Words for ‘soul’, ‘heart’ and ‘mind’ in Aristophanes

This is a study of ψυχή, θυμός, καρδιά, φρήν/φρένες and νοῦς. The meanings of these words by origin and later development have been much discussed by Homeric scholars and others interested in the evolution of Greek thought about the human personality 1); my present very limited purpose is to consider the various ways in which they enter into the multifarious vocabulary of Aristophanes, and to ask what light an analysis of his usage throws on their currency and connotations in the later fifth and very early fourth centuries 2).

1) See, for instance, Bruno Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes, I (1956; English edition, 1953); R. B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought... (1954), index, s.vv.: these works refer to some important earlier studies.

2) This paper was first read to my colleagues in University College London, and I am grateful for additional references, and comments based on parallel studies of other authors, especially to Professor T. B. L. Webster: cf. his article on ‘Soul and Mind in Greek Tragedy’ in JHS 77, Part I (forthcoming). A brief recent survey of work on the language of Aristophanes is given by K. J. Dover, in M. Platnauer (ed.), Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship (1954), 99.
Aristophanes gives us samples of many different styles or idioms; but the usage of the five words which concern us here can conveniently be considered under three main headings. In the first place, νοûς commonly, and the other words occasionally, appear in phrases where context and parallels suggest that we are dealing with the familiar language of everyday use: an obvious case is προσέχειν τὸν νοûς. Secondly, quotation and parody bring in some of the special idioms of poetry, especially Euripidean tragedy; with these passages belong others where Aristophanes follows poetic and not normal conventions, as he does most obviously in lyrics; and others still, where, if we cannot speak precisely of parody or burlesque, the choice of language is satirically appropriate, as in parody and burlesque, because of a particular set of associations: I mention a passage which must later be discussed, Birds 1553 ff., with its complex word-play on ψυχή and ψυχαγωγεῖν Σωκράτης. Thirdly, Aristophanes coins and distorts phrases as he coins and distorts words; and it seems justifiable to isolate a small group of passages as characteristic products of comic fantasy: for example, Wasps 648 f. ‘... a good fresh-chiselled millstone which can pulverize my thymos’, where the metaphorical hardness of angry resolution is fancifully equated with the real and familiar hardness of grain. The attempt to evaluate Aristophanes’ linguistic subtleties can fail in opposite ways: when we lose the point of a passage for lack of evidence, or read too much into it from what there is — much must therefore remain uncertain. In so far as the language of the comedies reflects that of the world around them, we can hope for a few details to supplement our other knowledge; and this study is presented in the hope that a full collection will make some of them a little clearer.

I. ‘Soul’, ‘heart’ and ‘mind’ in everyday language.

From the evidence of Aristophanes (which is admittedly limited and tenuous) there seems to be nothing to show that any of the words here discussed except nous had a significant range of use or meaning in the everyday vocabulary: it was hardly to be expected. If we attempt more precise English equivalents than the very rough ‘soul’, ‘heart’ and ‘mind’, psyche stands for ‘life’, and is an expression for ‘courage’ or the seat of courage; thymos stands for ‘anger’ and ‘desire’; nous for ‘attention’, ‘sense’ or ‘intelligence’, and ‘purpose’ —
we may probably add ‘meaning’ and ‘attitude’ as other functions. *Kardia* is a physical organ, and a centre of emotion; current speech seems to have had expressions for the effects of emotions on the heart analogous to those of poetry, and, not surprisingly, absent from plain prose. Two particular points to notice are occasional survivals (or developments) of Homeric idioms; and the use in balanced phrases of *psyche* ‘character’ parallel to *tropoi, phrenes* ‘good sense’ coupled with *nous*, and *nous* ‘attitude’ opposed to *physis*: this suggests the influence of a more formal style, that of rhetoric or poetry. We now turn to details.

A. PSYCHE

(i) ‘Life’: *psyche* can be said to correspond to ‘life’ where its loss (i.e. death) is hazarded. (a) *xívnunévoun peri tῆς ψυχῆς* Pl. 524 is a current phrase showing this sense, paralleled, for instance, by Antiphon 2. i. 4—5, Thuc. 8. 50, Lys. 22. 20. Similarly, τὸν peri ψυχῆς ὀρόμον δραμεῖν W. 375 f., which reveals its Homeric ancestry in X. 161 peri ψυχῆς θέον Ἐκτόρος, and is paralleled by Plato, Theaet. 173 a πολλάκις δὲ καὶ peri ψυχῆς ὁ ὀρόμος ‘a matter of life and death’; Euripides gives a poetic version at Or. 878, as van Leeuwen aptly observes. (b) καὶ ὁ φιλῶ γε τὴν ἐμῆν ψυχὴν ἐγὼ Αχ. 357, cf. *φιλοψυχία*, -εῖν; Lys. 6.43 has σῶσαι τὴν αὐτὸς ψυχῆς ἔτερων διὰ ταῦτα ἀποθανόντων.

(ii) ‘Courage’ or seat of courage: *ψυχήν ἄριστος* Κν. 457, P. 675, cf. Cl. 1048 f. The phrase is otherwise known from Tragedy (A. Pers. 442, E. Hec. 580), but the three contexts do not suggest parody, and prose admits similar expressions: e.g. κράτιστοι τὴν ψυχήν Thuc. 2. 40. 3, cf. Hdt. 3. 108, Lys. 20. 29.

(iii) ‘Character’: τῶν τ'αὖ γερέντων οἴδα τὰς ψυχὰς Αχ. 375, in an oration, and parallel with τοὺς τε γὰρ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ἄγροικων οἴδα 370 f.; perhaps therefore an affectation of rhetorical style.

B. THYMOS

(i) ‘Anger’: οἱ δὲ σκόπτοντος, ἵν' ἐγὼ γελάσω καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καταθομέω W. 567: for καταθέσθαι as opposite of ἐγείρειν cf. Thuc. 1.121. This phrase appears elsewhere in a comic development, B. 401 τὸν θυμὸν κατάθου κύψας παρὰ τὴν ὀργὴν ὀικεῖπερ ὀπλήτης: as it were ‘ground your anger’, like ‘ground your arms’; for this development, we may perhaps compare ἐχθραν
ἀνίεντας Thuc. 3.10.4, with the comic metaphor of τῆς ὀργῆς ὄλγον τὸν κόλλοπ' ἀνείμεν W. 574.

(ii) 'Desire': τάς τε συκάς . . . ἀσπάσαθαι θυμός ἤμιν ἐστι πολλοστὶ χρόνῳ P. 559, is said by the chorus of farmers. θυμός ἐστι, here parallel to βουλομαι 557, is a Homeric idiom (e. g. Y. 349), surviving in later verse, and perhaps occasionally used in the spoken language as a synonym for ἔπιθυμεῖν. Cf. especially Ἡδτ. 1.1 ὄνεεσθαι τῶν φορτίων τῶν σφι ἦν θυμὸς μάλιστα, a comic fragment, Theopompus 32 K πιούσα δ’ ὑπόσον ἐν σοι θυμός ἤ and Xen. Cyr. 3. 1. 37 ἀπελαύνετε ὑπ’ ὑμῖν θυμός.

