THE CRIMES AND ARTS OF PROMETHEUS

Most recent scholarship on Aeschylus' *Prometheus* has been devoted to the question of Zeus and the plan of the whole trilogy 1). And that in a way is understandable. Portions of the play are so plainly obscure — the wanderings of Io, for example — that one cannot give an account of them except by appealing to a larger design in which they would have a place. But these attempts to explain τοις ἐμφανέσι τὰ μὴ γνωσκόμενα has led to a neglect of what we have before us, which equally stand in need of explanation. We propose, then, to consider not the unavailable but two passages that are unusually dark and inevitably raise questions about the trilogy as a whole. The first concerns the crimes for which Prometheus was punished, the second the arts which he gave to men. The two are clearly related: the arts are somehow Prometheus' crimes.

As soon as Zeus usurped his father's throne, he distributed among the gods who had sided with him various offices and honors; but he assigned no special role to men and planned to destroy them entirely (ἅπτώσας γένος τὸ παῦ) before he produced a new race (228—233). Prometheus does not explain what lay behind the plan of Zeus, but only that he frustrated it. With the help, however, of a fragment of 'Hesiod', we may reconstruct what Zeus had in mind, and how Prometheus' crimes were an answer to it. Fragment 96 (Rzach) lists the heroes who came to woo Helen, and after saying that Menelaus won her and fathered Hermione, it goes on as follows (57—65: other possible restorations do not affect the sense) 2):

Πάντες δὲ θεοὶ δία τιμὸν ἔπετο
ἔξ ἑρίδος· δὴ γαρ τότε μὴδετο θέσκελα ἔργα

1) See Lesky, A., *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* (Göttingen, 1956), 77—82; the most extensive treatment of the play is F. Solmsen's *Hesiod and Aeschylus*, 124—177 (it is referred to as 'Solmsen'); see also Lloyd-Jones, H., *JHS* 76 (1956), 56—67; Fitton-Brown, A. D., *JHS* 79 (1959), 52—59; and for the linguistic side, Schmid, W., *Untersuchungen zum Gefesselten Prometheus* (Stuttgart, 1929), 41—77.

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Zeus υψηλημένης, μεῖξα κατ' ἀπείρονα γκαίαν τυρφασίας, ἢδη δὲ γένος μερόσων ἀνθρώπων πολλῶν ἀϊστώσαι, τῶν δὲ πρόφασιν μὲν ὀλέσων ψυχὰς ἡμιθέων, ἕνα μὴ δειλοῖς βροτοῖσιν τέκνα θεῶν μιγέγ, μόρον ὕφθαλμοίσιν ὃρῶντα,

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν μάκαρες καὶ ἐς υστερον ὡς τὸ πάρος περ

χωρίς ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων βίοτον καὶ Ἥθε' ἦχωσιν

The plan behind the Trojan war was to destroy the race of heroes so that the gods (τεχνα θεων) could no longer marry mortals and in their children “see death with their own eyes”. If Aeschylus regarded the heroes as the δεύτεροι πλοῦς of Zeus, after Prometheus had thwarted his original intentions, then Zeus might have first planned to destroy all mortals so that neither the gods nor his new race would ever see death by mixing with them. This new race would have been a better version of the heroes since they would share in the gods' immortality; they would have been like the daemones who came from the golden age (Hes. OD. 121—126); but they would have been generated, for Zeus wished to plant or sow (φιτοῦσαι, 233) and not make (ποιῆσαι) them (cf. Suppl. 310); and hence, before mortals could be wholly destroyed, men and women would have to be selected as their mothers and fathers 3). Io would be the first victim (cf. 668).

If Zeus wanted the earth exclusively inhabited by a race of demigods, so that they would not see death with their own eyes, then the other crimes of Prometheus were meant to make mortals equal to them even in this respect.

248 ΠΠ. ῾Οντούς γ' ἐπαυσα μὴ προδέρχεσθωι μόρον.
ΧΟ. τὸ ποιόν εὐρών τῆςδε φάρμαχον νόσου;

250 ΠΠ. τυφλὰς ὑπ’ αὐτοὶς ἑλπίσας κατῆκισα.
ΧΟ. μεγ’ ψφελήμα τούτ’ ἐδωρήσω βροτοῖς.

252 ΠΠ. πρὸς τοῖςδε μέντοι πῦρ ἐγὼ σφιν ὑπάσα.
ΧΟ. καὶ νῦν φλωγωτόν πῦρ ἔχουσ’ ἐφήμεροι;

254 ΠΠ. ἄρ’ οὖ γε πολλὰς ἐκμαθῆσονται τέχνας.

