκατάσκευον διόκη φράσιν…”21) Further, the same critic notes the absence of anything semnon or peritton in the style of Herodotus I, 8–1022), and observes that Demosthenes “ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδιωτικοῖς λόγοις” employs “τὴν κοινὴν καὶ συνήθη λέξιν,” and seldom uses “τὴν περιττήν καὶ οὕτω ταύτην ἐν’ αὐτοφόρῳ, ἀλλ’ ὥστε λαδεῖν”23). The inclusion of “περιττήν ἀπερίττων” (Demosthenes 8; cf. Hagedorn, 37), finally, in a list of opposites that are blended in the style of Demosthenes shows that perittos can denote the elaborate, as opposed to the simple or aperittos style.

Demetrius also indicates a connection between perittos and the high style. In his discussion of τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς (38 ff.) he says (77) that the diction in this type of style ought to be peritten and “ἐξηλαμβάνειν καὶ ἀσυνήθη μᾶλλον” since this produces “τὸν ὄγκον”24). Longinus, on the other hand, does not give an explicit statement linking perittos and the grand style, but we may draw some information from two of his remarks. The first of these comes in a passage dealing with τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς (3.4), when the author writes that this affectation is produced by those reaching for “τοὺ περιττῶν καὶ πεποιημένου καὶ μάλιστα τού ἄδεως…”25).

20) The text is from the edition of H.Usener and L. Radermacher (Leipzig 1899), page 58.4. All quotations from the works of Dionysius will be drawn from this edition. With regard to page 58.4, Hagedorn, 46 (cf. 23), cites Cicero, Orator 79, where the Roman orator (quoted here from the edition of Pleis, Stuttgart 1963) observes that the plain style lacks “quod quartum numerat Theophrastus in orationis laudibus: ornatum illud suave et affluens.” We should add here Cicero’s description of the orator in the grand style (Orator 97) as “amplus copiosus, gravis ornatus, in quo profecto vis maxuma est.”


23) Demosthenes 56; see also Ernesti, 261.


25) The text is that of D. A. Russell (Oxford 1968). I have not tried to include here all of the references to perittos in ancient rhetorical or literary sources. Instead, I have endeavored to give representative examples of the term found in circumstances which may help us to determine its significance.
Later (40.2), in dealing with "σύνθεσις" and "τὸ μέγεθος", Longinus observes that even those using words that are common and provide nothing periton have come to possess loftiness (δύναμον), distinction, and "τὸ μὴ τατείνοι δοκεῖν εἶναι" through their employment of "τοῦ συνθείναι καὶ ἀμώσαι" (cf. Ernesti, 261). On sorting out the meaning underlying the contrasts in these two passages, we see that peritos again is connected with the high style, although loftiness, etc., may be achieved without it.

It is possible that perittotes was developed as a formal expression, when rhetoricians needed a noun to characterize the stylistic quality with which peritos was involved. We can only speculate about such a development, for a line from peritos to perittotes has not been mapped out for us in ancient sources. Obviously, a relationship between the two could stem from the connection that peritos has with the grand style, which allows the expansion and elaboration that is the essence of perittotes. Perhaps, then, we may take our cue from the use of peritos to denote an elaborate style and translate perittotes as "elaboration", in the sense of changing something simple into something more complex 26).

Now that we have noted the possible origin and meaning of the term perittotes, we may briefly survey the contents of the section which it heads. Ps.-Hermogenes begins his discussion (417) by stating that perittotes is twofold (διπλή), namely "καὶ κατὰ λέξιν καὶ κατὰ γνώμην", and that each of these divisions also is twofold, being divided according to λέξιν and γνώμην. Next, διατυπή and πληθός are given as components of the second group "κατὰ λέξιν", while the second division "κατὰ γνώμην" is characterized as (418.1–2) "κατὰ ἐπενθυμήσεις καὶ λόγων καθολικῶν τοῖς ἴδιοις συμπλοκῆι" (to which we shall refer hereafter as epenthymesis and katholikoi logos). When considered as a whole, these classifications seem quite muddled. We have perittotes separated into "diction" and "thought". Then, "diction" apparently is subdivided into "diction" and "thought", and "thought" likewise is given similar subgroups. At this point the division

26) Kustas, "Diatribe", 7, translates peritos as "abundance", a rendition which also conveys the nature of the word. I have chosen "elaboration", because it seems to suggest the connection between peritos and amplification and implies an active principle.

On the relationship between peritos and perittotes, consult Ernesti, 261, who puts his brief discussion of perittotes within his section on peritos.
seems to break down utterly or to duplicate itself in an unlikely way. If we interpret the Greek text at face value, we must then come up with a distribution that resembles the following diagram:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{περιττότης} & \\
\text{kατά λέξιν} & \text{kατά γνώμην} \\
\text{κ. λέξιν} & \text{κ. γνώμην} \\
\text{διατριβή πλήθος} & \text{επενθύμησις καθολικοί λόγοι} \\
\end{align*}
\]

The author may have envisaged a grouping such as this\(^{27}\), or he may simply have overindulged a fondness for subdividing his material. Misinterpretation of a source also may have been a factor in this passage. At any rate, the first division by *kata lexin* and *kata gnomen* may hark back to something like Hermogenes' arrangement of his discussion of each stylistic "idea" under the rubrics "ἐννοια" and "λέξις"\(^{28}\). The second grouping, on the other hand, seems to be an instance of the common separation of figures into those of diction and those of thought. The word *schemata* does not occur, but the author may have deemed it unnecessary.

As I mentioned above, under *kata lexin*, which I view as a division containing figures of diction or speech, are grouped *diatribe* and *plethos*. *Epenthymesis* or "the insertion of corroborative arguments" (*LSJ* 617) and *katholikoi logoi* then are figures of thought placed under the heading *kata gnomen*. In referring to these terms as figures we should bear in mind A.D. Leeman's warning that "the catalogue of the figures of speech is the most

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27) We might think that Ps.-Hermogenes intended for *diatribe* and *epenthymesis* to come under the *kata lexin* and *kata gnomen* divisions, respectively, which are subsumed under the first *kata lexin* group. Then, he might have put *plethos* and *katholikoi logoi* under the *kata lexin* and *kata gnomen*, respectively, of the first *kata gnomen* division. Such a classification, however, is a rather strained interpretation of the Greek text.

28) Regarding this division see Hagedorn, 19–20. On 20, Hagedorn records the use of *gnome* by Ps.-Aristeides in a fashion similar to Hermogenes' employment of *ennoia*. Gregory of Corinth (1146.1–2) identifies *gnome* with *ennoia*.
chaotic and controversial department of the ancient doctrine of style." Thus, something like *epenthymesis* which may not seem like a figure of thought to us, and, indeed, may not have been one in the opinion of some rhetoricians, seems to have been considered a figure by our author and must be treated as such in our investigation.

The figure of primary interest for us, of course, is *diatribe*. We shall pass over it for the moment, however, and examine the three other figures in our passage. The first of these is *plethos*, a figure of diction defined as the "*ποικίλων ὄνομάτων ἱσοτίμων ἐπίχρυσας εἰς κίνησιν ἔθους*" (418.10). For his example Ps.-Hermogenes turns to Demosthenes' *On the Crown* 12, "τοῦ δὲ παρόντος ἀγώνος ἡ προσέρεισι αὐτῆ ἐχθρὸν μὲν ἐπιήρειν ἐχεῖ καὶ ὅριον καὶ λοιδορίαν καὶ προσπλακομόν ὥμοι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα" (418.11–14). Here the orator clearly has "poured forth" a string of words which share bad connotations and are intended to produce an unfavorable impression of his opponent's character, apparently thereby fulfilling the conditions for a *kinesin ethos*. In view of this example we might have expected some reference to *pathos* as well as *ethos*. Although Demosthenes is depicting the character of his opponent, and incidentally holding himself up as an injured party of good repute, the overall effect of the piling up of such nouns in polysyndeton is emotional. Gregory of Corinth, in fact, mentions "τῷ κυνήσου πάθος" (1152.20) in discussing this passage, although it is obvious from another reference (1153.4) that his text of *Peri methodou* also read "*το ἱσοτίμων ἔθους*". Ps.-Hermogenes, however, tends to stress "character" whenever he can, and we shall return to this notion later in studying the use of "*ἡδυκόν*" in the definition of *diatribe*.

The identification of *plethos* as a figure depends chiefly on the interpretation of the words "*ποικίλων ὄνομάτων ἱσοτίμων*", which can be explained with near certainty on the basis of another section of *Peri methodou*. Immediately preceding the section on *perittotes* there is a passage bearing the heading "*Πότε ταυτότητι ὄνομάτων χρησάμεθα καὶ πότε ποικίλια*". There Ps.-Hermogenes concludes that if one word, used repeatedly, will suffice to provide the clearest account, then there is no need for an


30) Emendation of Gregory's *πάθος* to *ηθος* might be defended on paleographical grounds, but it is likely that the commentator simply noticed the emotional nature of the instance cited and thus mentioned *pathos*.
abundance of words. If, on the other hand, one has many words
that are of equal value (isosima) and will equally serve to produce
vividness (enarxeia), then a variety (pouiklia) of words is suitable
(416.8 ff.). The repetition of one term is illustrated by Homer,
Odyssey 19.205–208, where we find “katathek”, “katetxein”,
tnikomenes”, and “tiketo”, all variations of the same root verb.
More important for our purposes are the examples of poikilia
taken from Homer and Thucydides. In the Homeric illustration
occur synonymous adjectives (δξυ, δομυ, πικρας) emphasizing
the sharpness of pain, as the poet writes (Iliad 11.269–272),

δις δ’οταν ὡδίνουσαν ἐκ οίς βέλος δξυ γναῖκα,
δομυ, τό τε προείσα μογοστόκου Ἐιλείθυαι,
’Ἡρης θυγατέρας πικρας ὡδίνας ἔχουσαι,
δις οξεί’ ὡδύαν δύνου μένος Ἀτρείδαια.

The example from Thucydides, differing from the Homeric one,
does not feature synonyms in close proximity, but, rather, notes
their use at varying intervals within a long section of the work.
Citing book 1, sections 1.3, 8.1, and 2.6, as well as one sentence
based on 5.3 but different from the received text, Ps.-Hermogenes
observes that in his prologue Thucydides employs “τεκμή-
ριον, σημείον, παράδειγμα, μαρτύριον, καὶ ἄει κύκλον ποιεῖται τῶν
ἀμομάτων” (416.7–8). From the instances given we may infer
that words which are called poikila and isotima in Peri methodou
are sufficiently close in meaning to warrant denotation as syno-
nyms. Plethos, therefore, by definition, is the pouring forth of
different but synonymous words which contribute to the pro-
duction of an impression of character. It is interesting to note
that, unlike simple poikilia, plethos is attached to ethos rather than
to enargeia, although the pouring forth of synonyms is vivid.

Now that we have clarified the definition of plethos, we shall
investigate whether the figure is identical with any better-known
device or has its origin in the Peri methodou. For the most part,
plethos has remained unexplained and ignored. Ernesti, for in-
stance, identifies diatribe (83) with commoratio and other figures
(see above at note 2), but for plethos he only quotes the definition
from Ps.-Hermogenes with no elaboration. Further, Volk-
mann31), Lausberg, and Martin make no mention of the term.

31) R. Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer
Übersicht (Leipzig 1885).

In his commentary on Demosthenes’ On the Crown (Demosthenes,
Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz, Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu grie-
Gregory of Corinth is of a little more help. That commentator first equates the phrase “διατριβή καὶ πλήθει” (Peri methodou 417.19ff.) with “ἐπιμονή καὶ ἐγχρονισμὸς καὶ συναγωγή” (1146.17–18). Then, several pages later (1153.1–3), he observes that plethos differs from diatribe “ὅτι ἐν ἐκείνῃ μὲν κατὰ κόλον γίνεται ταυτότητος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ κατὰ λέξιν”. Gregory’s distinction may have some validity, and so we shall explore briefly the theory that plethos is some type of epimone.

As will be indicated presently in this study, in our discussion of diatribe, epimone or “dwelling on the point” has several forms which have been categorized by Lausberg. Most of the rhetoricians who mention the figure class it as a figure of thought, although Julius Victor (Halm 433.33) and Tiberios (Spengel III, 74) list it as a figure of diction, while Phoibammon (Spengel III, 47 and 50) includes epimone under both kinds of figures. Generally, epimone is seen as a figure of speech when it relies on individual words for its development, and as a figure of thought when phrases or sentences give it form (cf. Lausberg 838). This distinction was not always observed by rhetoricians, however, and it should not worry us if we must compare a figure of diction such as plethos with a type of epimone designated as a figure of thought (see above at note 29).

