THE FLIGHT OF DAMARATOS

Damaratos, the Spartan king, was deposed at the instigation of his royal colleague Kleomenes, allegedly for not being the son of his predecessor and reputed father, but really for unpatriotic obstruction. Herodotos tells us this (vi 61—66) and adds that after his deposition he was insulted by his successor Latychidas at the festival of the Gymnopaidia and fled from Sparta, τόν λόγον φάς ὡς ἤς Δελφοὺς χρησόμενος τῷ Χρηστηρίῳ (vi 70). What we shall discuss here is when he fled, and why he fled, for it may well be that the λόγος was true and that he was, at first, intending to visit the Oracle, not flee to Persia.

Professor H. W. Parke has established the probability that Damaratos was deposed by the method described in the eleventh chapter of Plutarch’s Life of Agis 1). Every eight years the Ephors were entitled to watch for shooting-stars, and if one saw, or thought he saw, a star, the kings could be suspended and one, or possibly both subsequently deposed if he had been accused of some religious offence and condemned by the Oracle of Delphoi 2).

---

1) The Deposing of Spartan Kings, CQ XXXIX 1945 106.
2) Parke suggests one or the other, but it may possibly have been that both, or neither, were liable to deposition.
Plutarch describes this method as being used against Leonidas II, who should therefore have been deposed a multiple of eight years after Damaratos. Parke thinks that the years were the Spartan years 491/90 and 243/2. This is possible, but, since the Spartan year began in October 3) this might mean that Damaratos was deposed in the spring of 490, in the same year as Marathon, and not, as is usually assumed, in 491. If it was in 491 and also in the Spartan year 491/90 it must have been at the very beginning of the Spartan year, because the Oracle was closed for three months in the winter 4). It might have been in the Spartan year 492/1.

Unfortunately we cannot tell from Herodotos whether he means to date the deposition to 490 or 491 because of an error. In his narrative of 490 vi 95 1 and vi 95 2 both refer to events τοις προτέρων ἦτε and in vi 46 and vi 48 he dates

3) For the calendar see Bischoff RE X 1578 and 1591, and the references given. See also Thuc. v. 19, v. 36 and v. 46 (overlapping of the ephorate of Xenares with the generalship of Alkibiades at Athens) Thuc. VIII 39 (inconclusive, Spartan admirals did not always take office at that time) Plutarch Agis 13, and 16 Polybios IV 14—36, especially 27 and 34 (Spartan year begins about the same time as elections in Aitolia, after the equinox) and Beloch Griechische Geschichte 2 II 2 p. 270—271. L. Pareti (Atti Accad. Torino XIV 1909/10 pp. 812—829) gives a table of Spartan years worked out in an improbably rigid eight-year cycle, with Karneios as the last month, not, as Bischoff more probably maintains, the last but one. Weber (Alcestis pp. 14—16) interprets Alkestis 445 ff. as proving that the Karneia was the beginning of the year, but that is not likely, see Dale ad loc.

4) There is no direct, but strong circumstantial evidence for this; during the three winter months Dionysos was worshipped and Apollo was not supposed to be present. Cf. Plutarch de E 389 c, Qu. Gr. 9 and Halliday's Commentary. For the view that the Oracle was not closed during these months, cf. Farnell, Cults IV 186, and for the view that it was, Poulsen, Delphoi p. 23, Parke, Delphic Oracle 28, Parke and Wormell pp. 11 and 30 and the references their given especially Claudian 28. 25, RE IV 2 2532, X 2 1590—1.