προδέρχεσθωι μόρον cannot mean, as it is usually translated, “foresee death”, but quite literally it must mean “see death as

3) That Prometheus saved Deucalion and Pyrrha who were of the bronze age, which preceded the heroic in Hesiod’s scheme, slightly confirms this (Apollod. I. 7. 2), although there is only one race of men in PV.
their lot in front of them" (cf. e. g. προσοράω Th. VII. 44. 2). If προδέρχεσθαι meant a Cassandralike prophecy (cf. 843), Prometheus would not have been compelled to give them blind hopes; he simply would have taken this faculty away. As Zeus had wanted to make men invisible (αἰστώσας, 232) so that death might be invisible to his new race, so Prometheus, by blinding men with hopes, did the same for them without destruction. He made death invisible ("Αἰδης). The pre-Promethean situation of man was the constant awareness of death, and as this made any activity based on future expectations impossible, which is the presumption of any productive art (cf. Xen. Mem. I. i. 6—9), Prometheus had to remove men's oppressive sense of his mortality before the arts could become useful. Mortals are ἐφὶμεροι according to the Chorus — Prometheus never says they are (cf. 83, 546, 945) —, they live in the light of day in which they once saw themselves as only mortals 4). But Prometheus' gift of fire, coupled with blind hopes, means the replacement of this natural light by artificial light, whose purpose is precisely to conceal the original horizon within which men live. The price paid for the arts is blindness. Whether the fundamental condition, which has only been overlaid but not removed — the Chorus hardly regards post-Promethean man as different from what he was before (544—550) —, can be rediscovered on the basis of the arts is an open question. Aeschylus indeed might have thought that this rediscovery was a task of tragic poetry.

The Chorus believes that to see death before one is a disease — the gods hate Hades as much as mortals do (Γ 65) —, and that Prometheus benefited men in settling blind hopes in them. On the other hand, the Chorus asks in wonder whether ἐφὶμεροι have fire, but they do not seem to regard it as a great benefit to them; only Io, for whom the arts are of no use, will address Prometheus as though she thought it is (612 ss.). The Chorus is composed of immortals, and it would not be strange if they thought fire was primarily a benefit to the gods. Without fire men could not have sacrificed to Olympian gods (cf. Ar. Av. 1515—1524); if they sacrificed at all, they could only have poured libations and offered first fruits 5). And if

one thinks of the technical expression ἄπυρα λεφά, which are sacrifices to the Fates and Furies (Schol. ad Ag. 70; cf. Fraenkel, ad loc.), it is fitting that pre-Promethean man, haunted by his own mortality, should appeal to the only gods as far as he knew which controlled his life and death. In any case, such fireless sacrifices would necessarily assign a higher if not exclusive position to the chthonic gods: even the immortal gods would have made men think of death (cf. Eur. fr. 912 N). No wonder, then, that Zeus when he assumed power had no regard for men who could neither please nor displease him (cf. 494).

Prometheus’ three crimes — his rescue of men from annihilation, his cure of their despair, and his gift of fire — radically change not only the condition of men itself but also the relation of men to the gods. Prometheus’ reflection on this latter change is embodied in his description of the arts; but before we turn to that, we must consider how Prometheus viewed his effect on simply human life 6). The order in which he has presented the arts is not at first clear; for that number, though ἔξοχον σοφισµάτων (459), is fourth in his list while first (if the fragment is his) in his Palamedes (fr. 303 M, adesp. 470 N) shows that here it is not in a self-evident position. Men originally lived in the dark; their eaves were sunless and they did not know how to make houses whose windows faced the sun (450—453). Their emergence from caves into the sun naturally leads Prometheus to describe the art of distinguishing the seasons (454—458). The night-sky gave them clear guides for discrimination, but since the rising and setting of stars are sometimes still “hard to discern” (δόσκριτοι), Prometheus gave them numbers, which is the only sure way of marking the seasons (459 ss.); and as numbering is useless unless one remembers accurately, it is joined by the invention of letters. Thus the first four arts form a whole: 1) openness (houses) 2) the seeing of the sky in its differences (astronomy) 3) the precise discrimination of the stars’ movements (number) 4) the precise recording of these movements (letters). The fifth and central art is the taming of animals (462—466), which partly is necessary for agriculture and hence dependent on

the preceding three arts 7). The mention of horses then suggests, as Stanley remarks, ships, the horses of the sea (5 708); and Prometheus then reflects on his own situation in which he has no device to release him from his pains; for if Prometheus saved men from the flood sent by Zeus by advising Deucalion to build a ship (cf. Apollod. I. 7. 2), his own helplessness by contrast would now especially come home to him.