The descriptions of epimone which come closest to fitting plethos occur in the treatises of Phoibammon (Spengel 47), Tiberios (Spengel 74), Alexander (Spengel 17–18), and the anonymous Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου σχεμάτων (Spengel 147), cited hereafter as Anonymous I, to distinguish it from the anonymous Περὶ τῶν σχεμάτων τοῦ λόγου (Spengel 176), which we shall call Anonymous II. Phoibammon, first of all, defining his figure of diction as the “προφορὰ πλειώνων λέξεων ἐπίσης τὸ αὐτὸ σημαντοῦν, ἃ καὶ λόγων”, gives examples of epimone based upon single words and longer phrases. Significant for our investigation is the kind founded on “λέξεων”, illustrated by the sentence, “ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς ἔφρύσατο ἀπὸ συμπλοκῆς, ἀπὸ μάχης, ἀπὸ τραυμάτων, chischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern, Heidelberg 1976; cited hereafter as Wankel), I 168, H. Wankel discusses the motive of railing at an enemy in Demosthenes’ section 12 and notes the citation of the passage in Peri methodou as a “Paradebeispiel für eine Synonymenreihe im Dienst der διατριβή”. He also does not identify the figure.

32 The rhetoricians whom we shall quote in discussing epimone (com­moratio), here and later in this study, are listed by Lausberg (838) and Martin (135, note 3). Texts for the Greek authorities, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Spengel III; cf. Walz VIII.
The four prepositional phrases obviously are related in that each refers to some aspect of battle. They do not, however, contain synonyms.

A similar situation obtains in one of the examples of *epimone* (as a figure of diction) appearing in Tiberios, who writes that the figure occurs whenever someone puts more words directly upon one another. After citing an instance using only verbs, the rhetorician adds his second example (Spengel 74), “ψήφων αἴτει, ὄρχων αἴτει, νόμον αἴτει, δημοκρατίαν αἴτει”. Here, as in the illustration from Phoibammon, we have nouns which are related and deal with the same subject, but cannot be considered synonyms. Two of Alexander’s examples of *epimone* as a figure of thought come nearer to *plethos* in that the words involved are closer in meaning than those in the other illustrations cited above. The first of these is a quotation from Euripides and features the series of nouns τροφός, μῆτη, ἀδελφή, δμωΐς, ὁγκὺς and στέγη, all in asyndeton. For his second example Alexander turns to Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 43 (cf. Walz VIII, 441), for a passage which observes that the Thessalians and Thebans considered Philipp of Macedon a “φίλον, εὐεργέτην, σωτήρα”, another occurrence of related words in asyndeton. Differing somewhat from Alexander’s illustrations, an example of *epimone* formed by single words in polysyndeton appears in the treatise which we are citing as *Anonymous I* (Spengel 147). Demosthenes again is the author’s source (*On the Crown* 298; cf. Walz VIII, 655) and the quotation reads in part, “οὔτε καιρὸς οὔτε φιλανθρωπία λόγων οὔτ’ ἐπαγγελμῶν μέγεθος οὔτ’ ἔλπις οὔτε φόβος οὔτ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐπήθεν…” None of the sentences cited by Alexander or *Anonymous I*, however, contains words which are entirely *isotima* in the sense required by the *Peri methodou* for *plethos*. Certainly, τροφός, μῆτη, ἀδελφή and δμωΐς have much in common, but they are not synonyms and definitely not equivalent to the remaining two terms, ὁγκὺς and στέγη, no matter how metaphorically we may interpret the sentence. In a similar fashion, the three nouns describing Philipp are related but not identical in meaning, while the words in *On the Crown* 298 are even farther removed from one another. Thus, although all of these instances of *epimone* seem to resemble *plethos* in their abundance of related terms, we must conclude that the two figures are not precisely the same. *Plethos* requires a synonymy which is not absolutely essential for *epimone*. Further, and perhaps more important, the definition of the former lacks any notion of “dwelling on the point”, pre-
ferring to stress “character”. We should not ignore the possibility, however, that plethos could be employed with epimone, especially if epimone is a figure of thought. Quintilian, in fact, observes that figures of thought and speech “frequentissime coeunt” (9, 1.16), and here we do have two figures with enough in common to allow them to go together.

Since we have rejected the identification of plethos and epimone suggested indirectly by Gregory of Corinth, we must look to figures involving synonymy or enumeration for an equivalent for plethos. The best selection of these is in Quintilian, 9, 3.28 ff., whose comments have been schematized by Lausberg (607–687). After discussing what we would call grammatical figures (9, 3.1–27; cf. Lausberg 605) Quintilian writes, “illud est acerius genus, quod non tantum in ratione positum est loquendi, sed ipsis sensibus tum gratiam tum etiam vires accommodat” (9, 3.28). The first kind of these is composed of figures made by addition or repetition (“adiectione” or “per adiectionem”) and it encompasses figures ranging from geminatio (9, 3.28) to gradatio or climax (9, 3.57). Within this group are mentioned figures which involve the enumeration of synonyms or of unrelated words (9, 3.45–50), as well as asyndeton (dissolutio, 9, 3.50) and polysyndeton (9, 3.51–54).

Of primary interest to us is the passage concerning synonymy. Quintilian has been dealing with cases in which parts of sentences are repeated, when he adds (9, 3.45) that sometimes “initia quoque et clausulae sententiarum aliis, sed non alio tendentibus verbis inter se consonant.” Agreement among the ends of sentences is exemplified by “vos enim statuis, vos sententiam dixistis, vos iudicavit.” Then the rhetorician comments that some call this “avvOJv/av”, while others call it “disiunctio”, either of which is correct, since “est nominum idem signification separatio”. Still discussing synonyms, Quintilian next states that words which mean the same thing also “congregantur”. Illustrations of this phenomenon are provided by “quae cum ita sint, Catilina, perge quo coepisti, egredere aliquando ex urbe: patent portae, proficiscere” and “abiit, excessit, erupit, evasit.” These examples resemble those usually given for the figure synonymia, which, like plethos, involves words of similar meaning.

Martianus Capella provides the most concise Latin definition of synonymia, describing it as a “communio nominis, quotiens uno verbo non satis dignitatem rei aut magnitudinem de-
monstramus, ideoque ad eandem significationem plura confe-
ri-mus” (41.535; Halm 482; Lausberg 650). While this rhetorician
does not cite an example of the device, Aquila, whose definition
is essentially the same, quotes the sentence “prostravit, adfixit,
percult” (Halm 34; Lausberg 655; Martin 308). Isidore of Se-
ville, further, gives two examples from Cicero, which state “nihil
agis, nihil moliris, nihil cogitas” and “non feram, non patiar,
non sinam” (2, 21.5; Halm 518; Lausberg 650). In Alexander
(Spengel III, 30.14) we also encounter an illustration based on
verbs, a shortened version of a sentence from “Demosthenes”
Ποδε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τῇν Φιλίππου (153.3-4), which includes the
verbs γινόσκεται, οὐκ ἁγνοεῖται and ῥοποπτεῖται. Alexander’s de-
nition is rather specific, maintaining that synonymia occurs when-
ever, wanting to show one and the same thing, we use more
words which differ in character but which do show the same
thing by their meaning (τῇ ν δυνάμει). From this definition we can
see that an absolute identity of meaning may not be required,
but the words in the figure must have connotations similar
enough to allow them to “show the same thing.” Thus, while
γινόσκεται and οὐκ ἁγνοεῖται are essentially identical in meaning,
ῥοποπτεῖται differs slightly, but still comes under synonymia, since
“suspect” or “suppose” also contains some notion of “recognition.”
This same latitude allows a series like “prostravit, adfixit,
percult” to be classed as synonymia, even though there is a slight
variation in the exact meanings of the verbs. We should note
that the synonymy of the verbs in the illustrations cited is closer
to the idea of isotima than is that of the nouns in the instances of
epimone cited above. The fact that all of the examples of synonymia
which survive in rhetorical works are composed only of verbs
and never rely on a series of nouns, however, prevents us from
identifying synonymia and plethos as definitely the same figure,
although they must be considered close relatives33).

33) Related to synonymia, and sometimes equated with it, is interpre-
tatio, defined by the Rhet. ad Her. 4, 28.38 as “quae non iterans idem
redintegrat verbum, sed id commutat, quod positum est, alio verbo, quod
idem valeat, hoc modo:
‘Rem p. radicitus evertisti, civitatem funditus deiecisti.’ Item: ‘Patrem
nefarie verberasti, parenti manus scelerate attulisti.’ ” The relationship be-
tween this figure and epimone is obvious.

Calboli (365) follows Lausberg (727) in seeing interpretatio as “un
isocolon con cola sinonimi.” There is no evidence in the definition, how-
ever, to indicate that isocola are required for the figure. It seems likely that
the author simply included examples in which isocola and interpretatio appear
together, just as, for instance, isocolon and homoeoteleuton are found in con-
If we return now to Quintilian, we find references to two other figures which belong within the same family as *plethos*, but which, again, cannot be identified with it. In 9, 3.47, after his description of *synonymia* and some comments on *pleonasm*, the rhetorician observes that “nec verba modo, sed sensus quoque idem facientes acervantur.” His example is “perturbatio istum mentis et quaedam scelerum offusa caligo et ardentes furiarum faces excitaverunt.” For obvious reasons, specifically the use of phrases and the emphasis on similar thoughts rather than words, this unnamed figure cannot be taken as the equivalent of *plethos* or employed to show that some form of *synonymia* utilized strings of nouns.

The second figure cited by Quintilian in this section involves the accumulation of words that are “diversa” (9, 3.48). This concept is illustrated first by the sequence “mulier, tyranni saeva crudelitas, patris amor, ira praeceps, temeritatis dementia.” As a second example, Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* 5, 17–19, is quoted as follows:

> sed grave Nereidum numen, sed corniger Ammon,
> et quae visceribus veniebat belua ponti
> exsaturanda meis.

Quintilian does not name this figure. Instead, he simply denies that it is called “πλοετή”, since “sit unius *figurae*” (9, 3.49). Instances cited by other writers, however, allow us to identify the figure as *συναθροισμός*, which Alexander (I, 9; Spengel III, 17.13–14; Martin 308) defines as the “*συναγωγή τῶν πεπραγμένων ἢ πραγμάτων δυναμένων εἰς ἐν κεφάλαιον*” 34. Rutilius Lupus (I, 2; Halm 4; Lausberg 671), for example, writes that *synathroismos* can be made by “*et singulis verbis et plurium verborum coniunctio*” in the illustrations of *homoeoteleuton* (4, 28.20). Cf. Quintilian 9, 3.45, where *disjunctio* and *synonymia* occur.

We are not concerning ourselves in the present study with the relationship of one rhetorical treatise to another. On some aspects of this topic consult G. Ballaira, “Una figura inedita del περί σχημάτων di Alessandro di Numenio e le sue affinità con Quintiliano (Inst. 8, 6, 67–76)”, *RbM* 119 (1976) 324–328, and T. Schwab, *Alexander Numenius ΠΕΡΙ ΣΧΗΜΑΤΩΝ in seinem Verhältnis zu Kaikilos, Tiberios und seinen späteren Benützern* (Rhetorische Studien 6, Paderborn 1916).

34) The presence of *synagoge* in this definition holds some interest for us, since Gregory of Corinth (1146.17–18) employs the same term in his description of *diatribe* and *plethos*. See above after note 31.

Martin (307) observes that “der συναθροισμός will verschiedene Dinge, die συνωνύμα aber gleiche Dinge zum Ausdruck bringen”.

19 Rhein. Mus. f. Philol. 123/3–4
tione.” For one of his examples of synathroismos in singulis verbis Rutilius turns to Demochares and the remark “nam quis haec simul universa perpeti possit, timorem, morbum, senectutem, contumeliam, inopiam, vim? quarum quaevis una res per se satis est gravis ad deficiendum.” Certainly this kind of enumeration corresponds to Quintilian’s, with its use of nonsynonymous nouns in asyndeton, but it does not fit the requirements of plethos. Synathroismos has more than one form, however, and often is identified not only with enumeratio but also with distributio (cf. Lausberg 671; Calboli 404-405). Further, in Zonaios (Spengel III, 162.7; cf. Lausberg 675), whose synathroismos seems closest to distributio, we encounter the illustration “δήμοι στασιάζοντες, καὶ πόλεις καὶ γένη διηγόμενα, καὶ οἷα άκυτάμενα.” Here the nouns all describe aspects of the same entity, and they reveal a much nearer relationship, as parts of a whole, than do even the terms in Alexander’s second example of epimone quoted above, which refer back to Philipp. Zonaios’ nouns are, thus, essentially synonymous, and, if they were not tied up with the notion of distribution, they would allow us to assume that some kinds of synathroismos do involve synonyms and may be identical with plethos.