The scholiasts on Pindar Pyth. 4 1 (p. 95 and 96 in the Teubner edition) probably, and those on Kallimachos, H. Apoll. 1 (p. 49 in Pfeiffer) certainly, do not refer to the god's official absence in winter, but to occasions when he was being worshipped but was not responsive to the worship; whether Pindar Pyth. 4 5. and Libanius ep. 314, refer to an official or an unofficial absence it is impossible to say. The Spartan year ended, according to Bischoff, in a month corresponding to Boedromion at Athens, and the Delphic months, in which the Oracle was closed corresponded with Maimakterion, Posideon, and Gamelion. That would leave one month in which the Oracle could be consulted, unless there were an intercalation at Delphoi, giving one more. The Spartans would have an extra month if Pareti is right in saying that Karneios was their twelfth, but it was probably the eleventh.
the events a year apart, so either the events were not a year apart or one of the phrases τώτι προτέρων ἦτει is a mistake, but we cannot tell which one, if either, is the mistake. Nor can we say that it must have been 248 years before 243/2, because Leonidas II could have been deposed in 244/3, though 243/2 is more likely 5). Nor can we fix it precisely by the dates of the other Eurypontid kings the lengths of whose reigns are recorded by Diodoros, because none of their accession-dates is known with sufficient certainty; they are compatible with depositions in 491/90 and 243/2 and also with 492/1 and 243/3, though here again the later dates are rather more likely 6). All we can say is that it was either in the Spartan year 492/1 or 491/90.

The flight of Damaratos, after his deposition, is recorded, not in the continuous narrative that ends in vi 66,3, but in the digression that begins there and continues down to and including 72. This consists of the end of vi 66,3, the fate of Kobon and Perialla, and 67 to 72, the flight of Damaratos. That being so, we do not know whether the festival of the Gymnopaidia, during which he fled, is meant to be in the same year as his deposition or not. All we know is that it cannot be before 491 7), and it is a sensible guess that it was before Kleomenes' disgrace for bribing the Pythia who deposed him, or else he would have been reinstated.

An argument for its being the year of the deposition is the phrase in vi 67 2, Λευτυχίδης γεγονός ἡδη [αὐτὸς] βασιλεὺς ἀντε ἐκείνου which suggests that the flight was very soon after the deposition. But we may argue against this that ἡδη is sometimes used when the two events were several years apart (e.g. perhaps in Thucydides 1 103) and, more cogently, that if the

5) It was in the Spartan year before the battle of Pellene, which was fought just at the end of harvest time of either 242 or, more probably, 241. Cf. Walbank Aratos of Sicyon p. 182, who assumes that the harvest was gathered in autumn, but the corn harvest would be at the end of May or the beginning of June, and there is nothing to show that the vintage is meant here. The choice is between the beginning and the end of an Achaian strategic year, May 242 or June 241.

6) The whole series is discussed by Meyer, Forschungen, II 502—511. The accession that is a little awkward unless we accept the later dates is that of Archidamos II, whose fourth year ought to be 465/4 (Meyer p. 508).

7) Or after 487, since VII 3 implies that he had arrived in Persia by that date. But this is a silly story. Ktesias (54.23) says that he reached Xerxes when he was building the bridge over the Hellespont, but this is not to be believed against Herodotos.
Gymnopaidia were those of the year of the deposition it would mean that Damaratos had been elected to a magistracy in the middle of a year. This, though, is not conclusive, because we do not know what the magistracy was (see, for example, Macan’s note on vi 67), and, secondly, the year was one of such excitement that an unconstitutional election might have taken place, as it did in 242/1 8).

So Damaratos may have been deposed in 491 or 490, and may have fled in 491, 490, or 489, but one thing we may suggest, that if he fled during the festival of 490 it is possible that the crisis was contemporary with the battle of Marathon.

Herodotos says (vi 106) that Phidippides arrived from Athens just before Marathon and appealed to the Spartans for help, and that the Spartans delayed that help because they were waiting for the full moon. It is usually assumed 9) that this was the full moon of the Karneia. We cannot prove this absolutely because all Herodotos actually says is ήν γάρ ἔστα-μένοι τοῦ μηνὸς εἶνάτη, εἰνάτη δὲ οὐκ ἔξελεύσεθαι ἔφασαν μή ὦ πλήρεος ἔντος τοῦ κύκλου, but it is quite likely that is was.

