

meint er wohl dasselbe wie XII. 32. 21, wo er von dem eklichen Harz spricht, mit dem die Weiber des Summemmianus sich von Haaren befreien⁷³⁾, und was er mit brutaler Deutlichkeit X. 90. 1 ausspricht^{74).}

Für Einsichten in Körperpflege und Kosmetik bietet jedenfalls das Gedichtchen reiches Material; es lässt vor allem auch erkennen, welche Opfer für Modetorheiten zu bringen man schon vor 2000 Jahren bereit war.

Geisenheim/Rhein

Gerd Hagenow

JUVENAL'S THIRTEENTH SATIRE

In the case of Satire XIII, Juvenal is to be defended against both his detractors and his friends, against both those who find the poem insipid and confused, and those who consider it a sincere *consolatio* or a reiteration of popular beliefs regarding the conscience^{1).} Satire XIII is a *consolatio*, but a parody; it deals

73) S. o. S. 53 Anm. 35.

74) Quid vellis vetulum – cunnum? – Ebenda v. 9: si pudor est, wie III. 74. 5; vgl. auch Iuvenal III. 154. Auf die gleiche Praxis spielt wohl Apuleius Met. II. 17 an (glabellum feminal). Über die Gefahr, durch eine Pechpflasterkur in den Verdacht der „effeminatio“ zu geraten, vgl. Galen, de sanitati tuenda 6, 8; R A C Bd. IV Sp. 633 s. v. Effeminatus und Bd. III Sp. 1149 ff. s. v. Dirne (Herter).

1) Pierre de Labriolle, *Les Satires de Juvénal* (Paris. Year not given.) p. 304, says that the whole poem is “d'une lecture médiocrement attrayante” and remarks on the banality of the themes, failing to see that the satirist exploits their banality for the purpose of humor and for other purpose, too. G. Hight, *Juvenal the Satirist* (New York, 1961) p. 143, regards the poem as “strange”, though he finds in it a definite and plausible structure, which he outlines (p. 281). I must say that his out-line has the virtue of making the poem seem to follow the traditions of the *consolatio*. John E. B. Mayor, *Thirteen Satires of Juvenal*, Vol. II (London, 1880) p. 247, says that the effect of the poem is marred by verbosity. Ulrich Knoche, *Die Römische Satire* mentions but does not give any opinion on the poem (Berlin, 1949). E. V. Marmorale, *Giovenale* (Bari 1950) p. 50, speaking of Satires VIII and XIII, says, “Le esamineremo per dimostrare che Giovenale non ha nessuna preparazione etica, nessuna idea morale chiara, al di fuori di quelle date dai buonsenso, in lui non troppo sviluppato, e dall' esperienza.” He speaks again of XIII as “superficiale e confusa” (p. 51). He does not see that the contradictions in the poem are deliberate and play upon the rival claims of *consolatio* and satire. Johan A. Gylling, *De Argumenti Dispositione in Satiris IX-XVI Iuvenalis* (Lund, 1889) p. 93, calls the poem “rarum illud

with the conscience, but only to raise the question whether conscience alone is strong enough to restrain or "punish" men in a time when religion and law are corrupt.

Far from being confused, the satire is perfectly consistent in its argument. Calvinus, the addressee, cannot collect from his debtor. The debtor, who had sworn an oath by the gods, has betrayed *fides*. There is no legal remedy. The debtor's only punishment, Calvinus' only remedy, is bad conscience on the part of the debtor. Bad conscience depends on belief in the gods by whom the oath was sworn. Thus Juvenal digresses on religion²⁾.

