

mengésetzten (σύνθετον) und gefertigten (πλαστόν) Artefakt, dem σκεῦος (hier wohl in der Hauptsache Gerät und vielleicht auch Gebäude). Wir haben eine genaue Übereinstimmung mit der Stelle (2) aus dem VII. Brief.

4. Rep. X 601d 1—4: ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἐκάσ-
του σκεύους καὶ ζῴου καὶ πράξεως

5. Georg. 506d 5: ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώμα-
τος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου παντός

Beide Male, in (4) und (5), wird das unbelebte σκεῦος neben die lebenden Wesen gestellt.

Endlich sei nach Aritoteles (Rhet. III, 5 p. 1047 b 6) angeführt, wie der Sophist Protagoras die grammatischen Geschlechter der Substantiva bezeichnete: ἄρσενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεῦη.

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Words for 'soul', 'heart' and 'mind' in Aristophanes

This is a study of ψυχή, θυμός, καρδιά, φρήν/φρένες and νοῦς. The meanings of these words by origin and later development have been much discussed by Homeric scholars and others interested in the evolution of Greek thought about the human personality¹): my present very limited purpose is to consider the various ways in which they enter into the multifarious vocabulary of Aristophanes, and to ask what light an analysis of his usage throws on their currency and connotations in the later fifth and very early fourth centuries²).

1) See, for instance, Bruno Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*³, I (1956; English edition, 1953); R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought...*² (1954), index, svv.: these works refer to some important earlier studies.

2) This paper was first read to my colleagues in University College London, and I am grateful for additional references, and comments based on parallel studies of other authors, especially to Professor T. B. L. Webster: cf. his article on 'Soul and Mind in Greek Tragedy' in *JHS* 77, Part I (forthcoming). A brief recent survey of work on the language of Aristophanes is given by K. J. Dover, in M. Platnauer (ed.), *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship* (1954), 99.

Aristophanes gives us samples of many different styles or idioms; but the usage of the five words which concern us here can conveniently be considered under three main headings. In the first place, νοῦς commonly, and the other words occasionally, appear in phrases where context and parallels suggest that we are dealing with the familiar language of everyday use: an obvious case is προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν. Secondly, quotation and parody bring in some of the special idioms of poetry, especially Euripidean tragedy; with these passages belong others where Aristophanes follows poetic and not normal conventions, as he does most obviously in lyrics; and others still, where, if we cannot speak precisely of parody or burlesque, the choice of language is satirically appropriate, as in parody and burlesque, because of a particular set of associations: I mention a passage which must later be discussed, *Birds* 1553 ff., with its complex word-play on ψυχῆ and ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης. Thirdly, Aristophanes coins and distorts phrases as he coins and distorts words; and it seems justifiable to isolate a small group of passages as characteristic products of comic fantasy: for example, *Wasps* 648 f. '... a good fresh-chiselled millstone which can pulverize my *thymos*', where the metaphorical hardness of angry resolution is fancifully equated with the real and familiar hardness of grain. The attempt to evaluate Aristophanes' linguistic subtleties can fail in opposite ways: when we lose the point of a passage for lack of evidence, or read too much into it from what there is — much must therefore remain uncertain. In so far as the language of the comedies reflects that of the world around them, we can hope for a few details to supplement our other knowledge; and this study is presented in the hope that a full collection will make some of them a little clearer.

I. 'Soul', 'heart' and 'mind' in everyday language.

From the evidence of Aristophanes (which is admittedly limited and tenuous) there seems to be nothing to show that any of the words here discussed except *nous* had a significant range of use or meaning in the everyday vocabulary: it was hardly to be expected. If we attempt more precise English equivalents than the very rough 'soul', 'heart' and 'mind', *psyche* stands for 'life', and is an expression for 'courage' or the seat of courage; *thymos* stands for 'anger' and 'desire'; *nous* for 'attention', 'sense' or 'intelligence', and 'purpose' —

we may probably add 'meaning' and 'attitude' as other functions. *Kardia* is a physical organ, and a centre of emotion; current speech seems to have had expressions for the effects of emotions on the heart analogous to those of poetry, and, not surprisingly, absent from plain prose. Two particular points to notice are occasional survivals (or developments) of Homeric idioms; and the use in balanced phrases of *psyche* 'character' parallel to *tropoi*, *phrenes* 'good sense' coupled with *nous*, and *nous* 'attitude' opposed to *physis*: this suggests the influence of a more formal style, that of rhetoric or poetry. We now turn to details.

A. PSYCHE

(i) '*Life*': *psyche* can be said to correspond to 'life' where its loss (i. e. death) is hazarded. (a) *κινδυνεύων περι τῆς ψυχῆς* Pl. 524 is a current phrase showing this sense, paralleled, for instance, by Antiphon 2. i. 4—5, Thuc. 8. 50, Lys. 22. 20. Similarly, *τὸν περι ψυχῆς δρόμον δραμεῖν* W. 375 f., which reveals its Homeric ancestry in X. 161 *περι ψυχῆς θεόν Ἔκτορος*, and is paralleled by Plato, *Theaet.* 173 a *πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περι ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος* 'a matter of life and death'; Euripides gives a poetic version at Or. 878, as van Leeuwen aptly observes. (b) *καίτοι φιλῶ γε τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἐγὼ* Ach. 357, cf. *φιλοψυχία*, -εῖν; Lys. 6.43 has *σώσας τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν ἐτέρων διὰ ταῦτα ἀποθανόντων*.

(ii) '*Courage*' or *seat of courage*: *ψυχὴν ἄριστος* Kn. 457, P. 675, cf. Cl. 1048 f. The phrase is otherwise known from Tragedy (A. Pers. 442, E. Hec. 580), but the three contexts do not suggest parody, and prose admits similar expressions: e. g. *κράτιστοι τὴν ψυχὴν* Thuc. 2. 40. 3, cf. Hdt. 3. 108, Lys. 20. 29.

(iii) '*Character*': *τῶν τ' αὐ γερόντων οἶδα τὰς ψυχὰς* Ach. 375, in an oration, and parallel with *τοὺς τε γὰρ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ἀγροίκων οἶδα* 370 f.; perhaps therefore an affectation of rhetorical style.

B. THYMOS

(i) '*Anger*': *οἱ δὲ σκόπτουσ', ἔν' ἐγὼ γελάσω καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καταθῶμαι* W. 567: for *καταθέσθαι* as opposite of *ἐγείρειν* cf. Thuc. 1.121. This phrase appears elsewhere in a comic development, B. 401 *τὸν θυμὸν κατάθου κύψας παρὰ τὴν ὀργὴν ὥσπερ ὀπλίτης*: as it were 'ground your anger', like 'ground your arms'; for this development, we may perhaps compare *ἐχθραν*

ἀνιέντας Thuc. 3.10.4, with the comic metaphor of τῆς ὀργῆς ὀλίγον τὸν κόλλοπ' ἀνειμῆεν W. 574.