In the first place, it is quite likely that there was some sort of festival in Sparta at the time, because there is no other example of the Spartans not being allowed to march out only because of the phases of the moon, whereas there are two other examples in Herodotos of delay because of a festival (vii 206, and ix 7) 10).

Secondly, the month Karneios usually corresponded with the Athenian Metageitnion, but could be a month earlier or a month later 11). The festival was in progress at the full moon, and may have been celebrated from the seventh to the fifteenth of the month, though this is less certain 12).

8) Plutarch Agis 12 4. Weber (see note 1.) would make the Karneia begin a new year, but this is probably wrong.
10) Cf. Plutarch de Malignitate 26 and Thuc. v. 54 with Arnold’s and Poppo’s notes.
12) It lasted nine days (Ath. XV. 141 e) and in Cyrene one of them was the seventh (Plut. Qu. Symp. 717’d. IG XII 3 sup. 1324 may prove a different date for Thera but may not mean that (Nilsson Feste pp. 125—6), and Thucydides (v. 54) speaks as if all Dorians hept it at the same time, cf. Parke and Wormell vol. ii p. 75. Hesychios s. v. Καρνεάται says that these were chosen ἐπὶ τετραετίαν, and in Kos
Now it is also quite likely that the battle of Marathon was fought in Metageitnion. It was probably not fought at the beginning of the campaigning season, because it was preceded by attacks on Naxos and Delos and, according to the Chronicle of the temple at Lindos, by a siege of that city during the rainless season.

Plutarch three times dates the battle to the sixth of Boedromion, in one passage deliberately contradicting the statement of Herodotos (vi 106, vi 120) that it was fought between the ninth day and the third day after the full moon. Since Herodotos is more likely to be right, it is usually assumed that it was fought just after the full moon of either Metageitnion or Boedromion. The matter is discussed, with references, by Dinsmoor who prefers Boedromion, though Metageitnion would seem rather more likely, because the expedition of Miltiades to Paros occurred after the battle, in the same year, (cf. vii 1) and before Datis had left Mykonos.

It is not as certain as we could wish, partly because of uncertainties about the state of the calendar at the time, discussed by Dinsmoor, partly because Clinton may be right

(Nilsson p. 122) there were Karneiai every other year. But the 3 Spartan Karneia must have been celebrated more than once every four years, Eur. Alk. 445, Hdt. VII 206, Thuc. v. 75). See also note 23.

13) C. Blinkenberg, Die Lindische Tempelchronik p. 29—38. This suggests that Aelian is mistaken when he dates the battle in Thargelion see note 18. Herodotos does not mention the siege of Lindos but brings the fleet from Kilikia to Samos. The events in VI 46 may or may not also have been in the earlier part of that year, cf. VI 95 2, Munro CAH IV 232, Maean Hdt. IV—VI II p. 75. Blinkenberg says that the siege is not historical, but there must have been at least a visit, so that the dedications could be made.

15) AJA 1934 p. 444.
16) Hdt. VI 118, cf. Ephoros F Gr Hist. 70 F 63, vol. IIa p. 59. We assume the correctness of the usual view, that Herodotos in this part of his narrative uses years beginning in the spring. Mr Hammond, however (Historia 1955 p. 384—5) maintains that he uses Athenian archontic years, beginning in July. This is rather unlikely; VI 43 1 strongly implies that a new year is beginning, and Hammond has to deny that it means this, and then to assume that a new year begins at VI 43 4, where it is neither implied nor stated. He also has to assume that VII 20 refers to a later stage in Xerxes’ march than VII 37, which is unlikely again. Moreover, the natural interpretation of VI 31, VI 43, and VII 37 is that the years, in this part of the narrative, begin in the spring.