This possibility cannot be excluded altogether, despite Quintilian’s reference to verba diversa. There is, however, a figure resembling synathroismos which may resolve some of our difficulties. In book 8, 4.3–28, Quintilian discusses amplificatio, noting that it is produced by “incremento, comparatione, ratiocinatione, congerie” (4.3). Concerning the fourth type of amplificatio, the rhetorician writes that the “congeries quoque verborum ac sententiaram idem significantium” can be included under amplificatio, for even if “non per gradus ascendent, tamen velut acervo quodam adlevantur” (8, 4.26). Quintilian’s example, built of sentences with similar meanings, comes from Cicero (Pro Lig. 3.9), and reads, “quid enim tuus ille, Tubero, destrictus in acie Pharsalica gladius agebat? cuius latus ille mucro petebat? qui sensus erat armorum tuorum? quae tua mens, oculi, manus, ardor animi? quid cupiebas? quid optabas?” (8, 4.27). The fact that this collocation of sentences dwells on one point shows how closely related epimone and various forms of accumulation or enumeration can be, with one figure used to help make another. Especially important for our purposes, though, is the

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35) On the relationship between epimone and synathroismos, cp. Lausberg 675 and Alexander (Spengel III, 22.22ff.) on epitrochasmos.
sentence which follows this example. There Quintilian comments, “simile est hoc figurae, quam συναθροίσμων vocant, sed illic plurium rerum est congeries, hic unius multiplicatio.” Influenced by this statement some modern commentators, such as Volkmann (451), Lausberg (667), and Calboli (404), have treated synathrhoismos and “congeries” as if they were the same figure. That may have been the case for a Greek rhetorician such as Zonaios, whose example of synathrhoismos could illustrate either distributio or congeries (cf. Lausberg 667 and 671), but for Quintilian the two apparently are similar but distinct. Further, we should note, notwithstanding modern usage, that Quintilian’s figure is not called congeries. Quintilian is writing about a kind of amplification produced by “congerie”, but he does not explicitly call any figure congeries. For the sake of convenience, however, we shall continue to refer to the unnamed figure as congeries.

Whatever the proper name for congeries may be, the figure itself is a likely candidate for identification with plethos. In fact, the link between congeries and amplificatio reminds us of Longinus’ remark that “...κείσαι το μέν ὄνομα ἐν διάφορα, ἡ δ’αὐξήσεως καὶ ἐν πλήθει” (12.1, ed. D. A. Russell; cf. Lausberg 406). The phrase “ἐν πλήθει” is not a technical use of plethos, but its appearance with auxesis could indicate that the name of the figure plethos ultimately stems from phrases descriptive of amplification. If this were the case, then congeries and plethos would be essentially the same thing expressed in different languages. We cannot demonstrate such a relationship, however; we can only suggest it.

Unfortunately, Quintilian does not actually illustrate an accumulation of individual words of similar meaning, and his inclusion of “mens, oculi, manus, ardor animi” does not provide us with a list of true synonyms. We, therefore, can merely theorize, on the bases of Quintilian’s definition, of the resemblance between synathrhoismos and congeries and synathrhoismos (in form) and plethos, and of the correlation of the terms plethos and congeries, that plethos might be one kind of congeries. Such an identification is plausible, but it leaves out of consideration the multiple connectives occurring in the example of plethos. The definition does not mention those conjunctions, but elsewhere in Peri methodou (427.4) we encounter plethos again used in a section where polysyndeton appears. The author is discussing asyndeton and an unnamed alternative which obviously is polysyndeton. In distinguishing between the two devices he writes (427.2ff.), “ταυτόν δ’ ἐγγαζόμενα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐγγάζεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μετὰ συνδέσμων
plethos could be employed here in an utterly nontechnical way, especially since it is accompanied by the word megethos\textsuperscript{36). Further, it is odd that plethos is connected with ethos in 418.11, but opposed to ethikos here. Still, the utilization of the term in two instances where polysyndeton and an accumulation of single nouns turn up seems hardly accidental, all the more since one might think of the city names in the second occurrence as essentially equal words, even though they are not synonyms for each other. Even in its nontechnical usage, then, plethos might be viewed by Ps.-Hermogenes as somehow joined to polysyndeton. If we accept this connection as a possibility, then we may turn to Quintilian for additional help in identifying plethos. In another part of his discussion of figures created per adiectionem the rhetorician deals with asyndeton and polysyndeton (9, 3.50–54; cf. Lausberg 686). His examples of polysyndeton are followed by the remarks, “sed utrumque horum acervatio est aut iuncta aut dissoluta,” and “omnibus scriptores sua nomina dederunt, sed varia et ut cuique fingenti placuit.” Further, “fons quidem unus, quia acriora facit et instantiora quae dicimus, et vim quandam praeterea velut saepius erumpens affectus” (9, 3.53–54). It seems probable that the author of Peri methodou, a work allegedly connected with deinotes, the equivalent of vis, resembles those writers who invent names for various figures. In addition, the notion of an “acervatio” developed through polysyndeton agrees well not only with the basic concept of plethos but also with amplification and congeries. Thus, our best course would seem to be to assume that plethos, as a figure made per adiectionem, related to, or identical with, some form of congeries (itself an “acervatio”), is one of those figures cited by Quintilian which uses an accumulation of words, in its case, “of synonyms”, to produce “vim”. The plethos-congeries-polysyndeton relationship, then, might be compared

\textsuperscript{36) Place names and the term megethos connected with polysyndeton occur earlier in Demetrius II 54 (cf. Lausberg 686), who uses Iliad II 497 as his example. That critic observes that the names of the Boeotian towns there have “μέγεθος διὰ τοὺς συνδέσμους ἐφεξῆς τοσοῦτος τεθέντας”. Further, in II 63 (cp. Lausberg 686) Demetrius gives another instance of proper names in polysyndeton and states “ἡ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συνδέσμου θέσεις ἐμφανίζει τι ἄπειρον πλήθος.” This is another nontechnical usage of plethos, but it does give us some idea of the connotations of the word.
to the synathroismos-congeries-asyndeton relationship, with the first two figures of each group nearly identical and often appearing separately in conjunction with the third.

The next figure mentioned in the section of Peri methodou under investigation in the present study is epenthymesis, which is defined as “ἐνθύσημα ἑπιφερόμενον, δὴ προστεθὲν μὲν ὁ ποθεῖται, προστεθὲν δὲ τὸ πᾶν ὁφελεῖ” (418.15), that is, as an argument which is nonessential but which is a helpful addition. The purpose of epenthymesis is to soften “τὰ ἡθνη”, when the arguments being presented are harsh and remorseless. Obviously, τὰ ἡθνη here has to refer to the nature of the arguments (διανοήματα), rather than to the characters of the speaker or his audience.

The term epenthymesis may be the result of an attempt by Ps.-Hermogenes to name a practice described by Hermogenes in the Περὶ εὐφέσεως (III, pp. 152–154; cf. Martin 104). There the author presents the ἐπιθύμημα, a second enthymeme which is “invented” in addition to one that has preceded it (152.10ff.). In citing an example, Hermogenes takes as a theme the sentence “in fact the king dug through Mount Athos.” He then forms an enthymeme which states, “and indeed, while he dug through a mountain, a more difficult deed, we, on the other hand, shall dig through the earth, an act that is not difficult.” A second enthymeme, the epenthymeme, follows, remarking “and indeed he dug in order to gain some advantage, but we will dig so that we may not be surpassed and suffer harm.” According to Hermogenes, this second enthymeme is invented “ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας” and added (ἐπιφερόμενον) to the first one. There is no reference to the “softening” mentioned by Peri methodou. Instead, Hermogenes comments later (153.16–20) on a situation in which, when one enthymeme is not complete in itself, another is added as a supplement to provide a “περιπτωτέων δομώτητα” (cf. Martin

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37) Although Peri methodou refers only to an enthymema, not to more than one, Gregory of Corinth (1147.14; cf. 1148.9) thinks that the figure involves the addition of two or three other enthymemes; compare Hermogenes, Περὶ εὐφέσεως, 152.6–9. On the tradition of the enthymeme as a figure, see note 43 below.

38) Concerning the doubtful authenticity of this treatise, vide Kennedy, Roman, 626–628; Radermacher, 873–877.

Kennedy (626) observes that in book III, “the author is not interested in proof in the way Aristotle was, but in amplification and the arrangement of material.” This interest seems to be shared by the author of Peri methodou.
104). The use of the adjective *perittoteran*, of course, makes us think of *perittos*, but the meaning here seems to be “more acute” or “more striking”, rather than “more elaborate”. At any rate, if the author of *Peri methodon* drew on Hermogenes in developing the concept of *epenthymesis*, he did not follow that rhetorician entirely, for the idea of “softening” seems to be his own addition and contrary to the notion of creating a “more striking keenness”. Ps.-Hermogenes seems to have taken the *epenthymema*, which is a form of argument in *Peri heureseos*, and designated its use in a certain fashion as a figure of thought. As his example, he cites, but does not quote, the opening of Pericles’ funeral oration in Thucydides 2, 35, where, in his opinion, the thought “οὐχ ἐδει λέγεσθαι ἐπιτάφιον” has been softened by *epenthymesis* (418.19–25).

Closely associated with *epenthymesis* is the second figure of thought, *katholikoi logoi*, since occurrences of the two devices are found “side by side”, as in Thucydides 2, 35 (418.19). Further, while *epenthymesis*, as we noted above, functions as a “softener” of harsh arguments, *logoi* which are “koinoi” and “katholikoi” are employed for the proof of “ιδιων λόγον” (418.22), and so also have a place in argumentation. Gregory of Corinth (1154.20ff.; cf. Ernesti 165) has identified the figure *katholikoi logoi* for us, stating that it is clear that “γνώμας τούς λόγους πάντες τούς καθολικους ὑπομαζονσι.” According to Gregory, Theophrastus said that *gnome* is the “καθόλον ἀπόφασις ἐν τοῖς πράξεως”. The term ἀπόφασις here obviously must be the alternate spelling of ἀπόφασις, which means “statement” (cf. LSJ 226), rather than the ἀπόφασις which denotes “negation” and does not correspond with Gregory’s description of *gnome*. While the commentator does not tell where Theophrastus mentioned *gnome*, we can easily trace Theophrastus’ source. In his *Ars Rhetorica* (II, 1394a21) Aristotle defines *gnome* as “ἀπόφασις, οὐ μέντοι οὕτε περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἐκαστῷ, οἷον ποῖος τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου καὶ οὗ περὶ πάντων, ... ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσι, καὶ αἰστε ἥ φυσικά ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ πράττειν”, a definition upon which Theophrastus must depend39). The connection of *gnome* with “ka-

39) Gerber, 39, note 2, writes concerning Gregory (1154.24ff.) that even if this fragment does not seem to render Theophrastus’ words “integra”, it must be connected with his περὶ γνώμης or with his art of rhetoric. See in addition G. Rosenthal, “Ein vergessenes Theophrastfragment”, *Hermes* 32 (1897) 317–320; Kassel’s edition of Aristotle’s *Ars Rhetorica*, p. 119.
tholou” found in Aristotle and Theophrastus had a continuing tradition which undoubtedly led to the use of *katholikoi logoi* in *Peri methodou* to designate what must be *gnomai*. For instance, when, in his section on *chreias* (*Progymnasmata* 5, Spengel II, 96), Theon lists differences between the *chreia* and the *gnome*, he remarks (96.27–29) that “ποτὲ δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποφαίνεται τὴν χρείαν, τὴν δὲ γνώμην καθόλου μόνον.” Further, Nicholas Sophistes (*Progymnasmata* 4; Spengel III, 463.25; cf. Lausberg 1121) writes “τὸν γνώμην ἀπόφασιν εἶναι βούλευτα καθολικήν…” The definition of primary importance for our investigation, however, is that found in the *Progymnasmata* attributed to Hermogenes. There we encounter *gnome* explained as a “λόγος κεφαλαιώδης ἐν ἀποφάσει καθολικῆς ἀποτέλεσι τι ἢ προτέτοιο ἐπὶ τι ἢ ὀποῖον ἐκαστόν ἐστι δηλῶν” (p. 8.16–18; cf. Lausberg 1121). No direct link between these three *Progymnasmata* and *Peri methodou* need be shown here, for it is evident that the relationship between *katholou* or *katholike* and *gnome* has a long tradition which would permit an identification of *katholikoi logoi* with *gnome* or *gnomai*.