The Chorus next interposes and compares Prometheus to a bad physician who cannot cure himself; and as the repetition of the phrase ἐς νόσον πέσειν indicates (473, 478), Prometheus is thus provoked into describing medicine (478—483). Medicine deals with symptoms, which are the predictive signs of a disease; and hence Prometheus couples it by a simple τε with prophecy, also an art of interpreting signs that can be either good or bad (484—499) 8). The phrase τοῖσιν μὲν δὴ ταῶτ' (500), which closes his account of prophecy, would seem to indicate that metals, the ninth and last invention, are on a completely different plane 9). The connection seems at first purely verbal: the signs that arise in fire (φλογωτὰ σήματα) were previously ἐπάργυμα (499, cf. Ag. 1112 ss.), and just as Prometheus gave men eyes (ἔξωμμάτωσα) to see them, so he showed them the benefits hidden (κεκρυμμένα) in the earth. But if one considers that metallurgy is the only art mentioned that essentially needs fire (besides certain kinds of divination), and that φλογωτὰ σήματα could equally well describe the way in which one judges in smelting the state of a molten batch, metals are the fitting climax to the Promethean arts of prophecy. The last four arts, however, are much harder to see in their inner unity than the first four. Taming of animals might have led Prometheus to reflect on mastery in general, and thus the mastery of the sea to the mastery of disease, and that in turn to the mastery of chance through divination (cf. Pl. Leg. 709a1-c3). The discovery of metals, then, would be related to the previous three arts somewhat as housebuilding was related to astronomy, number and letters. As housebuilding meant the

7) The transition, linguistically, is triggered by ἔργανην (461), which suggests γῆς τὸ ἔργαζονθα as Eustathius puts it (Comment. in Il. 122, 45); and it suggests as well the phrase βοῶς ἔργανης Archil. 48 D 3 (39 B), Soph. fr. 138 N² (563 P); note the ν. l. here ἔργανην.

8) Herodotus II. 83—4 follows his account of Egyptian oracles with Egyptian medicine; cf. III. 132. 2.

9) Cf. for the phrase Eum. 480; Soph. El. 696, OC 62.
coming out into the open of men, which entailed the arts of
distinction and accuracy, so metallurgy, as the art of bringing
things out in the open which primarily are not in the open,
would entail the three preceding arts that make use of hidden
characteristics of the sea, the earth (herbs), and fire (sacrifices).

Prometheus first described men as clear-sighted in the
face of death, and his own activity as one of blinding; but in
the account of the arts he presents men as originally blind and
the arts as the means to bring them out into the light. How can
we explain this contradiction? The difficulty seems to consist in
Prometheus’ failure to state what he believes to be the nature of
man. Men were previously νηπιοι, he says, and he made them
ἐννοοῦς and φρενών ἐπιθόλους (443ss.). If we take this literally,
Prometheus claims that men were originally dumb or unspeaking
(in-fantes); but beings without speech and sense can hardly
be considered men at all, and Prometheus only says he showed
them how to write (460). If, however, νηπιοι means only foolish
as it usually does — δεχόθεν δὲ τε νηπίος ἔγνω —, the claim to
have given men those arts which they are capable of finding for
themselves seems unfounded. The art, for example, of astronomy
is altogether different from the gift of fire. Men might never be
so favored as to find out how to make fire (cf. 367—369), but
as long as they can see and reason they can discover the order
in the movements of the stars. And again if men can talk and
thus make distinctions, they can count, and no Prometheus
would be necessary to instruct them. λέγειν, after all, means to
count as early as Homer (δ 452) — to say nothing of the later
λογίζομαι —, and Prometheus himself uses it in almost that
sense (973; cf. Pers. 343) 10). What the silence of Prometheus
about the nature of man implies is revealed in a remark that at
first looks like a merely grammatical curiosity. Among the
ways of divination is ornithoscopy (488—490):