17) Fasti Hellenici II pp. 28 and 407, cf CAH IV pp. 245 and 313, referred to by Dinsmoor. Munro, however, does not date the battle to the
in saying that, owing to mistakes in the calendar, it was on the sixth of Boedromion after all, and partly because if the cause of Plutarch's error was confusion between the date of the battle and that of the festival to celebrate it, the battle need not have been anywhere near the sixth of Boedromion. Unger \(^{18}\) says, for that reason, that Aelian was right in dating the battle to Thargelion. The only one of his arguments that is weighty is his reference to Dionysios of Halikarnassos v 17, and that proves too much. Unger wants to date the battle to the Athenian year 491/90, but when Dionysios says that ὑστέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ Μαραθώνια τῆς Βροοτοῦ ταφῆς ... ἡκκαίδεκα ἔτειν and appears to date the funeral to 508/7, it would, if correct, prove that the battle took place in 492/1 \(^{19}\), which will not help us; we know that the battle was in the Athenian year 490/89 \(^{20}\). If it was fought in Thargelion, it would not be Thargelion 490 but Thargelion 489. That being so, the number of events which had occurred before the battle, and the expedition of Miltiades after it, both make Metageitnion the most probable full moon for the battle, though it may have been Boedromion \(^{21}\).

Boedromion of his version of the calendar, because that would date it to an impossible time in the winter. He says that it was, by that calendar, in Thargelion, but does not adduce Aelian for this. Cf also Eunapios in Toynbee, *Greek Historical Thought* p. 74. Pliny *NH* II. 90. Annuaire du Bureau des Longitudes 1950 B. 12.


19) We could only make it come later if we assumed that Dionysios worked out either in what Athenian year the funeral was or in what Roman year Marathon was, and neither is likely. If he did, he would probably have meant to date the battle to 491/90, but he did not mean to date Phainippos that year, *cf.* VII 1. 5. *Cf. Leuze Römische Jahrzählung*, pp. 157, 179, 196 and 351, Mommsen, *Römische Chronologie* p. 87.

20) See the discussions in Gomme, *Thucydides I* p. 132 and Cadoux *JHS* 1948 117—118. The only other evidence for so early a date is Thuc. VI 59, which is only meant to be approximate, and a corrupt scholiast on Pindar 0.5.19, which seems to make the battle contemporary with an event before the death of Hippokrates of Gela in 491/90. But this last is either approximate, mistaken, or both, see Dunbabin *Western Greeks* 107, 399, and 407—409. Moreover, a deposition so early would not fit the dates of the later Eurypontid kings, see note 6.

21) The evidence quoted by Gomme and Cadoux proves that the battle was in the Athenian year 490/89, except that of Herodotos whose years begin in the spring (see note 16.), and who dates it to the campaigning season of 490. He *may* be mistaken; he dates Marathon three years before the Egyptian revolt which could, though it need not, have broken out a year later than he said. *Cf. Parker AJSIL LVIII* 1941 285—301,
That means that both the battle and the Spartan Karneia were probably near the full moon of Metageitnion, though both of them may have been Boedromion. So if they were both in the same year there is a good chance that they coincided.

Damaratos fled at the Gymnopaidia. Professor Meritt (Classical Philology XXVI 1931 p. 78) maintains that this was a prelude to the Karneia. The evidence for this, discussed by Meritt and by Unger (Philologus 1884 p. 641) is a statement quoted by Bekker that they were in honour of Apollo Karneios at his festival 22) and the fact that both festivals seem to have been about the same time in 417. The evidence that it came before, not after, the Karneia is that it was near the beginning of an Athenian month in 371 (though this is not conclusive, as can be seen from Pritchett and Neugebaur, Calendars chapter 1). The argument against it is that Xenophon (Hell. vi. 4. 16) and Thucydides (v. 82) do not speak as if it were a prelude to an international festival with a truce.

If it was a prelude to the Karneia and if it was the festival of 490, it is probable that it was within a few days of the arrival of Phidippides 23), sent from Athens to demand instant help against the Persians.