C. KARDIA

(i) physical heart: Frogs 482—4 (bis). Dionysus, faint with fright, wants a sponge laid over his heart, which turns out to have sunk not to his boots, but εἰς τὴν κάτω κοιλίαν. Radermacher’s note discusses the background of this piece of popular therapeutic and the joke it leads to. Kardia should not be taken as ‘stomach’ or part of the stomach here or elsewhere in Aristophanes, pace van Leeuwen and Starkie on Ach. 12; on its medical sense at Thuc. 2. 49, which has suggested this, see D. L. Page, CQ n. s. 3 (1953), p. 100: even there ‘heart’ is likely.

(ii) heart as emotional centre: Apart from its activities in the passage above, the Aristophanic heart also ‘leaps’ with anticipation (πηδάω Cl. 1391), a disappointment ‘shakes’ it (ἐσείσε τὴν κ. Ach. 12), desire ‘strikes’ it (τὴν κ. ἐπάταξε Frogs 54). These phrases look colloquial from their contexts, and for ‘leaping’ there are parallels at Eur. Ba. 1288 (πηδήμι ἔχει), and, for instance, Plato, Ion 535 c, Smp. 215 e. (b) Grief is expressed in metaphors of biting and burning. δανείν τὴν καρδιὰν W. 375 is paired with τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμων δραμέτων and like it is probably a current expression with a long ancestry: cf. Hesiod, Erga 451, and Ω. 129 σήν ἐδεῖκτε κρὰδίην. G. P. Anagnostopoulos, Athena 36 (1924), p. 43 notes also μὴ ὑπὲρ διακόνιον εὐδοκίε W. 287 φ., and Mod. Gk. μὴ τρός τὴν καρδία σου. δοκεὶ δὴ δέδηγμαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ καρδιὰν Ach. 1 is paralleled in Tragedy (e. g. Eur. Alc. 1100), but also by Alkibiades’ highflown language at Plato, Smp. 218 a, and therefore should represent emotional but not specifically poetic language. ἀλλ’ ὁ Κλεονίκη κάρματι τὴν καρδιὰν Lys. 9 is a doubtful candidate for inclusion here. The phrase may have been made for the alliteration; „ungewöhnlich“ comments Wilamowitz „der Tragödie aber fremd“.
Words for 'soul', 'heart' and 'mind' in Aristophanes

(c) ἐκ τῆς καρδίας (φιλεῖν) Cl. 86 is possibly a current version of ἐκ θυμοῦ (φιλεῖν) I. 343 and later verse. In the same sense we find ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς Xen. Occ. 10. 4, ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς Theophr. Char. 17. 4, ἀπὸ καρδίας Theocr. 29. 4, and Mod. Gk. ἐξ ὀλης καρδιάς.

D. PHRENES, coupled with nous

The combination νοὺν ἐχεῖν ... καὶ φρένας Thes. 291 appears in a burlesque prayer as a stronger form of νοὺν ἐχεῖν; cf. Dem. 18. 324 ὁ πάντες θεοι ... τούτων βελτίω τινά νοῦν καὶ φρένας ἐνθείητε and [25]. 33. In lyrics we have Frogs 534, and the variant φρένας ἔχουσα καὶ πολύπλοκον νόημα Thes. 462. (b) Lys. 432 οὔ γὰρ μοχλόν δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ νοῦ καὶ φρενών, cf. Cratinus 65 K (~Eupolis, Demoi 9 D. 7/Page, Lit. Papyri, no. 40). The combination is hardly poetic: perhaps it had a limited currency in elevated or emotional discourse.

E. NOUS

(i) ‘attention’: προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν. I use this translation because ‘mind’ would be a little misleading: the sense is nearer ‘attend to’ than ‘think about’. 16 examples are obtainable from O. J. Todd’s Index Aristophaneus: the order is reversed at Cl. 575 and 1401 only, and only at 1401 is the phrase broken. It is common in prose, but apparently avoided in this form by Tragedy. Lysias, for instance, has 9 examples (D. H. Holmes, Index ...): he also inverts the phrase (10. 10) and breaks it (28. 7). Tragedy uses νοὺν ἐχεῖν in the same sense (cf. E. Or. 1181 δεύρο νοῦν ἐχε with Cl. 575 δεύρο τὸν νοὺν προσέχετε); and Euripides goes so far as τὸν νοὺν προς αὐτὸν οὔχ ἐχόων, ἐκείσε δὲ Ph. 1418, cf. Thuc. 7. 19. 5, Cratinus 181 K. Two other phrases with a similar use of nous may perhaps be added: τοῦ τὸν νοὺν ἐχεῖς; ‘What are you thinking of?’ Ekkl. 156, and τὸν νοὺν μου προσάγει W. 697.

(ii) ‘sense’, ‘intelligence’: νοὺν ἐχεῖν meaning ‘to have sense’, ‘be right’ is common to prose and verse; the phrase usually implies no more than ‘common sense’ in Aristophanes: of persons, W. 1440, B. 1371, Ekkl. 433, 777 and frg. 969 Hall-Geldart (if genuine); and of actions, Frogs 696. At Cl.

3) Phrenes was apparently current in idioms corresponding to English ‘take leave of one’s senses’: cf. Eupolis 357 K μαίνεται τε καὶ παρατείνει τῶν φρενῶν, Hdt. 3. 155 ἔκπλεε τῶν φρενῶν, Lys. frg. 90 παραλάττειν τῶν φ. Cf. also Andocides 2. 7 συμφορὰ τῶν φ.
843 f. ἄνδρας δεξιοὺς καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντας, said of Socrates and Company, may rather mean 'with intelligence'; and a more refined use of the phrase is perhaps reflected in two remarks of the literature-loving Dionysus: Frogs 1396 (discussed by Radermacher) πειθό δὲ κοὐφόν ἐστι καὶ νοῦν ὑδὸν ἔχον '... vacuous and without reason' and 1439 γέλοιον ἄν φαίνοιτο· νοῦν δ’ ἔχει τίνα; ... 'but what reason is there in it?' A similar and apparently current phrase is νοῦν κεκτήσατο Ἐκκλ. 747, cf. Plato, Laws 887 e. (b) νοὺς ἐνεστὶ is known from Tragedy (e.g. S. El. 1328, E. Hip. 920), but apparently a colloquial phrase at Ἐκκλ. 856 'Not if there is any sense in them', Lys. 572, Ach. 556 and Kn. 1121 'You have no sense in your long hair' (c) μηδενὶ σῶν νῦν ὥστε Ἐκκλ. 580 is 'senselessly'; cf. Plato, Crito 48 c.