quidem et insigne probitatis documentum, cuius laus non diminuetur,
quamvis non defuerunt, qui de inanibus declamationibus cum despiciant
loquerentur". He says that Juvenal has alleviated his friend's grief "mitis-
sima consolatione" (p. 101). At the same time he recognizes that the poem
is humorous (pp. 102-103). Auguste Widal, *Juvénal et ses Satires* (Paris, 1869)
pp. 291-92, says that the poem is "faible par moments" because the poet,
on account of his old age, is given to "des vains et inutiles développements
de rhéteur". Like Hightet he finds (pp. 298-99) the ending self-contradictory,
and like almost all the commentators he supposes that Juvenal's main pur-
pose in the poem is to demonstrate the power of the conscience. R. Schuetze,
Juvenalis Ethicus (Greifswald, 1905) makes this supposition, too. "Satura
tertia decima monumentum philosophiae vere popularis mihi videtur. Prae-
clare Juvenalis describit quomodo homines conscientia malefacti con-
tinuo vexati ad peiora impellantur, ut iustum poenam effugere non possint."
(p. 70). Schuetze's ample illustration of the fact that guilty conscience "ite-
rum atque iterum iisdem verbis describitur" (p. 73) helps us to see that
Juvenal is playing with the language of popular philosophy in the same
way as with the conventional terms of the *consolatio*. Augusto Serafini, *Studio
sulla Satira di Giovenale* (Florence, 1957) pp. 354-55, seems to take Juvenal's
re-telling of the ages myth seriously, inferring from this (and of course
other passages), that Juvenal has "una religione antica"; also, p. 246, "Egli
ha profondo il senso religioso." This view is at least open to question. But
Serafini does recognize what he well calls Juvenal's tendency to generalize
the exceptional - a tendency from which XIII gets its humor and some of
its "strangeness".

2) The poem should be out-lined as follows: 1-27 Introduction. The theme of the *consolatio* is announced in the first lines. The satirist will con-
sole an affliction of the mind (*dolor* 12) in Calvinus which expresses itself in
grief and in the desire for revenge, but especially the latter. (Cicero's dis-
cussion of the matter in *Tusc.* III shows that one could speak of a *consolatio*
of any affliction of the mind, not only of grief. *Dolor* may refer to any afflic-
tion of the mind, especially to anger and the like.) The satirist puts forth
certain precepts and begins his *solacia* but then digresses. 28-119 Digression
on religion. 120-173 The satirist resumes the *solacia* but still avoids the sub-
ject of revenge. 174-249 the satirist interrupts himself by the device of
occupatio and at last comes to the point. He says (174-192): "Don't ask for
revenge"; and (193-249), "You will have your revenge". I find, then,
roughly four sections: 1-27; 28-119; 120-173; 174-249. I say roughly,
because in effect the last two sections I mention are one and they are of a

At present no one believes in the gods. In this way consolation becomes satire. But at the same time, Calvinus' predicament, which is nothing but a reflection of the irreverence and criminality of the present age, points to the question of a fundamentally moral human nature. If the constraints of law and religion are removed, is there yet a moral structure within man? This question lies behind the ironic solacia of 120–172.

Before proceeding to the analysis of Satire XIII, it is well to recall the high place of its theme, *fides*, in Roman ethics³⁾. Cicero speaks of the *fides amicorum ... quam qui laedit, oppugnat omnium commune praesidium et quantum in ipso est, disturbat vitae societatem* (*pro Ros. Am.* 111; cf. *Arist. Rhet.* 1. 15. 22). The decay of *fides* in Juvenal's time would have seemed the surest sign of the general decay of Roman institutions. The moral drama of Tacitus' *Annals* is in large part the conflict of traditional Roman morality, e.g., in the figure of Thrasea, who could say, *dignum fide constantiaque Romana capiamus consilium* (15. 20. 4), with the figures of degeneracy, e.g., Tiberius, who could say of the breaking of an oath sworn by Juppiter, *deorum iniurias dis curae* (1. 73. 5). In Tacitus, there are still those who maintain *fides*; but in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* the *fragilitas humanae fidei* (9. 18) is found everywhere. Lucius discovers that there is more honor amongst thieves than elsewhere in society. So it is appropriate that a thief should provide this truly Juvenalian estimate of the present state of *fides*. The thief speaks of treasure which he and his companions had hidden in a sepulchre: *confestim itaque constrictis sarcinis illis, quas nobis reservaverant fideles mortui, Plataeae terminos concito gradu deserentes, istud apud nostros animos identidem reputabamus, merito nullam fidem in vita nostra reperiri, quod ad manes iam et mortuos odio perfidiae nostrae dimigrarit* (4. 21).

It is with such an opinion that Juvenal writes Satire XIII, although his perspective is not that of the criminal (*mediusfidius!*) but that of the traditional morality.

The *consolatio* begins obliquely. Not until line 5, with the word *recenti*, do we know that we are reading or hearing a con-

piece with the opening. The poem, then, is, as I shall show by going into these sections in detail, a mock *consolatio* with a long digression on religion.