10) Cf. Plato Epin. 977c 3—d 4. λόγος occurs some 28 times in PV,
more than in any other play of Aeschylus (in Ag. 19x). It is curious that
it does not occur in Prometheus’ account of the arts, whereas μυθος first
occurs there (505) and becomes frequent thereafter (641, 647, 664, 684 are
all in a single speech of Io’s, 876, 954, 1080, cf. 889, 1063). λέγειν is also
unevenly distributed: only five out of twenty occur before 609, and of
these the first four imply a reluctance to speak (197, 260, 317, 442), and
445 prefaxes the list of arts. Perhaps it is not irrelevant that the play
moves from silent Bia to Hermes, jacundus nepos Atlantis.
The accusative of respect φύσιν is puzzling. The relative clause seems to be equivalent to οὖτινες δεξιός τε εὐωνύμους τε (εὐωνύμους is the reading of Γ), but one may wonder whether metrical considerations alone made Aeschylus avoid coupling φύσιν and εὐωνυμοὶ. δεξιός literally means “on the right” and by extension “propitious”, but εὐωνυμοὶ literally means “of good name” (the constant usage of Pindar) and only because one recognizes it as a euphemism for “unpropitious”, does it mean “on the left”. δεξιός and εὐωνυμοὶ are themselves signs that have to be interpreted. The right is right by nature but the left is only sinister by name; but since they are correlative terms, right and left as propitious and unpropitious have suppressed the distinction between nature and name, φύσις and νόμος. As the distinction, then, between nature and convention is not operative for men but replaced by art, so that between speech (λόγος) and language (γλώσσα) cannot be drawn. Prometheus does not distinguish between number and letters but joins them with a single τε, even though all tribes know how to count while not all tribes know how to write (cf. Her. IV.113.2). The fourth art (letters) and the eighth (divination) equally show that Prometheus in bringing men into the light has not revealed all the distinctions found in the light, and that the ambiguous status of speech and reason in his account is founded on the blindness he first gave to men. For it is impossible to reconcile his giving men blind hopes as well as the art of divination unless their belief that they accurately know this art is in fact the basis of their blind hopes. Men first lived in a chaos and were like the shapes of dreams, but

12) Cf. Her. II. 36. 4: γράμματα γράφουσι καὶ λογίζονται ψήφοις Ἑλληνες μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ φάροντες τὴν χείρα, Ἀλγόπτης δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄριστα καὶ ποιοῦντες τὰ ἀριστερὰ αὐτὸς μὲν φασὶ ἐπιδέξια ποίειν, Ἑλληνας δὲ ἐπαρίστηρα; Plato Leg. 794 d5—795 a 7.
13) Cf. Th. V. 103. 2, where the Athenian ambassadors say to the Melians: “Do not imitate the many, οἷς παρὰν ἀνθρωπεῖσιν ἐτί σφιξεσθαι, ἐπειδὴν πιεζομένους αὐτοὺς ἐπιλίποιον αἱ φανεραι ἔλπιδες, ἐτί τὰς ἀφανεῖς καθότανται μαντικήν τε καὶ χρησμοῦς καὶ δυσ τοιαῦτα μετ’ ἐλπίδων λυμαλ-νηται.”
Prometheus showed them how to tell which dreams were fated to turn out true (νάχρινα πρώτος ἔξ ὀνειράτων ἔρη ὑπαρ γενέσθαι, 485)\(^{14}\). Men do not altogether awaken under Prometheus’ guidance but still live in a twilight — think of Io’s dreams (645—662). They now believe they can tell apart ὑπαρ from διαρ, but it is only the ὑπαρ of dreams. “I opened the eyes of mortals” (ἐξωμιμάτωσα), Prometheus says again, but only so that they could see the signs concealed in fire and not the light of the sun (488 ss.), for Prometheus makes no distinction between the δύσκριτοι risings and settings of the stars and the δύσκριτοι cries of birds (458, 486 (consider 447 ss.), cf. 662, Ag. 981). But men as surely lack the complete art of divination as Prometheus possesses it\(^{15}\). The arts which illuminate the human world are embedded in all-encompassing darkness (cf. Se. 3, 25).