(ii) 'Desire': τάς τε συκάς . . . ἀσπάσασθαι θυμὸς ἡμῖν ἐστί πολλοστῶ χρόνῳ P. 559, is said by the chorus of farmers. θυμὸς ἐστί, here parallel to βούλομαι 557, is a Homeric idiom (e. g. Y. 349), surviving in later verse, and perhaps occasionally used in the spoken language as a synonym for ἐπιθυμεῖν. Cf. especially Hdt. 1.1 ὠνεέσθαι τῶν φορτίων τῶν σφι ἦν θυμὸς μάλιστα, a comic fragment, Theopompus 32 K. πιούσα δ' ὀπίσσον ἄν σοι θυμὸς ἦ and Xen. Cyr. 3. 1. 37 ἀπελάνετε ἔπου ὑμῖν θυμὸς.

C. KARDIA

(i) *physical heart*: Frogs 482—4 (bis). Dionysus, faint with fright, wants a sponge laid over his heart, which turns out to have sunk not to his boots, but εἰς τὴν κάτω κοιλίαν. Radermacher's note discusses the background of this piece of popular therapeutic and the joke it leads to. *Kardia* should not be taken as 'stomach' or part of the stomach here or elsewhere in Aristophanes, *pace* van Leeuwen and Starkie on Ach. 12; on its medical sense at Thuc. 2. 49, which has suggested this, see D. L. Page, CQ n. s. 3 (1953), p. 100: even there 'heart' is likely.

(ii) *heart as emotional centre*: Apart from its activities in the passage above, the Aristophanic heart also 'leaps' with anticipation (πηδᾶν Cl. 1391), a disappointment 'shakes' it (ἔσεισε τὴν κ. Ach. 12), desire 'strikes' it (τὴν κ. ἐπάταξε Frogs 54). These phrases look colloquial from their contexts, and for 'leaping' there are parallels at Eur. Ba. 1288 (πήδημ' ἔχει), and, for instance, Plato, Ion 535 c, Smp. 215 e. (b) Grief is expressed in metaphors of biting and burning. δακεῖν τὴν καρδίαν W. 375 is paired with τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμον δραμεῖν and like it is probably a current expression with a long ancestry: cf. Hesiod, Erga 451, and Ω. 129 σὴν ἔδειαι καρδίην. G. P. Anagnostopoulos, Athena 36 (1924), p. 43 notes also μηδ' οὕτω σεαυτὸν ἔσθιε W. 287 f., and Mod. Gk. μὴ τρῶς τὴν καρδίαν σου. ὅσα δὲ δέδηγμαί τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ καρδίαν Ach. 1 is paralleled in Tragedy (e. g. Eur. Alc. 1100), but also by Alkibiades' highflown language at Plato, Smp. 218 a, and therefore should represent emotional but not specifically poetic language. ἀλλ' ὦ Κλεονίκη κάομαι τὴν καρδίαν Lys. 9 is a doubtful candidate for inclusion here. The phrase may have been made for the alliteration; „ungewöhnlich“ comments Wilamowitz „der Tragödie aber fremd“.

(c) ἐκ τῆς καρδίας (φιλεῖν) Cl. 86 is possibly a current version of ἐκ θυμοῦ (φιλέειν) I. 343 and later verse. In the same sense we find ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς Xen. Oec. 10. 4, ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς Theophr. Char. 17. 4, ἀπὸ καρδίας Theocr. 29. 4, and Mod. Gk. ἐξ ὄλης καρδίας.

D. PHRENES, coupled with *nous*

The combination νοῦν ἔχειν . . . καὶ φρένας Thes. 291 appears in a burlesque prayer as a stronger form of νοῦν ἔχειν; cf. Dem. 18. 324 ὦ πάντες θεοὶ . . . τούτοις βελτίω τινὰ νοῦν καὶ φρένας ἐνθείητε and [25]. 33. In lyrics we have Frogs 534, and the variant φρένας ἔχουσα καὶ πολύπλοκον νόημα Thes. 462. (b) Lys. 432 οὐ γὰρ μοχλῶν δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ νοῦ καὶ φρενῶν, cf. Cratinus 65 K (~ Eupolis, Demoi 9 D. 7/Page, Lit. Papyri, no. 40). The combination is hardly poetic: perhaps it had a limited currency in elevated or emotional discourse³).

E. NOUS

(i) 'attention': προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν. I use this translation because 'mind' would be a little misleading: the sense is nearer 'attend to' than 'think about'. 16 examples are obtainable from O. J. Todd's Index Aristophaneus: the order is reversed at Cl. 575 and 1401 only, and only at 1401 is the phrase broken. It is common in prose, but apparently avoided in this form by Tragedy. Lysias, for instance, has 9 examples (D. H. Holmes, Index . . .): he also inverts the phrase (10. 10) and breaks it (28. 7). Tragedy uses νοῦν ἔχειν in the same sense (cf. E. Or. 1181 δεῦρο νοῦν ἔχε with Cl. 575 δεῦρο τὸν νοῦν προσέχετε); and Euripides goes so far as τὸν νοῦν πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔχων, ἐκεῖσε δέ Ph. 1418, cf. Thuc. 7. 19. 5, Cratinus 181 K. Two other phrases with a similar use of *nous* may perhaps be added: ποῦ τὸν νοῦν ἔχεις; 'What are you thinking of?' Ekkl. 156, and τὸν νοῦν μου προσάγει W. 697.

(ii) 'sense', 'intelligence': νοῦν ἔχειν meaning 'to have sense', 'be right' is common to prose and verse; the phrase usually implies no more than 'common sense' in Aristophanes: of persons, W. 1440, B. 1371, Ekkl. 433, 777 and frg. 969 Hall-Geldart (if genuine); and of actions, Frogs 696. At Cl.

3) *Phrenes* was apparently current in idioms corresponding to English 'take leave of one's senses': cf. Eupolis 357 K *μαίνεται τε καὶ παραρρεῖ τῶν φρενῶν*, Hdt. 3.155 *ἐκπλέειν τῶν φρενῶν*, Lys. frg. 90 *παραλλάττει τῶν φ.* Cf. also Andocides 2.7 *συμφορὰ τῶν φ.*

843 f. ἀνδρας δεξιους και νουν ἔχοντας, said of Socrates and Company, may rather mean 'with intelligence'; and a more refined use of the phrase is perhaps reflected in two remarks of the literature-loving Dionysus: Frogs 1396 (discussed by Radermacher) πειθῶ δὲ κοῦφόν ἐστι και νουν οὐκ ἔχον '... vacuous and without reason' and 1439 γέλοιον ἀν φαίνοιτο· νουν δ' ἔχει τίνα; ... 'but what reason is there in it?' A similar and apparently current phrase is νουν κεκτῆσθαι Ekkl. 747, cf. Plato, Laws 887 e. (b) νοῦς ἔνεστι is known from Tragedy (e.g. S. El. 1328, E. Hip. 920), but apparently a colloquial phrase at Ekkl. 856 'Not if there is any sense in them', Lys. 572, Ach. 556 and Kn. 1121 'You have no sense in your long hair' (c) μηδενὶ οὖν νῶ Cl. 580 is 'senselessly'; cf. Plato, Crito 48 c.