There are also precedents for the classification of *gnome* as a figure. For example, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* includes a figure of diction called *sententia* and defines it as an “oratio sumpta de vita, quae (a)ut quid sit aut quid esse opporteat in vita, breviter ostendit” (4, 17.24). Further, according to that treatise, there is a “genus sententiae, quod confirmatur subiectio rationis,” which is illustrated by the sentence” omnes bene vivendi rationes in virtute sunt conlocandae, propterea quod sola virtus in sua potestate est, omnia praetera subjecta sunt sub fortunae dominationem” (4, 17.24). The Aristotelian origin of this doctrine is clear (cf. *Ars Rhetorica* II, 1394a29ff.), although the topic undoubtedly went through numerous treatments before reaching the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Two rhetoricians, Cornelius Celsus and Visellius, who classed the use of *gnomes* as a figure of thought are cited by Quintilian (9, 2.104 and 107), who disapproves of such a classification41). Celsus

40) Cp. Lausberg 872. Quintilian (8, 5.3) writes that “antiquissimae sunt, quae proprie, quamvis omnius idem nomen sit, sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci πρότερον appellant”. In a later passage (8, 5.7) the rhetorician mentions the term *katholika* with reference to a type of *gnome* or *sententia*.

41) In 9, 3.98, Quintilian mentions figures of thought listed by Caeci-
probably was not a professional rhetorician and seems to have based his discussion of figures on the work of Rutilius Lupus\textsuperscript{42}). Among the devices which he called figures is found the "proverbiis uti". Visellius, who, in Quintilian's opinion, also errs, even though he "paucissimas faciat figuras," puts sententia into his list of figures, which, interestingly enough, also includes enthymeme. To these references to the figure sententia may be added Isidore of Seville, who lists sententia, a "dictum impersonale," among the figures of thought\textsuperscript{43}). Thus, although the stronger tradition seems to have excluded sententia or gnome from the figures of diction or thought, there did exist another tradition which apparently influenced Ps.-Hermogenes into making a figure out of katholikoi logoi. Also, the existence of a figure named enthymeme seems to indicate a possible precedent for the creation of the figure epenthymesis in Peri methodou.

The connection between the gnome and the enthymeme also has a long history, stemming from Aristotle's \textit{Ars Rhetorica}. In the lines following the definition of gnome which we quoted above Aristotle writes (1394a27–29) that the conclusions and beginnings of enthymemes are more or less gnomai, when they are looked at by themselves (i.e. out of the context of their rhetorical syllogism). For example, the gnome

\begin{center}
\textit{οὐκ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων ὅστις ἐστ' ἐλεύθερος}
\end{center}

helps to form an enthymeme, when it is joined to the phrase,

\begin{center}
\textit{ἡ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλος ἐστιν ἡ τύχη} \textsuperscript{44}).
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{43}) Vide Kennedy, \textit{Roman}, 484–485, who also notes that Rutilius Lupus took examples from Gorgias of Athens.

\textsuperscript{42}) Vide Kennedy, \textit{Roman}, 484–485, who also notes that Rutilius Lupus took examples from Gorgias of Athens.

Aristotle continues his discussion by presenting various kinds of gnomes, but they need not concern us here, since *Peri methodou* does not mention any of them.

We have already noted one apparent continuation of this Aristotelian tradition, that is, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4, 17.24). To this may be added Quintilian (8, 5.3-4; cf. Lausberg 872), who says of the type of *sententia* which can be classed as a gnome, "hanc quidam partem enthymematis, quidam initium aut clausulum epichersonatis esse dixerunt, et est aliquando, non tamen semper". Further, "illud verius, esse eam aliquando simplicem, ut ea, quae supra dixi; aliquando ratione subjecta." This connection of gnome and reason seems closely related to the species of example given in the Aristotelian passage cited above, but Quintilian may also want to show that not every such connection produces an enthymeme. Elsewhere, however, the Roman writer specifically describes one form of enthymeme as a "sententiam cum ratione" (5, 10.1–2). Later experts on rhetoric knew of a "sententiale" or "gnomikon" enthymeme, which seems to have developed from the concept of the "sententiam cum ratione." For instance, Isidore of Seville (2, 9.11; Halm 512; cf. Lausberg 872) mentions the *sententiale* type, while Fortunatianus (2, 29; Halm 118) lists *gnomikon* among his "genera enthymematum". C. Iulius Victor even provides a distinction between the gnomic *enthymeme* and the "sententia", commenting (11, 34; Halm 412), "sed enthymema gnomicon hoc a sententia differt, quod ibi tantum simpliciter sententia pronuntiatur, hic autem simul et ratio sententiae redditur" (cf. Martin 103–104). Even though all of these are Latin writers, they still reflect the joint Graeco-Roman tradition. Thus, we should not be surprised to find *epenthymeme* (or *epenthymesis* in this case) and *katholikoi logoi*, the "descendants" of *gnome* and *enthymeme*, connected in *Peri methodou*.

There remains, certainly, the question of how close a relationship is implied by "παράλλαξις". In order to answer this, we must turn to the example cited by Ps.-Hermogenes, which is the beginning of the funeral oration delivered by Pericles in Thucydides 2, 35. Apparently *Peri methodou* assumes that the theme of this section is "ούκ ἐδει λέγεσθαι ἐπιτάφιον" (418.25), and it wants to show how this view is softened and proved through the use of the figures *epenthymesis* and *katholikoi logoi*. It would be helpful, of course, if Ps.-Hermogenes had told us how he defines *enthymeme*. We cannot really tell from his description of *epenthymesis*
whether he considers the _enthymeme_ a rhetorical syllogism with one or more parts suppressed or an argument from contraries\(^45\). If he actually is following the Hermogenean _Peri heureseos_, which has the only extant discussion of _epenthymeme_, and which features examples of _enthymemes_ based on the \(\mu\varepsilon\nu\_\varepsilon\) construction, then we should expect him to be an adherent of the "contraries" or "antithetical" view of the _enthymeme_ or at least to cite examples involving contrasts. If we look for these contrasts, we can produce a scheme of "arguments" in Thucydides 2, 35, which seems to be what _Peri methodou_ calls _epenthymesis_. According to this scheme, the first "enthymeme" would be the whole of 35.1. Here Pericles observes that, while \(\omega\mu\varepsilon\nu\_\pi\omicron\lambda\omega\omicron\omicron\) have praised the person who established the law adding a speech to the funeral ceremony, he himself thinks it sufficient that, since men have been good "\(\varepsilon\gamma\gamma\omicron\omicron\)", then honor should be paid them "\(\varepsilon\gamma\gamma\omicron\omicron\)". Further, the courage of many men should not be "risked" on the basis of one man's speaking ability (or lack of it)\(^46\). Section 35.2 then must contain the _epenthymeme_, which Ps.-Hermogenes deems necessary to soften the effects of the _enthymeme_. Thus, we may take as our supplementary _enthymeme_ the passage which begins by stating that it is difficult to speak in due measure, when the appearance of truth is hardly established. To this remark is joined the contrast which forms the _enthymeme_\(^47\), as


Regarding Aristotelian influence on later theories of the _enthymeme_ and _epicheireme_, consult F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric", in _Kleine Schriften_ II (Hildesheim 1968), 194–203. Something of the notion of opposition found in the _enthymeme_ as an argument from contraries may also be derived from Aristotle. As Grimaldi has shown (78), the "general topic of opposites (B 23, 97abff.)... is the first general topic for enthymemes given by Aristotle which might indicate that he finds the quality of opposition of some importance for the _enthymeme_". See also 80–81 (on _gnome_ and _enthymeme_).

\(^46\) I am following the edition by H.S. Jones (Oxford, rep. 1966), and obviously I have compressed the argument here, while retaining its essential parts. On the authenticity of this speech and its sentiments, see especially Hans Herter, "Zur ersten Periklesrede des Thukydides", in his _Kleine Schriften_ (ed. E. Vogt, München 1975), 214–222.

\(^47\) Cf. Hermogenes, _P. heureseos_, 153.22–25, where there appears the _enthymeme_ "\(\kappa\alpha\lambda\varepsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\varepsilon\omicron\nu\varepsilon\omicron\nu\_\omicron\varepsilon\omicron\varsigma\varepsilon\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu"
Pericles warns that the listener who is knowledgeable and well-disposed probably would think that what is being set forth is something rather inferior to what he wishes and knows. On the other hand, continues Pericles, the listener who is unacquainted with the facts thinks, because of his envy, that there has been exaggeration, if he hears something "ὑπερ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσαν". Appended to these remarks is another contrast, which Pericles may have considered a second epenthymeme. Here the Athenian statesman notes that panegyrics spoken about other people are sufferable to the extent that each one feels himself competent to do something of what he has heard, but "τὸ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν φθονοντες ἦδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν." The passage then ends with a comment (35.3) expressing the speaker's intention to obey the law by delivering the eulogy, since the custom was approved by "τοῖς πάλαι".

The above analysis has shown how Thucydides 2, 35.1–3, could have been reduced to enthymemes and epenthymemes by the author of Peri methodou. Further, there are obvious examples of katholikoi logoi in this passage. For instance, the second epenthymeme could stand on its own as a gnome. The remark about envy in the first epenthymeme also has the nature of a "general truth"48), as does the phrase "ὁς καλὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων χαρτομένος ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτῶν", which occurs in the opening enthymeme. Thus, we see that not only do katholikoi logoi and epenthymesis stand "parallax" in the sense of "side by side but distinct", but they also are "side by side" in the sense that gnomic statements form parts of the epenthymemes. Parallax, then, can imply as close a relationship as that between enthymeme and gnome in Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica. Further, the second epenthymeme in the Thucydidean passage seems to be an instance of the combination of a gnome with a reason, which typifies the form given in Aristotle and reflects the kind cited by the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Quintilian, and C. Iulius Victor, as quoted above.

With this description of epenthymesis and katholikoi logoi, we complete our study of the three other figures which are discussed in section 5 of Peri methodou, where diatribe appears. It should be evident now that plethos, epenthymesis, and katholikoi logoi are

48) A. W. Gomme (ed.), A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, II (Oxford 1956), 103, observes concerning this passage that "it is always dangerous to generalize about a people, but no body of men has ever been so conscious of envy and its workings as the Greeks".
rhetorical figures in the opinion of Ps.-Hermogenes, and that there is a tradition which allows these devices to be so termed. In addition, all three figures definitely provide some form of amplification or elaboration. Plethos creates its effect through the use of a variety of synonyms. In epenthymesis elaboration is created by appending a second argument or epenthymeme to one already stated but expressing a harsh sentiment. Finally, the device called katholikoi logoi augments by supplying a general truth which, in combination with more specific remarks (the “λόγων καθολικών τοῖς ἰδίως συμπλοκή”), helps to convince the listener. With the characteristics of these three figures established, we now may turn our attention to a detailed investigation of diatribe, which should resemble the devices surrounding it in Peri methodou in that, like them, it is a figure and a form of elaboration.

Since we already have quoted the definition of diatribe from Peri methodou in the first paragraph of the present study, we need not repeat it here. Further, we pointed out above that diatribe, like plethos, is classed under kata lexin, which we have interpreted as a classification covering figures of diction. Now we shall investigate the examples of diatribe cited by Ps.-Hermogenes and try to determine on the basis of them and of certain key terms in the definition precisely what sort of figure Peri methodou is describing.

Looking for key terms within the definition we encounter first the word “ektasis”, which may be literally translated as “a stretching out” or even as a “lengthening” (LSJ 321), rather than simply an “expansion”. The noun is a technical term in rhetoric and grammar, and turns up in discussions of rhythm and the lengthening of syllables. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for instance, writes of the “ἐκτάσεις” and “συστολάς” of words 49. We also find the term in more technical rhetorical works, such as the Peri ὁρθών of Tryphon. There ektaisis is listed under pleonasmos (lengthening) and defined as a “λέξεις ἐκτεινομένη παρὰ τὸ σύνθετος, οἶον καλλίστη, δέλησι, δῶσι” (Spengel III, 198.8). Ektasis in Peri methodou, however, is not connected with the lengthening of syllables. It is not impossible that the word has been taken over from discussions of vowel length and then used some-

49) De comp. verborum 25; p. 268.19 in Roberts’ edition. The verbal forms “ἐκτεινέται” and “συστελείται” are in chapter 14 (Roberts, 140.18) in a discussion of vowels. Cf. Ernesti, 99, who cites additional examples of the use of ektasis and ekteino.
what metaphorically, but we can find a more likely origin for its utilization, if we look at two related verbal forms occurring in the *progymnasmata*. First of all, in its section dealing with myths, the *Progymnasmata* attributed to Hermogenes observes that it is necessary “αὐτὸς ποτὲ μὲν ἐκτείνειν, ποτὲ δὲ αναστέλλειν”. The author then gives his instructions for “extending” and shortening the presentation of a myth (p. 2.11–3.14). Interestingly enough, at the close of the example of “ekteinein” (3.12) there appears the verbal form “διατρίβον”, obviously referring to the way in which the extending is to continue\(^\text{50}\). Another writer of *progymnasmata*, Theon, employs forms of the verb “ἐπεκτείνειν”, when he delineates ways of expanding the *chreia*. Theon writes that we extend (ἐπεκτείνομεν) the *chreia*, whenever we lengthen (μηκενομεν) the questions and answers or some deed or feeling contained in it (Spengel II, 103.28–30; cf. Lausberg 1110). Ps.-Hermogenes’ *diatribe*, of course, is not directly connected with either myth or *chreia*. The appearance of forms of *ekteinein* and *epekteinein* in discussions involving extension, and thus, in fact, expansion, in these two exercises, however, suggests that *ektasis* in *Peri methodou*, connected as it is with the “βραχέος διανοήματος ἡδικὸν”, owes its utilization to a tradition related to the technical usage of its kindred verbal forms. Somewhere in this tradition *ektasis* must have assumed a connotation of lengthening associated not with the value of syllables, but with amplification or elaboration.