The Spartans did not refuse outright, nor send the help at once, but told the Athenians to wait until the full moon. Why?

It is fair to assume that genuine religious feeling about the moon was not the only reason. When Nikias refused to retreat

---

22) He could hardly have meant any other festival of Apollo Karneios, cf. Kallimachos h. Apoll. 80, Müller Dorian 357, who says the Hyakinthia were also in his honour, but see Preller Myth. I 4 pp. 248—9.

23) There is no evidence that the Gymnopaidia was not annual, though we only know of it for uneven years, nor that the musical contest at the Karneia was not annual (Ath. XIV. 635, cf note 12) whatever its relationship with the Gymnopaidia (Unger loc. cit., contrast Müller Dorian 315). For a denial that IG I 2 96 proves that the Gymnopaidia in 417 was in Skirophorion see Meritt loc. cit.
from Syracuse because of the eclipse, he was wanting to postpone the retreat, for other reasons, already 24) and he and his army deliberately forgot the eclipse when the Syracusans began to block the harbour 25). The Spartans would not have postponed help for Athens for that reason alone.

The reason may have been that the Messenians were in revolt at the time. Miss L. H. Jeffery 26) has shown that there probably was such a revolt about this time, and to the references she gives we may add Herodotos v 49 8, which suggests that the revolt had started by the beginning of the Ionic revolt. The only ancient writer who synchronizes it with Marathon is Plato 27) and he is not sure 28) but the synchronism is suggested by what we know of the Messenians at Zankle, that they were probably not established there until 489 or possibly 488 29). Guy Dickins suggests 30) that the revolt was being encouraged by Kleomenes, who had already fled. This would be possible if Damaratos were deposed in 492/1, fled at the festival of 491, and then Kleomenes fled before the festival of 490 31). But there is no direct evidence; Herodotos says (vi 74) that Kleomenes made the Arkadians swear to follow him, and also that there had been fighting with theArkadians at the beginning of the Messenian revolt (v 49 8) it may be that Kleomenes was trying to revive the revolt, if an oath to follow a Spartan king can be described as such, but there is no real need to assume that he did.

26) JHS lxix 1949 26—30.
27) Laws 692 d.
28) 698 e.
29) Robinson JHS lxvi 1946 13—20. He says 489, but the evidence he gives, six issues of coins, suggests 488. 489 may be right, though, if Damaratos were deposed in 490, the fall of Miletos will be 493. The battle of Lade should then be in October 494, at the time of the Thesmophoria (Hdt. vi 16. RE VI 26, 28). The Samians left immediately after the battle (Hdt. vi 22) and would have reached Zankle in 494/3, the Samian year beginning at the same time as the Athenian (Bischoff RE X 1585). If the first, unlettered, series of coins was for 494/3, this suggests that the Samians were ejected, and the Messenians installed, in 489/8. If the deposition was in 491, Lade will still have be October 494, with Miletos captured before spring 493, or else the Samians will arrive in Zankle in 495/4, a year before Anaxilaos, with whom they negotiated, came to the throne (Diodorus xi 48).
31) It would also be possible if Marathon was 489 and Damaratos had fled at the festival of 490.
One argument, however, against the delay in helping Athens having anything to do with the revolt is this; why should the Spartans have made excuses about the moon instead of simply telling the Athenians that they were fighting the Messenians and therefore could not help them? If it be argued that they wanted to conceal the revolt, why did Aristagoras know all about it in 498? (v. 49.8). The excuse shows that the reason was something that they did want to conceal and were ashamed to admit. And if the delay was caused by a revolt, why was it only delay that was caused? We should have expected either an outright refusal or a small force sent at once\(^{32}\). If the Gymnopaidia during which Damaratos fled was the same as the Karneia which was the excuse for not helping at Marathon, the reason is more likely to have been the crisis caused by the flight. This would have been an intelligible reason for the delay of the Spartans.