(iii) 'Purpose', 'plan': This sense is clear in κατὰ νουν: with πράττειν Kn. 499, 549, P. 762; and with χωρεῖν P. 940, cf. Theocr. 14. 57 and Gow's note. So also in P. 104 f. τίνα νουν ἔχων; answered by ἐρησόμενος... This phrase could be an unusual substitute for ἐν νῶ ἔχειν, which is metrically awkward, as Sharples notes. It is a short step from 'intention' to '(intended) meaning': Pl. 1080 οἶδ' οἶδα τὸν νουν· οὐκέτ' ἀξιοῖς ἴσως εἶναι μετ' αὐτῆς; Frogs 580 οἶδ' οἶδα τὸν νουν· παῦε παῦε τοῦ λόγου — 'I know your idea' covers both cases; and so τίς ὁ νοῦς; 'What's the idea?' Frogs 47; cf. Hdt. 4.131 ἐπειρώτεον τὸν νόον τῶν διδομένων. Are these really colloquial phrases? οἶδ' οἶδα at least suggests it (see also Frogs 584, Ekkl. 998); and there are parallels with νοεῖν Cl. 1186, 1381, Pl. 55 and τίς δ' ἠπίνοια σοῦστίν; P. 127, cf. W. 1073, B. 994.

(iv) 'Attitude': It is perhaps worth noting separately here Pl. 993 f. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ νῦν ὁ βδελυρὸς ἔτι τὸν νουν ἔχει τὸν αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μεθέστηκεν πάνυ, and B. 371 εἰ δὲ τὴν φύσιν μὲν ἐχθροὶ, τὸν δὲ νουν εἰσιν φίλοι: 'if they are natural enemies, yet they are kindly disposed to us' — the antithesis suggests a model in rhetoric or high poetry: cf. S. El. 1023.

II. Poetic language: satirical allusion and word-play.

By reason of the broad definition given above, this group of passages is numerically the largest, and also, to the present study, the most interesting. Quotation, parody and burlesque represent, in different degrees of accuracy, language derived from particular sources; where the representation has some

satirical point, we can learn something about the original, as when a cartoon reveals something we missed in a familiar face. Thus, when Aristophanes quotes $\mu\eta\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \epsilon\mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \omicron\kappa\epsilon\iota\ \nu\omicron\upsilon\nu$ from Euripides (Frogs 105 = 144 N²), we have, apart from the fact, the plausible inference that the idiom was striking enough to be ridiculed in the word-play which follows. Since Aristophanes follows poetic conventions of language both in parodying other poetry and in writing his own, it is convenient also to consider here passages in poetic style which are not obviously derivative — for instance, some of the occurrences of *phren*, *phrenes* in lyrics — and to ask in these cases whether the comic poet makes any special use of traditional materials. Not all 'derivative' language is poetic: where not, it is usually more difficult to identify, but there are a few examples of *psyche* and *nous* which may represent learned idiom, or at least the sort of pseudo-intellectual language which frequently appears in the comedies in the mouths of Socrates and Euripides, and with reference to them and their fellow-spirits: it is hard to believe that this has not some basis in fact. This therefore is the place to examine all the passages where our words may have been chosen to lend point to the satire. Here there is obviously wide scope for subjective interpretation. The words for 'soul', 'heart' and 'mind' have at least some currency in all kinds of fifth-century Greek, and an allusion pointed by a particular use of one of them will necessarily be less obvious than an allusion pointed by a word or a form right outside the normal Attic vocabulary. Even granted that we are right over some linguistic subtlety, could an audience have appreciated it? Tragic parody, at least, could have been marked by voice and gesture, as well as by the borrowed plumes of language; and what missed the $\gamma\epsilon\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \eta\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$ might well have found its target among the *σοφοί*, either at the performance or in reading the circulated text⁴).

A. PSYCHE

Psyche occurs in poetic contexts without special emphasis as a word proper to poetry; but it has also a particular use in paratragedy to make contrasts with non-literary words and expressions, and so to satirize the diction of Euripides for false elevation and its accompanying bathos. The range of meaning

4) Ekk1. 1155 ff.; cf. Frogs 1109 ff., and Dover, op. cit., 101.

here is 'life' or 'life-soul'; enduring or courageous soul; and 'character' — these, we have seen, are meanings also current in non-poetic language in certain limited uses. *Psyche* as 'soul after life' appears with specific Homeric reference, and the play which this meaning admits argues also for the survival of the traditional associations in common currency; the disembodied *psyche* is 'shadowy', and poets' *psychai* flit like ghosts in the air. Other passages reflect the impact of modern ways of thought: the Clouds seem to use learned language in talking of 'the enduring' as an ingredient of the *psyche*; *psyche*, like *nous* and *phrenes*, can be 'mind' affected by rhetoric. Poetic and intellectual language fuse in association with Socrates and Euripides; the reference of a decision to *psyche* involves intellectual as well as poetic satire of the tragedian; conversely, Socrates' companions are spoken of, with poetic allusiveness, as *psychai sphai*.

(i) 'Life', 'Life-soul': (a) quotations: ψυχὴν δ' ἔξεσάωσα P. 1301 = Archilochus 6 D. ψυχὴν for the accepted αὐτὸν is hardly a more poetic version, since 'saving *psyche*' is not characteristically poetic: cf. Lys. 6.43, quoted above, p. 207. ψυχὰι . . . ἔθανον Thes. 864 = E. Helen 52: 'life-soul' stands for 'living person' in the sense that it 'dies'. (b) burlesque of Euripides: Cl. 711 ff. Strepsiades complains that the Socratic bugs τὰς πλευρὰς δαρδάπτουσιν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκπίνουσιν καὶ τοὺς ὄρχεις ἐξέλκουσιν καὶ τὸν πρωκτὸν διορύττουσιν . . .; so later 717 f. φροῦδα τὰ χρήματα, φρούδη χροιά, φρούδη ψυχὴ, φρούδη δ' ἐμβάς. The clash between subject and metre is reinforced by clashes of language, as at Lys. 958 ff. (under [iii] below): the passages are discussed in this light by C. Jernigan, *Incongruity in Aristophanes* (1939) 30 f. For the repeated φροῦδος a probable source is Hec. 160 f. (Hec. 171 f. ~ Cl. 1165 f.). Earthy elements in the mixture are obvious; for ἐκπίνειν in Tragedy, see S. El. 785 f. τοῦμόν ἐκπίνουσ' αἰεὶ ψυχῆς ἄκρατον αἶμα and Ant. 532; δαρδάπτειν (Frogs 66, with Radermacher's note) and the form χροιά are also poeticisms. Similarly at Frogs 1331 ff., in a pseudo-Euripidean lyric based, it seems, on Hec. 68 ff., a dream vision is described as ψυχὰν ἄψυχον ἔχοντα (meaning, as Radermacher says, that it has no 'life-soul', but behaves as if alive), and μεγάλους ὄνουχας ἔχοντα. Here, again with satire of Euripides' bathos, there is a deliberate contrast between poetic and banalistic.