(iii) 'Purpose', 'plan': This sense is clear in κατὰ νοῦν: with πρᾶττεν ᾿Εκκλ. 499, 549, P. 762; and with χωρεῖν P. 940, cf. Theocr. 14. 57 and Gow's note. So also in P. 104 f. τίνα νοῦν ἔχων; answered by ἐρησώμενος... This phrase could be an unusual substitute for ἐν νῷ ἔχειν, which is metrically awkward, as Sharpley notes. It is a short step from 'intention' to '(intended) meaning': Pl. 1080 οἶδ’ οἶδα τὸν νοῦν· οὐκέτ’ ἄξιος ἱσος εἶναι μετ’ αὐτῆς; Frogs 580 οἶδ’ οἶδα τὸν νοῦν· παῦε παῦε τοῦ λόγου — 'I know your idea' covers both cases; and so τίς ὃ νοῦς; 'What's the idea?' Frogs 47; cf. Ἡδτ. 4.131 ἐπειρώσατο τὸν νόον τῶν διδομένων. Are these really colloquial phrases? οἶδ’ οἶδα at least suggests it (see also Frogs 584, Ἐκκλ. 998); and there are parallels with νοεῖν Cl. 1186, 1381, Pl. 55 and τίς δ’ ἡμῖνοια σουσίν; P. 127, cf. W. 1073, B. 994.

(iv) 'Attitude': It is perhaps worth noting separately here Pl. 993 f. ἄλλ’ οὐχὶ νοῦν ὃ βεβελυρός ἔτι τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τὸν αὐτόν, ἄλλα πολὺ μεθέστηκεν πάνυ, and B. 371 εἶ δὲ τὴν φύσιν μὲν ἐχθροῖ, τὸν δὲ νοῦν εἰσὶν φίλοι: 'if they are natural enemies, yet they are kindly disposed to us' — the antithesis suggests a model in rhetoric or high poetry: cf. S. El. 1023.

II. Poetic language: satirical allusion and word-play.

By reason of the broad definition given above, this group of passages is numerically the largest, and also, to the present study, the most interesting. Quotation, parody and burlesque represent, in different degrees of accuracy, language derived from particular sources; where the representation has some
satirical point, we can learn something about the original, as when a cartoon reveals something we missed in a familiar face. Thus, when Aristophanes quotes μη τον ἐμὸν ὀτει ναυν from Euripides (Frogs 105 = 144 N 8), we have, apart from the fact, the plausible inference that the idiom was striking enough to be ridiculed in the word-play which follows. Since Aristophanes follows poetic conventions of language both in parodying other poetry and in writing his own, it is convenient also to consider here passages in poetic style which are not obviously derivative — for instance, some of the occurrences of phren, phrenes in lyrics — and to ask in these cases whether the comic poet makes any special use of traditional materials. Not all 'derivative' language is poetic: where not, it is usually more difficult to identify, but there are a few examples of psyche and nous which may represent learned idiom, or at least the sort of pseudo-intellectual language which frequently appears in the comedies in the mouths of Socrates and Euripides, and with reference to them and their fellow-spirits: it is hard to believe that this has not some basis in fact. This therefore is the place to examine all the passages where our words may have been chosen to lend point to the satire. Here there is obviously wide scope for subjective interpretation. The words for 'soul', 'heart' and 'mind' have at least some currency in all kinds of fifth-century Greek, and an allusion pointed by a particular use of one of them will necessarily be less obvious than an allusion pointed by a word or a form right outside the normal Attic vocabulary. Even granted that we are right over some linguistic subtlety, could an audience have appreciated it? Tragic parody, at least, could have been marked by voice and gesture, as well as by the borrowed plumes of language; and what missed the γελῶντες ἡδέως might well have found its target among the σοφοί, either at the performance or in reading the circulated text 4).

A. PSYCHE

Psyche occurs in poetic contexts without special emphasis as a word proper to poetry; but it has also a particular use in paratragedy to make contrasts with non-literary words and expressions, and so to satirize the diction of Euripides for false elevation and its accompanying bathos. The range of meaning

here is ‘life’ or ‘life-soul’; enduring or courageous soul; and
‘character’ — these, we have seen, are meanings also current
in non-poetic language in certain limited uses. Psyche as ‘soul
after life’ appears with specific Homeric reference, and the
play which this meaning admits argues also for the survival of
the traditional associations in common currency; the disem-
bodied psyche is ‘shadowy’, and poets’ psychai flit like ghosts
in the air. Other passages reflect the impact of modern ways of
thought: the Clouds seem to use learned language in talking of
‘the enduring’ as an ingredient of the psyche; psyche, like nous
and phrenes, can be ‘mind’ affected by rhetoric. Poetic and
intellectual language fuse in association with Socrates and
Euripides; the reference of a decision to psyche involves intel-
lectual as well as poetic satire of the tragedian; conversely,
Socrates’ companions are spoken of, with poetic allusiveness,
as psychai sophai.

(i) ‘Life’, ‘Life-soul’: (a) quotations: ψυχήν δ’ ἔξεσάώσα
P. 1301 = Archilochus 6 D. ψυχήν for the accepted αὐτῶν is
hardly a more poetic version, since ‘saving psyche’ is not
characteristically poetic: cf. Lys. 6.43, quoted above, p. 207.
ψυχαὶ ... ἔθανον Thes. 864 = E. Helen 52: ‘life-soul’ stands
for ‘living person’ in the sense that it ‘dies’. (b) burlesque
of Euripides: Cl. 711 ff. Strepsiades complains that the Socratic
bugs τὰς πλευρὰς δαρδάττουσιν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκπίνουσιν καὶ
tους ὀρχεῖς ἔξελκουσιν καὶ τὸν πρωτὸν διορύττουσιν...; so
later 717 f. φρούδα τὰ χρήματα, φρούδῃ χροῖα, φρούδῃ ψυχή,
φρούδῃ δ’ ἐμβάς. The clash between subject and metre is rein-
forced by clashes of language, as at Lys. 958 ff. (under [iii]
below): the passages are discussed in this light by C. Jernigan,
Incongruity in Aristophanes (1939) 30 f. For the repeated
φρούδας a probable source is Hec. 160 f. (Hec. 171 f. ~ Cl.
1165 f.). Earthy elements in the mixture are obvious; for ἐκπίνειν in Tragedy, see S. El. 785 f. τοῦμὸν ἐκπίνουσ’ αἰτὶ ψυχῆς
ἀκρατον αἶμα and Ant. 532; δαρδάττειν (Frogs 66, with Rader-
macher’s note) and the form χροῖα are also poeticisms. Simi-
larly at Frogs 1331 ff., in a pseudo-Euripidean lyric based, it
seems, on Hec. 68 ff., a dream vision is described as ψυχὰν
ἀψυχὸν ἔχοντα (meaning, as Radermacher says, that it has no
‘life-soul’, but behaves as if alive), and μεγάλους ὀνυχὰς ἔχοντα.
Here, again with satire of Euripides’ bathos, there is a deli-
berate contrast between poetic and banausic.
(ii) 'soul after life', with play on other senses: (a) Birds 1553 ff., a complicated passage. There is a marsh where Socrates ψυχαγωγεῖ: Peisandros went there δεόμενος ψυχήν ἵειν ἂν ξώντε ἐκεῖνον προδύλπε. Peisandros, who is elsewhere satirized as a coward, has lost his psyche 'courage' (cf. Schol., quoting Eupolis 31 K); to recover it he behaves as if it were a Homeric psyche in the Underworld, sacrificing 'a sort of camel-lamb' in grotesque imitation of Odysseus (1561). What appears is the ghostlike Chairephon 'the Bat' — the 'half-dead' as he is at Cl. 504. Psyche is both the Homeric 'soul after life' and 'courage'; ψυχαγωγεῖ is primarily appropriate to Socrates as 'conductor of the ghosts' — his pallid followers — but there is a secondary sense of 'mind-leading', or 'persuading': the Aristophanic Socrates keeps Λόγοι in his Thinking-House.6 (b) Cl. 94: ψυχῶν σοφῶν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν φροντιστήριον 'This is a Thinking-House of Intelligent Souls': so the audience gets its first hint of Socrates and Company, perhaps intentionally mysterious to stimulate interest, as Aristophanes does more blatantly at Ψ. 71 ff., P. 39 ff., Frogs 53 ff. Play on the meaning 'ghosts' is likely, judging from the passage just considered; and Chairephon is named with Socrates among the 'pale, shoeless men' when the revelation comes (105). But Schol. RV interprets with ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφῶν: this suggests that the primary sense comes from the tragic use of psyche as 'person': e. g. S. Ai. 154 τῶν γὰρ μεγάλων ψυχῶν ἑίς σῶν ἄν ἀμάρτος. It is rash to infer, with the later Schol., an allusion to Socratic talk of the psyche. (c) Two other passages which involve the idea of a disembodied psyche may be noticed here. P. 827 ff.: Trygaios has seen no-one on his journey through the air 'but for two or three souls of dithyrambic poets'; they were 'flying about collecting preludes'. The traditional imagery of poetic flight (see A. C. Pearson, CR 40 [1926] 183 f.) is here given a satirical twist: the dithyrambic poets' psychai take the air not for vision but for material, like Euripides' nous (Ach. 398, p. 219 below);