Once one sees that the chiaroscuro art of divination is the model, as it were, for all the Prometheus arts, the only outright falsehood in his speech begins to make sense. Prometheus, who cannot cure himself, showed men the mixing of drugs, “by which they ward off all diseases” (483; contrast Soph. Ant. 360—364). We must not palliate this claim and assume Prometheus means less than he says. Man’s first illness was the awareness of death, for which Prometheus found a remedy in blind hopes. If they cured man of this numbing fear, it may not be too fanciful to suggest that the ultimate hope was that of immortality; for if Heracles dominated the succeeding play or plays, as the fragments suggest, no one could be found more fitting as the embodiment of this hope (cf. Thomson, 29—32)\(^{16}\). I should not wish to insist upon this admittedly unprovable conjecture, but it does explain why divination and medicine are put side by side. In any case, a medicine that cures every disease entails a way to avoid death, even if it only means a shadowy existence in Hades, for Hades is not death simply and, according to Hesiod, is no older than Zeus (Th. 453—457). Prometheus even there found riches, hidden in the earth, where before men had

\(^{14}\) χρῆ almost entirely replaces ἄετ in PV, χρῆ and χρεων some 19 times, ἄετ only once (9) with acc. and inf., for in a play that only has divine characters every “must” is a “fate” (cf. Ch. 297).

\(^{15}\) Note the allusion to blind hope in the Chorus’ words to Prometheus: τίς ἐλπίς; οὐχ ὃς κτλ. (259, cf. 536—538).

\(^{16}\) See Her. IV. 93—94 (the Getae) for the consequences of such a hope.
only put their unburnt dead 17). Hades is Pluto (cf. 805 ss.; Pearson ad Soph. fr. 273).

The list of arts begins with man’s emergence into the open and ends with the bringing to light of metals. Within this framework of light, the central art is something of an anomaly. The verbs Prometheus uses to describe his way of giving each art are those of showing, distinguishing, and discovering: ἔδειξα (458, 482), ἐξευρέτα (460, 468, 469, 503), ἐμπάμην (477), ἔστοιχισα (484), ἐκρίνα (485), ἐγνώρισα (487), διώρισα (489), ὁδωσα (498), ἐξωματίσωσα (499); but in the case of taming the verbs are surprisingly direct: ἔζευξα and ἦγαγον (462, 465). Taming apparently is not an art that can be taught in speech; Prometheus has to show it in deed. And what holds for the tamer holds for the tamed: it must learn through suffering. Prometheus thus alludes to the need for force and compulsion in taming (ὑπόδομος), which distinguishes it from all the rest of his arts; for even in his medicine there are only “gentle remedies” (482; cf. Her. III.130.3). The taming of Prometheus himself, which is constantly described in terms of subduing a horse, is sufficient proof that persuasion does not suffice 18). Prometheus, who pities even the fate of the monstrous Typho (352), is inclined to discount and reject compulsion (cf. 212 ss.) — he calls horses here “lovers of the reins” (πελήνοι, 465) 19)—, but his tacit admission that it is necessary raises the question whether the same relation which holds between men and beasts should not also obtain between gods and men. The gods, as beings of a different order, may have to rule by force. It is the “bit of Zeus” that compelled Inachus to eject “by force” his daughter from house and country (671 ss.). That the gods need to use force would be perhaps the major concession Prometheus will later make in being reconciled with Zeus 20), for the very condi-

17) ἐνέρθη δὲ χθονὸς κεκρυμμένα (500) reminds one inevitably of the common phrases καλύπτειν and γρήχειτειν for burial, as well as of Emp. 274 ss., μέγας ὡρ Ἀιδής ἔστιν εὐθύνος βροτῶν ἐνέρθη χθονὸς; Pers. 229 τοῖς τε ἐνέρθη γῆς φίλος, etc.; indeed, this is the only Aeschylean passage where ἐνέρθη, νέρθην does not refer to Hades (nine times).

18) φάλλει (54), μασχαλιστήρας (71), κηρκυσσον (74), see Blomfield’s Glossarium on these words; cf. 323, 563, 1009 ss., Schmid, op. cit., 59.

19) See Fraenkel, Ag. 1067 for the harshness of Greek bits, and contrast the way Oceanus manages his bird γνώμη στομίων ἀτερ εὐθύνων (287).

20) In light of such phrases as Ag. 182 ss. δαιμόνων δὲ που χάρας βιαλῶς σέλμα σεμνῶν θμέων and Suppl. 1069 εὐμενῆ βλέν, it seems to me
tion of his release — the continuation of the reign of Zeus — means that he can no longer simply please Io or by implication the rest of mankind (cf. 758 ss.) 21). Io is there as a silent actor because Prometheus does not yet understand it 22). Prometheus now, however, does not regard men but the new gods as savage; and the gods are shown as at best indifferent: Oceanus never mentions men. The tyranny of Zeus must be moderated if human life is to become tolerable; and Prometheus offers a way to make the other gods as philanthropic as himself. Sacrifices are a way to tame the gods (cf. 494), for they give the gods a reason for taking an interest in men (526—535). “How could I forget divine Odysseus”, Zeus once said to Athena,