(ii) 'soul after life', with play on other senses: (a) Birds 1553 ff., a complicated passage. There is a marsh where Socrates ψυχαγωγεῖ: Peisandros went there δέόμενος ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν ἢ ζῶντ' ἐκείνον προὔλιπε. Peisandros, who is elsewhere satirized as a coward, has lost his *psyche* 'courage' (cf. Schol., quoting Eupolis 31 K); to recover it he behaves as if it were a Homeric *psyche* in the Underworld, sacrificing 'a sort of camel-lamb' in grotesque imitation of Odysseus (1561). What appears is the ghostlike Chairephon 'the Bat' — the 'half-dead' as he is at Cl. 504. *Psyche* is both the Homeric 'soul after life' and 'courage'; ψυχαγωγεῖ is primarily appropriate to Socrates as 'conductor of the ghosts' — his pallid followers — but there is a secondary sense of 'mind-leading', or 'persuading': the Aristophanic Socrates keeps Λόγοι in his Thinking-House.⁵⁾ (b) Cl. 94: ψυχῶν σοφῶν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φροντιστήριον 'This is a Thinking-House of Intelligent Souls': so the audience gets its first hint of Socrates and Company, perhaps intentionally mysterious to stimulate interest, as Aristophanes does more blatantly at W. 71 ff., P. 39 ff., Frogs 53 ff. Play on the meaning 'ghosts' is likely, judging from the passage just considered; and Chairephon is named with Socrates among the 'pale, shoeless men' when the revelation comes (105). But Schol. RV interprets with ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφῶν: this suggests that the primary sense comes from the tragic use of *psyche* as 'person': e. g. S. Ai. 154 τῶν γὰρ μεγάλων ψυχῶν εἰς οὐκ ἂν ἀμάρτοις. It is rash to infer, with the later Schol., an allusion to Socratic talk of the *psyche*. (c) Two other passages which involve the idea of a disembodied *psyche* may be noticed here. P. 827 ff.: Trygaios has seen no-one on his journey through the air 'but for two or three souls of dithyrambic poets'; they were 'flying about collecting preludes'. The traditional imagery of poetic flight (see A. C. Pearson, CR 40 [1926] 183 f.) is here given a satirical twist: the dithyrambic poets' *psychai* take the air not for vision but for material, like Euripides' *nous* (Ach. 398, p. 219 below);

5) Cf. Kock-Schroeder ad loc., C. Pascal, Dioniso (Catania, 1911), 225 ff. The idea of rhetoric as ψυχαγωγία perhaps goes back to Gorgias (Plato, Phaedr. 261 a, 271 c: cf. L. Radermacher, Artium Scriptores (SBOstAkad., ph.-hist. Kl. 227.3 (1951), 66, 207.) ψυχαγωγεῖν is used both of persuasion and deception in fourth century prose (LSJ, s. v.): for Aristophanes it will naturally be an evil activity. For *psyche* as mind affected by rhetoric, note especially S. Phil. 54 f. τὴν Φιλοκλήτου σε δεῖ ψυχὴν ὀπωσ λόγοισιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων, discussed by Webster, op. cit.

similarly, their unhappy colleague Kinesias is made to ask for wings to fly in search of airy nonsense at *Birds* 1383-5. These are not dead souls, as Merry's note suggests: the following reference to the popular belief that the dead go to air as stars is made to introduce two different points, as van Leeuwen and others have seen; but is it appropriate for writers of air to have *psychai* which behave like ghosts as well as like minds. At *W.* 756, Philokleon exhorts his 'soul' in paratragic anapaests, presumably in burlesque of Euripides, whose addresses to *thymos* and *kardia* are satirized elsewhere; then, with absurd bathos, he has lost it — σπεῦδ' ὦ ψυχὴ ποῦ μοι ψυχὴ; — finally, borrowing from the Bellerophon, he addresses it as a shadowy wraith: πάρες ὦ σκιερά (*Eur.* 308 N², who had said *inter alia*, 'shadowy grove').

(iii) *Enduring or courageous soul*: (a) *Ach.* 393 ὄρα 'στιν ἄρα καρτερὰν ψυχὴν λαβεῖν: Dikaiopolis is preparing to go to Euripides for tragic equipment, and approaches tragic style, though without recognizable parody: *E. Telephus* 718 N² is too unlike to count. (b) *Lys.* 958 ff. The Chorus consoles Kinesias for the trick played on him by Myrrhine: ἐν δεινῷ γ', ὦ δύστηνε κακῷ τείρει ψυχὴν ἐξαπατηθεῖς . . . and ποῖος γὰρ ἔτ' ἂν νέερος ἀντίσχοι, ποῖα ψυχὴ, ποῖοι δ' ὄρχεις . . .; (963). These are paratragic anapaests like those of *Cl.* 711 ff. discussed above; the repeated ποῖος, like the repeated φροῦδος there, is aimed at Euripides, and Schol. suggests *Andromeda* (116 N²) as the original: ποῖαι λιβάδες, ποῖα σείρην. Also possible is the context which inspired the parallel burlesque in *Clouds* - *Hec.* 155, 159 f. The use of verbal incongruity is similar: *psyche* brings poetic associations which are shattered when it is spoken of in the same way as a part of the body or a familiar material object; so also in *W.* 756, discussed at the end of (ii) above. This is a special application to literary burlesque of the familiar comic trait of reducing the abstract and elevated to the terms of everyday life, or of 'men worse than ourselves': more will be said of this later (p. 220 ff.).

(iv) *emotional soul*: This aspect of the *psyche* is familiar in Greek literature from passages where it is said to be affected by joy, grief, etc.; the two contexts in Aristophanes where *psyche* overlaps with this sort of 'heart' are rather more complicated. (a) *Frogs* 1468: Dionysus, pressed at last to choose between Aeschylus and Euripides, says that he will follow

the bidding of his *psyche*: αἰρήσομαι γὰρ ὄνπερ ἡ ψυχὴ θέλει. He speaks in strict metre, and approaches tragic diction, as he frequently does elsewhere in the play. Whether or not he is quoting, as van Leeuwen suspects, the casting of the responsibility onto the *psyche* is turned against Euripides in the same way as the notorious tongue/mind antithesis (Hip. 612), which is recalled three lines later when the decision is announced: ἡ γλῶττ' ἰμώμοχ' Αἰσχύλον δ' αἰρήσομαι. The 'emotional soul' in this context is an inner self (like Hippolytos' *phren*), which is not bound by external considerations such as the σοφία of Euripides (cf. 1413), or the bonds of an oath (1469 f.): hence the element of satire. The essential commentary is by Wilamowitz, *Lesefrüchte* CCLVIII (Hermes 64 [1929] 474). (b) Cl. 319 f.: Strepsiades has just heard that the Clouds give men a host of rhetorical virtues: ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἀκούσασ' αὐτῶν τὸ φθέγμ' ἡ ψυχὴ μου πεπόνηται καὶ λεπτολογεῖν ἤδη ζητεῖ, κτλ. πεπόνηται is a high-flown equivalent of ἀνεπτέρωται, which seems to have been a fashionable word for mental excitement, to judge by the play made with it in *Birds* 1437 ff.: note also 433, and 1447 ὑπὸ . . . λόγων ὁ νοῦς . . . μετεωρίζεται. Strepsiades' *psyche* suffers no ordinary excitement; he is moved by the very presence of rhetoricians, and wants to be one too; *psyche* approaches the sense 'mind' as in ψυχαγωγεῖν: see p. 213 n. 5. As in the *Frogs* passage, there seems to be an element of intellectual satire in the choice of language.