3) On *fides*, see Richard Heinze, *Vom Geist des Römertums*⁸, ed. Erich Burck, (Darmstadt, 1960), pp. 59–81; Matthias Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der Römischen Republik*, (Leipzig, Berlin, 1912), pp. 52 ff. = *The Roman Nobility*, trans. Robin Seager, (Oxford, 1969), pp. 65 ff.

solatio. The opening sentence is deliberately casual and urbane⁴⁾. This attitude comes out in the speaker's use of the indefinite pronoun, the impersonal verb, the rather vague *exemplum malo*, which could refer to any kind of offence, not necessarily a serious one, and especially the word *displacet*, which certainly does not suggest that the conscience of the *auctor* is torturing him. The force of this word may be judged from line 215 of this poem, where the satirist uses it of sour wine, or from instances in other Satires⁵⁾. The next sentence in the poem begins, *prima est haec ultio* (2), as if the satirist were going to mention others; but not until the very end of the poem do we hear of any other *ultio* than that administered by conscience⁶⁾, on the efficacy of which, in my opinion, the satirist will cast doubt in the course of the poem. Lines 3 and 4 go on *improba quamvis / gratia fallaci praetoris vicerit urna*⁷⁾. The emphasis which *improba* gets from its position in the line, after a sense-pause, and from being set outside its clause, is designed. We should have the word in the back of our mind when we come to 53 – *inprobitas illo fuit admirabilis aevo* – where *inprobitas* begins the climax of the passage on the golden age⁸⁾. The concept of *probitas* takes in the religious, the legal and the ethical – all the themes of this poem. *Probitas* is the opposite of the quality or qualities possessed by Calvinus's erst-while friend and the other criminals mentioned in this poem. *Vicerit* is subjunctive⁹⁾, and the perfect tense would, if my sense of the first two lines is right, have a gnomic ring. The satirist says, "Of

4) My characterization of the speaker's attitude in the opening passage is in agreement with the view of W.S. Anderson, "The Programs of Juvenal's Later Books", *Classical Philology* LVII (1962) 149–151, that the speaker is *anti-indignatio* in XIII.

5) In VI. 495 *displiceo* is again used in connection with a matter of taste ("quaenam est hic culpa puellae, / si tibi displicuit nasus tuus?"); and ironically in II. 26 ("si fur displicat Verri").

6) Gylling, *op. cit.*, p. 95, said "Offendi possumus verbo, quod est prima (v. 2), quasi nulla praeter hanc ultio commemoretur, cum omnia ad animi conscientiam referantur." But, in the end, Gylling goes on, the poet tells us that the wicked are sure to bring about their own ruin.

7) The alliteration at the beginning of 3 (*nemo nocens*) should be noticed; in fact, the opening passage contains several examples of this device: 7 "tam tenuis census tibi contigit" – here perhaps to give an edge of mockery to the speaker's words; 9 "casus multis hic cognitus": 12 non debet dolor esse viri nec volnere maior" – in these examples for the sake of irony, since the satirist knows very well that he is using hackneyed topoi and vocabulary.

8) Cf. *probavit* in I. 205.

9) H.P. Wright, *Juvenal* (Boston, 1901) p. xxviii, says that after *quamvis* (the conjunction) Juvenal uses only the subjunctive.

course the criminal was let off in court." In any case, the legal remedy for a case like Calvinus' is passed off at the outset; mentioned and dismissed again (135 ff.); and brought back, as I shall show, in the last lines of the poem.

In 5 we have the first indication that the poem is a *consolatio*: *quid sentire putas homines, Calvine, recenti / de scelere et fidei violatae criminis?* Notice that the satirist maintains his pose of unconcern by the use of the general *homines*; not until the end of the poem, 244-45 (*noster/perfidus*), does the wrong-doer come in for any special reproach. There lies behind *recenti* a very common convention of the *consolatio* according to which the consoler must choose the right time for administering his consolation. Cicero laid down the law in Tusc. III. 76: *Sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum ...* The consoler often points out at the beginning of his *consolatio* that he has indeed chosen the right time: he has not tried to offer consolation too soon after the occasion, usually the death of a relative, of the grief he will console, for he would waste his efforts on a grief fresh, strong, and therefore inconsolable. The kind of grief that one must not try to console is sometimes called *recens*, as by Statius in the dedicatory preface of *Silvae* I, where the phrase *recens vulnus* occurs, or in V. 1. 18 (*plaga recens*). Seneca sums up the convention in *Ad Helviam Matrem* 1. 2: *dolori tuo, dum recens saeviret, sciebam occurrentum non esse, ne illum ipsa solacia irritarent et accenderent — nam in morbis quoque nihil est perniciosius quam immatura medicina...* Juvenal, for his part, turns the convention inside out by suggesting, in effect, that Calvinus think not of his own but of his malefactor's need for a *consolatio*. One of the effects of these lines is, of course, humor (the poet, after the mocking proposal, hastens to wave aside with *sed* what he had said and to restore decorum); another, not so obvious at first, is extreme exaggeration of the force of conscience. The satirist suggests that the force of conscience is so strong that the malefactor is really worse off than Calvinus. I doubt this suggestion is to be taken seriously.