As important as *ektasis* in the definition of *diatribe* is the phrase “βραχέος διανοήματος ἡδικὸν”, which establishes the kind of extension involved in the figure, namely, the lengthening of a “brief moral thought” (cf. Kenney as cited in note 10 above). It is possible, however, that the adjective *ethikos* implies more than just “moral” here. Ps.-Hermogenes clearly views *diatribe* as a device which helps the speaker win his audience’s favor. We see this factor in the second half of the definition, which we shall discuss presently. The emphasis on the orator’s character suggests that *ethikos* may also have some connotation of character, rather than only the meaning “moral”. Thus, we might come closer to our author’s view of *diatribe*, if we render the phrase “βραχέος διανοήματος ἡδικὸν” as “of a brief thought show-

\(^{50}\) See C.S. Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400) Interpreted from Various Works* (Gloucester, Mass., 1959), 24, who renders *diatribon* here as “dwelling on the incidents”.
ing moral character”. Since this translation is rather cumbersome, however, we shall substitute the rendering “of a brief ethical thought”, where the English cognate is understood to encompass both the idea of “moral” and the notion of character. The change is slight, but it does provide a nuance which may be in keeping with other uses of ethos and ethikos by Ps.-Hermogenes (cf. 418.10 and above after note 30).51)

A stronger emphasis on character occurs in the second half of the definition with the concept of “το ἰδεὸς τοῦ λέγοντος” remaining in “τῆς γνώμης τοῦ ἀκούόντος”. The phrase “το ἰδεὸς τοῦ λέγοντος” has its own long tradition, extending back to Aristotle’s stress on the need for an orator to establish his good character in the eyes of his audience, and it may have become something of a topos by the time of Peri methodou52). Both of the illustrations cited by Ps.-Hermogenes give clear indications of the working of this concept. Conspicuous in the basic thought (“all know the arrogance of Meidias”) and in the developed form of the prologue to Demosthenes Against Meidias, the first of the examples, is the emphasis on the bad character of Meidias. Reference to Meidias’ nature is an ethical thought, with both of the connotations of the word ethikos, and allows the speaker to show what we might term “moral indignation” at the behaviour of his opponent (cf. Gregory of Corinth 111.23 ff.). This indignation then creates a favorable impression of the character of the orator, who is depicting himself not only as the victim of his enemy’s excesses, but also as a “right-thinking” person who, along with

51) For instance, Peri methodou uses ethikos in its discussion of asyndeton (427). Again, in section 20, the ἰδεὸς δόχος is delineated (435–436). I will provide a more detailed investigation of ethikos in Peri methodou in a future study.

The precedents in rhetorical literature for interpreting ethikos as “expressive of character” or “of moral character” are too numerous to list here, ranging from Aristotle on to Cicero (Orator 37.128), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (especially in his Lysias), Ps.-Aristides, and Hermogenes. Valuable surveys of the topic are provided by J.F. Lockwood, “ΗΘΙΚΗ ΛΕΞΙΣ and Dinarchus”, CQ 23 (1928) 181, and W. Süss, Ethos, Studien zur älteren griechischen Rhetorik (Leipzig 1910). See also Solmsen, 203–204; E. Schüttrumpf, Die Bedeutung des Wortes Ethos in der Poetik des Aristoteles (Zetemata 49, München 1970); A. Hellwig, Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles (Hypomnemata 38, Göttingen 1973).

52) On the “ἡδος τοῦ λέγοντος” cp. Aristotle, Ars Rhetorica I, 1356a 1 ff., and II, 1395b 13 ff.; Grimaldi, 61–62; Hellwig, 251–257 and passim; Martin, 96–97, 158 ff., 257; Ret. ad Her. 1, 4–5 and Caplan, 14, note a; Süss, 150 ff.; Τέχνη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου (Anon. Seguer), Spengel I, 439.3.
the “good men” judging his case, strongly disapproves of such behaviour.

When we turn to the second illustration, we again find evidence for the importance of the speaker’s character in Ps.-Hermogenes’ view of diatribe. In the opening section of On the Crown Demosthenes tries to win the goodwill of his audience through two prayers, which stress first his own goodwill and then the obligation of the judges to consider the laws of Athens and their oath to hear both sides equally. Through these prayers the orator provides a classic example of an introduction which aims at securing the favor of the listeners by creating a good impression of the speaker as an honest man. Further, this prooimion fits well into the category of introductions described by Quintilian as taken “ab actore”. That rhetorician notes concerning a speaker (4, 1.7), “quamquam enim pauciora de se ipso dicit et parcius, plurimum tamen ad omnia momenti est in hoc positum, si vir bonus creditur.” Quintilian’s remark suits our Demosthenes passage, since the orator does say little about himself in it, but he uses indirect means, notably prayers, to convince the judges that he is a man of sterling character. Thus, we must acknowledge the importance of the idea of the good character of the speaker in both of the illustrations and in the definition of diatribe. It is this emphasis on the orator’s character which makes it quite obvious that diatribe in Peri methodou is not the same thing as the Cynic-Stoic diatribe, which dispenses moral philosophy in a popularized form, but which cannot be said to have the creation of a favorable impression of the speaker’s character as a primary aim.

As a result of our investigation of the key words in the definition of diatribe, the predominance of the concepts of ex-
pansion and of creating a favorable impression has become ob­
vious. The importance of character may be unique to Ps.-Her­
mogenes and may not have been a standard feature of the figure
diatribe. We already have seen how Peri methodou describes πλῆθος
in terms of the “moving of character”. Further, the author sees
epenthymesis as a device used to soften the nature of harsh
thoughts, a notion seen to occur nowhere else. We, therefore,
should not be astonished, if we find that diatribe in other writers
maintains its connection with “expansion” and with keeping
something in the mind of the audience, but looses its ties with
character, when it is viewed as a figure. Before pursuing this
facet of diatribe, though, we shall briefly consider what Ps.-
Hermogenes means by the extension of a brief ethical thought.

As was noted earlier, diatribe is a figure of speech for our
author. Thus, we would expect that its creation would depend
on words rather than on thoughts, although the word “thought”
appears in its definition. Verbal expansion is evidently what is
illustrated by the example from the speech Against Meidias.
There, instead of stating only that “all know the arrogance
(bybrin) of Meidias,” Demosthenes has expanded that simple
thought through the addition of “ἀσέλγειαν”, almost synonym­
ous with “ὁδρων”, through the use of the clause “‘Ἰ πρὸς ἀπαντάς
ἄει χρήται Μειδίας”, instead of just “Μειδίον”, and, finally, by
writing “οὐδένα οὐθ’ ὑμῶν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ἁγνοεῖν οἴομαι”,
rather than “πάντες ἵστε”. All of these extensions of individual
words or short phrases involve changes in words rather than
thoughts. Analysis of the second instance of diatribe is less simple,
for Peri methodou does not tell us what it considers the undedifying
thought or how much of the opening of On the Crown it regards
as the prooimion. Gregory of Corinth (1152.15 ff.) seems to have
thought that only the following section of the introductory sen­
tence was meant⁵⁴): “Πρῶτον μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοῖς θεοῖς
ἐυχομαι πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις, δόσην εὐνοιαν ἐξών ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε
πόλει καὶ πάσιν ύμιν, τοσαύτην ὑπάρξαι μοι παρ’ ὑμῶν εἰς τοντον
τῶν ἁγιῶν...” Possibly the Byzantine commentator was trying
to make the illustration from On the Crown have a brevity equal
to that of the example from Against Meidias. Citing only this

⁵⁴) I am quoting here from the text of Demosthenes, On the Crown,
ed. G. Mathieu in Demosthenes, Plaidoyers Politiques IV (Collection des Uni­
versités de France, Paris 1947), which is the text that I shall follow in dis­
cussing the oration. Gregory’s text contains insignificant differences.
part of the prooimion, however, is not satisfactory, for the syntax of the sentence is not taken into account. After the word *agona* which concludes the section quoted by Gregory, the passage continues, “ἐπειθ', ἐπειθ ἐστὶ μάλιστ' ὑπὲρ ύμων καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας εὐσεβείας τε καὶ δόξης, τούτῳ παραστήσαι τοὺς θεοὺς ύμῖν, μὴ τὸν ἀντίδουκν σύμβουλον ποιήσασθαι περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἀκούειν ύμᾶς ἔμοι δεί (σχέτικον γὰρ ἄν εἰθ τοῦτό γε), ἀλλὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸν ὅρκον, ἐν ὑ δόσαι τοῖς ἄλλοις δικαίοις καὶ τούτῳ γέγρασται, τὸ ὄμοιος ἄμφοτὲ ἀναφοράσασθαι.” The verb εὐχομαι, which appears in the first part, governs this section as well, a factor which seems to indicate that we should view the thoughts in both segments as a connected whole. Thus, the underlying *dianoema* would be something like “may heaven inspire the assembly to give me such a trial as my merits deserve and impartial justice dictates,” 55) or, put less elegantly, “I pray that your good will may be equal to mine and that you may avoid prejudice and obey the law.” The idea that this sentence, and perhaps even the shorter one following it (section 2), should be taken as a unit is reinforced by the occurrence of a condensed repetition of it in On the Crown 8, noted by Holmes and Tyler (115; cf. Wankel, 145; note 55), who refer to the prooimion as “a solemn prayer reiterated shortly after (8).” In 8 Demosthenes states “...βούλομαι πάλιν τοὺς θεοὺς παρακαλέσαι, καὶ ἐναντίον ύμῶν εὐχομαι πρὸτον μὲν, ὡσπὸν εὐνοιαν ἐχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πάσιν ύμῖν, τοσούτην ὑπάρξαι μοι παρ' ύμων εἰς τουτὸν τὸν ἀγώνα, ἐπειθ' ὅ τι μέλλει συνοίσει καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξιάν κοινή καὶ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν ἐκάστῳ, τούτῳ παραστήσαι πάσιν ύμῖν περὶ ταυτῷ τῆς γορφῆς γνώμαι.” This remark not only is an instance of “ring composition” used within an oration. It also shows us what section 1 might have looked like without some of the expansions that make it an illustration of *diatribe*. For example, the phrase “τοὺς θεοὺς ... πάσι καὶ πάσισις” is missing, as is all of the portion on the juryman’s oath. We shall discuss the expansion of the basic thought in sections 1 and 8 presently.

The assumption that our example of *diatribe* must include both sections 1 and 2, however, does produce one difficulty. If *diatribe* is a figure of diction, it seems odd that it should encom-
pass so large a segment without affecting the thought. We should remember, first, though, that the often blurred distinction between figures of thought and of diction in antiquity would allow Ps.-Hermogenes to class a figure, whose lengthy development would make us want to call it a figure of thought, as a figure of speech (see above at note 29). Further, many of the amplifications in 1 and 2 are verbal and do not alter the basic thought, although they strengthen it. We should not forget, finally, that the word “brief” in the definition of *diatribe* refers only to the thought and not to its expansion. Thus, parts 1 and 2 may be treated as the example meant by *Peri methodou*, when it cites the *prooimion* of *On the Crown*, without concern for the illustration’s length. With these aspects in mind, we now shall try to determine whether *diatribe* may be identified with any known rhetorical figure.