(v) 'Character': P. 1068 (burlesque oracle): ὦν δόλιαι ψυχαί, δόλιαι φρένες. The point lies in the repeated δόλιαι and *psychai* and *phrenes* function as conventional poetic words to make up a phrase for the hexameter. We cannot therefore press the distinction too far, but perhaps it is 'men whose natures and thoughts are treacherous' (b) Cl. 414 f. εἰ μνήμων εἰ καὶ φροντιστῆς καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ . . . — this is part of the recipe for a successful Socratic pupil. The words are carefully chosen: memory, power of thought and endurance are all tested in the following scenes, and it seems more than chance that the *psyche* is spoken of in the scientific way we know from the Hippocratic treatise on *Airs, Waters and Places*, 24: τὸ δὲ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ . . . οὐκ ἂν . . . ἐνείη, and from Euripides (*Or.* 1180). It is inapposite, with van Leeuwen, to compare περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τρέχειν: see rather Cl. 486 (Socrates) ἔνεστι δῆτά σοι λέγειν ἐν τῇ φύσει; and R. Goossens, *LEC* 17 (1949) 22—8.

B. THYMOS

The interesting passages are three certain burlesques, and one possible, of Euripidean addresses to *thymos*; these, taken with the similar addresses to *psyche* and *kardia*, tend to confirm the view of Leo and others that the development of this form of address in Tragedy was a Euripidean innovation: at all events, it was striking enough to be selected for ridicule, whether simply as a stylistic trait, or, as is possible, with the further implication that 'nous ne sommes plus dans un âge où l'on parle à son bras et à son âme' as Voltaire said of a passage in Corneille⁶).

(i) 'anger': θυμοῦ δίχα 473 K, apparently paratragic.

(ii) *seat of courage and endurance*: (a) Ach. 480 ff., a reductio ad absurdum of a Euripidean soliloquy, with two exhortations to *thymos*, and another ὦ τάλαινα καρδία (485). This was probably inspired by Medea's address to her heart and hand at Med. 1242 ff.: note Med. 1245 ~ Ach. 483, and Med. 1056 ὦ θυμέ Similarly Ach. 450 ὦ θύμ', — ὄρᾳς γὰρ ὡς ἀπωθοῦμαι δόμων, πολλῶν δεόμενος σκευαρίων . . . : Dikaiopolis, in appropriate language, calls his *thymos* to witness his rejection by Euripides, and goes on to exhort it to become an importunate wheedling beggar (like Telephos, 429). σπευδ' ὦ ψυχῇ W. 756 has already been discussed. (b) Kn. 1193 f.: similarly, in a difficult situation, the Sausage-seller cries: οἴμοι, πόθεν λαγῶά μοι γενήσεται; ὦ θυμέ, νυνὶ βωμολόχον ἐξευρέ τι. Here there is no direct allusion to Euripides, and we may have only an affectation of elevated poetic style, as Leo suggests (Monolog . . . 100); so Cratinus affects θυμέ in a lyric passage of Ploutoi (Page, Lit. Papyri, no. 38).

C. KARDIA⁷)

(i) 'courage': Ach. 489 (the soliloquy discussed under *thymos* above): following the appeal to *kardia* in 485, there comes at the end of the speech ἄγαμαι καρδίας: cf. Rhesus 245

6) Le Cid, I. vii. 49: cf. Jebb on S. Trach. 1269. See especially on these and the relevant Euripidean passages F. Leo, Der Monolog im Drama (1908), 36, 100, and B. Meissner, Mythisches und Rationales in der Psychologie der euripideischen Tragödie (Göttingen, 1951), 58 ff., 74 ff.

7) ἦτορ does not occur in A., κέαρ only at Ach. 5, as a literary *flosculus*, and elsewhere in Comedy at Eup. 90 K = E. Med. 397.

ἄγαμαι λήματος. Dikaiopolis is amazed at the resolution he has summoned up.

(ii) *emotional centre*: Two parodic passages: Kn. 1269 ἐκούσῃ καρδίᾳ follows a parody of Pindar, frg. 89 a Snell, and is at least in his style: cf. ἐκόντι . . . νόῳ Pyth. 8.67 et al.; ἐκὼν θυμῷ γελανεῖ Pyth. 4.181; καρδίᾳ γελανεῖ Ol. 5.2. Thes. 869 f.: ἀλλ' ὅσπερ αἰκιάλλει τι καρδίαν ἐμήν· μὴ ψεῦσον, ὦ Ζεῦ, τῆς ἐπιούσης ἐλπίδος. 870 parodies Soph. Peleus 493 P (Schol.); for the metaphor of 869 (which is presumably also paratragic), cf. Bacchyl. 1.164 f. ἐλπίδι . . . σαίνει κέαρ 'flatters his heart'.

D. PHREN, PHRENES

Both singular and plural appear in parodic and lyric passages as poetic expressions for 'mind'; *phrenes* are affected by shock, and stirred to wrath; once *phren* stands for 'way of thinking', 'disposition'. An interesting phenomenon is the application of the word in Aristophanes' mockery of intellectuals: it is commonly used of the rarified minds of poets, philosophers and others, and twice in iambs which are not recognizably parodic — the poetic word in the hands of a comedian has become a convenient instrument of satire.

(a) *parodic passages*: (1.) burlesque oracles, in hexameters: Kn. 1052 μεμνημένος ἐν φρεσίν; P. 1068, see p. 215 above; P. 1099 δόλω φρένας ἐξαπατήσας (cf. Hes. Theog. 889) (2.) parody of lyric: B. 938 f. τὸ δὲ τεᾶ φρενὶ μάθε Πινδάρειον ἔπος; B. 1376 (Kinesias) ἀφόβω φρενὶ σώματι τε. Compare, for instance τεᾶ . . . φρενὶ Pindar, Pyth. 5.19, ἀταρβεῖ φρενὶ ib. 51. (3.) paratragedy: Kn. 1237 ὡς μοῦ χρησμὸς ἀπτεται φρενῶν (cf. e. g. E. Med. 55); B. 1238 = trag. adesp. 48 N² ὦ μῶρε, μῶρε, μὴ θεῶν κίνει φρένας ('stir to wrath'; so E. Alc. 674 παροξύνειν); Frogs 886, Aeschylus prays to Δήμητερ ἢ θρέψασα τὴν ἐμήν φρένα (tragic style, not quotation: see van Leeuwen's note); Lys. 708 κακῶν γυναικῶν ἔργα καὶ θήλεια φρήν. In this last passage, *phren* stands for 'way of thinking', 'disposition', as opposed to 'acts', as in Eur. Ino 400 N² ὦ θνητὰ πράγματ' ὦ γυναικεῖται φρένες; cf. γυναικῶν θηλύφρων συνουσία Ekkl. 110 = trag. adesp. 51 N². Wilamowitz — improbably — suggests an original where the phrase applied to a man: 'dann eigentlich kann eine Frau nur einen solchen Sinn haben'.

(b) *satire of cleverness*: (1.) The *glossal/phren* antithesis of E. Hip. 612 is twice recalled, Thes. 275, Frogs 101—2 (cf.