The satirist goes on to offer some of the stock precepts:

sed nec

tam tenuis census tibi contigit, ut mediocris
iacturae te mergat onus, nec rara videmus
quae pateris: casus multis hic cognitus ac iam
tritus et e medio fortunae ductus acervo.

ponamus nimios gemitus. flagrantior aequo
non debet dolor esse viri nec vulnere maior. (6-12)

The satirist's attitude and tone in stating these precepts are brought out by a comparison of the lines just quoted with a passage from a *consolatio* by Cicero: *Est autem consolatio per vulgata quidem illa maxima, quam semper in ore atque animo habere debemus, homines nos ut esse meminerimus ea lege natos, ut omnibus telis fortunae proposita sit vita nostra, neque esse recusandum, quominus ea, qua nati sumus, condicione vivamus, neve tam graviter eos casus feramus, quos nullo consilio vitare possumus, eventisque aliorum memoria repetendis, nihil accidisse nobis novi cogitemus*¹⁰).

Cicero gets around the banality of the *topos* of fortune by an apology (*consolatio per vulgata quidem maxima*); Juvenal by wit (*casus ... e medio fortunae ductus acervo*). Where Cicero aims to be lofty and all-inclusive in his statements (*nullo consilio; nihil novi; omnibus telis; semper*) Juvenal flatly understates (*nec rara videmus/ quae pateris; casus multis hic cognitus ac iam / tritus et e medio fortunae ductus acervo*).

The use of *dolor*, *viri*, and *vulnere* in 12, on the other hand, get their effect from overstatement. Though all of Juvenal's playing with the conventions depends upon the fact that death is not the occasion of this *consolatio*, the words just mentioned, since they are especially associated with death, are especially comical when applied to the loss of money. Of course Juvenal himself makes the contrast between the loss of money and the loss of a member of the family; but he saves this contrast until he can use it in a properly satirical way, in order to damn the present state of things, as he does in 13 off. In the opening passage, the contrast is simply assumed.

Behind *viri* is the very wide-spread convention of the *consolatio* that excessive grief is womanish¹¹). *Dolor* and *vulnus* are also very common in *consolaciones*. I think that either *plaga* or *vulnus* or both appear in every *consolatio* in the *Silvae*. The use of *vulnus* and *dolor* together appears in the *Agricola* of Tacitus (45. 5). The solemnity of the words in this context will make clear their near

10) *Ad Fam.* V. 16. 2. To Titius on the death of his son.

11) Cf. for instance, *Ad Fam.* X. 16. 6; Seneca, *Ep.* XCIC. 2, where he tells Lucilius that Marullus bore his grief too *molliter*; also *Ep.* LXIII. 13; Tacitus, *Agricola* 46; cf. Juvenal, XIII. 191-2, where he says that revenge is womanish.

absurdity in Juvenal: *noster hic dolor, nostrum vulnus, nobis tam longae absentiae condicione ante quadriennium amissus est. omnia sine dubio, optime parentum, adsidente amantissima uxore superfuere honori tuo: paucioribus tamen lacrimis comploratus es, et novissima in luce desideravere aliquid oculi tui.*

The satirist brings out his sense of the incongruity of the use of the words *dolor* and *vulnus* in connection with the loss of money in the lines that follow 12, in an exclamatory and indignant question, which breaks the decorum of the conventions that he has at least been pretending to observe:

tu quamvis levium minimam exiguamque malorum
particulam vix ferre potes spumantibus ardens
visceribus, sacrum tibi quod non reddit amicus
depositum? (13-16)

Spumantibus ardens/visceribus is out-right raillery. That the deposit is called *sacrum* in the first mention of Calvinus' particular affliction is noteworthy. The word *sacer* and compounds of it are common in this poem, and I shall discuss them below.