Ως περὶ μὲν νόσων ἐστὶ βροτῶν, περὶ δ’ ἧπα θεοίσιν ἀθανάτοσιν ἔδωκε, τολοθρανὸν εὐρύν ἔχουσιν;

The first effect which sacrifices had, one can imagine, was to persuade Zeus to abandon his plan of destroying the race of men and generating an immortal race of heroes; for though Prometheus saved it once from a flood, he surely could not have saved it from an onslaught of thunderbolts. Fire, as we learn from the battle between Hephaestus and Scamander, is more powerful than water.

If we have partly uncovered some of the implications behind Prometheus' list of the arts, we have not yet explained its dramatic function. Why does it occur between the Oceanus—

that Kratos' words ὥς ἄν διδαχῇ τὴν Διὸς τυραννίδα στέργειν (10) should be taken literally: Prometheus will learn to love the tyranny of Zeus.

21) Between Prometheus' saying his release will not come πρὶν ἄν Ζεὺς ἐκπέμψῃ τυραννίδος (756) and his saying that Zeus cannot but be overthrown πλὴν ἔγον ὕπ' ἄν ἐκ δεσμῶν λυθεῖσι (770), a change occurs: the first would satisfy Io's desire for vengeance, the second would not, since by itself it implies that he will tell Zeus the secret; but Prometheus, by bringing in Heracles, makes it appear that he will be released ἄκοντος Διός, contrary to the testimony of Philodemus (fr. 321a M); hence Pauw's conjecture ἄρχοντος. Io thought, however, that the answer to τις οὖν ὁ λύσων ἐστὶν ἄκοντος Διός; would be οὔδεις (cf. Hephaestus' ὁ λοφήσαν γάρ ὁ πέρικτι ποι, 27: cf. Soph. Ant. 261); and Prometheus does not see fit to tell her that his release requires the perpetuation of Zeus' tyranny (875 ss.).

22) His omission of weapons in the list of arts, even though the unapproachable Scythians are armed with bows (711), stands together with his failure to mention political life (cf. Solmsen, 140 n. 79, 142 n. 88, 143 n. 91): πόλεις and πόλισμα each occurs once (421, 846). This failure is all the more striking because we see in the very first scene that Hephaestus has an art inferior to the art of ruling, and that his art is morally neutral (45—47; cf. Soph. Ant. 365—369).
scene and the arrival of Io? Just prior to Oceanus’ coming
Prometheus told the Chorus to stop bewailing his present
troubles and hear the future that awaited him (271—273); and
yet Oceanus’ entrance not only delays this revelation for the
moment but puts it off until Io comes. Oceanus, then, somehow
has made Prometheus meditate on the past and reconsider the
arts he gave to mortals. Oceanus tells him almost at once,
“Know thyself, Prometheus” (309, cf. 335), and this injunction,
I believe, compels Prometheus, while the Chorus sings, to think
over his crimes. “Do not think”, he begs, “that I am silent out
of wilful pride and disdain, but I devour my heart in deep
reflection (συννοιτάζω) to behold myself thus outraged” (436—438).
Prometheus’ thoughts are on the arts, and if not of remorse they
are almost of despair. To the Chorus’ confident belief that once
released he will be as strong as Zeus (508—510), he replies that
he is not thus fated to lose his chains, “for art is far weaker
than compulsion (necessity)” (511—514). This looks at first as
if it only meant, “My art is weaker than the compulsion of
Zeus” (cf. 107), and hence the list of arts would be Prometheus’
way of acknowledging his own weakness (cf. 469—471); but
were this its primary sense, it never would have led the Chorus
to ask, “Who then is the helmsman of necessity?” The general
force of Prometheus’ assertion makes it applicable to Zeus as
well: “His art too (these chains) is weaker than necessity”
(cf. 87). The Chorus phrases its question personally; it does not
ask, “What then (τι σῶν) is master of (stronger than) necessity?”
It senses at once that art no more than necessity is a purely
abstract noun. The Fates and Furies are necessity, and as Zeus
is weaker than they (517 ss.), the conclusion seems plain: not
Prometheus but Zeus essentially is art 23). If Zeus as the highest
god is art in the most general sense, one can see another reason
why Prometheus’ description of the arts is his response to
Oceanus’ command to know himself. The arts indicate his
relationship to Zeus, and why he apparently has the edge over
Zeus. The ordering of human life parallels the ordering of the
world that he accomplished on Zeus’ accession to the throne