An attempt at identification of the figure is made by Ernesti (83), whose remarks on *diatribe* were quoted above at note 2. Of course, the devices which he lists are not precisely equivalent. *Commoratio* or “dwelling on the point”, the Latin term for *epimone*, might be a part of a digression (*excursio* or *epeisodion*), for instance, but, according to rhetorical theory, the figure is not a digression, but rather a means of emphasizing an important point. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero’s *De oratore* support this view. For example, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* defines *commoratio* as “cum in loco firmissimo, a quo tota causa continetur, manetur diutius et eodem saepius reditur” (4,45.58). Further, this figure prevents the audience from removing its attention “de re firmissima,” and its *locus* is not “a tota causa separatus”, but rather “tamquam sanguis perfusus est per totum corpus orationis.” The notion of *commoratio* as something spread throughout a speech may have led Ernesti to connect it with *diatribe*, for Aristotle (*Ars Rhetorica* III, 1418a27) writes of διατριβῇ spread throughout an oration56. As we shall indicate below, however, Aristotle is writing about digressions in the sec-

56) Ernesti undoubtedly was aware of the differences in the terms which he cites (see above at footnote 2), and he must have intended for them to be interpreted as possible equivalents for *diatribe*, but not as synonyms for each other. In his description of *epimone* (126), for instance, he does not mention *excursio* or its synonyms, but he does include *commoratio in una re* from Cicero, *De orat.* III 52. We, therefore, should not assume that Ernesti necessarily thought that *commoratio* and Aristotle’s *diatribe* were the same thing.
tion just mentioned, and so we should not make the mistake of assuming that commoratio and epeisodion (or excursio or digressio) are synonyms. That the two are not equivalent is also clear from Cicero, who distinguishes between commoratio and digressio. In De oratore 3, 202 (cf. Martin 135, note 3), for instance, the Roman orator, writing briefly about effective figures of thought, separately mentions “commoratio una in re” and “ab re digressio.” Quintilian (9, 2.4; cf. Lausberg 835) makes the same distinction, when he asks, “Quae delectatio aut quod mediocre saltem docti hominis indicium, nisi alia repetitione, alia commoracione infigere, digredi a re et redire ad propositum suum scierit, removere a se, in alium traicere, quae relinquienda, quae contemnenda sint, iudicare?” We shall treat digressio later, in a discussion of diatribe in Aristotle, but for the moment it is sufficient to note the distinction between digressio or excursio and commoratio. Further, perusal of the examples of diatribe given by Peri methodou reveals that the figure as understood by Ps.-Hermogenes cannot be identical with digression. The passages cited from On the Crown and Against Meidias may in no way be considered digressions, especially since they are the beginnings of the two orations.

Ernesti’s combination of diatribe and commoratio, on the other hand, has much to recommend it. At the very least we may point to the relationship between the two words, since both may have the connotation of spending time on something and thus denote “dwelling on the point”. Epimone, which we shall use interchangeably with commoratio, shares the connotation of spending time, for it can mean “tarrying” or “delay” (LSJ 647; cf. Thucydides 2, 18.3), as well as “dwelling on the point”. Thus, we easily may see how either of the Greek terms could have been the predecessor of commoratio, and also how diatribe could be an equivalent term for epimone.

We already have looked at one definition of commoratio (Rhet. ad Her. 4, 45.58) and at epimone as it appears in four rhetorical writings (see above after note 32). Before we draw any conclusions about diatribe and epimone, however, it behooves us to look further into definitions and examples of the latter. As I mentioned earlier (at note 32), epimone (commoratio) occurs as both a figure of diction and a figure of thought. Commoratio, for instance, is listed among the figures of diction by the Rhetorica ad Herennium (4, 45.58), but with the figures of thought by Cicero (De oratore 3, 202; cf. Martin 135, note 3). Neither of these
works gives any reason for its classification. Lausberg (838) has made some attempt at explaining how *epimone* or *commoratio* could fit into both categories of figure. For him, *epimone* is a figure of thought when there is an accumulation of sentences (Satzhäufung), as this accumulation shows "gedanklich variierte (also nicht identische) Inhalte in der Ausdrucksform eines Gedankens (dem Satz)." Examples are provided from Phoibammon (Spengel III, 51.23), Tiberios (Spengel III, 74.11), and Isidore of Seville (2, 21.43; Halm 521). Phoibammon, whose definition of *epimone* as a figure of diction was quoted above (after note 32), for instance, defines the figure of thought by calling it the "πολλῶν ἐμφορά πραγμάτων, εἰς παράστασιν καὶ δήλωσιν ἐνός." His illustration, based on the theme of showing that someone is "σεrious", remarks, "καὶ νυκτός οὐδὲς μὴ κατεργῶν ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν βιβλίων ἄγερθεις ἀνεγίνωσκε. άφεσθήνως δὲ τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἀνέχει καὶ μαχρόν ὀδον βαδίζειν, ἵνα τοῦτον ἄψι ἀδειπνος ἐκάθευδεν, ἵνα πολὺ ἐννόηση." Under *epimone* in Isidore we find another series of sentences, this time taking the form of the questions, "cui tandem pepericit? cuius amicitiae fidem custodivit, cui bono inimicus non fuit? quando non aut accusavit aliquem aut verberavit aut prodidit?" Tiberios differs somewhat from Isidore and Phoibammon in that the illustrations of his definition are quite brief. One of his examples was cited above in the discussion of *plethos* and to this we may add his second instance, "αγεῖς, ἐλαύνεις, διώκεις, συνοφαντεῖς" (which Lausberg lists under another kind of *epimone*, his third division). In the first illustration the *epimone* depends on a variation in nouns, while in the second the verbs, with their subjects ("you") understood, satisfy only the minimum requirements for complete sentences. The apparent dependence on single words, whether nouns or verbs, tempts us to move Tiberios' examples out of their classification as *epimone* involving sentences and into that of *epimone* using single words (Lausberg's third division). In both cases, however, the individual words do occur in, and actually create, distinct sentences, and, thus, they do not correspond to instances like those in Alexander (Spengel III, 18), which employ a row of nouns within the same sentence. Tiberios' illustrations, then, do fit in with those of the two other rhetoricians, but, unlike those men, Tiberios does not consider *epimone* a figure of thought, treating it instead among the figures of speech. This factor reveals a weakness in Lausberg's system. Lausberg apparently has relied upon a modern classification,
based on his view of what the figure should be, and omitted to mention that his classification of forms of epimone in terms of figures of diction or of thought does not always agree with the opinions of his ancient sources. To his first group, by the way, we should add the anonymous Schemata dianoeas (Halm 72,21; cf. Caplan 374), which defines epimone as “latine repetitio crebra sententiae” and quotes the opening three questions of Cicero’s First Catilinarian Oration as its illustrations.

Lausberg next provides two categories encompassing epimone as a figure of diction (figura elocutionis). The first of these is the accumulation of “mehrgliedriger Satzteile” and is a figure of speech because it “belongs to” adiunctio (743; cf. Rhet. ad Her. 4, 27.38). For his examples, Lausberg turns to Phoibammon (Spengel III, 47.25), Zonaios (Spengel III, 162.11) and Anonymous II (Spengel III, 176.8; see above after note 32). The definition and one of the illustrations of Phoibammon were quoted above (after note 32), and here we need add only the second example, which reports, “ὁ τὰ ἐμὰ λαμβάνων, ὁ διαβάλλων με πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, ὁ ἐπιμονεῖσθαι μοι πανταχόθεν τι ποιεῖ, ως δῆλον ὅτι μισεῖ με.” In Zonaios we see epimone described as remaining upon the same thing for the sake of amplification. Zonaios’ illustration reads, “εἰ γὰρ τὸ Βυζάντιον τῆς οἰκονομῆς ὀφθαλμός, γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ὁτι κοάτιστον, ἐώς καὶ ἐσπερίων λήξεως σύνδεσμος, εἰς ἣν τὰ πανταχόθην ἄχρονα συντρέχει καὶ ὃθεν ἀνχεται.” Finally, Anonymous II gives a definition resembling Zonaios’ and cites part of the same example, with minor alterations. To these three instances of epimone formed with “sentence parts” we shall add the passage from Demosthenes’ De falsa legatione 259, mentioned as an illustration of the figure by Demetrius (280) in his discussion of deinotes. After defining epimone as the “ἐμημεία πλείων τοῦ πράγματος,” the critic quotes an abbreviated version of the following sentence: “νόσημα γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νόσημα δεινον ἐμπετπώκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ χαλεπῶν καὶ πολλῆς τινος εὐτυχίας καὶ παρ’ ὅμοιω ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον.”57) The shortened form, of course, is the thought underlying Demosthenes’ rendition and shows how the sentence would have appeared, if it did not contain epimone and were not “deinon”. Demosthenes is the source for yet another illustration of epimone built from “sentence parts”. In his comments on the figure Alexander quotes

57) I have quoted the Demosthenes text after G.Mathieu’s edition (III, Paris 1945; see note 54 above). Lausberg does not include Demetrius in his descriptions of epimone.
from Demosthenes’ Against Meidias 74 (Spengel III, 18.6ff.; cf. Walz VIII, 441) the complaint, “ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὑπ᾿ ἐχθροῦ γήφοντος ἑυθεν, ὑβρεῖ καὶ ὁδὸν οἴνω τούτῳ ποιοῦντος, ἐναντίον πολλῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ πολιτῶν ὑβρισάμεν.” The sentence in the oration continues, “καὶ ταῦτ᾿ ἐν ἑρεί καὶ οἱ πολλῇ μοι ἐν ἀνάγκῃ βαδίζειν χορηγοῦντι” (ed. J. Humbert and L. Gernet, Paris 1959, vol. 2), although Alexander does not include this section. Here the thought “I was assaulted by my insolent enemy” certainly has been expanded to stress the gravity of Meidias’ offense, and to portray his bad character.

As was the case with Lausberg’s first category, this second grouping leaves itself open to criticism. First of all, Anonymous II and Zonaios list epimone as a figure of thought, not as a figure of diction. Lausberg’s classification would have been more accurate, if he had either mentioned this variation or avoided the distinction between thought and diction altogether, keeping only his divisions based on the use of sentences or “sentence parts”. Our second criticism involves the idea that epimone belongs to adiunctio, since the two figures actually are not related. According to the Rhetorica ad Herennium (4, 27.38), adiunctio occurs when the verb “quo res conprehenditur” is not put into the middle of its sentence, but instead is placed “aut primum aut postremum”. This figure, so defined, certainly is rather different from epimone or commoratio. If we look at the examples of epimone provided by Phoibammon, Zonaios, and Anonymous II, we see that Lausberg apparently was misled by the form of the sentences given, which generally resembles those used to illustrate adiunctio. Phoibammon’s first example, for instance, with its repetition of prepositional phrases may have reminded Lausberg of an adiunctio such as “deflorescit formae dignitas aut morbo aut vetustate” (Rhet. ad Her. 4, 27.38). The example cited by Zonaios and the anonymous work, on the other hand, can in no way be considered adiunctio, for the necessary verbal linkage is missing. Thus, while adiunctio may occasionally appear in passages illustrating epimone, the collocation of figures should not be taken as an indication of a necessary relationship between them.

Lausberg characterizes his third kind of epimone as the accumulation of individual words, a figure of diction, and he takes examples from Alexander (Spengel III, 17.28), Tiberios (Spengel III, 74.8), and Anonymous I (Spengel III, 147.19ff.). We already have quoted two of Alexander’s illustrations (after note 32
above) of the figure, which he defines as dwelling “ἐπὶ πλείων” upon the same thought with amplification. Further, Tiberios’ description and cases have been treated in the discussion of Lausberg’s first classification. It should be emphasized here, though, that Lausberg includes only Tiberios’ second example under *epimone* involving sentences and puts the first example, composed of single verbs, into this third category. We have argued above that both examples fit into the “sentence” division, although, since the first illustration is composed of one word sentences, we also could place it into category three, with reservations, as a special case.

The third work given by Lausberg as an illustrator of his final division is influenced either directly or indirectly by Hermogenes. The author of *Anonymous I* writes that *epimone* is a figure in which “ἐφ’ ὄν ἰσχύωμεν πραγμάτων χρώμεθα αὐτῷ.” The possible source for this remark is Hermogenes’ *Peri ideon* 285, 23–24, where we read “ταῖς γὰρ ἐπιμοναῖς ἐφ’ ὄν ἰσχύωμεν πραγμάτων χρώμεθα.”58) For its examples, *Anonymous I* cites Demosthenes’ *On the Crown* 298 and 63. The first of these was quoted in part above in our discussion of *plethos*. In reproducing some of *On the Crown* 63 as its second instance, *Anonymous I* seems to be related to Hermogenes, for it includes only that section which Hermogenes has (P. i. 286, 1–3), omitting the “τἴρ πόλιν” (which is not in Demosthenes’ text), but retaining the “ἐξῆς” indicative of the incompleteness of the citation.