After the out-burst just quoted, the satirist goes on with his precepts (16-18), asserting that Calvinus is old and experienced enough to know better. 19-22 suggest that the satirist will pass from precepts to *solacia*:

magna quidem, sacris quae dat praecepta libellis,
victrix fortunae sapientia, ducimus autem
hos quoque felices, qui ferre incommoda vitae
nec iactare iugum vita didicere magistra.

Leaving behind the commonplaces of popular philosophy, the satirist will go on to provide Calvinus with *solacia*, by showing him how common it is for men to lose money through embezzlement, and not only through embezzlement, but in ways far worse. But after beginning with what seems to be the introduction to concrete examples of the loss of money and of how that loss was borne, which is what the convention would require, the satirist goes off on a tangent¹²).

According to the convention, the consoler should back up the precept ("You aren't the only one" — *casus multis hic cognitus*) with examples of how others have borne the same mis-

12) Is there a play on *iactare iugum* (22), since the occasion of this poem is a *iactura* (8)?

fortune. Again the formulation of the convention can be found in Cicero (*Tusc.* III. 79): Ne illa quidem firmissima consolatio est, quamquam et usitata est et saepe prodest: "Non tibi hoc soli." Prodest haec quidem, ut dixi, sed nec semper nec omnibus; sunt enim qui respuant, sed refert quo modo adhibeatur. Ut enim tulerit quisque eorum, qui sapienter tulerunt, non quo quisque incommodo adfectus sit praedicandum est.

The satirist flagrantly disregards this principle. Beginning with the long digression that follows the lines I have just been discussing, the satirist always gives examples of the *incommodum* and never of how it was borne. In this *consolatio*, he would have to give examples of how the desire for revenge was overcome; instead he actually increases Calvinus' desire for revenge. When he finishes his *consolatio*, he knows that Calvinus will be *laetus* (248) if his malefactor is punished.

But the transition to the digression is perfectly natural. 19–25 arouse the expectation that the satirist will go on to concrete examples. He goes on rather to a general statement about the present age, retelling the myth of the ages, and focusing the myth and all his remarks on the subject of religion. The satirist moves from the observation that even on the most holy days the illegal pursuit of money does not cease (22–25) to the questions, "Why bother to invoke the faith of gods and men?" and, "Don't you know that most people¹³⁾ would consider you naive for expecting a perjurer to believe in the *numen* of shrines and altars?" and then to his myth of the ages, the point of which is the piety of the earliest age and the impiety of the present. We remember that the *depositum* was *sacrum*. Calvinus' malefactor has not only betrayed his friendship with Calvinus: he has also broken a vow to the gods.

The comparison of the satirist's version of the ages myth with previous versions¹⁴⁾ makes it clear that religion is the point of this one. The proliferation of deities as the world declined is Juvenal's own addition to the traditional story. One did not find *inprobitas* in that god-fearing age because of the power of religious

13) Or, "the lowest members of Roman society", W.S. Anderson, *op. cit.*, 150, 158 fn. 11.

14) I suppose A.O. Lovejoy *et al.*, *A Documentary History of Primitivism and Related Ideas* (Baltimore, 1935) have collected every version of the myth. I make my assertion on the basis of the *Works and Days* 106ff., Ovid, *Metam.* 1. 89ff., Lucretius 5. 925ff., Seneca's soliloquy in the *Octavia* attributed to him 377ff.

belief to regulate human conduct. The satirist's example is reverence for age, for *sacrae senectae* (59). The adjective shows how, in the satirist's account of things, religious belief affected human institutions, such as the relations between young and old. But now a *sanctus vir* (64) would be a freak; now the offices of religion would be used against religion itself, for a religious man is a portent which must be expiated. Calvinus complains that he has been robbed *fraude sacrilega* (71–72); but, the satirist explains, it's easy to call the gods to witness if no mortal witness knows the truth. People will swear by the whole arsenal of the gods; and a father will invoke on himself the fate of Thyestes (84–85). By this allusion, the satirist ties in his remarks on these swearers of false oaths with his account of the golden age, when

nec rota nec Furiae nec saxum aut volturis atri
poena, sed infernis hilares sine regibus umbrae. (51–52)

The wheel calls to mind Ixion and his false promises. The stone might be the stone that hung over the head of Tantalus, who was a member of the same family with which the father in 84 risks associating himself. The Furies are avengers of crime, especially crimes against the ties of kinship. In fact, the whole passage (76–85) constitutes a dramatization and so a “proof” of the point of the satirist's re-telling of the ages myth, and is further evidence for the consistency of this section of the poem (28–119) as an excursus on the relation between religious faith and conscience.