1471). At Ach. 445 Euripides is made to say δῶσω· πυκνή γὰρ λεπτά μηχανᾶ φρενί. This, if parody and not quotation, belongs above; πυκνός and λεπτός are favourite words for the subtlety which Aristophanes so often scorns, as J. D. Denniston pointed out in CQ 21 (1927) p. 119; and they recur in some of the following passages, where *phren* or *phrenes* appears as the vox propria for a mind with these qualities. (2.) Lyric passages (9): Frogs 876 λεπτολόγους ξυνετᾶς φρένας . . . ἀνδρῶν γνωμοτύπων; B. 456 φρενός ἀξυνέτου (the reverse!); P. 1030 σοφῆ δόκιμον φρενί; B. 428 ἐν σοφόν τι φρενί; :: πυκνότατον κίναδος; Ekk1. 571 γῦν δὴ δεῖ σε πυκνήν φρένα . . . ἐγείρειν; Thes. 437 πάντα δ' ἐβάστασε φρενί πυκνῶς τε ποικίλους λόγους ἀνηῦρεν; Frogs 899 οὐδ' ἀκίνητοι φρένες of the contending poets; and, to the Socratic pupil, Cl. 703 ff. ταχὺς δ' ὅταν εἰς ἀπορον πέσης, ἐπ' ἄλλο πῆδα νόημα φρενός, and 474 ἀξια σῆ φρενί 'worthy of your intellect'.⁸⁾ (3.) That this usage is not entirely due to parody and the conventions of lyric verses appears from Cl. 153 ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τῆς λεπτότητος τῶν φρενῶν (of Socrates), and B. 1445 ἀνεπτερωῖσθαι καὶ πεποτηῖσθαι τὰς φρένας of a young man's reaction to Tragedy: see on Cl. 319 f., p. 215.

E. NOUS

Nous, unlike *phren*, *phrenes*, was found in a number of common phrases; and it is correspondingly infrequent in Aristophanes as a word of poetry and literary burlesque. *Nous* and *gnome* appear together as 'intelligence' and 'judgement' in contexts which suggest that they were a fashionable pair of virtues in sophistic and intellectual circles, and fair game for the comic poet⁹⁾. Other passages reflect the impact of the new learning, if not its language: *nous* 'idea' is twice used as a mock technical term; the old notion that poets' minds 'take wing' is given a new twist in application to Euripides; the 'elevation' of the mind by rhetoric is taken literally and made amusing; the idea that wine brings inspiration appears in the novel form of wetting the *nous* to produce subtle devices.

8) On Cl. 703 ff. as satire of Socratic method, see Schol. ad loc.; R. Philippon, RhM, n. f. 81 (1932), 36; W. Schmid, Philologus 97 (1948), 220.

9) It is worth recalling here that one of the charges against Euripides was that he taught people to think and question things (*noein*, *perinoein*, Frogs 957 f.) This, as Gilbert Murray puts it 'is the intellectual criticized by the plain man'; or at least by the plain man's standards: Aristophanes (1933), 126.

(i) *'mind'*: (a) poetry and burlesque: P. 733 ἦν ἔχομεν ὀδὸν λόγων εἰπωμεν ὄσα τε νοῦς ἔχει is presumably a poetic version of ἂ ἐν νῷ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν or the like; Frogs 105 μὴ τὸν ἐμὸν οἴκει νοῦν (= Eur. 144 N²) is followed by ἔχεις γὰρ οἰκίαν and perverted into 'do not inhabit my mind: you have a house'. (b) Euripides' *nous*: Ach. 398 ὁ νοῦς μὲν ἔξω ξυλλέγων ἐπύλλια οὐκ ἔνδον, αὐτὸς δ' ἔνδον ἀναβάδην ποιεῖ τραγωδίαν. The excursion of his mind was amusing when taken so literally. It collects *epyllia*, which are a light diet for Tragedy (Frogs 941), and it must leave earth to find subtleties: it is like the dithyrambic poets' *psychai* at Peace 827 ff. (see p. 213), with the appropriate difference that it is a *nous* and seeks refinement from the air, not dilution. (c) *nous* and rhetoric: B. 1447 f. ὑπὸ γὰρ λόγων ὁ νοῦς τε μετεωρίζεται ἐπαίρεται τ' ἀνθρώπος. As in the last passage, we have an over-literal interpretation of figurative language (on which the whole context depends); and it is possible that Aristophanes had some description of the power of words in mind.¹⁰) At Kn. 96 (the line is echoed at 114) Demosthenes calls for wine τὸν νοῦν ἔν' ἄρδω καὶ λέγω τι δεξιόν, as he says: 'if I get drunk, I shall spatter everything here with subtle devices, phrases and ideas' (βουλευματίων καὶ γνωμιδίων καὶ νοιδίων 100). This is a variant, with a suitably modern flavour, of the common idea that wine brings inspiration: see, for instance, Archilochus 77 D, on leading dithyrambs well after drinking; Pindar 124 Sn.; Cratinus, Pytine, esp. 185-6 K; and Xen. Smp. 2.24, where Socrates talks of wetting the *psyche*, with the same image from watering a garden or a plant to produce a crop.

(ii) *nous* 'intelligence', coupled with *gnome*: *nous* and *gnome* are qualities which the Clouds give to men, along with the rhetorical virtues of διάλεξις, τερατεία, περίλεξις, κροῦσις and κατάληψις (Cl. 317 f.);¹¹) Strepsiades' *nous* is to be scrutinized

10) A useful comparison with this passage and Ach. 398 is Clouds 223 ff., where Socrates is made to raise himself physically in order to mix his *phrontis* with the air for speculation about τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα. There, in contrast, there is an explicit reference to the equation *nous*/air expressed by Diogenes of Apollonia: cf. Diog., frgg. B. 4-5, and also Cl. 762; for other links with him, see Diels-Kranz, II⁸, 66 ff, and T. Gelzer 'Aristophanes und sein Sokrates', Mus. Helv. 13 (1956) 65, especially 69, 79 ff. on air and associated ideas in Aristophanes.

11) See on these terms Eranos 51 (1953) 129 f., and Radermacher, Artium Scriptoros, 112, who would derive them from the rhetorician Phaiax.

and his *gnome* tested in the Thinking-House (Cl. 477); Lysistrate, following Euripides' Melanippe, says ἐγὼ γυνὴ μὲν εἰμι, νοῦς δ' ἔνεστί μοι, αὐτὴ δ' ἐμαυτῆς οὐ κακῶς γνώμης ἔχω. (Lys. 1124 f.; cf. E. 483 N², with van Leeuwen and Wilamowitz ad Ar. loc.: 1124 may be quotation, and 1125 parody). We may add, probably, Kn. 482, where the Sausage-seller must display his *nous* or *gnome* against the violence of Kleon in addressing the Boule: that is, if it is right to read γνώμην (R) for ψυχὴν (V and other MSS), with Neil, Coulon and others and against Hall & Geldart. The contexts suggest, though they cannot prove, that the combination is not fortuitous, but derives from contemporary usage in the jargon of intellectuals; and we noted that *nous* in νοῦν ἔχειν seemed to admit a similar 'highbrow' use (p. 209). The extension of the pairing to other senses of the words may well be due to Aristophanes: cf. Cl. 728 νοῦς ἀποστερητικός 'a deprivatory notion' corresponds to γνώμην ἀποστερητρίδα 730, cf. 747; Cl. 743 f. νοήματα / γνώμη; Kn. 100 γνωμιδίων καὶ νοιδίων.

(iii) 'purpose': P. 1064 (burlesque oracle) θεῶν νόον οὐκ ἀλοντες — for the 'divine purpose', see e. g. Bacchyl. 5.95.