5) Cf. Kock-Schroeder ad loc., C. Pascal, Dioniso (Catania, 1911), 225 ff. The idea of rhetoric as ψυχαγωγῖα perhaps goes back to Gorgias (Plato, Phaedr. 261 a, 271 c: cf. L. Radermacher, Artium Scriptores (SBOstAkad., ph.-hist. Kl. 227.3 (1951), 66, 207.) ψυχαγωγῖα is used both of persuasion and deception in fourth century prose (LSJ, s. v.): for Aristophanes it will naturally be an evil activity. For psyche as mind affected by rhetoric, note especially S. Phil. 54 f. τὴν Φιλοκτήτου σε δεῖ φυσῆν ὅπως λόγοισιν ἐκκληθεῖσι λέγων, discussed by Webster, op. cit.
similarly, their unhappy colleague Kinesias is made to ask for wings to fly in search of airy nonsense at Birds 1383-5. These are not dead souls, as Merry’s note suggests: the following reference to the popular belief that the dead go to air as stars is made to introduce two different points, as van Leeuwen and others have seen; but is it appropriate for writers of air to have *psychai* which behave like ghosts as well as like minds. At W. 756, Philokleon exhorts his ‘soul’ in paratragic anapaests, presumably in burlesque of Euripides, whose addresses to *thymos* and *kardia* are satirized elsewhere; then, with absurd bathos, he has lost it — σπευδ ’ώ ψυχήν ποιμ ιν ινι ινι; — finally, borrowing from the Bellerophon, he addresses it as a shadowy wraith: πάρες ’ώ σκευρά (Eur. 308 N², who had said inter alia, ‘shadowy grove’).

(iii) Enduring or courageous soul: (a) Ach. 393 ὁρᾶ στὰν ἀρά καρπετὰν ψυχῆν λαβεῖν: Dikaiopolis is preparing to go to Euripides for tragic equipment, and approaches tragic style, though without recognizable parody: E. Telephus 718 N² is too unlike to count. (b) Lys. 958 ff. The Chorus consoles Kinesias for the trick played on him by Myrrhine: ἐν δεινῷ γ’, ὃ δόστην κακῆς τείρει ψυχῆν ἐξαπατηθεῖς... and ποιὸς γὰρ ἔτ’ ἀν νέφρος ἀντίσχοι, ποῖα ψυχή, ποῖοι δ’ ὀρχεῖς...; (963). These are paratragic anapaests like those of Cl. 711 ff. discussed above; the repeated ποίος, like the repeated ψυχῆς there, is aimed at Euripides, and Schol. suggests Andromeda (116 N²) as the original: ποία λιβάδες, ποία σέρην. Also possible is the context which inspired the parallel burlesque in Clouds - Hec. 155, 159 f. The use of verbal incongruity is similar: *psyche* brings poetic associations which are shattered when it is spoken of in the same way as a part of the body or a familiar material object; so also in W. 756, discussed at the end of (ii) above. This is a special application to literary burlesque of the familiar comic trait of reducing the abstract and elevated to the terms of everyday life, or of ‘men worse than ourselves’: more will be said of this later (p. 220 ff.).

(iv) emotional soul: This aspect of the *psyche* is familiar in Greek literature from passages where it is said to be affected by joy, grief, etc.; the two contexts in Aristophanes where *psyche* overlaps with this sort of ‘heart’ are rather more complicated. (a) Frogs 1468: Dionysus, pressed at last to choose between Aeschylus and Euripides, says that he will follow
the bidding of his psyche: αἱρήσομαι γὰρ ὄντερ ἢ συνχὴ θέλει. He speaks in strict metre, and approaches tragic diction, as he frequently does elsewhere in the play. Whether or not he is quoting, as van Leeuwen suspects, the casting of the responsibility onto the psyche is turned against Euripides in the same way as the notorious tongue/mind antithesis (Hip. 612), which is recalled three lines later when the decision is announced: ἢ γλώττι ὀμψωχ’ Ἀλχύλον δ’ αἱρήσομαι. The ‘emotional soul’ in this context is an inner self (like Hippolytos’ phren), which is not bound by external considerations such as the σοφία of Euripides (cf. 1413), or the bonds of an oath (1469 f.): hence the element of satire. The essential commentary is by Wilmowitz, Lesefrüchte CCLVIII (Hermes 64 [1929] 474). (b) Cl. 319 f.: Strepsiades has just heard that the Clouds give men a host of rhetorical virtues: ταῦτα ἄφ’ ἀκούσας αὐτῶν τὸ φιλέμ’ ἢ ψυχή μου πεπόνται καὶ λεπτολογεῖν ἔδω ᾽ζητεί, κτλ. πεπόνται is a high-flown equivalent of ἀνεπτέρωται, which seems to have been a fashionable word for mental excitement, to judge by the play made with it in Birds 1437 ff.; note also 433, and 1447 ὑπὸ. . . λόγων ὅ νοος . . . μετεωρίζεται. Strepsiades’ psyche suffers no ordinary excitement; he is moved by the very presence of rhetoricians, and wants to be one too; psyche approaches the sense ‘mind’ as in ψυχαγωγεῖν: see p. 213 n. 5. As in the Frogs passage, there seems to be an element of intellectual satire in the choice of language.