The satirist goes on to explain why people swear so rashly. These people are of two types. Some are atheists. Others will risk divine punishment for money, hoping that the gods' wrath will be slow or that the gods will be forgiving. One of these people will drag you *sacra ad delubra* and swear that he doesn't owe you anything; but by this time you yourself no longer believe they are *sacra* because Juppiter so placidly allows the ways of the wicked to prosper.

In all this section of the poem, the irony cuts two ways, both against the supposed purity of the Saturnian age¹⁵⁾ and against present-day perjurers. Mankind has passed from an incredible extreme of piety to an incredible extreme of impiety. What then is the place of piety? The very *adynta* which the satirist asso-

15) The same scepticism in the handling of the ages myth appears in the opening passage of Satire VI.

ciates with the *sanctus vir* imply negatively that reverence for the gods is natural and so right, even if it has not been lived up to in any age. All these *adynata* illustrate what is not generally according to nature, and, in the case of men, fish, and mules, what is not natural to the species. A *sanctus vir*, in this age for which nature has no name (29–30), which, by implication, is unnatural, comes himself to seem unnatural, freakish, in fact, to someone like the satirist, who can still distinguish between *sanc-titas* and the actual standards of his age. But the standards of the present age are corrupt by definition in this poem; therefore the *sanctus vir* is the only natural one, the only one who does what it is right for his species to do. I am encouraged in this interpretation by the fact that the satirist raises again in this poem even more explicitly the question of what is natural for man. There, in the case of criminality, as here in the case of irreverence, the satirist combines a potentially hopeful view of human nature with a very cynical reflection on the possibility that this nature ever has been or ever will be realized.

This whole digression on religion has been, as the whole poem will turn out to be, more satirical than consolatory. Calvinus, far from being consoled, has been led by these considerations to the same state of mind as that of the perjuror. He still wants revenge (174); but now he does not think that Juppiter is on his side. Now he really needs *solacia*. The satirist resumes the attitude he dropped at the beginning of the digression, where he said that one ought to have learned from life if not from philosophy. Here (120ff.) he disavows any special philosophical competence. Humble though he is, he can handle this case:

curentur dubii medicis maioribus aegri:
tu venam vel discipulo committe Philippi. (124–125)

Dubii aegri, presumably, are those who have a real *vulnus*, that is, the death of a member of the family. The metaphor of healing, by the way, is standard consolatory fare¹⁶⁾. Now the satirist begins again on the *solacia* which follow from *Non tibi hoc soli*, which again turn out to be a rhetorical opportunity for the satirist and no consolation for Calvinus, who still wants revenge.

In the course of his *solacia*, the satirist speaks of the law courts, where perjurors are as brazen as at the shrine of the gods.

16) Cf. *Ad Fam.* IV. 5. 5 and the passages from Cicero and Seneca already quoted in the body of my paper.

Law, which would replace private revenge, is as useless as the gods, from whom no divine retribution was forthcoming. The courts are full of cases like Calvinus's (135 ff.). The defendant, since the transaction was unwitnessed, has only to deny his signature. Given this situation, Calvinus's feelings are really arrogant (140–142), if, the satirist says, appealing to a *topos* of the *consolatio*, he thinks he can be exempted from the common rule¹⁷⁾. Furthermore, many worse crimes occur. You are offended because a *sacrilegus* (72) failed to return your *sacrum depositum* (15–16), but what about the *sacrilegus* who robs even temples, or the petty *sacrilegus* who scrapes gold off the images of the gods? Irreverence goes far beyond what you have experienced. A few days at any one house would show you the *humani generis mores* (159) if you should wish to know them.

sufficit una domus; paucos consume dies et
dicere te miserum, postquam illinc veneris,
aude. (160–161)

In the lines immediately following, the satirist says, as if by way of illustration:

quis tumidum guttur miratur in Alpibus aut quis
in Meroe crasso maiores infante mamillam?
caerula quis stupuit Germani lumina, flavam
caesariem et madido torquentem cornua cirro?
[nempe quod haec illis natura est omnibus una.]
ad subitas Thracum volucres nubemque sonoram
Pygmaeus parvis currit bellator in armis,
mox inpar hosti raptusque per aera curvis
unguis a saeva fertur grue. si videas hoc
gentibus in nostris, risu quatiare; sed illic,
quamquam eadem adsidue spectentur proelia, ridet
nemo, ubi tota cohors pede non est altior uno. (162–72)