Once again we must point out a difficulty in the classification. Tiberios is the only one of the rhetoricians quoted for the third kind of *epimone* who lists it as a figure of diction. Alexander, Hermogenes, and *Anonymous I* all consider *epimone* a figure of thought. As we stated above, Lausberg, making a valiant effort to bring order to the material on *epimone*, apparently decided to organize his three groups according to a modern view, rather than strictly after his sources. In order to avoid confusion, however, we shall abandon the classification based on the type of figure and distinguish forms of *epimone* according to their involvement with sentences, sentence parts, or individual words.

Obviously, we have delineated all of the kinds of *epimone* because they have a bearing on our attempt to identify *diatribe*. We demonstrated earlier that *plethos* in *Peri methodou* cannot be *epimone*, although the two figures are related. Now we shall

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reconsider the examples of *diatribe* cited by Ps.-Hermogenes to see whether the figure *diatribe* corresponds to any type of *epimone*.

The first illustration of *diatribe* and its underlying thought have been quoted and discussed above (see after note 1 and before note 54). There we indicated that the expansion was produced by the insertion of the clause “ὦ...Μειδίας” and the infinitive phrase “οὐδένα...ἀγνοεῖν”, governed by οἴομαι. The only extension involving single words is the addition of “τὴν μὲν ἀσέλγειαν” to supplement the “τὴν ὀβέσσω” of the basic concept. Clearly Demosthenes is being redundant in appending a synonym for *hybris*. He also is dwelling on his point, when he brings in his audience through the clause and phrase mentioned and stresses the misbehavior of his adversary, thereby establishing the tone and theme of his *exordium*. Since the extension of the thought (or dwelling on the point) is accomplished primarily through sentence parts, we shall put the type of *diatribe* represented by *Against Meidias* 1 into Lausberg’s second category of *epimone*. Examples such as Zonaios’, with its phrases in apposition and clauses beginning with εἰς ὧν and ὤθεν, and Alexander’s third illustration from *Against Meidias* 74, which features the same kinds of development, justify this classification.

The *prooimion* of *On the Crown* also contains *epimone* of the second type. As we noted above, section 8 of that oration shows us how section 1 might have looked without expansion, although the former still retains the clause δανὴ...ὡμῖν and its correlative phrase τοσαυτὴν...ἀγῶνα, which are part of the extension of the thought underlying section 1. If we assume that the theme of *On the Crown* 1 is “I pray that your good will may be equal to mine and that you may avoid prejudice and obey the law”, we can see that this sentiment is enlarged through sentence parts. Thus, instead of saying just έύχομαι or τοῖς θεοῖς έύχομαι, the orator adds πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις 59). The simple idea of praying that the jurors’
good will may equal Demosthenes’ is expressed through a relative clause, δανγ... ύμιν, matched to its correlative infinitive phrase, where the words μοι παρ’ ύμων help to reinforce the ἐγὼ and πᾶσιν ύμιν preceding them. Additional fulness occurs in the use of ἔχων ἐγώ διετέλω, strengthened through its assonance, rather than a mere ἔχω, and in the pointed τοῦτον. In this first half of the sentence, then, we have ample indication that Demosthenes is dwelling on his point by means of an expansion of sentence parts. The second half contains similar kinds of amplification. For instance, the orator begins his appeal to his judges’ concept of justice by inserting the clause ὅτε... δόξης, which utilizes a prepositional phrase to dwell on the piety and good repute that is expected of the jurors. Certainly the clause is not a syntactical necessity, for the infinitive παραστήσαι has a subject and an object, τοῦτο and the phrases to which it leads. We, therefore, should count the ὅτε clause as a sentence part added to let the speaker emphasize his topic. Further analysis of this kind would provide us with other illustrations of how Demosthenes expands and stresses his point. For instance, instead of only reminding the jurors that they should remember the laws and their oath to listen to both sides equally, the orator inserts the clause ἐν ὑπ... γέγρασσαι, another sentence part which is not strictly necessary. Nor is the prepositional phrase πρὸς... δικαίους essential 59A). Both the clause and the phrase, however, allow Demosthenes to linger over his theme and thus help him to bring it strongly to the attention of his listeners.

These instances which we have cited are enough to justify our contention that the figure epimone is present in On the Crown 1. Further, it is irrelevant whether we follow Gregory of Corinth and assume that the epimone involves only the first half of the sentence, or whether, on the basis of the syntax, we insist that the whole sentence be taken into account. Either half of the statement could serve as an illustration of the figure, if we simplify the underlying thought by breaking it in two. In any case, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Ps.-Hermogenes has chosen examples of epimone to illustrate his figure diatribe. We, therefore, may assume that he has given the name diatribe to what most other rhetorical writers called a form of epimone, specifically the type developed through sentence parts, and that

59A) According to Wankel I, 115, the phrase πρὸς... δικαίους within this clause is “eine geläufige Form der Peribole”.
Gregory of Corinth is at least correct in his assertion that *diatribe* involves *cola* rather than the single words found in *plethos* (see above after note 31).

There still remains the question of whether *Peri methodou* is unique in its application of the term *diatribe*. To provide an answer to this query we shall examine the relevant occurrences of *diatribe* in two other sources. The first of these is Aristotle’s *Ars Rhetorica*, III, 1418a27 (cf. Ernesti 83), which is the earliest use of *diatribe* with a connotation applicable to the present investigation. In chapters 13–16 of book III Aristotle writes about the disposition (*taxis*) of a speech, which he views as having four divisions (1414b7), i.e. introduction (*prooimion*), statement of the case or narrative (*prothesis* or *diegesis*), proof (*pistis*), and epilogue (*epilogos*). Chapter 17 and part of chapter 18 are devoted to the study of proof, with the chief emphasis on deliberative and judicial forms of oratory. Within this section Aristotle comments that the deliberative type of speech is *γαλεσίωτερον* than the judicial form (1418a21). He includes among his reasons the tendency of deliberative to be concerned with “τὸ μέλλον”, while judicial deals with the past. Further, judicial, unlike deliberative, has the law as its starting point. The final contrast appears in the remark that a deliberative speech does not have “πολλὰς διατριβάς, οἷν πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἧματα πάντων, ἡνὶ μὴ ἐξίστηται.” Naturally, we are tempted to identify *diatribas* with the figure *diatribe*, especially since the reference to the speaker and his opponent would seem to fit in with the notion of character stressed by Ps.-Hermogenes. Such an identification is difficult to maintain, however, in light of the advice that Aristotle dispenses in 1418a29–37. There the philosopher writes that, if one is at a loss, he should do what the Athenian orators and Isocrates do. He then explains what he means by citing the example of Isocrates, who “καὶ γάρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάριτος δ’ ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ” (1418a30–32). The attack on the Spartans comes, incidentally, in Isocrates *Panegyricus* (110–114), while the unfavorable references to Chares occur in the *De pace* (134 and *passim*)60. Aristotle next extends his discussion briefly to *epi-

60) On *De pace* 134, see M.L.W. Laistner (ed.), *Isocrates: De Pace and Philippics, Edited with a Historical Introduction and Commentary* (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 22, New York 1927), 122–123. Sandys, in Cope, *Rhetoric* III, 204, notes in identifying these references that the *Panegyricus* is a “λόγος συμβουλευτικός”, as its ostensible object is to advise Athens.
Epimone and Diatribe: Dwelling on the Point in Ps.-Hermogenes

Deictic oratory, in which one must vary the speech by introducing episodes praising someone or something, such as those introduced by Gorgias (cf. Cope, Rhetoric III, 205; Martin 179).

Aristotle's examples seem to indicate that what he means by diatribas in 1418a27 is "digressions". Digression frequently is mentioned by later rhetorical writers as parecbasis, diexodos, digressio, excursus, and a variety of similar terms, denoting "a description of a place, a person, an event, a myth or a legend" and serving "to bring a relaxation to the mind of the hearer".61) Of course, relaxation was not the sole purpose of digressions, for they also, for instance, could arouse emotion or procure the favor of the audience (cf. Quintilian 4, 3.1-17). The position of digressions and their connection with the body of a speech were topics of dispute among ancient rhetoricians. Cicero, for example, tells us that Hermagoras believed that a digression should come between the arguments and the conclusion of an oration, and that a passage so placed should be "a causa atque a iudicationalis ipsa remotam". Further, this section should contain "aut sui laudem aut adversarii vituperationem" or "in aliam causam deducat, ex qua conficiat aliquod confirmationis aut reprehensionis, non argumentando, sed augendo per quandam amplificationem."62) Cicero disagrees with Hermagoras, observing that digression is not one of the parts of a speech and that praise and blame should not be separate but should be woven in with one's arguments (De inventione I, 51, 97). Quintilian also does not consider the digression one of the fixed parts of a speech, and he defines the egressio or parecbasis as the treatment "alicuius rei, sed ad utilitatem causae pertinentis, extra ordinem excurrens tractatio" (4, 3.14-15). What is important for our investigation here is the emphasis in Cicero and Quintilian on praise and blame, which we may take as corresponding to Aristotle's "ποίησις ἀντίδικου ἢ πείρα αὐτοῦ", and the placing of digressions throughout an oration, just as Aristotle suggests for diatribas.

and Sparta to unite their forces against Persia, under the lead of the former state, but incidentally it becomes a "λόγος ἐπιδεικτικός", when it praises Athens (sections 21-98) and "digresses into the region of λόγος δικαιικός", when it attacks the Lacedaemonians (110-114).

61) Leeman I, 49. For the terms, consult Martin, 89; Volkmann, 164-167, and Lausberg 340, who list the ancient sources which I shall be mentioning.

62) De inventione I 51.97, quoted here from Hermagoras, Fragmenta, ed. D. Matthes (Leipzig 1962), I fr. 22a. Vide Fortunatianus (Halm 113. 15ff.), Julius Victor (Halm 427.24ff.), and Martianus Capella (Halm 487. 6ff.).
Ernesti (83) may have realized that Aristotle was writing about digressions in 1418a27 (see note 56 above), for this passage is the only one which can justify his inclusion of *excursio* and *episodion* among his equivalents for *diatribe*. J. E. Sandys in Cope’s commentary on the *Ars Rhetorica* (III 203) cites Ernesti, but adds an interpretation of *diatribas* as “‘landing-places’, where the speaker may pause and linger for a while, and whence he may even expiate into a passing digression.” For Sandys *diatribai* may be closer to the figure *commoratio* than to *digressio*, although Cope, on whom he relies, seems to have preferred to interpret them as digressions.

Simple dwelling on the point, however, is not what is taking place, for example, in the *diatribe* on the Lacedaemonians in Isocrates’ *Panegyricus*, mentioned by Aristotle. That passage clearly is a digression. Thus, we must reject *commoratio* (*epimone*) as an equivalent for Aristotle’s *diatribas*, when the latter term is applied to this example. The references to Chares (*De pace*) cited by the philosopher, which never refer to the general by name but only talk about him anonymously, on the other hand, seem less likely to be digressions. Although the *De pace* is full of digressions (e.g. 41 ff.), most of the attacks on Chares (such as at 134) are rather brief and seem to qualify neither as digressions nor as instances of *commoratio*. Brevity, however, is not the antithesis of digression. Quintilian provides us with some very short illustrations of *digressio*, including (9, 2.56; cf. Lausberg 341) the remark “et adspexit me illis quidem oculis, quibus turn solebat, cum omnibus omnia minabantur,” from Cicero’s *Pro Milone* 12, 33. Thus, assuming that the Roman rhetorician is using an established tradition, we may apply his concept to the *De pace* and grant that slight departures from the main point may have qualified as digressions, and that, therefore, *diatribe* in its plural form in our Aristotelian passage is referring to digressions. In addition, we should bear in mind the likelihood that *diatribe* was not a technical rhetorical term for Aristotle, but rather was a

63) Sandys is relying on the following passage from E. M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric with Analysis, Notes and Appendices* (London 1867), 359: “again in public speeches, there are few landing places, as it were, pauses in the main argument, where episodical and extraneous matter may be introduced; they admit, that is to say, of very few digressions, for which forensic speeches afford abundant opportunity; such as attacks upon the opponent, exculpatory or panegyrical remarks upon oneself, or appeals to the feelings”.

word chosen by him as indicative of a digression’s tendency to linger over a theme apart from, but related to, the main topic of a speech\(^{64}\).