(v) ‘Character’: P. 1068 (burlesque oracle): ὅν δόλαι ψυχαί, δόλαι φρένες. The point lies in the repeated δόλαι and ψυχαί and φρένες function as conventional poetic words to make up a phrase for the hexameter. We cannot therefore press the distinction too far, but perhaps it is ‘men whose natures and thoughts are treacherous’ (b) Cl. 414 f. εἰ μνήμον εἰ καὶ φρονυστῆς καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἐνεστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ . . .—this is part of the recipe for a successful Socratic pupil. The words are carefully chosen: memory, power of thought and endurance are all tested in the following scenes, and it seems more than chance that the psyche is spoken of in the scientific way we know from the Hippocratic treatise on Airs, Waters and Places, 24: τὸ δὲ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ . . . οὕτω ἀν . . . ἐνείγη, and from Euripides (Or. 1180). It is inapposite, with van Leeuwen, to compare περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τρέχειν: see rather Cl. 486 (Socrates) ἐνεστὶ δητά σοι λέγειν ἐν τῇ φύσει; and R. Goossens, LEC 17 (1949) 22—8.
B. THYMOS

The interesting passages are three certain burlesques, and one possible, of Euripidean addresses to thymos; these, taken with the similar addresses to psyche and kardia, tend to confirm the view of Leo and others that the development of this form of address in Tragedy was an Euripidean innovation: at all events, it was striking enough to be selected for ridicule, whether simply as a stylistic trait, or, as is possible, with the further implication that 'nous ne sommes plus dans un âge où l'on parle à son bras et à son âme' as Voltaire said of a passage in Corneille 6).

(i) 'anger': θυμὸν δίχα 473 K, apparently paratragic.

(ii) seat of courage and endurance: (a) Ach. 480 ff., a reductio ad absurdum of a Euripidean soliloquy, with two exhortations to thymos, and another ὁ τάλαινα καρδία (485). This was probably inspired by Medea's address to her heart and hand at Med. 1242 ff.: note Med. 1245 ~ Ach. 483, and Med. 1056 ὁ θυμόν... Similarly Ach. 450 ὁ θυμόν, — ἐραξ γὰρ ὡς ἀπωθομαὶ δόμων, πολλάν δέμενος σκευαρίων...: Dikaiopolis, in appropriate language, calls his thymos to witness his rejection by Euripides, and goes on to exhort it to become an unfortunate wheedling beggar (like Telephos, 429). σπεδ' ὁ ψυχή W. 756 has already been discussed. (b) Kn. 1193 f.: similarly, in a difficult situation, the Sausage-seller cries: οὖμοι, πόθεν λαγώμα μοι γενήσεται; ὁ θυμόν, νυνι ἱδωμόλογαν ἔξεφραν τι. Here there is no direct allusion to Euripides, and we may have only an affectation of elevated poetic style, as Leo suggests (Monolog... 100); so Cratinus affects θυμόν in a lyric passage of Ploutoî (Page, Lit. Papyri, no. 38).

C. KARDIA 7)

(i) 'courage': Ach. 489 (the soliloquy discussed under thymos above): following the appeal to kardia in 485, there comes at the end of the speech ᾧ γαμαὶ καρδίας: cf. Rhesus 245

---

6) Le Cid, I. vii. 49: cf. Jebb on S. Trach. 1269. See especially on these and the relevant Euripidean passages F. Leo, Der Monolog im Drama (1908), 36, 100, and B. Meissner, Mythisches und Rationales in der Psychologie der euripideischen Tragödie (Göttingen, 1951), 58 ff., 74 ff.

7) ἱστορ does not occur in Α., κέφαρ only at Ach. 5, as a literary flosculus, and elsewhere in Comedy at Eup. 90 K = E. Med. 397.
Words for 'soul', 'heart' and 'mind' in Aristophanes

Dikaiopolis is amazed at the resolution he has summoned up.

(ii) emotional centre: Two parodie passages: Kn. 1269 ἐκοῦσθ' καρδία follows a parody of Pindar, frg. 89 a Snell, and is at least in his style: cf. ἔχοντι ... νός Pyth. 8.67 et al.; ἐκὼν θυμῷ γελανεῖ Pyth. 4.181; καρδία γελανεῖ Ol. 5.2. Thes. 869 f.: 'ἄλλ' ὡσπερ αἰώνα παράδειγμα ἐμήν μὴ ψεύσων, ὣς Ζεῦ, τῆς ἐπεούσης ἐξίδεσσ. 870 parodies Soph. Peleus 493 P (Schol.); for the metaphor of 869 (which is presumably also paratragic), cf. Bacchyl. 1.164 f. ἐλπίζει ... σαλείν κέραπ 'flatten his heart'.

D. PHREN, PHRENES

Both singular and plural appear in parodie and lyric passages as poetical expressions for 'mind'; phrenes are affected by shock, and stirred to wrath; once phren stands for 'way of thinking', 'disposition'. An interesting phenomenon is the application of the word in Aristophanes' mockery of intellectuals: it is commonly used of the rarified minds of poets, philosophers and others, and twice in iambics which are not recognizably parodie — the poetic word in the hands of a comedian has become a convenient instrument of satire.

(a) parodie passages: (1.) burlesque oracles, in hexameters:
Kn. 1052 μεμνημένος ἐν φρέσιν; P. 1068, see p. 215 above; P. 1099 δόλῳ φρένας ἐξαπατήσας (cf. Hes. Theog. 889) (2.) parody of lyric: B. 938 f. τῷ δὲ τεχνοφρενί μάθε Πινδάρειον ἔπος; B. 1376 (Kinesias) ἀφόβως φρενι σώματι τε. Compare, for instance τεχνοφρενί ... φρενί Pindar, Pyth. 5.19, áραρβεί φρενί ib. 51. (3.) paratragedy: Kn. 1237 ὡς μοῦ χρησμὸς ἀπτεται φρενῶν (cf. e. g. E. Med. 55); B. 1238 = trag. adesp. 48 N² ὧ μόρε, μῶρε, μήθε θεῶν κλίνει φρένας ('stir to wrath'; so E. Alc. 674 παροξύνειν); Frogs 886, Aeschylus prays to Δήμητρι ή θρέψασα τὴν ἐμήν φρένα (tragic style, not quotation: see van Leeuwen's note); Lys. 708 καθὼν γυναικῶν ἔργα καὶ θήλεια φρήν. In this last passage, phren stands for 'way of thinking', 'disposition', as opposed to 'acts', as in Eur. Ino 400 N² ὧ θυγατράγματ' ὧ γυναικεῖα φρένες; cf. γυναικῶν θηλόρροιν συνωσία Ekkl. 110 = trag. adesp. 51 N². Wilamowitz — improbably — suggests an original where the phrase applied to a man: 'dann eigentlich kann eine Frau nur einen solchen Sinn haben'.