At first (159) the satirist has seemed to say that Calvinus can learn the character or the ways of the human race by listening at some house in Rome. His examples, however, show the *mores* not of the human race, but of certain divisions of it, tribes or nations. Since Calvinus will hear only of crime at the house he

17) Cf. *Ad Fam.* VI. 1. 1 “Nec debes tu ... aut praecipuam aliquam fortunam postulare aut communem recusare.” Seneca, *Ad Pol.* 1. 3 “quis tam superbae impotentisque arrogantiae est, ut in hac naturae necessitate, omnia ad eundem finem revocantis, se unum ac suos seponi velit...?”

visits, the satirist, with his list of illustrations, seems to say that criminality is the way of the human race as a whole, just as certain physical characteristics are natural to certain groups within the race as a whole. Particular localized characteristics – the large breasts of Egyptians, the yellow hair and blue eyes of the Germans, the goitre of those who dwell in the Alps, and the short stature of Pygmies – are to the inhabitants of particular locations what criminality is to the race as a whole. But the satirist's examples tell more than this. Goitre is, after all, an abnormality; the Egyptian breasts are grotesque; the greasy hair-do of the German is extravagant; the Pygmies are an oddity, with respect to size, in the human race. The satirist has chosen examples of what is bizarre not by Roman standards alone, though he appeals to Roman standards (*si videas hoc / gentibus in nostris* 170–171), but by the standard of the average or the norm. The argument, then, should be revised as follows: Criminality is a part of the *humani generis mores* in the same way that certain bizarre traits are a part of tribes or nations within the human race. Criminality, then, is unnatural in that, like the size of Pygmies, it departs from what is the norm for humans; but natural in that (so far as one can tell from the satirist's examples) it is fixed in human nature like a bizarre physical trait.

One can see why the satirist is unable to play the role of consoler. Calvinus's case simply does not admit of the straightforward use of the topoi of the *consolatio*. In fact, the very use of these topoi brings on satire and destroys consolation. If the satirist can say that a certain crime is common and expectable and to be viewed with irony or unconcern, then he has found a rhetorical opportunity for piling up examples and for pursuing the ends of his own kind of poetry, as we see him doing in this satire.

Criminality, then, is like irreverence. Both are extremely common in the present age, and both are either natural, in a sense, in man, or else have been a part of his history from the beginning, as the satirist suggests that irreverence has been – a suggestion that came out in his ironical exaggeration of the piety of the earliest age. One remembers that the satirist was led by the irreverence of Calvinus, which had been induced by the satirist's account of mankind's irreverence, to provide *solacia* ("What you have suffered is common," etc.), but these *solacia* turn out to be only proofs, as it were, of what he has already said about irreverence, with such disastrous effects upon the con-

solation. Calvinus is left with his desire for revenge unconsoled at 174: *nullane peiuri capitisi fraudisque nefandae/poena erit?*

Now the satirist offers two kinds of *solacia*: Calvinus should not desire revenge, for various reasons; Calvinus will get his revenge, in one way or another. In offering these *solacia* the satirist is forced by decorum into deliberate self-contradiction, for he has already belied what he must now tell Calvinus if he is to console him. For instance, he has already professed himself to be one *qui nec Cynicos nec Stoica dogmata legit* (121), who will simply point out the ways of the world; but now he replies to Calvinus, *Chrysippus non dicet idem* (184). He has said that he will appeal to what one can learn *vita magistra* (22), but now he appeals to the teachings of philosophers. The satirist has already shown that he knows that the precepts of philosophy will not carry much weight with Calvinus. Calvinus is a man of experience (18), who is supposed to have learned from experience, not from reading.

When the satirist turns to his second line of argument (192–3 *cur tamen hos tu / evasisse putas*), he is no more convincing. His first point, that the very contemplation of crime will bring punishment, which he illustrates by an anecdote from Herodotus, hardly rings true. Calvinus himself knows how easily his malefactor has escaped: the gods have not struck him down. Furthermore, the present age is full of crime of this kind and of far worse kinds, and perjurors fearlessly flaunt their ill-gotten jewels (138–139). I note, in passing, that the anecdote in its context in Herodotus does not have any effect, either. Leotychides, a Spartan king, is trying to get the Athenians to return some hostages who have been left in trust with them. He uses the story that Juvenal paraphrases in order to persuade the Athenians, but without success.