The chief argument against it, apart from the uncertainty of the synchronism, is that we should have expected Herodotos to connect the two events if they were connected in fact. It is, however, not impossible that he should have missed the connection between the delay at Marathon and the flight of Damaratos if he had obtained his information for these events from different sources; for a similar lack of connection we may compare vi 23 and vii 164. If we do not accept this, other reasons for the delay may be suggested; perhaps the Spartans were waiting to see whether the Athenians were worth helping or whether they would medize (as they nearly did). This, however, seems less likely. But, whatever the reason was, the flight did cause a crisis, and we must now see why.

Damaratos said, according to Herodotos, that he wanted to consult the Oracle\(^{33}\). Herodotos thinks that he was lying (vi 70) but when we consider the circumstances of his deposition, it becomes likely that he meant what he said. He had been deposed when the Oracle had said that, owing to his false claim to the throne, he was the sinner marked out by the star

\(^{32}\) We should also consider the difficulty Damaratos would have had in reaching Elis if the revolt had been in such a critical state as to hold up help for Athens.

\(^{33}\) If he said this, it disproves the supposition that oracles were at this time only given once a year, in February. Cf. Plutarch Qu. Gr. 9, and Halliday's Commentary, Amandry La Mantique p. 81, Parke CQ. 1943 19.
and Kleomenes was not, so he would naturally want to have that oracle contradicted. Moreover, if he could prove that there had been a flaw in the previous consultation, (for instance, a bribe from Kleomenes) he might not actually have to consult the Oracle at all. If Parke is right about the procedure of the deposition, he could automatically assume that if he were not the king whom the gods wanted to depose, then Kleomenes was \(^{34}\). This seems to be what actually happened afterwards. (vi 66 3, vi 74) \(^{35}\).

This was probably why he went; why he chose to go just then we cannot claim to know. The reasons Herodotos gives can hardly be described as adequate. But we can see that this would cause a crisis in Sparta \(^{36}\) for it might have meant the deposition of Kleomenes and Latychidas and the return of Damaratos in triumph.

Kleomenes had, therefore, to do two things. He must prevent Damaratos from reaching the Oracle, and he must see

\(^{34}\) That is why we should assume, though Herodotos does not actually say so, that the flight took place before the deposition of Kleomenes. It would be strange indeed if Damaratos did not claim reinstatement when the oracle that had deposed him was solemnly declared invalid, and then did so some other time. If he did, we must assume that it was immediately after Kleomenes' deposition, of which he was taking advantage, and that it was Kleomenes' friends who pursued him to Persia to prevent his reaching the Oracle and being reinstated. This would have been difficult at a time when Damaratos' party were winning, and it is simpler to suppose that the flight took place before the deposition of Kleomenes. If it were contemporary with the Delphic volte-face he would want to consult the new Pythia, if (as is likely) earlier, he would be more likely to want to prove a flaw in the previous consultation. It is not made clear that vi 74 is the beginning of the digression that ends at vi 93, but it is hard to see where else it can begin; 85 is possible but less likely.

\(^{35}\) Damaratos may have gone to Elis first because he wanted to consult the Oracle at Olympia as well, cf. Plut. Agis 11, Parke Delphic Oracle 222, Parke and Wormell pp. 84 and 209. Classical Quarterly xxxix 1945 106. If Oracles at Delphi were given on the seventh of the month he would have nearly a month to get there for a consultation (Cf. Meritt p. 79). Nobody says explicitly that oracles were given on the seventh of the month except for the early time when they were given on the seventh of Bysios only (Plutarch Qu. Gr. 9) but the number seven was particulary sacred to Apollo (Plutarch de E 17. 392 f, Halliday loc. cit.).