(iv) 'idea': Cl. 728, the phrase νοῦς ἀποστερητικός, just mentioned, appears as learned jargon in the mouth of Socrates: the *-ikos* termination in Aristophanes is discussed by C. W. Pepler, AJPh 31 (1910) 428 ff.; see also A. Ammann, -ΙΚΟΣ bei Platon (1953) 234, 265. The same tone is discernible in 471 K, when the poet says of Euripides χρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ τοὺς νοῦς δ' ἀγοραίους ἤττον ἢ 'κεῖνος ποῶ 'I use the rounded quality of his expression, but create less vulgar notions than he does'. This is similar to the use of *nous* in certain phrases already discussed (p. 209 f.); and the apparent technical term may be an Aristophanic extension of this.

III. Comic Fantasy.

In discussing passages of literary burlesque, we have seen something already of the way Aristophanes' fantasy works in reducing the elevated to everyday terms, and there have been signs of his ability turn traditional language to new uses (for instance *phren*, *phrenes*), and to extend particular expressions beyond their original senses. All these aspects of comic usage are seen more clearly in our third and final group of passages, and the first, the comedian's delight in concrete everyday

terms, is particularly striking: as when we meet 'a *thymos* of oak' or 'eyesores on the *phrenes*'. We find comic play with all the words in familiar meanings: *psyche* and *thymos* are both 'heart', in the sense of 'seat of courage and endurance': *thymos* stands also for 'anger'. *Kardia* appears as the seat of emotions, and as 'courage'; *phren*, *phrenes* as 'mind', and so *nous*, but also in the sense which we earlier distinguished as 'attention'. There is, inevitably, no absolute distinction between passages discussed here and those taken under the other two headings: most have poetic elements in the fantasy, though the exceptions with *nous* are noteworthy; a further point is that most of them, with interesting exceptions from the *Frogs*, come from the first six plays (425—414 B. C.) as opposed to the later five (411—388). On this a little more will be said in conclusion.

A. PSYCHE

'*seat of courage and endurance*': (a) B. 465 f. λέγειν ζητῶ τι πάλαι, μέγα καὶ λαρινὸν ἔπος τι, ὅ τι τὴν τούτων θραύσει ψυχὴν '... a great well-fed retort to shiver their hearts': λαρινός, as Kock-Schroeder point out, is a vox propria of fat stock (e. g. of an ox, P. 925); otherwise the strong expression θραύσει ψυχὴν suggests choral lyric. (b) Cl. 420 ff. Strepsiades makes a comic reply to the remark 'if the enduring is an element in your *psyche*' (415): he ascribes to himself a 'stout heart' (ψυχὴ στερρὰ) — so much so, that with this, and other attributes comically described, he is fit to be an anvil. (c) A proper name is substituted for an abstract quality: W. 380 τὴν ψυχὴν ἐμπλησάμενος Διοπίθους. For ἐμπλήρημι note τ. 117 μή μοι θυμὸν ἐνιπλήσης ὀδυνάων, with W. 424 ὀργῆς καὶ μένους ἐμπλήμενος. Diopieithes may stand for 'bravado': the evidence is collected by Holden, *Onomasticon Aristophaneum*², s. v.

B. THYMOS

(i) *seat of courage and endurance*: W. 383 ἀμνοῦμέν σοι τὸν πρινώδη θυμὸν ἅπαντες καλέσαντες. πρινώδης θυμὸς is a comic equivalent of the heroic *thymos* of iron or adamant: cf. πρίνινον ἦθος W. 877, and Ach. 180 f. Similarly, and with appropriate Homeric reference, Aeschylus at *Frogs* 1017 says that his heroes are redolent of spear, lances, and 'hearts of

sevenfold hide' (θυμούς ἑπταβοείους). θυμός ἀμυνίας Kn. 570 is perhaps modelled on the type θ. αἰχματὰς Pindar, Nem. 9.37 (cf. 27), with a possible play on the form of the proper name.

(ii) 'anger': (a) W. 648 f. πρὸς ταῦτα μύλην ἀγαθὴν ὦρα ζητεῖν σοὶ καὶ νεόκοπτον, ἦν μὴ τι λέγῃς, ἥτις δυνατὴ τὸν ἐμὸν θυμὸν κατερεῖζαι. Stubborn anger is comically equated with hard grain, as we noted at p. 206; similarly, calming anger is like lowering a weapon (B. 401), discussed p. 207); the common metaphor of 'sharpness' as in δξυθυμέω etc., leads to a comic identification of anger with vinegar and sour wine: W. 1082 θυμὸν δξίνην πεπωκότες and Ach. 353 δεινὸν γὰρ οὕτως ἄμφακίαν πεφυκέναι τὸν θυμὸν ἀνδρῶν ὥστε βάλλειν καὶ βοᾶν, cf. W. 877 f., with Starkie's note. With these passages in mind, the phrase τὸν θυμὸν δακῶν 'biting my anger' (to restrain it) Cl. 1369, is plausibly seen as a comic extension of χεῖλος δακῶν (e. g. Tyrtaeus 10.32). (b) Frogs 992 ff. The Chorus addresses Aeschylus, beginning with a quotation from his Myrmidones (131 N²), and going on . . . μόνον ὅπως μὴ σ' ὀ θυμὸς ἀρπάσας ἐκτὸς οἴσει τῶν ἐλαῶν 'mind your *thymos* does not catch you up and carry you off out of the contest'. The idea of anger as a wind is developed in the following lines, where Aeschylus is told to sail close-hauled and wait for the blast to settle: it may even have been suggested by the tragedian's own imagery: cf. Cho. 390 πάροιθεν δὲ πρῶρας δριμύς ἀηται κραδίας θυμὸς, and for ἐκτὸς τῶν ἐλαῶν Cho. 1022 ὥσπερ σὺν ἵπποις ἠγιοστροφῶ δρόμῳ ἐξωτέρῳ — although, of course, neither image is exclusively Aeschylean. The comic development is to make the *thymos* carry the man bodily off the course.

C. KARDIA

(i) *seat of emotions*: (a) Cl. 1368 f. κἀναῦθα πῶς οἴεσθέ μου τὴν καρδίαν ὀρεχθεῖν; ὅμως δὲ τὸν θυμὸν δακῶν . . . ὀρεχθεῖν (Ψ. 30, of dying oxen) here seems to mean 'swells, throbs' (not 'roars') as Gow suggests on Theocr. 11.43. (b) P. 525, the breath of Peace comes on the heart (κατὰ τῆς καρδίας) with a delicious air of freedom from service and myrrh. (c) κάομαι τὴν καρδίαν, Lys. 9, noted on p. 208, possibly belongs here.

(ii) 'courage': B. 1473 ff. ἔστι γὰρ δένδρον πεφυκὸς ἔκτοπὸν τι Καρδίας ἀπωτέρω Κλεώνυμος. *Kardia* stands for a place-name, as well as 'courage'.

D. PHREN, PHRENES

(a) Frogs 1040, Aeschylus' *phren* 'takes casts' (ἀπομαξαμένη) of Lamachos to produce heroic *aretai*. (b) Pl. 581 ἀλλ' ὦ Κρονικαῖς λημαις ὄντως λημώντες τὰς φρένας ἄμφο: 'with antediluvian eyesores on your *phrenes*'. Metaphors in both passages show the familiar comic distortion in terms of the concrete.