The satirist's second point, that wrong-doers suffer terribly from their own conscience, is equally hollow. The implication of *nec mensae tempore in perpetua anxietas nec mensae tempore cessat* (211) is that these conscience-stricken wrong-doers are not so stricken that they might not be expected to forget their cares at dinner-time. In fact, the displeasure that a guilty-conscience gives them is not greater than the displeasure of sour wine – not a very profound displeasure. The lines

et, quod praecipuis mentem sudoribus urguit,
te videt in somnis; tu sacra et maior imago
humana turbat pavidum cogitque fateri. (220–22)

are especially nice. The satirist tells Calvinus, in effect, that Calvinus looms like a god in the conscience of the malefactor. Calvinus's *imago* appears *sacra* to the *sacrilegus*, even if the gods, their shrines and his oath have not appeared so. Conscience replaces law and religion. The guilty one confesses. But these are empty affirmations of what the satirist has already denied. The guilty one has not confessed and we have no reason to expect that he will. He may be slightly upset, but he is not in such a sweat that he neglects to buy jewelry and expensive old wines with his ill-gotten money. How can we believe that criminals are terrified at thunder and lightning (223–227) when we have been told that they swear false oaths freely by the *Tarpeia fulmina* (78) and that some are atheists (86–89)? If criminals consider their physical infirmities punishments sent by the gods (229–235), then they are getting what they bargained for (91–96), or rather less than they bargained for, because they would gladly undergo more than the fever mentioned here in order to keep their money.

Considering the view of human nature developed in the digression on religion, and in the supposed resumption of the *solacia*, one is not surprised to find the theme sounded once more at the conclusion:

tamen ad mores natura recurrit
damnatos fixa et mutari nescia. (239–40)

The *tamen*, by the way, confirms the satirist's own disbelief in the efficacy of conscience as a restraint, and also, no doubt, as a form of punishment (*quando recepit / eiectum semel attrita de fronte ruborem?* (241–42) The satirist says of Calvinus's betrayer, "Give him enough rope and he'll hang himself." But notice the punishments the satirist envisages:

dabit in laqueum vestigia noster
perfidus et nigri patietur carceris uncum,
aut maris Aegaei rupem scopulosque frequentes
exulibus magnis. (244–47)

Mayor, in his note on Satire X. 66 (*Seianus ducitur unco*), gives many examples of the use of the *uncus*, and of the *uncus* and the *laqueus*, all of which have to do with the punishment of political criminals¹⁸⁾. Mayor also quotes a "frantic litany chanted by the senate after the death of Commodus" from the *Vita Commodi* of

18) Mayor, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 92–94.

Aelius Lampridius, in which *unco trahatur* is the refrain to a list of Commodus's crimes, all of which are one form or another of murder. Mayor's long note on 73 shows that this is the same class of punishment as the noose and the hook¹⁹⁾. Both are political.

We have in the closing lines of the poem –

poena gaudebis amara
nominis invisi tandemque fatebere laetus
nec surdum nec Teresian quemquam esse deorum –
(247-49)

a bizarre convergence of the themes of the poem. Instead of consoling the desire for revenge, the satirist promises that the desire will be satisfied, though the vengeance will be neither divine, legal, personal, or self-inflicted through conscience. Rather, the satirist predicts or promises that *noster perfidus*, because he will naturally revert to his criminality, will fall afoul of the powers that be, which, of course, are corrupt, like practically everything and everybody else (3-4), or simply useless (135 ff.). The very corruption which Calvinus's betrayer represents will carry him off. This is poetic, or satirical, justice. But Calvinus, for his part, will regard this vengeance as divine; his faith in the gods will be restored. The corruption which the satirist has depicted as caused by irreverence will bring about the death of an irreverent perjurer, and restore reverence to one whose faith has been shaken. This paradox provides an excellent conclusion because it satisfies the requirements of both *consolatio* and satire. The poem is more complicated, more consistent, and more comical, in its bizarre way, than the commentators have said.

Harvard University

Lowell Edmunds

NACHRICHTEN DES SOLINUS ÜBER ALEXANDER IN DER HISTORIA DE PRELIIS

Zu den wichtigsten Excerptoren des Plinius, die dessen „Naturgeschichte“ dem Mittelalter mundgerechter gemacht haben, gehört C. Iulius Solinus, der, in der Mitte des 3. Jahr-

19) Mayor, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 120-122.