(b) satire of cleverness: (1.) The glossa/phren antithesis of E. Hip. 612 is twice recalled, Thes. 275, Frogs 101—2 (cf.
At Ach. 445 Euripides is made to say διόςεις πυχνῇ γὰρ λεπτὰ μηχανὰ φρενὶ. This, if parody and not quotation, belongs above; πυχνὸς and λεπτὸς are favourite words for the superficlety which Aristophanes so often scorns, as J. D. Denniston pointed out in CQ 21 (1927) p. 119; and they recur in some of the following passages, where phren or phrenes appears as the vox propria for a mind with these qualities. (2.) Lyric passages (9): Frogs 876 λεπτολόγους ξυνετὰς φρένας . . . ἀνδρῶν γνωμοντύπων; B. 456 φρενὸς ἀξιμέτοι (the reverse); P. 1030 σοφῆ δόξαμον φρενὶ; B. 428 εὖν σοφὸν τι φρενὶ; : : πυθιότατον κλινάδος; Ekkl. 571 νῦν δὴ δεῖ σε πυχνὴν φρένα . . . ἐγείρειν; Thes. 437 πάντα δ’ ἐξάστασε φρενὶ πυχνὸς τε ποικίλους λόγους ἀνηγέρεν; Frogs 899 οὐδ’ ἀκίνητου φρένες of the contending poets; and, to the Socratic pupil, Cl. 703 ff. ταχὺς δ’ ἄτοις εἰς ἄρτον πέσης, ἐπ’ ἄλλο τῷ ἄλλῳ νόμιμα φρένος, and 474 ἄξια σῇ φρενὶ ‘worthy of your intellect’. 8) (3.) That this usage is not entirely due to parody and the conventions of lyric verses appears from Cl. 153 ὡς Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς, τῆς λεπτοτητὸς τῶν φρενῶν (of Socrates), and B. 1445 ἀνεπτεράσθαι καὶ πεποτήθαι τὰς φρένας of a young man’s reaction to Tragedy: see on Cl. 319 f., p. 215.

E. NOUS

Nous, unlike phren, phrenes, was found in a number of common phrases; and it is correspondingly infrequent in Aristophanes as a word of poetry and literary burlesque. Nous and gnome appear together as ‘intelligence’ and ‘judgement’ in contexts which suggest that they were a fashionable pair of virtues in sophist and intellectual circles, and fair game for the comic poet 9). Other passages reflect the impact of the new learning, if not its language: nous ‘idea’ is twice used as a mock technical term; the old notion that poets’ minds ‘take wing’ is given a new twist in application to Euripides; the ‘elevation’ of the mind by rhetoric is taken literally and made amusing; the idea that wine brings inspiration appears in the novel form of wetting the nous to produce subtle devices.

8) On Cl. 703 ff. as satire of Socratic method, see Schol. ad loc.; R. Philippson, RhM, n. f. 81 (1932), 36; W. Schmid, Philologus 97 (1948), 220.

9) It is worth recalling here that one of the charges against Euripides was that he taught people to think and question things (noein, perineoĩn, Frogs 957 f.) This, as Gilbert Murray puts it ‘is the intellectual criticized by the plain man’; or at least by the plain man’s standards: Aristophanes (1933), 126.
(i) 'mind': (a) poetry and burlesque: P. 733 ἧν ἔχομεν δόν ὁμο- 1 λόγων εἰπώμεν ὅσα τὸ νους ἔχει is presumably a poetic version of δ ἐν νῷ ἔχομεν εἰπέν or the like; Frogs 105 μὴ τὸν ἐμὸν οἶκει νοῦν (= Eur. 144 N²) is followed by ἔχεις γὰρ οἶκλαν and perverted into 'do not inhabit my mind: you have a house'. (b) Euripides' nous: Ach. 398 δ' νοῦς μὲν ἔξω ἄλληλων ἐπολλία- 2 σῶς ἐνδον, αὐτὸς δ' ἐνδον ἄναθάδην ποιεῖ τραγῳδίαν. The excur- 3 sion of his mind was amusing when taken so literally. It collects ἐπυλλία, which are a light diet for Tragedy (Frogs 941), and it must leave earth to find subtleties: it is like the dithy­ 4 rambic poets' psychai at Peace 827 ff. (see p. 213), with the appropriate difference that it is a nous and seeks refinement from the air, not dilution. (c) nous and rhetoric: B. 1447 f. ὑπὸ γὰρ λόγων δ' νοῦς τε μετεωρίζεται ἐπαφευται τ' ἔνθρωπος. As in the last passage, we have an over-literal interpretation of figurative language (on which the whole context depends); and it is possible that Aristophanes had some description of the power of words in mind. At Kn. 96 (the line is echoed at 114) Demosthenes calls for wine τὸν νοῦν ἵν’ ἄριστον καὶ λέγω 6 τι δεξίων, as he says: 'if I get drunk, I shall spatter everything here with subtle devices, phrases and ideas' (βουλευμάτων καὶ γνωμιδίων καὶ νοῦδίων 100). This is a variant, with a suitably modern flavour, of the common idea that wine brings in­ 9 spiration: see, for instance, Archilochus 77 D, on leading dithyrmic poets after drinking; Pindar 124 Sn.; Cratinus, Pytine, esp. 185-6 K; and Xen. Smp. 2.24, where Socrates talks of wetting the psyche, with the same image from watering a garden or a plant to produce a crop.

(ii) nous 'intelligence', coupled with gnome: nous and gnome are qualities which the Clouds give to men, along with the rhetorical virtues of διάλεξις, τερατεία, περιλεξις, κριτικής and καταληψις (Cl. 317 f.); Strepsiades' nous is to be scrutinized

10) A useful comparison with this passage and Ach. 398 is Clouds 223 ff., where Socrates is made to raise himself physically in order to mix his ψχρώνια with the air for speculation about τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα. There, in contrast, there is an explicit reference to the equation nous/ air expressed by Diogenes of Apollonia: cf. Diog., frgg. B. 4—5, and also Cl. 762; for other links with him, see Diels-Kranz, II, 66 ff, and T. Gelzer 'Aristophanes und sein Sokrates', Mus. Helv. 13 (1956) 65, especially 69, 79 ff. on air and associated ideas in Aristophanes.

11) See on these terms Eranos 51 (1953) 129 f., and Radermacher, Artium Scriptores, 112, who would derive them from the rhetorician Phaiax.
and his *gnome* tested in the Thinking-House (Cl. 477); Lysistrate, following Euripides’ Melanippe, says ‘γνώμη μέν εἶμι, νοῦς δ’ ἐνεστὶ μοι, αὐτὴ δ’ ἐμματίζει οὖ κακῶς γνώμης ἔχει.’ (Lys. 1124 f.; cf. E. 483 N⁴, with van Leeuwen and Wilamowitz ad Ar. loc.: 1124 may be quotation, and 1125 parody). We may add, probably, Kn. 482, where the Sausage-seller must display his *nous* or *gnome* against the violence of Kleon in addressing the Boule: that is, if it is right to read *γνώμην (R)* for *ψυχήν (V)* and other MSS, with Neil, Coulon and others and against Hall & Geldart. The contexts suggest, though they cannot prove, that the combination is not fortuitous, but derives from contemporary usage in the jargon of intellectuals; and we noted that *nous* in νοῦν ἔχειν seemed to admit a similar ‘highbrow’ use (p. 209). The extension of the pairing to other senses of the words may well be due to Aristophanes: cf. Cl. 728 νοῦς ἀποστερητικὸς ‘a deprivatory notion’ corresponds to γνώμην ἀποστερητριδᾶ 730, cf. 747; Cl. 743 f. νοῦματα / γνώμη; Kn. 100 γνωμιδίων καὶ νοικίασιν.

(iii) ‘purpose’: P. 1064 (burlesque oracle) θεῶν νόον ὁδὸν ἀλοντες—*for the ‘divine purpose’, see e. g. Bacchyl. 5.95.