23) Fraenkel, in his Ag., vol. III, 729, in his discussion of this pas-
sage not only assimilates the Fates and Furies to a “moral law” (Wilamo-
witz’ phrase) and thereby makes them almost unintelligible, but he claims
(n. 2) that 514 is a polemic against ‘Musaios’, fr. 4 Diels, Vorsokr., ως αἱτ
τέχνη μη’ ἀμετανόη τοχυς ἔστην. But “better” is not the same as “stronger”,
and art (Zeus) may equally well be both weaker and better than necessity.
(439—441, cf. 228—231). The empire of Zeus would also be surrounded by darkness. This empire, in which each god has a specific task, is presented in the first scene, where Zeus is shown to control both the art of metal-working (Hephaestus) and the art of taming (Kratos and Bia). But Zeus who has assigned a share (μοῖρα) to every god turns out to have a share as well (cf. 49 ss.). There is something for which he has no art. The three Shares (Μοῖραι) and their executive arm the Furies have no part in the art of Zeus. We later learn that Zeus’ defectiveness consists in his ignorance of generation. He does not know that if he marries Thetis, she will have a son that will overthrow him 24). Zeus, then, lacks the art of the Fates or generation. Their art is that of weaving: ἐνθα δ’ ἐπειτα ἐπέστα τῆς οἰ αἰσικα κατὰ Κλώθες τε βαρείωι γεννομένω νήσοντο λίνω (η 196—198, cf. Eum. 334 ss.) 25). It does not seem accidental therefore that of the three human needs — food, clothing, and shelter —, Prometheus mentions arts that satisfy the first and third but not the art of weaving, although he thrice employs words that necessarily remind us of its absence 26). As the only female art does not appear among the arts of mortals, so it is not counted in the technocracy of Zeus (τὰν Διὸς ἄρμονίαν, 551; cf. Suppl. 592—594; Her. II. 53.2).

We must now try to discover the sense behind this somewhat enigmatic result. Zeus is a god who was generated, and as a generated being nothing in his ancestry warrants any other presumption than that he like his father and father’s father before him will be overthrown (956—959; cf. Ag. 168—173). In the play itself the Chorus of Oceanids is silently there to threaten him with his overthrow, for Thetis, granddaughter of Oceanus on her mother’s side, surely lurks in their shadow (cf. 894—906). Oceanus also, as θεῶν γένεσις (Ἐ 201), at least partly appears to remind us of generation. He fathered the mother of Kratos and Bia (Hes. Θb. 383—385), the wife of

24) It also seems implied that he does not know that Heracles, in the thirteenth generation from Io (774), will release Prometheus ἄκοντος Διὸς; and hence it is fitting that Io should enter just after this (but see n. 21). τοῦχη occurs in the play 13 times, as it does in Soph. OT (cf. 1080—1085).


26) πλινθωπείς (450), λινόπτερα (468), and ἀμάνθη (461), which is Athena’s epithet in Attica and elsewhere as the goddess of weaving (Soph. fr. 844, 2 P).
Prometheus (557—560), and the father of Io (636). Oceanus is the complete opposite of Prometheus and art 27). He alone remained apart when Zeus called an assembly of the gods (γ 4—9). As the embodiment of generation he represents the missing element in the rule of Zeus, for Zeus does not know how to control it. If the new gods are to be proof against generation, they must find a way of becoming asexual: once he is castrated Uranus no longer generates and becomes a neutral σώραννος (Hes. Th. 175—205). Does Zeus, then, have such a way? If the trilogy unfolded it, the Oresteia would be its fitting counterpart; for there the human cycle of crime and counter-crime is stopped by law, and here the divine cycle of usurpation and expulsion which are grounded in sexuality would be stopped by art. The art needed, as we have allegorically said, is the art of weaving, and the goddess of weaving is Athena. The virgin Athena, in one account, was born from the head of Zeus by the art of Hephaestus (Pind. Ol. VII. 35—37, cf. Hes. Th. 924—926); and in another, she would have had if born from Craft (Μητίς) the sovereignty among the gods (Hes. Th. 886—900; cf. Solmsen, 67 ss.). She is any case the perfect product of art, who can solve the problem of generation among the gods just as she once partly solved it among men; for by virtue of her being motherless, she tipped the scale in favor of Orestes (Eum. 657—666, 736—738) 28). Our final conclusion,