The other significant uses of *diatribe* by a rhetorician occur in Menander’s *Diagosis τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν* (cf. Ernesti 83)\(^{65}\). Chapter 3 of that treatise provides us with several instances. Menander is discussing invocatory hymns (*kletikoi hymnoi*), and he begins by mentioning examples in which a deity is invoked “from many places”. Then the rhetorician writes as follows (p. 34, 3.3): “τοῖς δὲ συγγραφέωσι βραχυτέραν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα δια- 
τριβήν ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πολλῶν τόπων καὶ χωρίων ἀνακαλέσουσιν οὔτε ἐγκάστῳ μετὰ διαγραφῆς, ἀλλὰ ὡσπερ Πλάτων ὄσπερ ἐξηγούμενος τῷ εἰδει ἀχθηται.” For his illustration from Plato he quotes the *Phaedrus* 13, 237a, “ἀγέτε δὴ Μοῦσαι λέγειαι, 
ἐκτὸς δ’ ὁδὸς εἰδός μονακών, εἰτε διὰ γένος τὸ Διονύσον ταύτην ἐπέ- 
σχετε τὴν ἐπομνημια.”\(^{66}\) Menander then adds the observation that Homer “ἐν κλειτικῷ χαίται τῷ εἰδει μετὰ τῆς ἰδιοποιίας,” and he cites the prayer of Chryses in *Iliad* I, 37–38,

... δὲ Χρύσην ἀμφιβεβήκας

Κῦλλαν τε ζάδενην, Τενέδου τε ἑρὶ ἄνασσεις.

\(^{64}\) The only other occurrence of the word *diatribe* in Aristotle’s *Ars Rhetorica* is in II, 1384b9, and seems to be a nontechnical usage, meaning “occupation or amusement” (cp. Cope, *Rhetoric* II, 82). Aristotle occasionally employs forms of the verb *diafrizein* in *Ars Rhetorica* in the sense of “dwelling upon” (see I, 1371b31; II, 1378b7; III, 1415b23; Cope, *Rhetoric* I, 223, II, 14, III, 175), and possibly this use has led some to think that *diatribas* in 1418a27 must refer to “dwelling on the point” and thus be commoratio.

\(^{65}\) For the text of Menander we shall rely on C. Bursian, *Der Rhetor Menandros und seine Schriften* (Abh. Bayer. Ak. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl., 16 pt. 3, 1882), 30–68; cf. Spengel III, 329–367. Problems concerning the authenticity of the treatise and of the second work, entitled *Περί ἐπιδεικτικῶν* (Bursian, 69–151), attributed to Menander, are discussed by Bursian, 1–29; J. Soffel, *Die Regeln Menanders für die Leichenrede* (Beiträge zur kl. Philologie 57, 1974), 100–104 (see also 92ff.). The *Peri epideiktikon*, incidentally, has only one example of *diatribe*, on p. 91.3, when Menander discusses a variety of *propemptikon* which has “πλειόνα διατριβήν ... περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια”.

Kustas, “Diatribe”, 10, and footnotes 32 and 33 on 11, lists most of the occurrences of *diatribe* and related verbal forms in Menander, but he neither discusses the passages cited nor realizes that *diatribe* in Menander apparently is a figure. Cf. Ernesti 83; *TLG* 1359.

Μοῦσαι, εἰτε διὰ φόδης εἰδός λέγειαι, εἰτε διὰ γένους μονακών τὸ Διονύσον ταύτην ἐπομνημια...”
If we continue our survey of this passage in Menander, we encounter the remark that for a poet “ἐξουσία πλείων”, while for a prose writer “ἐλάττων” suffices (34, 4), where greater and lesser must refer to diatribe. The rhetorician next comments that a suitable style for kletic hymns would be one “τε δι’ ὅρας προοίμια καὶ κόσμου”, and that for that reason poets “τάς διατριβὰς προσλαμβάνοντος.” Almost as an afterthought, the phrase “σχήματα δὲ τὰ ἀνακλητικὰ ἀμφότερα” is added. Menander’s exposition concerning the kletic hymn finally concludes with what he terms a “not useless rule”. According to this rule (3.6), if a prayer follows the invocation (τῇ κλήσει), then “ἐπὶ ἐλάττων ἡ διατριβή” for both poets and prosaic authors. If, however, the invocation would be “ψυλή”, then the diatribe is “πλείων”.

Diatribe again occurs in connection with the greater and the lesser in chapter 4, where Menander discusses the valedictory hymn (apopemptikos hymnos)67), which is found only among the poets. In this form “διατριβὴν δὲ ἐνδέχεται πλείων,” not elattona, as in the kletikos, where we want the god to arrive as quickly as possible. The apopemptikos essentially wants the god to depart as slowly as possible and thus favors the longer kind of diatribe (4. 3).

The physikos hymnos, which deals with a god’s “physical qualities” (cf. Burgess 174), offers more examples of diatribe. In his fifth chapter (p. 36) Menander lists Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato as writers of such hymns, and then he notes that the physikoi hymni are either expository or brief, depending upon whether their authors are dealing with known or unknown things. Thus, according to Menander, Plato tends to be brief, while the two poets expound at length. Adding another distinction, the rhetorician differentiates between those who present their material in riddles (i.e. the Pythagoreans) and those who present it openly (such as the three authors mentioned). Those like the Pythagoreans, further, need “βουκχύττα,” but the others require “πλείστην καὶ μεγίστην διατριβὴν” (5.4–5).

There are three other chapters in the Diairesis ton epideiktikon in which diatribe occurs. The first of these (chapter 6) concerns the mythikos hymnos, which Menander distinguishes from the genealogikos hymnos (6.1–4), and which seems to be less congenial to the diatribe than are other hymnic forms. After making a

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67) On the kletikos, apopemptikos, and other types of hymns described by Menander consult Burgess, 174ff.
remark which is corrupt in our text, the rhetorician writes (cf. Cope, Rhetoric III, 203), “ realloc εξουσία καὶ τοῦ κατὰ σχολὴν λέγειν καὶ τοῦ περιστέλλειν τοὺς ποιητικοὺς κόσμοις καὶ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς ὤντε κόρον ὤντε ἄρνιαν παράτησι — καὶ τοῖς ἀγνοῦ ὡσαύτων[ὁς] ἐνιοῦ τῶν ποιητῶν προσφέρουσι τινας ἀκαίρους διατριβὰς – συγγραφεῖσι δὲ ἡ λογοποιοίς ἑλαχίστη ἐξουσία” (6. 4–5). There follows a delineation of ways to present a myth, concisely but not baldly (6.5), terminated by the observation that one will not lack methods except for that one “theorema”, namely “ὡς διατριβὴ ἀποφόσφορος” (cf. 6.6).

Chapter 7, which describes the genealogikos hymnos, features one usage of diatribe. Menander tells us that most descriptions of the birth of a deity are contained in other types of hymn (such as the mythikos), although they have been found separately (7.1–2). Then he remarks that, if the genealogikos section is interwoven with other forms, then “length” must be allowed, but, if “καθ’ αὐτὸ εἶν τὸ μέρος, ὅτι βραχείας δεῖ τα διατριβῆς” (7.2). To this passage we shall append one final reference which turns up in Menander’s discussion of how one should praise a city on the basis of its habits or pursuits. In section 28 of that exposition (pp. 66–67; cf. Spengel III., 365) the rhetorician mentions encomia “τὰ μὲν κοίνα παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δ’ ἴδια καυρῶν” (67.1). The idia seem to be encomia connected with speeches made at festivals, assemblies, contests, or gladiatorial combats, while the koina are those which have no such “cause”. After making this distinction Menander writes (67.3–6) that it is necessary, accordingly, that “τῶν πανηγυρικῶν γε τὴν πλείστην διατριβὴν περὶ τῶν καυρῶν ἐκαστον ποιεῖσθαι,” such as if there would be a festival or an assembly or a gathering for a contest (armed, gymnastic, or musical).

If we now try to determine on the basis of the passages cited what diatribe is for Menander, we first must take note of what it is not. Despite the fact that the examples in the description of kletic hymns are from addresses to deities, diatribe is not identical with invocation, for the terms klesis and diatribe are differentiated in 3.6 (p. 35; Spengel III, 335–336). Further, although we might be tempted to assume that prooimia or opening remarks of any kind are the favorite environment of diatribe, the use of the word in reference to passages which have no set position (cf. 4.2, 5.4–5, etc.) forces us to abandon that premise. It would have been interesting, of course, if all of Menander’s instances of diatribe had come from prooimia, as do the examples of
the figure in *Peri methodou*. Finally, we cannot claim that *diatribe* is the same as *epitheton*, since the term definitely is not connected with epithets in the section concerning praise of a city (p. 67. 3–6).

These negatives provide us with a beginning but with little else. Unlike the author of *Peri methodou*, Menander does not give a definite indication (such as a reference to *lexis* or *gnome*) that he considers *diatribe* a figure. The closest that he comes to any “hint” of his views is to mention poetic “
νόσμοις ναὶ ταῖς κα-
τοσκευαῖς” and then to state that he is not oblivious to the existence of “unseasonable diatribes” among the poets (6.4). The implication, certainly, is that *diatribe* belongs among the poetic ornaments, a position which is rather vague but which could mean that it is a poetic figure, and thus also a rhetorical figure. The employment of the plural *diatribas* here in chapter 6.4 and also in 3.4, however, would seem to point us away from an identification of *diatribe* as a figure such as *epimone* and possibly toward an understanding of the word as an equivalent for *digressio* or *parecbasis*, just as it seems to be in Aristotle. The content of Menander’s remarks and examples, unfortunately, serves as inconclusive evidence, which again shows the close relationship between *commoratio-epimone* and *digressio* (see above at note 56ff.). Certainly the illustrations from Plato and Homer do seem to dwell on their respective points, if we take the underlying thought to be a description of some aspect of the divinities invoked. When Socrates calls on the “Μοῦσαι λίγειαί” in the *Phaedrus*, for instance, he dwells on the origin of the Muses’ epithet. At the same time, however, he seems to be digressing into an etymological wordplay, rather than emphasizing anything strictly necessary for his theme. Chryses, likewise, in addressing Apollo, inserts two descriptive phrases which dwell on the god’s attributes, but which essentially digress from the point at issue, the punishment of the Greeks. Since epithets and descriptive phrases are standard parts of invocations, however, we are making a fine distinction when we try to separate emphasizing something pleasing to a god from digressing into an ornamental pas-

68) Cf. G. J. de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato* (Amsterdam 1969, 82), who mentions the wordplay and notes that the listing “έιτε ...
έιτε” is “a standing trait of epicletic hymns”; Eduard Norden, *Agnostos Theos, Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede*, 145, note 3, and 146ff. on this trait.
sage. The distinction between long and short *diatribas* which Menander makes here (3.6) and his references to greater and lesser *diatribas* (4.2, 5.4–5, etc.), on the other hand, may give us a connection with digression, since *digressio* also is represented by long and short forms (see above after note 63). Thus, the brevity of *diatribe* in Menander’s illustrations is no hindrance to identifying the figure with digression, just as it is no barrier to assuming that *epimone* is involved.

Still, we do have an example of *epimone* in which multiple descriptive phrases occur. This is found in Zonaios (Spengel III, 162.11), and it includes three phrases and two clauses describing Byzantium (see above on page 309). Unfortunately, Zonaios does not quote the rest of the sentence, and so we cannot discern whether the emphasis on Byzantium’s attributes has any connection with the main thought. The existence of such an illustration of *epimone*, at any rate, gives us some basis for arguing that *diatribe* in chapter 3 of Menander could be the equivalent of *epimone* just as readily as of *digressio*, depending upon how strictly we expect such passages to adhere to the central part of a statement.

Perhaps one of the more persuasive arguments in favor of *diatribe* as *epimone*, however, should be the improbability of the appearance of a digression in the opening sentence of invocations beginning a speech (as in the *Phaedrus*) or a prayer (as in the *Iliad*). Further, since the other instances of *diatribe* in Menander do not have examples attached, we must depend upon chapter 3 to give us the firmest indication of what the rhetorician intended. Therefore, even though, in view of the frequent disagreements between rhetoricians noted by Quintilian and others, one author’s *epimone* might be another writer’s digression, the nature of the illustrations makes us tentatively inclined to identify *diatribe* in Menander with *epimone*. 69)

In concluding now our involved study of *diatribe* in Ps.-Hermogenes, Aristotle, and Menander, we shall again emphasize certain key points. First, *diatribe* in each of the three authors refers to a rhetorical device, which is either the figure *epimone* or a form of *digressio* (although Aristotle may not be using the word in a technical sense). Further, none of the comments by our ancient sources justifies the assumption that their use of the

69) This problem needs further investigation, which I will undertake in a future study.
term may be employed as a definition or illustration of the genre popularly called the Cynic-Stoic diatribe. Ps.-Hermogenes' emphasis on the character of the speaker and the nature of the illustrations in Peri methodou, finally, are ample proof that his definition has no connection with the genre and has been misapplied by those who have attempted to tie the two together.

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