\(^{36}\) The crisis could conceivably have been the struggle about the deposition of Damaratos himself, (Cf. RE III A. 2. 1385) but this is not likely, and involves an unnecessary assumption of a mistake in the narrative of Herodotos, which puts the deposition before Marathon.
that he was so deeply committed to the Persian side that he would never be permitted to return to Sparta again. When Herodotos says (vi 70) that pursuers were sent who came up with Damaratos at Zakynthos, and that after some negotiations they let him go and that he then went to Persia, the probability is that Kleomenes sent them, and that they only let Damaratos go on condition that he went to Persia and stayed there. That meant that even if the Oracle reversed its decision and deposed Kleomenes, Latychidas, his partisan, would remain on the Eurypontid throne, while Kleomenes would be succeeded by Leonidas37).

As far as we can conjecture, the opponents of Kleomenes consisted mainly of those who did not want Sparta to be defeated by the Persians but distrusted the “entangling alliances” beyond the Peloponnese by which alone such a defeat could be avoided. But there were also men like Damaratos who would go to any length to oppose Kleomenes, and who would be willing to rule as Persian nominees. We know little about Leonidas except his heroic death, but he must have either belonged to the first group or been a partisan of Kleomenes. Since he married Kleomenes’ daughter, apparently before his own accession (vii 205) he was probably his partisan. In any case, his patriotism was above reproach, whereas Kleomenes had reason to think that that of Damaratos was not. Therefore Damaratos must be driven out before he succeeded in persuading any of the other opponents of Kleomenes to follow him, and driven to Persia, so that if Kleomenes were subsequently deposed his policy, however much it were damped down, could not be reversed. In most modern states the whole procedure would be thought fantastically non-violent.

This was Kleomenes’ motive, whenever the incident occurred, and if it was contemporary with Marathon we now see why Phidippides was told to wait for the full moon. The Ephors would not want to promise help to Athens if they did

37) Plutarch Agesilaos 1. 2. implies that the successor was decided before the king’s death, and ἐφίδρος meant “heir” (Hdt. v 41). But Herodotos suggests (v 42, vii 205) that it was decided after the king’s death, perhaps this was when there was some doubt. In Leonidas’ case the doubt may have been due to a possible claim from Dorieus’ son; if such existed, Leonidas forstalled it by his marriage; Hdt. vii 205.
not know who would be on the throne in a few days' time. This would also explain why they postponed the decision instead of refusing outright or sending a small force at once, and why they did not admit the real reason for the postponement.

Whether or not it was contemporary with Marathon, Kleomenes' manoeuvre was a success. When the Oracle did change its policy and reverse its decision (vi 66.3) and when Kleomenes was deposed and brought to a miserable end (vi 74) Damaratos was not restored, Latychidas and Leonidas were the two kings, and, though their compromising policy towards Aigina later may show a damping-down of Kleomenes' policy, it was not reversed 38). Enough of his work had survived to save Sparta, and thus to save Greece. Kleomenes was like Miltiades in Athens, he could not save himself but he just succeeded in saving his city, and when the crisis came in 480 there were Leonidas, Latychidas, and the Athenians ready to face it. Herodotos almost fails to understand the struggle of Miltiades, and quite fails to understand that of Kleomenes, because in each case he sympathized with the party who opposed them, Damaratos and the Alkmeonidai. Since Miltiades met the Persians in battle he is given something like his due, but Kleomenes is not, though he was the liberator of Athens from the Peisistratids, the victor of Sepeia, and the king who risked and lost his kingdom to drive the traitor from his city.

Caterham, Surrey
(England)

Daphne Hereward

38) E. g. Latychidas was not surrendered to the Aiginetans when they demanded him, and Sparta did not defend Aigina against Athens when open war broke out between them. It may or may not have been a damping-down of Kleomenes' policy when Latychidas demanded the return of the hostages from Athens; are we sure that Kleomenes would have left the Aiginetan hostages in Athens after Marathon? Besides his official mission Latychidas may have been sent to find out whether the Athenians, who had just been condemning Miltiades, were to be trusted before the Spartans helped them.