27) Consider Prometheus’ contemptuous contrast between the unmade cave of Oceanus and Scythia the mother of iron: τοὺς ἑταλμησες λειπόν ... πετρηρωθῇ αὐτόκτε ... ἡκερείν ἠάτην ἑαυτῆς ἐλθέν ἐς αἶμα (299—302); cf. Thucyd. IV. 3. 2, 4. 3: Pylos is φώτος καρτεράνων καὶ αὐτὸ καρτεράνων. Note that love frustrates art in the so-called deception of Zeus, where Hera had clearly planned to entice Zeus into her chambers so that once inside he could not leave since Hephaestus had fitted the door “with a hidden bolt that no other god could open” (Ε 168). Hera makes herself too attractive for the scheme to work (Ε 215—223, 293—351); and the first indication that it will fail is Sleep’s rejection of a throne made by Hephaestus “forever imperishable”, but his acceptance of one of the Graces (Ε 238—276).

28) The much-abused line Sept. 197 ἀνήρ γυνὴ τε χόδε τῶν μεταίχμιον is not so foolish if one realizes that neuter citizens would solve the problem of the trilogy: the crimes and curse of Oedipus could not have occurred. Consider the τὸ τότε of Soph. Ant. 334 (the hymn to art) in light of the hymn to Eros (781—800). One may note that Soph. Ant. 332—352 presents nine human activities and characteristics that seem to be a reply to Prometheus’ list: 1) ships, 2) farming, 3) hunting, 4) taming, 5) speech, 6) thought, 7) ἀκούσμοι ὁργα, 8) shelter, 9) medicine. Speech rather than taming is central, and speech rather than letters is decisive. Hunting and
then, that Athena might have played an important part in the
last play of the trilogy (whether it be Ἰώπφώρος or Λυώμενος)
is not altogether surprising 29); but as it is safer to leave the
unknowable alone, we would rather appeal at the end to our
analysis of Prometheus’ arts and crimes.

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TEXTKRITISCHES I ZU HIPPOLYT
REFUTATIO B. III—X

Ioanni Herter

Zuerst einige Worte zu „Buch III“ im Titel. Wie bekannt,
werden B. II—III der Refutatio für verloren gehalten. So
auch We. S. XV. Die Ansicht von Adhémar d’Alès2), daß im
jetzigen B. IV auch die Grundteile der verlorengegangenen
B. II—III enthalten seien (und zwar Kapitel 1—27 = B. II;
Kap. 28—42 = B. III; u. Kap. 43—51 = B. IV), von R. Gan-

29) Cf. Thomson, 34 ss.; Schmid, op. cit., 107 ss.; contra, Solmsen,
153 n. 127.

1) Miller = Origenis Philosophumena s. Omnium haeres. refutatio, e
cod. Parisino nunc primum ed. Emmanuel Miller, Oxonii 1851.
Gö. = S. Hippolyti ep. et mart. Refutationis omn. haeres. libror. decem
quae supersunt. Recensuerunt, Latine verterunt, notas adiœcerunt Lud. Dun-
cker et F. G. Schneider. Gottingae 1859.
Cruice = Philosophumena s. Haeresium omn. confutatio. Opus Origeni
adscriptum e cod. Paris. productum rec., Latine vertit, notis variorum suisque
instruxit, prolegomenis et indicibus auxit Patricius Cruice, Parisiis 1860.
We. = Hippolytus Werke. Dritter Band. Refutatio omn. haeres. herausge-
gegeben von Paul Wendland (Die gr. christl. Schriftst. d. ersten drei Jahrhun-
derte, 26), Leipzig 1916.

2) La Théologie de Saint Hippolyte (Bibl. de théologie hist.), Paris
1906, 80—90; Idem, Les livres II et III des Philosophumena, REG 19 (1906)
1—9.
then, that Athena might have played an important part in the last play of the trilogy (whether it be Ἰυρφόρος or Λυώμενος) is not altogether surprising; but as it is safer to leave the unknowable alone, we would rather appeal at the end to our analysis of Prometheus’ arts and crimes.

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ἀστυνόμοι ὁργαί reveal the absence in Prometheus’ list of force and the city; while the absence here of astronomy and prophecy reveals the Chorus’ omission of τὰ ὁράτακα as a human limit (cf. 418). Their list presents man as an offensive (1—4) and defensive being (7—9), with thought as somewhat anomalous; cf. Pl. Plt. 279 c 7—9.