(iv) ‘idea’: Cl. 728, the phrase νοῦς ἀποστερητικὸς, just mentioned, appears as learned jargon in the mouth of Socrates: the -ikos termination in Aristophanes is discussed by C. W. Peppler, AJPh 31 (1910) 428 ff.; see also A. Ammann, -ΙΚΟΣ bei Platon (1953) 234, 265. The same tone is discernible in 471 K, when the poet says of Euripides χρῶμαι γάρ αὐτὸν τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ τούς νοὺς δ’ ἄγοραίους ἢττον ἄ τ’ ξεινός ποῦ ‘I use the rounded quality of his expression, but create less vulgar notions than he does’. This is similar to the use of *nous* in certain phrases already discussed (p. 209 ff.); and the apparent technical term may be an Aristophanic extension of this.

III. Comic Fantasy.

In discussing passages of literary burlesque, we have seen something already of the way Aristophanes’ fantasy works in reducing the elevated to everyday terms, and there have been signs of his ability turn traditional langauge to new uses (for instance *phren, phrenes*), and to extend particular expressions beyond their original senses. All these aspects of comic usage are seen more clearly in our third and final group of passages, and the first, the comedian’s delight in concrete everyday
Words for ‘soul’, ‘heart’ and ‘mind’ in Aristophanes

terms, is particularly striking: as when we meet ‘a thymos of oak’ or ‘eyesores on the phrenes’. We find comic play with all the words in familiar meanings: psyche and thymos are both ‘heart’, in the sense of ‘seat of courage and endurance’: thymos stands also for ‘anger’. Kardia appears as the seat of emotions, and as ‘courage’; phren, phrenes as ‘mind’, and so nous, but also in the sense which we earlier distinguished as ‘attention’. There is, inevitably, no absolute distinction between passages discussed here and those taken under the other two headings: most have poetic elements in the fantasy, though the exceptions with nous are noteworthy; a further point is that most of them, with interesting exceptions from the Frogs, come from the first six plays (425—414 B.C.) as opposed to the later five (411—388). On this a little more will be said in conclusion.

A. PSYCHE

’seat of courage and endurance’: (a) B. 465 f. λέγειν ζητῶ τι πάλαι, μέγα καὶ λαρινὸν ἔπος τι, δὲ τὴν τούτων θραύσει ψυχῆν ‘...a great well-fed retort to shiver their hearts’: λαρινῶς, as Kock-Schroeder point out, is a vox propria of fat stock (e.g. of an ox, P. 925); otherwise the strong expression θραύσει ψυχῆν suggests choral lyric. (b) Cl. 420 ff. Strepsiades makes a comic reply to the remark ‘if the enduring is an element in your psyche’ (415): he ascribes to himself a ‘stout heart’ (ψυχὴ στερρᾶ) — so much so, that with this, and other attributes comically described, he is fit to be an anvil. (c) A proper name is substituted for an abstract quality: W. 380 τὴν ψυχὴν ἐμπληκάμενος Διοπείθους. For ἐμπληκάμενοι note τ. 117 μὴ μοι θυμόν ἐνπληκάμενος ὀδυνάων, with W. 424 ὄργης καὶ μένους ἐμπληκάμενος. Diopethes may stand for ‘bravado’: the evidence is collected by Holden, Onomasticon Aristophaneum, s. v.

B. THYMOS

(i) seat of courage and endurance: W. 383 ἀμυνομένων σοι τὸν πρινώδη θυμὸν ἀπαντῶς καλέσαντες. πρινώδης θυμὸς is a comic equivalent of the heroic thymos of iron or adamant: cf. πρίνων ἡθὸς W. 877, and Ach. 180 f. Similarly, and with appropriate Homeric reference, Aeschylus at Frogs 1017 says that his heroes are redolent of spear, lances, and ‘hearts of
sevenfold hide’ (θυμός ἔπταυσείους). θυμός ἀμυνίας Kn. 570 is perhaps modelled on the type θ. αἰχματάς Pindar, Nem. 9.37 (cf. 27), with a possible play on the form of the proper name.

(ii) ‘anger’: (a) W. 648 f. πρὸς ταῦτα μῶλην ἄγαθήν ὥρα ζητεῖν σοι καὶ νεκροπότων, ἂν μὴ τι λέγῃς, ἕτες δυνατῆ τὸν ἔμοι θυμὸν κατερεῖξαι. Stubborn anger is comically equated with hard grain, as we noted at p. 206; similarly, calming anger is like lowering a weapon (B. 401), discussed p. 207; the common metaphor of ‘sharpness’ as in δεξυμείω etc., leads to a comic identification of anger with vinegar and sour wine: W. 1082 θυμὸν δέξην πετσώκητες and Ach. 353 δεινὸν γὰρ οὕτως διμέρων περικέναι τὸν θυμὸν ἄνδρῶν ὡστε βάλλειν καὶ βοῶν, cf. W. 877 f., with Starkie’s note. With these passages in mind, the phrase τὸν θυμὸν δακῶν ‘biting my anger’ (to restrain it) Cl. 1369, is plausibly seen as a comic extension of χείλος δακῶν (e.g. Tyrtaeus 10.32). (b) Frogs 992 ff. The Chorus addresses Aeschylus, beginning with a quotation from his Myrmidones (131 Ν 9), and going on . . . μόνον ἰππως μὴ σ’δ θυμὸς ἀρπάσαις ἐκτὸς οἶσει τῶν ἐλαών ‘mind your thymos does not catch you up and carry you off out of the contest’. The idea of anger as a wind is developed in the following lines, where Aeschylus is told to sail close-hauled and wait for the blast to settle: it may even have been suggested by the tragedian’s own imagery: cf. Cho. 390 πάροιδην δὲ περίφρας δρομῆς ἀγήται καρδίας θυμός, and for ἐκτὸς τῶν ἐλαών Cho. 1022 ὥστερσεν ὑπὸ τοῦρος ἱπποστροφῶν δρόμῳ ἐξωτέρῳ — although, of course, neither image is exclusively Aeschylean. The comic development is to make the thymos carry the man bodily off the course.

C. KARDIA

(i) seat of emotions: (a) Cl. 1368 f. κανταῦθα πῶς οἶσθέ μου τὴν καρδίαν ὀρεχθείν; ὡμος δὲ τὸν θυμὸν δακῶν . . . ὀρεχθείν (Ψ. 30, of dying oxen) here seems to mean ‘swells, throbs’ (not ‘roars’) as Gow suggests on Theocr. 11.43. (b) P. 525, the breath of Peace comes on the heart (κατὰ τῆς καρδίας) with a delicious air of freedom from service and myrrh. (c) κάρμαι τῆν καρδίαν, Lys. 9, noted on p. 208, possibly belongs here.

(ii) ‘courage’: B. 1473 ff. ἔστι γὰρ δενδρὸν περικές ἐκτόπον τε Καρδίας ἀπωτέρων Κλησύνομος. Kardia stands for a place-name, as well as ‘courage’.
D. PHREN, PHRENES

(a) Frogs 1040, Aeschylus’ phren ‘takes casts’ (ἀπομαξαμένη) of Lamachos to produce heroic aretai. (b) Pl. 581 ἀλλ’ ὁ Κρονίκας λήμας ἄντως λημώντες τὰς φρένας ἁμφώ: ‘with antediluvian eyesores on your phrenes’. Metaphors in both passages show the familiar comic distortion in terms of the concrete.