E. NOUS

(i) 'mind' (a) P. 996 ff. μεῖζον δ' ἡμᾶς τοὺς Ἕλληνας . . . φιλίας χυλῶ καὶ συγγνώμῃ τινὶ πραοτέρᾳ κέρασον τὸν νοῦν: cf. W. 878 μέλιτος μικρὸν τῷ θυμίδιῳ παραμείζας. (b) W. 93 ὁ νοῦς πέτεται τὴν νύκτα περὶ τὴν κλεψύδραν. Philokleon's mental 'flight', less ambitious than that of Euripides (Ach. 398), is given a ludicrously specific objective. Kn. 1119 ὁ νοῦς δέ σου παρῶν ἀποδημεῖ looks like a fantasy of the same kind, but may be a flight of phrase possible in everyday speech.

(ii) 'attention': Two passages show comic play with what may have been a normal phrase: Kn. 75 ff., the *nous* of the giant Kleon is ἐν Κλωπιδῶν (79), while his hands are ἐν Αἰτωλοῖς and other parts of his body in other satirically appropriate places. P. 669 Trygaios explains that the Athenians rejected peace because ὁ νοῦς . . . ἡμῶν ἦν τότ' ἐν τοῖς σκύτεσιν i. e. 'on the hides', as war materials, and 'in the leather quarter' as an allusion to Kleon: cf. Schol.

IV. Conclusion.

Statistics must be invoked with extreme caution in a narrow study with so many uncertainties, but they will be helpful to illustrate an important point which the arrangement of this essay has obscured. We have noted 153 occurrences of the five words: individual figures are: *psyche* 27, *thymos* 16, *kardia* 16, *phren*, *phrenes* 30, *nous* 64. Of *psyche*, *thymos*, *kardia* the five early plays, Ach.-Peace, have 41 examples, Birds has 4, and the five later plays, Lys.-Plutus, only 13; of the 13, Frogs provides 7. Nor, among the 13, is there any striking novelty. Current uses of the words, if we were right, account for five occurrences (*psyche*, Pl. 524; *kardia*, Lys. 9 (?), Frogs 54, 482—4); there remains *psyche* at Lys. 959, 963 — a burlesque of Euripides in the earlier manner of Cl. 711 ff. — *psyche* at Thes. 864 = E. Helen 52; and *kardia* in probable paratragedy,

Thes. 869; Frogs has two examples of *psyche* in contexts relating to Euripides (1334, discussed p. 212; 1468, p. 214), and two of *thymos* in contexts relating to Aeschylus (994, 1017; p. 221 f.). *Nous* again, apart from current phrases, has in the later plays *nous/gnome* (Lys. 1124 f. ~ Eur. 483 N²), μή τὸν ἐμὸν οἴκει νοῦν (Frogs 105 = Eur. 144 N²), and perhaps a special use of νοῦν ἔχειν, meaning 'to have reason', Frogs 1396, 1439: cf. Cl. 835. If, as is probable, the lost play *Skenas katalambanousai* belongs to the later period, we can add θυμοῦ δίχα 473 K (? paratragic), and νοῦς (pl.) 'ideas' 471 K, similarly to Cl. 728: these were the only two fragments concerned. *Phren*, *phrenes* alone continue steadily in the uses described, and in fact provide the only two passages in the fourth-century plays where the use of the five words was regarded as different from current idiom: Ekk1. 571, quoted p. 218, and Pl. 581, p. 223. The difference in quality is as striking as the difference in quantity, and whatever allowances are made (e. g. for chance, or the sparsity of lyric metres in Ekk1., Plut.), we seem to be left with something to explain, tentative as any explanation must be.

The words for soul, heart and mind, seen in the mirror of Aristophanes' comedies, enter very little into the ordinary vocabulary of everyday life (we must make a major reservation for *nous*, and probably a minor reservation for *kardia*). For the young Aristophanes they are words to play with, partly because of their established uses in serious poetry, whose conventions he reproduces in parody and mocks by distortion; but also because of the contemporary use of them by Euripides, and the new shades of meaning which *psyche* and *nous* acquired as new ideas came upon the old. After Birds, we have much less material, and it seems justifiable to speak of a decline in the kind of satire and fantasy with these words which we have been at pains to note. This we can explain, perhaps, partly in terms of a flattening in Aristophanes' style, which becomes clear in the fourth-century plays, partly from the assumption that the novelties of the 420's were less striking in later decades, partly from changes in subject matter: it is significant that the Frogs shows a return to some of the old tricks when a theme of literary satire made them appropriate, and it may be unwise to press the argument from silence further. The data from Aristophanes are too few and too

uncertain to make more than a marginal contribution to our knowledge of Greek psychological terminology, but if this paper has done anything to make their application to a general study less problematical, it will have served one of the purposes with which it began.

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ZUM V. BUCH DER ORACULA SIBYLLINA ¹⁾

(Ed. Geffcken, GCS 1902)

Franz Dölger zum 4. Oktober 1956

1) V. 10/11 sind umzustellen; dadurch wird der seltsame Sprung von Romulus und Remus auf Caesar etwas gemildert. — V. 13 lese ich (statt des überlieferten und in allen Ausgaben stehenden πολέμων) πολεμῶν. Die Anfangsverse des V. Buches lauten also:

Ἄλλ' ἄγε μοι στονοέντα χρόνον κλύε Λατινιδάων.

ἦτοι μὲν πρότιστα μετ' ὄλλυμένους βασιλῆας
Αἰγύπτου, τοὺς πάντας ἴση κατὰ γαῖα φέρεσκεν,
καὶ μετὰ τὸν Πέλλης πολιήτορα, ᾧ ὑπο πᾶσα

5 ἀντολίη βεβόλητο καὶ ἐσπερίη πολυόλβος,
ὃν Βαβυλῶν ἤλεγξε, νέκυν δ' ὤρεξε Φιλίππῳ,
οὐ Διός, οὐκ Ἄμμωνος ἀληθέα φημιχθέντα,
καὶ μετὰ τὸν γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος Ἀσσαράκοιο,
ὃς μόλεν ἐκ Τροίης, ὅστις πυρὸς ἔσχισεν ὄρμῆν,

11 καὶ μετὰ νηπιάχους, θηρὸς τέκνα μηλοφάγοιο,

10 πολλοὺς δ' αὖ μετ' ἀνακτας, ἀρηιφίλους μετὰ φῶτας

12 ἔσσειτ' ἀναξ πρότιστος, ὃ τις δέκα δις κορυφώσει
γράμματος ἀρχομένου· πολεμῶν δ' ἐπὶ πουλὸ κρατήσει·

Nun aber höre mir an die Schmerzenseit der Lateiner:

Wahrlich zuallererst nach dem Tode der Herrscher

Ägyptens,

Welche ja alle auf gleichem Boden dort liegen begraben,

Und nach dem Bürger von Pella, durch dessen Gewalt
das gesamte

1) Weitere textkritische Bemerkungen zum V. Buch habe ich veröffentlicht: Mnemosyne VII, 1938, 48; Symb. Osl. XVIII, 1938, 108; XIX, 1939, 101 f.; Hermes 74, 1939, 221; Phil. Woch. 1942, 140; Mnemosyne 4 a Ser. V, 1952, 129.