E. NOUS

(i) ‘mind’ (a) P. 996 ff. μείξον δ’ ἴμας τοὺς Ἑλληνας … φιλάς χυλῷ καὶ συγγυμνῇ τινὶ προστέρα κέρασον τὸν νοῦν: cf. W. 878 μέλιτος μυρόν τῷ θυμιδίῳ παραμείξας. (b) W. 93 δ’ νοὺς πέτεται τὴν νύκτα περὶ τὴν κλεψύδραν. Philokleon’s mental ‘flight’, less ambitious than that of Euripides (Ach. 398), is given a ludicrously specific objective. Kn. 1119 δ’ νοὺς δὲ σοι παρών ἀποδημεῖ looks like a fantasy of the same kind, but may be a flight of phrase possible in everyday speech.

(ii) ‘attention’: Two passages show comic play with what may have been a normal phrase: Kn. 75 ff., the nous of the giant Kleon is ἐν Κλωπιδὼν (79), while his hands are ἐν Δισωλοῖς and other parts of his body in other satirically appropriate places. P. 669 Trygaios explains that the Athenians rejected peace because δ’ νοὺς … ἴμων ἣν τὸτ’ ἐν τοῖς σκύτεσιν ἵ. σ. ‘on the hides’, as war materials, and ‘in the leather quarter’ as an allusion to Kleon: cf. Schol.

IV. Conclusion.

Statistics must be invoked with extreme caution in a narrow study with so many uncertainties, but they will be helpful to illustrate an important point which the arrangement of this essay has obscured. We have noted 153 occurrences of the five words: individual figures are: psyche 27, thymos 16, kardia 16, phren, phrenes 30, nous 64 Of psyche, thymos, kardia the five early plays, Ach.-Peace, have 41 examples, Birds has 4, and the five later plays, Lys.-Plutus, only 13; of the 13, Frogs provides 7. Nor, among the 13, is there any striking novelty. Current uses of the words, if we were right, account for five occurrences (psyche, Pl. 524; kardia, Lys. 9 (?), Frogs 54, 482—4); there remains psyche at Lys. 959, 963 — a burlesque of Euripides in the earlier manner of Cl. 711 ff. — psyche at Thes. 864 = E. Helen 52; and kardia in probable paratragedy,
Thes. 869; Frogs has two examples of *psyche* in contexts relating to Euripides (1334, discussed p. 212; 1468, p. 214), and two of *thymos* in contexts relating to Aeschylus (994, 1017; p. 221 f.). *Nous* again, apart from current phrases, has in the later plays *nous/gnome* (Lys. 1124 f. ~ Eur. 483 N²), μὴ τὸν ἑμὸν ὑπὲρ νοῦν (Frogs 105 = Eur. 144 N²), and perhaps a special use of νοῦν ἔχειν, meaning ‘to have reason’, Frogs 1396, 1439: cf. Cl. 835. If, as is probable, the lost play *Skenas katalambanousai* belongs to the later period, we can add θυμῷν ἔχειν 473 K (? paratragic), and νοῦς (pl.) ‘ideas’ 471 K, similarly to Cl. 728: these were the only two fragments concerned. *Phren*, *phrenes* alone continue steadily in the uses described, and in fact provide the only two passages in the fourth-century plays where the use of the five words was regarded as different from current idiom: Ekkl. 571, quoted p. 218, and Pl. 581, p. 223. The difference in quality is as striking as the difference in quantity, and whatever allowances are made (e.g. for chance, or the sparsity of lyric metres in Ekkl., Plut.), we seem to be left with something to explain, tentative as any explanation must be.

The words for *soul*, heart and mind, seen in the mirror of Aristophanes’ comedies, enter very little into the ordinary vocabulary of everyday life (we must make a major reservation for *nous*, and probably a minor reservation for *kardia*). For the young Aristophanes they are words to play with, partly because of their established uses in serious poetry, whose conventions he reproduces in parody and mocks by distortion; but also because of the contemporary use of them by Euripides, and the new shades of meaning which *psyche* and *nous* acquired as new ideas came upon the old. After Birds, we have much less material, and it seems justifiable to speak of a decline in the kind of satire and fantasy with these words which we have been at pains to note. This we can explain, perhaps, partly in terms of a flattening in Aristophanes’ style, which becomes clear in the fourth-century plays, partly from the assumption that the novelties of the 420’s were less striking in later decades, partly from changes in subject matter: it is significant that the Frogs shows a return to some of the old tricks when a theme of literary satire made them appropriate, and it may be unwise to press the argument from silence further. The data from Aristophanes are too few and too
uncertain to make more than a marginal contribution to our knowledge of Greek psychological terminology, but if this paper has done anything to make their application to a general study less problematical, it will have served one of the purposes with which it began.

University College London

E. W. Handley

ZUM V. BUCH DER ORACULA SIBYLLINA 1)
(Ed. Geffcken, GCS 1902)

Franz Dölger zum 4. Oktober 1956

1) V. 10/11 sind umzustellen; dadurch wird der seltsame Sprung von Romulus und Remus auf Caesar etwas gemildert. — V. 13 lese ich (statt des überlieferten und in allen Ausgaben stehenden polēmōn) polēmōn. Die Anfangsverse des V. Buches lauten also:

'Αλλ' άγα μοι στον ούντα χρόνον κλύε Δατινιδάων.
ντο τον πρώτον μετ' ὀλυμπένους βασιλῆας
Διυπτου, τούς πάντας ἤν χατα γαία φέροευς,
καὶ μετὰ τὸν Πέλλης πολιτορά, ἦν ὑπὸ πάσα

5 ἀντολῆ βεβόλητο καὶ ἐπερίθη πολύβολος,
ὅν Βαβυλῶν ἠλεγχε, νέκυν δ' ὤρεξε Φιλιππως,
οὐ Διός, οὐκ Ἀμμανος ἀληθέα φημικθέντα,
καὶ μετὰ τὸν γενεὴς τε καὶ αἰματος Ἀσσαράκης,
ὅς μόλεν ἐκ Τρούης, ὦτως πυρὸς ἔσχισεν ὅμην,

10 καὶ μετὰ νηπιάκους, ἡμηρὸς τέκνα μηλοφάγοι,
πολλῶς δ' αὖ μετ' ἀνακτας, ἀρνησίλους μετὰ φώτας

12 ἐσαέτ' ἀναζ πρωτάτος, δ' τις δέκα δ' ὕμελε ἐκφωσί
γράμματος ἀρχομένου πολέμων δ' ἐπὶ πουλὸ κρατῆσαι.

Nun aber höre mir an die Schmerzenszeit der Lateiner:
Wahrlich zuallererst nach dem Tode der Herrscher Ägyptens,
Welche ja alle auf gleichem Boden dort liegen begraben,
Und nach dem Bürger von Pella, durch dessen Gewalt das gesamte